the statute. Newark v. Funk, 15 Ohio St. 462 (1864). In Illinois, municipal corporations are not subject to garnishment in any case, no matter what may be the character of the indebtedness. This position is maintained by Lawrence, J., with great force. Merwin v. Chicago, 45 Ill. 133; Burns v. Harper (money in hands of school directors), 59 Ill. 21 (1871); Millison v. Fisk, 43 Ill. 112. So in Iowa, Jenks v. Township, supra. Waiver. Clapp v. Walker, 25 Iowa, 315. In Minnesota a judgment debtor may be ordered to assign to his creditor a debt due him from a municipal corporation. Knight v. Nash, 22 Minn. 452 (1876). In Texas the view suggested in the text is

adopted, and, in the absence of a statute, a city is subject to garnishment for an ordinary debt due by it to a third person. City of Laredo v. Nalle, 65 Tex. 359 (quoting text).

In Kansas a city cannot be garnished and made liable to pay a creditor of its creditor without express statutory provision. Switzer v. Wellington (Sup. Ct. Kansas, 1889), 28 Am. Law Reg. 281, and note citing and reviewing the cases. Holt, C., said: "Cities are a part of the government, and should not be required to become involved in litigation in which they have no interest. This exemption from garnishment process is based entirely upon the ground of public policy."

1 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 82 (1851); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. (U. S.) 212; Municipality v. Pease, 2 La. An. 538 (1847); Worsley v. Municipality, 9 Rob. (La.) 324; New Orleans v. United States, 10 Pet. 662, 737; The Wharf Case, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 383; Ill. &c. Co. v. St. Louis, 2 Dillon C. C. R. 70 (1872); Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80 (1877); distinguished, Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 688; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324 (1876); Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57 (1873); Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423 (1879); Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 U. S. 430 (1879); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (1881); note to 18 Am. and Eng. Corp. Cas. 511; Mayor of St. Martinsville v. Steamer Mary Lewis, 32 La. An. 1293; The Geneva, 16 Fed. Rep. 874; Leathers v. Aiken, 9 Fed. Rep. 679. Such a power does not violate the Constitution of the United States, Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559. The right of a municipality to collect wharfage is in compensation for actual use of structures provided by the municipality. Railroad v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; New Orleans v. Wilmot, 31 La. An. 65. An incorporated town cannot charge wharfage for the use of an unimproved river bank in front of it. Christie v. Malden, 23 W. Va. 667 (1884). See infra, sec. 112, note. For rights and powers of City of New York, in respect to wharves, see Kingsland v. New York, 110 N. Y. 569 (1888); Williams v.

New York, 105 N. Y. 419; Langdon v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 93 N. Y. 129, and cases cited; Turner v. People's Ferry Co., 21 Fed. Rep. 90. Brooklyn Brooklyn v. New York Ferry Co., 87 N. Y. 204. New Orleans: The Lizzie E., 30 Fed. Rep. 876; Silver v. Tobin, 28 Fed. Rep. 545; Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166; New Orleans v. Wilmot, 31 La. An. 65.

Wharfage charges must be reasonable (see infra, sec. 112), and may be graduated by the tonnage of vessels using a wharf; and this is not a duty of tonnage within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U. S. 444 (1886); Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 423; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691 ("wharfage" and "duty of tonnage" defined and distinguished); N. W. Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 4 Dillon, 10 (1876); Keokuk v. Packet Co., 45 Iowa, 196 (1876); s. c. affirmed, 95 U. S. 80 (1877); Ellerman v. McMains, 30 La. An. 190. See, also, United States v. Duluth, 1 Dillon C. C. 469; Packet Co. v. Atlee, 2 Dillon, 479 (1873); s. c. 21 Wall. 389. In McMurray v. Baltimore, 54 Md. 103, it was held that the "dedication of a strect to public use as a street extending to the water carried with it by necessary implication the right of the city to extend it into a harbor by the construction of a wharf at the end

thereof." To same effect, Backus v. Detroit, 49 Mich. 110. Infra, sec. 109 and note; sec. 110.

1 State and authorized municipal pilot and harbor regulations, when not in conflict with the Federal Constitution or Federal legislation, are valid. Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. 450; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (U. S.) 296; Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken (wharfage charges), 121 U. S. 444 (1886); Cisco v. Roberts, 36 N. Y. 292; Port Wardens v. Ship, &c., 14 La. An. 289 (1859); Same v. Pratt, 10 Rob. (La.) 459; Chapman v. Miller (pilotage fee), 2 Speers (S. C.) Law, 769; Alexander v. Railroad Co. (duty on tonnage), 3 Strob. (S. C.) Law, 594(1847); State v. City Council, 4 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 286; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 82 (1850); Worsley v. Municipality, above cited; Jeffersonville v. Ferry Boat, 35 Ind. 19 (1870); Harbor-master v. Southerland, 47 Ala. 511 (1872). But State enactments, which amount to a regulation of commerce or impose a duty on tonnage, are of course void. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577 (1874); Packet Co. v. St. Paul, 3 Dillon, 454; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581 (1873); Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31 (1867). The collection of wharfage dues does not violate any provision of the United States Constitution. Where a municipal corporation under express legislative authority is clothed with the exclusive right to collect wharfage rates from all vessels that make use of its wharves, it is a vested right that cannot be impaired by the legislature. Ellerman v. McMains, 30 La. An. pt. 1, 190. But this is denied and overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States. Railroad Co. v. Eller

man, 105 U. S. 166. A city has no vested right to wharfage. "Whatever powers the municipal body rightfully enjoys over the subject are derived from the legislature, and may be revoked at any time, not touching, of course, any property of the city actually acquired in the course of administration." Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166, 172 (1881), per Matthews, J.

2 Fuller v. Edings, 11 Rich. (S. C.) Law, 239 (1858); Waddington v. St. Louis, 14 Mo. 190 (1851); Baltimore v. White, 2 Gill (Md.), 444 (1845); Wilson v. Inloes, 11 Gill & J. (Md.) 351; Weber v. Harbor Comm'rs, 18 Wall. 57 (1873); Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (1881); Town of Ravenswood v. Flemings, 22 W. Va. 52, where an act conferring upon a town the exclusive right to erect wharves within its limits between ordinary high-water mark and low-water mark without compensation to the adjacent lot-owners, was held constitutional, and an adjacent owner enjoined from constructing a wharf within those limits without the consent of the town. The owner of a private wharf, whose land is compulsorily taken for a public wharf, is not necessarily entitled to be compensated for loss of income from his private wharf, resulting from the establishment of the public wharf near to the private one. Fuller v. Edings, supra. The grant of an exclusive right to keep a wharf, in order to secure its erection, does not violate the provision of a State Constitution, declaring "that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." Such an improvement is beneficial to the public, and, in order to secure it, the exclusive profits for a given period may be granted to the contractor. Martin v. O'Brien, 34

1 Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U. S. 166 (1881). This case adjudged two important points. The city of New Orleans was empowered by the legislature to construct levees and wharves on the banks of the Mississippi River within its limits, and to charge reasonable compensation for their use. Under this authority the city, at its expense, graded the banks of the river at certain points, drove piles, covered them with plank flooring, and thus constructed wharves for the convenient landing of vessels. The legislature also authorized the defendant railroad company, whose terminus was in New Orleans, to construct, manage, use, and enjoy, not only its railroad property and appurtenances, but also any steamboat piers and wharves that the directors might deem necessary or convenient. And afterwards, by an act passed in 1869, the legislature authorized this railroad company to enclose a portion of the banks of the river (at a place never improved or used by the city as a wharf), and to use the place thus enclosed for the purposes of a wharf for vessels; and the act further provided that no vessel should use such wharf without the consent of the railroad company, and that all vessels so using such wharf and not using any other wharf in the city should be exempt from the payment of levee and wharf dues to the city. The railroad company afterward leased its wharf to others, which lease provided that vessels coming to the consignment, custody, or care of the lessees might load and unload their cargoes on the said wharf, exempt from wharf and levce dues to the city. The city made two points: First,

that inasmuch as under its franchise to construct wharves it had expended large sums in making wharves for the public convenience, it had a vested right to the franchise and its revenues, of which it could not be deprived, as the legislature had sought to do, by the act of 1869. Second, it was also contended that it was a violation of the city's rights for the railroad company to permit the use and employment of their property as a wharf by persons not engaged in conducting the proper business of the railroad company, thus opening a rival wharf business in competition with the city; and that the act of 1869, if it authorizes this to be done, is in violation of the Constitution of the United States, which forbids the taking of private property without due process of law. See ante, sec. 68, note.

The Supreme Court decided that the action could not be maintained; that the act of 1869 did not infringe any vested rights of the city, and that the question as to whether the company in constructing its wharf and in leasing it out, as above stated, acted ultra vires, could not be raised by the city, which was not a stockholder in the defendant company.

The decision below (2 Woods, 120), following the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in New Orleans v. The Railroad Co. (27 La. An. 414), based on the proposition that the act of 1869 did not confer upon the railroad company the right to charge wharfage dues against vessels landing at the said wharf which were in no way connected with the business of the railroad company, and the right to maintain a free wharf for such vessels, was reversed. On this point the Supreme Court was of opinion that the city was not entitled to raise the question that the company was violating its charter in this respect, and under that cover to create and protect a monopoly which the law did not give to it.