Kollock vs. Parcher and others. road ties are usually made from the stems of small trees, and shaped for use in the construction of a railroad track, and we think are as clearly timber, within the meaning of that word as used in the statute, as squared sticks of timber prepared for use as beams, sills and posts in the construction of a dwellinghouse or other building. This seems to have been the definition of the word as given by this court in the case of Babka v. Eldred, 47 Wis., 189, 192. This court, in the construction of the lien laws of the state, has been disposed to construe them liberally in favor of the parties for whose benefit they were enacted. Sec Hogan v. Cushing, 49 Wis., 169; Winslow v. Urquhart, 39 Wis., 260. And certainly a liberal construction of the word "timber" will include railroad ties when finished and ready to use in the construction of a railroad track. The learned counsel for the appellants also contended that they were not the absolute owners of the ties when they gave the bill of sale to Cash; that the bill of sale given to them by Waller was simply a mortgage to secure them for the amount due to them from Waller for advances made. We are at a loss to see how that fact could affect their liability under the contract made with Cash. It is clear from the evidence that Cash got a good title to the ties by their bill of sale, even though Waller was the real owner of the ties at the time the appellants sold to Cash. The apparent title was in them, and, the real owner consenting to the sale and permitting the consideration money to be paid by the purchaser to the appellants, he would be estopped from setting up any title to the same as against Cash, the purchaser. The receipt of the purchase money from Cash by the appellants was a sufficient consideration for the covenant on their part to pay all persons having liens on the same at the time of the sale. There being a sufficient consideration to support their promise, the promise binds them, and, under the repeated decisions of this court, the persons for whose benefit the promise is made may maintain ac Kollock vs. Parcher and others. Putney v. tions in their own names to enforce such promise. Farnham, 27 Wis., 187; Bassett v. Hughes, 43 McDowell v. Laev, 35 Wis., 171; Cotterill v. Stevens, 10 Wis., 422; Cook v. Barrett, 15 Wis., 596; Kimball v. Noyes, 17 Wis., 695. The only other error assigned by the appellants is, that the copy of the contract was improperly received in evidence against their objection. It is said in the argument in this court, that it was improperly received, for two reasons: first, that no sufficient reason was given for not producing the original; and second, that it was not shown that the copy offered was a true copy of the original. The last objection, we think, is not sustained by the evidence. It is true that the certificate attached to the copy was not sufficient to authorize it to be read as a copy: first, for the reason that it did not show that it had been compared with the original; and second, because the certificate was not made by a person authorized by law to certify to it in order to make the copy so certified admissible as evidence. But the person who made the copy from the original was in court, and testified that it was a copy of the original contract. This, we think, was sufficient without the certificate to authorize the court to receive the same in evidence as a copy of the original contract. As to the first objection, that the original should have been produced, or some good reason shown for not producing it before the copy was admissible, we think that objection was not made with sufficient distinctness on the trial. There were three objections made to the receipt of the copy in evidence. The first objection was, "that it was not the original contract, and that it was not yet proven to be a true copy." This objection was sustained, and the plaintiff produced the person who made the copy, who testified that he made the copy from the original. The copy was then offered in evidence, again objected to "as incompetent;" the objection was overruled; and then the appellants cross-examined the witness as to his Kollock vs. Parcher and others. knowledge of the original from which he made the copy, and again objected to the copy being read in evidence, "for the reason that it is not proven that this copy is a true and correct copy of the original contract, and it is therefore incompetent and inadmissible." This objection was overruled, and exception taken, and the copy was then read in evidence. We think that the act of the appellants in assigning as the ground of their objection to the receipt of the copy in evidence that it was not a true copy, was a waiver of any right to object now upon this appeal that it was improperly received because there was no sufficient reason shown for not producing the original. There are two rules well established by the decisions of this court relating to exceptions to the introduction of documentary evidence. The first is, that where the evidence would be competent if certified or proved in the way pointed out by law, a general objection to the evidence as incompetent is not sufficient to raise the question as to its proper authentication, and upon such general objection the evidence may be received, although not properly proved or authenticated. Best v. Davis, 18 Wis., 386; Bowman v. Van Kuren, 29 Wis., 209-215; Evans v. Sprague, 30 Wis., 303; Neis v. Franzen, 18 Wis., 537; State ex rel. v. Norton, 46 Wis., 332; Pettit v. May, 34 Wis., 666; Tomlinson v. Wallace, 16 Wis., 225. The other rule is, that when a specific objection only is made to the receipt of evidence, either documentary or otherwise, all other objections are considered waived. Hanson v. Milwaukee Mech. Mut. Ins. Co., 45 Wis., 321-23. In this case, the appellant having objected to the receipt of evidence on the ground that the document was not a correct copy of the original, he cannot now object that the original should have been produced. We find no error in the record which would justify the reversal of the judgment. By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. VOL. LII-26 Mead and others vs. Nelson. MEAD and others vs. NELSON. April 25-May 10, 1881. TAX SALES AND DEEDS: LIMITATION OF ACTION. (1) When a plaintiff in ejectment may set up the limitation of actions to vacate tax sales or cancel the certificates. (2) In what cases the nine months' limitation still in force. (3) Resolution of county board instructing clerk to issue tax deeds, construed. (4) What constitutes an "application" for a tax deed. 1. Sec. 7, ch. 334, Laws of 1878, provides that "every action or proceeding to set aside any sale of lands for the non-payment of taxes, or to cancel any tax certificate shall be commenced within nine months" after the date of such sale or certificate, etc. Held, that this limitation applies not only to a direct proceeding in equity by the owner to set aside such a sale or certificate, but also to an avoidance, by plaintiff in ejectment, of a tax deed to defendant, by proof of irregularities in the tax proceedings invalidating the sale and certificate. 2. As to all tax sales and certificates on which the nine months' limitation had commenced to run before the present revision took effect, the act of 1878 creating that limitation still remained in force, though omitted from the revision, and no longer in force as to sales made thereafter. Compare secs. 4221 and 4984, R. S. 3. A resolution of a county board instructing the county clerk "to issue a tax deed to the county on all certificates remaining in the county treasurer's office three years from the date of their issue," held to create a continuing authority in the county clerk, until it should be rescinded, to execute tax deeds from year to year thereafter, whenever the three years for redemption upon any tax certificates should expire; and the county board was authorized to give such a direction by § 146, ch. 18, Tay. Stats., then in force. 4. Sec. 1175, R. S., provides that when land sold for taxes has not been occupied for at least thirty days "at any time within the six months immediately preceding the time when the tax deed upon such sale shall be applied for," no tax deed shall be issued upon the certificate, except upon proof filed with the officer whose duty it is to issue such deed, that the land was not so occupied. The statute is silent as to the manner of applying for the deed. Held, that the 'making and filing with the proper officer of an affidavit of the non-occupancy of the land constitute in themselves, without further showing, a sufficient application for the deed, especially where the affidavit states (as in this case) that it is Mead and others vs. Nelson. "made for the purpose of obtaining" such deed; and the fact that the deed itself is dated some weeks later, is no ground for presuming that the application was not made until such later date, and holding the affidavit insufficient as not showing non-occupancy of the land for the six months "immediately preceding" such application. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Waupaca County. Ejectment, for a quarter-quarter section of land. The action was brought by Joel L. Mead and three others, and was commenced March 22, 1880. Answer, that defendant is seized in fee of an undivided one-half of the land, by deed from the county of Waupaca dated December 3, 1879, the county having acquired title to such undivided one-half by tax deed dated and recorded June 23, 1879. The answer also alleges that the cause of action stated in the complaint did not accrue within nine months before the commencement of the action. The circuit court held that the tax deed to the county was valid, and that defendant did not unlawfully withhold possession of the premises, etc. From a judgment in defendant's favor, the plaintiffs appealed. The nature of the errors alleged in the rulings of the court will sufficiently appear from the opinion. G. W. Washburn, for appellants. For the respondent there was a brief signed by Myron Reed, his attorney, and Hastings & Greene, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Hastings. ORTON, J. The defendant was allowed to introduce in evidence a tax deed to the county of Waupaca of an undivided half of the premises. The tax deed bears date June 23, 1879, and the tax certificate upon which it was issued bears date May 9, 1876. On the trial the plaintiffs offered, but were not allowed, to show certain irregularities in the tax proceedings anterior to the issuing of the certificate. Such evidence was excluded on the ground that the statutory limitation of nine months in which the tax certificate could be avoided for any |