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flict that no purchase of the land described in the complaint, or any portion thereof, was made by plaintiff from Pico, but that an agreement was made to purchase over 1,000 acres of land, including the land in controversy, provided the claim of Pico to the Moquelemos grant was confirmed by the supreme court of the United States; that plaintiff was in possession long before the date of such contract, and had improved the land prior thereto, and that neither his entry nor improvements were made under said contract. The finding of fact, standing by itself, seems liable to the criticism aimed at it, but when taken in connection with other facts, as found by the court, the reason of the objection fails.
The findings, as a whole, embody a history of plaintiff's connection with the land, his acts of control over it, improvements made thereon, contracts for the purchase thereof from Andreas Pico, his failure to obtain title under such contract, the reason of such failure, and his subsequent application to purchase through the regents of the University of the State of California. For convenience, as we suppose, the findings are divided into 19 sections, and numbered consecutively from 1 to 19, and a part of the subject matter which might with propriety have been included in No. 1 is embodied in No. 5, and the two findings, read together, properly state the facts deducible from the evidence, touching the attempted purchase from Pico. The fifth finding is in the following language:
"That in fact said purchase of said land by plaintiff from said Pico was a conditional one, and said Pico agreed in and by the agreement of purchase thereof to repay to plaintiff said sum of $1,560, in case the claim of said Pico to said land, as a part of said Mexican grant called Moquelemos,' should not be finally confirmed."
Had this last finding been attached to the first, it would have met the objection aimed at the former. Separated from it, we cannot see that it loses its potency as a fact in the case.
The seventh finding of fact, among other things, finds that the rules and regulations of the board of regents of the university required all applications for land granted by congress for the use of an agricultural college to accompany such application with an affidavit containing, among other things, a statement that there were no occupations of nor settlements upon the land sought to be purchased other than that of the applicant, and that the affidavit of defendant contained no such statement. It is objected to this finding that it was the land committee of the board of regents, and not the board, who promulgated the regulations in evidence dated April 9, 1871. The instructions purport to emanate from the board of regents, and are addressed to H. A. Higley, land agent of the university, directing him to received applications for surveyed land in accordance with previous instructions, but to so change the required affidavit as to read, etc. There is also in evidence a resolution of the board of regents dated June 15, 1871, providing for the additional affidavit required
by the regulations of April 9, 1871, in cases of applications made prior to the date of said last-named instructions. These proceedings show that the instructions of April 9, 1871, were recognized, acted upon, and enforced by the board of regents, and whether originally formulated by the board as such, or by a committee, is not important. The essential thing is that they were put forth, published to the world, and acted upon, as the instructions governing their subordinates, and applicants for the purchase of university lands, so called. Defendant’s application to purchase was filed February 26, 1874, and was accompanied with the affidavit hereinbefore mentioned, a copy of which is set out in the complaint herein.
According to the eighth finding, “the board of regents of said university never accepted said defendant's said application to purchase,
and said land was never located in said United States land-office, Stockton district,
for defendant's benefit.” The only evidence in the bill of exceptions on the subject is that of A. J. Moulder, land agent of the university, who says:
“I cannot remeinber what I did in reference to the defendant's application, but the presumption is violent that I did in that case what I always did in similar cases, and what it was my duty to do; that is, applied to the register of the land-office of the Stockton district, to select that particular tract of land as a portion of the 150,000 acres agricultural grant assigned by the legislature to the university.”
If the land was in fact ever entered, or application made therefor, at the Stockton land-office, the fact was one which could have been so easily proven, and the records of the land-office, constituting, as they would, conclusive evidence on the point, in the absence of such proof we are not surprised that the court, upon the uncertain evidence set out, found as above stated.
There was no evidence that the board of regents of the university ever accepted defendant's application to purchase, or in any way passed upon his application, or did or performed any act or thing in the premises, save and except through their land agent, who received his application to purchase, and $296.33 as part of the purchase price which it was usual to exact when an application was filed.
This disposes of all the grounds upon which the motion for a new trial was based. The facts as found by the court warrant the judgment entered, and we are of opinion the judgment and order denying a new trial should be affirmed.
BY THE Court. For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion the judgment and order are affirmed.
(68 Cal. 116)
Filed November 27, 1885. 1. SHERIFF'S SALE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
A person claiming under a purchaser at execution sale of real estate may maintain ejectment, and his action, commenced within five years after he was entitled to a deed, is not barred by the statute of limitations, though the sheriff's sale took place more than five years before the commencement of
such action. 2. RESULTING TRUST—CONSIDERATION PAID FOR ANOTHER.
Where, on a transfer of real property to one person, the consideration is paid for another, a trust results in favor of the person for whom the consideration is paid; and it is not necessary that the consideration should have
been paid by him. 3. CESTUI QUE TRUST IN POSSESSION—LACHES.
A cestui que trust, under a trust resulting from the fact that the consideration at a sale of the land was paid for him, if in possession, is not guilty of laches in not asserting his rights against the holder of the legal title out of possession. Commissioners' decision. Department 1. Appeal from superior court, county of Alameda. J. M. Rothschild and J. E. McElrath, for appellant. Curtis H. Lindley, for respondent.
BELCHER, C. C. This is an action to quiet title to a block of land known as block No. 5, in the town of Livermore, in Alameda county. By their answer the defendants set up the statute of limitations, and then certain facts under which they claimed that the plaintiff held the title to the land in trust for them. The case was tried, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and the appeal is from that judgment and an order denying a motion for new trial.
The facts out of which the case arose are as follows: In March, 1875, A. D. Splivalo owned this block No. 5 and other parcels of land in Alameda county. E. M. Derby had a judgment against Splivalo for $347.30, which was a lien upon all such lands. The defendants, Phillip and Simon Anspacher, wished to purchase block No. 5 for $1,800, but desired that it should be first released from the lien of this judgment. Thereupon Splivalo, the Anspachers, Derby and E. B. Mastick, his attorney, had a conference, at which Derby virtually agreed to release block No. 5 from the lien of his judgment upon the payment to him of $150. The Anspachers then paid Splivalo the purchase price of the block, $1,800, took a deed of it, dated March 17, 1875, and at once went into possession, and have been in possession of it ever since. Splivalo afterwards paid Derby the $150, but, instead of releasing the block from the lien, he simply credited the money upon his judgment. In August, 1875, an execution was issued on the judgment, and on the twenty-second day of November following the block in question, and eight other blocks of land in the town of Livermore, were sold thereunder and bid in by Derby in satisfaction of the amount still remaining due on his judgment. In May, 1876, just before the time the redemption expired,
Splivalo, Anspacher, Pardini, who were interested in one of the blocks sold, and Derby, met at Mastick's office to discuss the situation. It was found that the amount of money necessary to redeem all the property sold was $412, and it was agreed that Anspacher's block, No. 5, Pardini's block, and one or two other blocks should be redeemed or released from the sale. As the most convenient way of effecting this release it was suggested that the title to all the property sold be put in the name of the plaintiff, and that he then make the deeds of release. This was agreed to, and thereupon Splivalo and Mastick went to see the plaintiff about it. Splivalo informed the plaintiff how they proposed to put the title to the property in his name, how many blocks had been sold, and that block No. 5 and three other blocks were to be deeded over by him to the parties to whom they really belonged and wliose names were given to him. The plaintiff replied, "Do whatever you please,” and then agreed to deed the blocks over as requested. After this interview, and on the twenty-seventh day of May, Splivalo drew bis check for $412 on the plaintiff, who was a banker, and with whom he already had an overdrawn account, and then went with the check to the plaintiff's bank and drew the money on it; the money so drawn being charged up to his account. Splivalo then went back to Mastick's office and paid him the $412 and took from him a receipt reading as follows:
“E. N. Derby vs. A. D. Splitalo. $112 Received of A. D. Splivalo $412, in full for redemption of land sold under execution, issued in the above-entitled case. [Signed]
"E. B. & J. W. MASTICK,
“Attorneys for E. M. Derby. “Dated May 27, 1876." Mastick immediately paid the money over to Derby. Splivalo testified:
“I paid the money just before the time for redemption expired, but it was not to redeem. It was for the purpose of getting an assignment of all the property in the name of Barroilhet, who owned all the other blocks in dispute. The assignment was not made on that day, because Derby was not there, and the thing went on until sixth of February, 1877. * * * Then I went to Mastick, and Mr. Mastick had the certificate. IIe wrote the assignment on the back of the certificate. Mr. Derby was sent for ani.signed the assignment to Barroilhet. It was acknowledged, * * * and then any clerk came to Oakland and got the sheriff's deel, and immerliately thereafter Mr. Pardini requested Barroillet for a deed to block 31, and Barroilhet inade it. The others were not requested, and they remained so. I had no conversation with Barroilhet when the deed was made. The deed was delivered to Barroilhet; the certiticate never was. * * *
The money was my money. I borrowed it from Mr. Burroilhet on my open account.”
“I went with Splivalo and called upon Mr. Barroilhet, and he said whatever we did was all satisfactory to him. IIe turned the matter over to Mr. Splivalo to give directions. * * The distinct understanding was that these people were to be protected.
* Anspacher was to be protecte;
I mean freed from the lien or freed from the sale. * * * Question. Is your recollection clear that you gave this redemption receipt to Splivalo? Answer. I know it was; I am as certain about it as anything. I know that I actually gave this, and it brings to my mind distinctly that all this time I regarded this property as redeemed property, * * * and I know it was at that time intended as a redemption and was a redemption. I admit that it was not exactly a good way to do it, to make an assignment of the certificate; but it was done with the expectation that all these people were to be protected and none to be harmed by it, and nothing was paid for it at all.
* * Q. Mr. Mastick, did Mr. Barroilhet pay anything for that certificate? A. Not at all, he paid nothing. When the assignment was made, and the money was paid for the redemption, and the receipt given, it was brought in by Splivalo and paid by him.”
Upon the facts of the case the court below was of the opinion that the plaintiff is the owner in fee-simple and entitled to the possession of the premises in controvery; that no trust exists in favor of the defendants in the property, and that the plaintiff holds the legal title free from any equitable claim whatever on the part of the defendants.
1. The sale under the execution took place on the twenty-second day of November, 1875, and the purchaser was not entitled to a sheriff's deed until the twenty-third day of May, 1876. This action was commenced on the eighteenth day of April, 1881, and the action was therefore not larred by the statute of limitations, and this is so whether the statute commenced to run as soon as the deed might have been made to the purchaser, or not till it was actually made and delivered to the plaintiff. Jefferson v. Wendt, 51 Cal. 573; Pratt v. Pratt, 96 U. S. 704.
2. Our Civil Code provides as follows:
“Sec. 853. When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration thereof is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made.”
It is claimed for respondent that when the title to the block of land in controversy was transferred by the sheriff's deed to him, no trust resulted in favor of the appellants, because the consideration for the transfer was not paid by them. But in order that a trust might result in their favor it was not necessary that the consideration for the transfer should have been paid by them. It was enough if it was paid for them. That the consideration for the transfer of this block No. 5 was paid for the appellants is clear from the evidence, and there is no conflict. First. The $150 was paid by Splivalo to release this block from the lien of the judgment, and this was done for the appellants. Second. The $412 was paid by Splivalo to place the title to this block in the name of the respondent for the appellants. And when the respondent received his deed, he knew that the consideration for the transfer to him had been paid by Splivalo for the appellants, and that he had agreed to accept the title and hold it for them.
We think it clear, therefore, that when the respondent accepted the sheriff's deed he took the title to the block of land in controversy in trust for the appellants.