Opinion of the Court, per LANDON, J. Keteltas' possession was the continuation of the like possession of his father under the same title from its date in 1756. (Jackson ex dem. v. McCall, 10 Johns. 377.) There is no evidence tending to rebut this presumption. The defendants insist that the deed of 1847 to White does in terms convey the salt meadow, but does not in terms convey the beach, but only all the right, title and interest of the grantor John S. Keteltas and such as his father had therein. A grant of a salt meadow separated from the sea only by a beach formed by the sand thrown by the waves upon the meadow itself, ought not, in the absence of evidence of the public reservation or of a hostile grant to another, to be construed, to use the words of the opinion in the case cited, "to cut him (the grantee) off from access to the water over his own land." The word beach denotes land washed by the sea, and in the absence of qualifying words, a boundary by the ocean beach extends to high-water mark. (Trustees of East Hampton v. Kirk, 68 N. Y. 459; People ex rel. Burnham v. Jones, 112 id. 605.) The practical location of the lot within the boundary ditches extending to high-water mark is not inconsistent with the language of the description of the salt meadow in the deed of 1756. The usage of parties under an ancient grant aids in construing its obscure terms. (Trustees of Brookhaven v. Strong, 60 N. Y. 56-72.) The additional words of the deed of 1847, "of all the right title of the party of the first part in and to the shore and water of the bay in front of said described premises," are satisfied by referring them to whatever rights the grantor intended to convey below high-water mark. The presumption is that when Stephen Keteltas died in 1845, he was seized of the locus in quo as owner deriving title under the deed given to his father in 1756. His possession was peaceable, exclusive, notorious and unchallenged; it ascended beyond present memory, and was referable to the deed of 1756. It is not shown to be referåble to any other source. not overcome. Opinion of the Court, per LANDON, J. He had at least prima facie title. (Mayor of N. Y. v. Carleton, 113 N. Y. 284.) His son John S. Keteltas, succeeding to his title and possession, conveyed to William H. White in 1847. White thus acquired a prima facie title. (Stevens v. Hanser, 39 N. Y. 302.) Such a deed suffices if It affords sufficient presumptive evidence of the subsequent possession of the grantee and those holding under or through him, unless actual proof of an adverse possession for twenty years be made. (Code C. P. § 308; Thompson v. Burhans, 79 N. Y. 99; Bliss v. Johnson, 94 id. 235.) No such proof was made. The plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title, not upon the weakness of that of the defendant. But he measures his title with that of the defendant, and if it is better in respect of his right of possession, he prevails because of its sufficient strength. (Dunham v. Townshend, 118 N. Y. 281; Carleton v. Darey, 90 id. 566; Thompson v. Burhans, supra; Clute v. Voris, 31 Barb. 511; Jackson ex dem. v. Hubble, 1 Cow. 613; Onderdonk v. Lord, Hill & Denio, 129; Whitney v. Wright, 15 Wend. 171; Hunter v. Starin, 26 Hun, 529.) Upon the facts already stated the plaintiff had the better title in respect of the right of possession. The plaintiff himself, as tenant under White from 1863 to 1875, and as owner from 1875 to 1885, took sand from the beach and sold it to the extent of about 250 sloop loads each year. The business was continuous throughout the year. He also disposed of the grass upon the salt meadow, either cutting it himself or permitting others to do so. This possession was open, notorious and, except as improperly resisted by the defendant Sarah A. Burke, was exclusive. Thus there was no abandonment for twenty years of the possession and dominion of the premises under the title presumed to have originated in 1756, but it was practically continuous during living memory. It is proper to add that the deed of 1756 by its recitals purports to deduce title from colonial grants made in the previous century. While these recitals are not evidence against strangers to this title of the facts recited (Hardenburgh v. Statement of case. Lakin, 47 N. Y. 109), they are evidence that the grantors and There are no other exceptions which require discussion. All concur. Judgment affirmed. ELIZABETH-W. ALDRICH, Appellant, v. MARY E. Bailey, Respondent. Assuming that a deed executed by an insane person is not voidable merely, but absolutely void, to establish its invalidity, it must appear that the grantor was, at the time he executed it, wholly, absolutely and completely unable to understand or comprehend the nature of the transaction. The parties entered into a contract by which plaintiff agreed to sell and defendant to purchase a certain lot in the city of New York; the latter refused to perform the contract because of the filing of a lis pendens a few days before the making of the contract, in an action to have certain deeds and other instruments affecting the title to the block of which the lot formed a part, declared void. Neither the plaintiff here nor her grantor were made parties to that action. The complaint therein alleged that P., the former owner of the block, when he, by reason of extreme old age, was "mentally weak, incompetent and unsound of mind, incapable of attending to business personally, and incapable and incompetent to understand and comprehend properly the nature of a business transaction," and when entirely under the control of S., his agent, through force and fraud practiced upon him by S., who was bribed thereto by the defendant, acting in pursuance of a fraudulent scheme and conspiracy entered into between them to obtain title to the property, caused and influenced P to make a contract agreeing to convey the property in question to E., one of the defendants, in exchange for other real estate, and subsequently procured P. to execute such a conveyance, which contract and conveyance was in fraud of the rights of plaintiff in that action as heir at law and legatee of P. Held, that the averments of the complaint were not sufficient to justify a finding that P. was insane when he executed the contract and deed, but that the gravamen of the action was fraud; that, as it was conceded that plaintiff here took title to the lot in question in good faith, paying a full consideration, his title was not affected by the fraud (2 R. S. 137, § 5), and that plaintiff was entitled to a judgment for specific performance. (Argued February 1, 1892; decided March 8, 1892.) Statement of case. APPEAL from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered upon an order made the first Monday of October, 1889, on a case submitted pursuant to section 1279 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relieved the defendant from performing a contract to purchase certain real estate. The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion. Geo. Putnam Smith for appellant. The Supreme Court erred in supposing that the conveyance to Noble was thereby rendered a nullity as against Mrs. Aldrich. She having purchased the land in question in good faith and without notice of any claim on the part of Paine or his heirs that the transaction whereby he parted with the land had been inequitable, her title was unaffected by such claim. (Bumpus v. Platner, 1 Johns. Ch. 213; Griffith v. Griffith, 9 Paige, 315; Simson v. Bank of Commerce, 43 Hun, 156; Bradley v. Luce, 99 Ill. 234; Wade on Notice, § 62; 1 Story's Eq. §§ 381, 434; Peck v. Arihart, 95 Ill. 113; Valentine v. Lunt, 115 N. Y. 496.) William Paine's claim to and consequent cloud upon the title of the land now owned by Mr. Aldrich was limited and restricted by the form of his action. (Valentine v. Lunt, 115 N. Y. 505.) E. H. Landon and Win. D. Page for respondent. The vendor must be able to convey a good marketable title, or he cannot enforce his contract. (Fry on Spec. Perf. §§ 573, 576, 579, 583, 585; Pom. on Cont. §§ 198, 202, 205; Waterman on Spec. Perf. §§ 411, 412, 415; Moore v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 592; Fleming v. Burnham, 100 id. 10; Schriver v. Schriver, 86 id. 584, 585; Schulze v. Rose, 65 How. Pr. 75; B. P. Comrs. v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 248; Swayne v. Lyon, 67 Penn. St. 436.) Plaintiff's title is doubtful and dangerous. An action to procure the annulment of a deed through which plaintiff derives title is pending. Although this plaintiff and defendant have not been made parties to that action, they may be brought in at any time by an amend Opinion of the Court, per HAIght, J. ment to the proceedings, or a subsequent action may be brought against them. The court will not impose upon this defendant the risk of an unfavorable decision in that action, nor the possibility of being embroiled in litigation. (Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 383; Newhouse v. Goodwin, 17 Barb. 236; Alston v. Jones, Id. 276, 288; Comstock v. Comstock, 57 id. 453; Hughes v. Jones, 116 N. Y. 73; Johnson v. Stone, 35 Hun, 383; Hicks v. Marshall, 8 id. 328; M. L. Ins. Co. v. Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541; Riggs v. A. T. Society, 84 id. 335; Sprague v. Duel, 11 Paige, 480; Ingraham v. Baldwin, 9 N. Y. 45; Canfield v. Fairbanks, 63 Barb. 465.) HAIGHT, J. On June 11, 1889, the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant for a sale of a lot on 63d street, running through to 64th street, on Eleventh avenue, in the city of New York. The defendant now refuses to accept a deed from the plaintiff and to pay therefor for the reason that on June 3, 1889, a notice of lis pendens was filed in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York in an action in the Supreme Court wherein William Paine is plaintiff and William Noble et al. are defendants, the object of which, as stated in the notice, is to have certain deeds, conveyances and other instruments affecting the title to the block, of which the plaintiff's lands form a part, declared null and void, etc. Neither the plaintiff nor her grantor were made parties to that action. John Paine was formerly the owner of the block in controversy and conveyed the same to Elizabeth Noble. The General Term held that under the complaint filed in that action it may be found that Paine was insane at the time he executed the deed to Noble, and if he was his deed was absolutely void and no title would pass, under the authority of Van Deusen v. Sweet (51 N. Y. 378). Assuming for the purposes of this case that the rule is there correctly stated, and that a deed would be not merely voidable, but absolutely void when executed by an insane person, yet under the rule in that case a deed is absolutely void only when it appears that the person executing it was at the time so deprived of his mentak |