THOMAS COLLINS, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK CENTRAL AND HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
(Argued April 22, 1892; decided May 6, 1892.)
APPEAL from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the fifth judicial department, entered upon an order made October 23, 1890, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict and also affirmed an order denying a motion for a new trial.
James F. Gluck for appellant.
Frank Brundage for respondent.
Agree to affirm; no opinion.
All concur, except FOLLETT, Ch. J., dissenting, and Haight, J., not voting.
1. The complaint herein alleged that plaintiff J. acquired title to certain premises subject to a mortgage, as devisee under the will of N., who died in 1880, which will was admitted to probate in February, 1880; that in May, 1880, defend- ant B., who then owned the mort- gage, brought an action to fore- close it, fraudulently omitting to make J. a party, and by perjury obtained an adjudication that there was due thereon $5,869.87, when in fact there was only about $1,000 unpaid; that the purchaser on the foreclosure sale fraudulently executed a mortgage on the prem- ises to defendant G., which was foreclosed without making J. a party, and the premises bid off and conveyed to C., the attorney of record for G. in that action; that several of the defendants who were named, including G.. collected rents exceeding the amounts due on both mortgages. Judgment was demanded that the pretended mortgage to G. be canceled and stricken from the records; that de- fendants account for the rents and profits received by either of them; that plaintiffs be at liberty to re- deem upon payment of whatever was found due, etc. Defendant G. demurred on the ground that two causes of action were improperly united, and that as against her, it did not state facts sufficient to con- stitute a cause of action. Held, untenable; that but one cause of action was stated, and that suffi- cient facts were stated to entitle plaintiffs, as against G., to an accounting. Johnson v. Golder, 116
2. In an action to set aside a general assignment as fraudulent and for an accounting, actual fraud as against creditors of the assignor, both on his part and that of the
assignee, was proved and found The interlocutory judgment ad- judged the assignment void, ap- pointed a receiver and required defendant to deliver to him all of the assigned property, and to pay over all the income, profits, etc., received therefrom "less any law- ful disbursements made or in- curred by said assignee." The assignor had been engaged in a manufacturing business. On the accounting the referee allowed the assignee the amount paid by him to the workmen in the factory, who were preferred, for work done prior to the assignment, and the additional value given to the stock by working it after the assign- ment, but refused to allow ex- penditures incurred by the assignee for appraising stock, payment for legal services, rent of factory, labor, etc. Held, no error; that the provision in the judgment did not extend the right to credits for disbursements beyond those which would be treated as lawful with- out its aid; and that as the dis- bursements SO made were in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme, and by virtue of power dependent upon title or right of possession, they were unlawful. Smith v. Wise. 172
3. The assignment preferred certain
notes made by the assignor and in- dorsed by a firm, of which the as- signee was a member; these notes were paid by the assignee before the commencement of the action. Held, that while the assignee was to be treated as never having had title, and, therefore, as against creditors, no rights dependent upon title were available to him, as the payment of the notes was made by direction of the assignor when he was at liberty to make it, and when the direction was opera- tive, the assignee was entitled to be allowed the sum paid. Id.
By various statutes in relation to the city of Albany, it is made lawful for the common council “to make by-laws and inflict reasonable pen- alties to enforce the same, for regu- lating and keeping in repair the docks and slips within the city, and to prevent the same and the river opposite thereto from being in any manner obstructed" (§ 19, chap. 153, Laws of 1801), and that body is constituted and declared commissioners of highways with power to pass ordinances, among other things, "to prevent all ob- structions in the river near or op- posite" the city wharves or docks. ( 15, chap. 185, Laws of 1826.) The common council of the city passed an ordinance declaring that whenever any vessel is sunk at any dock or anywhere in the Hudson river opposite the city, it shall be the duty of the street commis- sioner, under the direction of the mayor, to give notice to the owner to remove it, and if the notice is not complied with, making it law- ful for that officer to take posses- sion of the vessel, remove and sell
it, etc. Plaintiff's complaint al- leged in substance that he was the owner of a dock in that city; that a loaded canal boat sank at the dock, obstructing its use; that a written notice thereof was served on the mayor, who gave written direc- tions to the street commissioner to remove it; that officer notified the owner, but declined to remove it himself, or to do anything more in the matter, whereupon plaintiff caused the boat to be removed. Plaintiff asked to recover the ex- penses of such removal and his damages. Upon demurrer to the complaint, held, that assuming said statutory provisions were not repealed by the amended charter of 1883 (Chap. 298, Laws of 1883), which in prescribing the powers to pass ordinances, omits all men. tion of the river opposite the city, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; that as no duty in reference to the matter was im- posed upon the city by the statute, no liability existed: (1) As by the said charter of 1883 (§ 44, tit. 3) it is provided that the city shall not be liable for a failure to enforce any ordinance; (2) As the statutes prescribe that the city shall pro- vide for the enforcement of its ordinances by fines and penalties, and so, that portion of said ordi- nance which authorized the sale of the vessel, or its loading, thus creating a forfeiture, was invalid. Coonley v. City of Albany. 145
Under the provision of the act of 1874 (Chap. 261, Laws of 1874), amending the act of 1845 (Chap. 115, Laws of 1845), in reference to aliens taking and holding lands in this state, which provides that if an alien resident, or a natural- ized or native citizen, "has died or shall hereafter die" holding a conveyance of lands in the state. purchased by such person, and "leaving persons who would answer the description of heirs," such persons, whether citizens or aliens, may take and hold the lands as heirs, etc., the state surrendered its title to lands acquired by es cheat previous to the passage of the act, of which it had not before
that time assumed in any manner to make disposition, where the person to whose title the state so succeeded, died leaving alien heirs. Wainwright v. Low. 313
2. S. died in 1871, intestate, seized of certain real estate; she left the plaintiff, an alien, her only heir at law. By an act passed in 1876 (Chap. 184, Laws of 1876), the state released its right and interest in the lands to A., the husband of S., with the proviso, however, that nothing therein contained should "affect the right in said real estate of any heir at law." Before the passage of the act of 1874, no pro- ceeding for escheat had been taken by the state. The trustee having died, upon petition of A., a new trustee was appointed by the court, with directions to convey the prem- ises to A., which was done. In an action of ejectment, defendant claimed title under said convey- ance to A. Held, that upon the passage of said act of 1874, the title vested in plaintiff, which title was not affected by the act of 1876; that, therefore, A. acquired and conveyed no title or interest by his deed; and that judgment was prop- erly directed for plaintiff.
1. By an ante-nuptial agreement, S., in contemplation of the marriage, conveyed to a trustee certain lands, the trustee to pay to her the rents and profits, or at her election to permit her to hold and use the lands during her life, and upon her death to convey them as she by deed, appointment or will," should order, direct or appoint." S. re- tained possession of the premises until her death. Held, that the ante-nuptial conveyance did not create a trust within the meaning of the Statute of Uses and Trusts (1 R. S. 728, § 55), as the power of │
S. died in 1871, intestate and without having executed an ap- pointment or deed as prescribed in the ante-nuptial agreement. She left the plaintiff, an alien, her only heir at law. By an act passed in 1876 (Chap. 184, Laws of 1876), the state released its right and interest in the lands to A., the husband of S., with the proviso, however, that nothing therein contained should "affect the right in said real estate of any heir at law." Before the passage of the act of 1874, no pro- ceeding for escheat had been taken by the state. The trustee having died, upon petition of A. a new trustee was appointed by the court, with directions to convey the prem- ises to A., which was done. In an action of ejectment, defendant claimed title under said convey- ance to A. Held, that upon the passage of said act of 1874, the title vested in plaintiff, which title was not affected by the act of 1876; that, therefore, A. acquired and conveyed no title or interest by his deed; and that judgment was properly directed for plaintiff. Id.
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