of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates had proposed such a conference. "Let the representatives of the working classes work out the terms of peace. . . We shall not trust irresponsible diplomats and rulers with the question of peace."

Russian Appeal for Conference. On May 9 in Petrograd the Executive Committee of the Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates voted to appeal to the peoples of the world to call a peace conference. They also decided to send a delegate to Stockholm to confer with the Socialist delegates there, to send delegates to neutral and allied countries to further the peace movement and to urge Socialists in all countries to demand that their governments give free passage to delegates.

Gorky's paper said the Russians would go to such an international conference whether the British and French went or not and Skobeleff, Minister of Labor under Kerensky, said that for the sake of restoring the International and stopping the war he was willing to meet not only Scheidemann but "the devil and his grandmother."

All the while there was constant newspaper talk of "German peace manœuvres." peace manœuvres." The Borgbjerg, Grimm and Hoffman episodes raised a cloud of suspicion which the ever-repeated Russian disclaimers of any idea of a separate peace could not easily allay.1

The "Branting Conversations." The conference was declared opened on May 13. There was no regular assembly, but the representatives of belligerent countries gave their views to members of

1 The interpretation put upon the Stockholm Conference by the pro-Ally, pro-war Socialists in the United States, is given pp. 79-80.

the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee, particularly, apparently, to Branting. There was thus a very important exchange of ideas, and Scheidemann especially seems to have gone home with a conviction that the irresponsible character of the German Government and the consequent lack of confidence in it, was a prime obstacle to peace. Huysmans' view was that peace depended largely on the ability of 99 our German comrades to force their government to come out clearly for no annexation. He explained that "when we say 'peace without indemnities' we consider it understood that Belgium must be reëstablished and that its material losses must be made good. We do not look upon that as indemnity." Branting said that this view was shared by all who participated in the conference.

These "conversations" seemed so successful a beginning, that the Russian Council of Workers' and Soldiers' Delegates issued a formal call1 to all Socialist parties and the chief labor organizations of the world to meet at Stockholm between June 28 and July 8; later the date was changed to August 15. Meanwhile the Dutch-Scandinavian Socialist Committee issued a questionnaire 2 addressed to the different national Socialist groups.

The German Socialist Majority, in their reply, accepted the Russian peace-formula, and explained the sense in which they understood it:

German Majority Views. No annexations implies an independent Belgium and return of colonies.

Indemnities [evidently understood to mean war contributions] are repudiated. Reparation of damages should be 1 This will be found on p. 168.

2 See p. 170.

not by one side. International financial assistance can be provided where needed.

The right of nations to dispose of themselves applies not only to Belgium but to Finland and the Poland of the Congress of Vienna [sc. Russian Poland].

For settlement of the Serbian and Balkan questions reference is made to the statement of the Austrian Socialists (given below).

Sympathy is expressed with the desire for freedom from domination of Ireland, Egypt, Tripoli, Morocco, India, Thibet, Corea.

The case of Alsace-Lorraine is argued at length from the German point of view, concluding in favor of more freedom within the German Empire.

There is an outspoken pronouncement in favor of freedom, within the state, of national minorities, with specific reference to Danish, French, and Polish speaking inhabitants of Germany.

There are moderate provisions in regard to international arbitration, military service, methods of warfare and safeguards of commerce during war.

The memorandum comes out for the open door," free trade, free travel, democratic control of treaties.

"The main problem, however, for international Socialism is to bring about peace as soon as possible."

"1

"Minority" Memorandum. Memorandum. The German Minority memorandum, which also stood for peace on the Russian formula, is briefer and more radical.2

Serbia must be reëstablished as an independent self-governing state. The idea of a republican Balkan Federation is favored.

The Poles of Prussia and Austria have the same right to national independence as those of Russia.

Alsace-Lorraine should decide its own destiny.

Belgium not only should have complete political and eco1 The document will be found in full, p. 172.

2 See p. 182.

nomic independence but "in fulfillment of the German Government's promise at the beginning of the war, the Belgian nation has to be compensated for the damage caused by the war, especially for the economic values that have been taken away. Such a repayment has nothing to do with the various kinds of indemnities, which simply mean the plundering of the vanquished by the victor, and which we therefore reject."

The whole colonial régime is condemned. "The possession of any colony without its own self-administration is nothing but the possession of an unfree people and like slavery is incompatible with our principles."

The importance of a common Socialist peace program is admitted but it means nothing unless Socialists by refusing to vote appropriations and by the sharpest measures force their governments to accept it and to declare themselves ready to enter into a peace conference on the basis of this program.

To refuse this policy would be to forfeit the right to be considered an organ of international Socialism.

Austrian Socialist Views. The Austrian Socialists naturally are especially concerned with the very difficult question of nationalities.

They assert that in many parts of Europe the intermingling of the population is such that a disentangling of nationalities by a territorial delimitation is absolutely impossible. They argue that a system of small states would not be advantageous and declare for autonomy of the national groups of Austria within the framework of the monarchy. These groups include the Bohemians, Poles of Galicia, Ruthenians and South Slavs.

They oppose the annexation of Belgium.

They want Serbia to receive not only her political independence but access to the sea by union with Montenegro, and are quite ready to see the Balkan states federate.

They are for the independence of Finland and of the Poles of Russian Poland and they hope the future will bring voluntary agreements between the latter and Germany and Austria which shall permanently settle the Polish question.

They favor free trade, the "open door," internationalization of water routes, and international railroads to be built and administered in common for lines of world importance. They urge the continuation of the work of The Hague, a reform of military international law, gradual abolition of standing armies in favor of popular militias for defense only, and nationalization of munitions industries.

The peace treaty should contain clauses for international agreement on labor protection.

A Socialist Conference should certainly be called and all should take part.1

Hungarian Socialist Views. The Hungarian Socialist views proved for the most part to be in key with those of the radical German minority. With regard to the Balkan question, however, they found a solution in far-reaching democratic reforms rather than in territorial readjustment. They stated with great emphasis the view that "the people of all the belligerent States are peacefully-minded and that their Governments in all countries are responsible for the war; and that not accidental circumstances, but the constantly operating forces of national and social oppression and exploitation led to the war. Imperialism, high protective tariff, oppression of nationalities, the lack of democracy, the want of real parliamentary control even in the countries governed on parliamentary principles, the domination of the financial oligarchy in France, Czardom in Russia, the feudal nationalistic oligarchy of Hungary, Junkers and large-scale indus1 See p. 186.