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ing Germany," Our extreme demands only crushed the moderate party and united the whole nation together under the most extreme party."

Mr. Snowden "regarded the minimum conditions of peace as the complete restitution of Belgium and of the conquered territories of France, and adequate compensation."

Mr. McNeill thought that "whilst the last thing this country desired was to increase our imperial responsibilities or acquire territory it did not follow that... it might not be necessary to transfer territory from the enemy to ourselves or our dominions, or to our Allies."

6.

Germans Blame Allies for Continuance of War. On January 6, the German and Austrian Emperors issued orders announcing the Allies' refusal and laying upon them the blame for the continuation of the war. They had "dropped the mask," said the Kaiser, and "admitted the lust of conquest."

The German reaction to the Allies' terms as stated to President Wilson, is given specifically in a comment on January 15, by Zimmermann, German Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"There is not a German who would not rather die than see the accomplishment of the announced intention of the Entente Powers with respect to Germany, to see German provinces with predominant German populations torn from the German Empire, and United Germany, which our fathers labored to achieve, torn asunder and the country reduced, as the Allies have plainly announced as their ambition, to a condition of subjection to rival great powers of Europe.

"The conditions for Austria-Hungary are even more difficult. Its dismemberment to satisfy the passion for territorial aggrandizement of Russia, Italy, Serbia, and Roumania, would leave the State not even a third-rate power, while who can say what would be the fate of the 'redeemed small nationalities' when brought under the sway of Russia? Bulgaria, of course, would be bitterly punished and Turkey would practically cease to exist if the plans, contemplated in the Entente's answer, were attained."

CHAPTER II

THE PRESIDENT'S SENATE ADDRESS

THE BREAK WITH GERMANY

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I.

WITH the statement of the Allies' war aims and the German rejection of such terms, it seemed once more as though discussion had reached a dead end.

The President's Senate Address. The situation was, however, abruptly altered by President Wilson's dramatic appearance on January 22 before the Senate and his great 66 peace without victory" address.

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(1)

He notes that in reply to his request for terms: The Central Powers state merely their readiness for conference. (2) The Entente Powers have stated with sufficient definiteness to imply details" what they regard as "indispensable conditions of a satisfactory peace." (3) The statesmen on both sides "have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted," that it was "no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists." (4) In every discussion it is taken for granted that there must hereafter be some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again."

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His purpose is now to formulate the conditions upon which the Government would feel justified in asking the American people to approve its formal adherence to a League for Peace.

His thesis is that though the United States can not decide what the peace-terms are to be, it may decide whether or not they shall be made lasting by international agreement.

What Peace America Would Help Assure. Further, American coöperation in guaranteeing peace must depend on the character of the peace settlement. Therefore the United States should state at once what kind of peace it will help to make permanent.

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Accordingly he named these specific conditions: First, it must be a peace between equals": both sides have said that it was no part of their purpose to crush their antagonists;

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1

Second, it must be a peace founded on "equality of rights among nations, irrespective of their size or strength;

Third, it must be a peace based on the acceptance of the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed: the acceptance of which principle would imply the inviolable security, henceforth, of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own — and, as a single further instance, the existence of a united, independent and autonomous Poland;

Fourth, so far as is practicable, every great peo

1 These assurances imply, President Wilson goes on to say, "a peace without victory." This phrase, especially when taken apart from the explanatory passage which followed it, was the subject of much critical comment by the belligerents and their advocates. It was only gradually that the speech came to be appreciated as a whole and in its true perspective as a piece of constructive statesmanship.

ple now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured either by cession of territory or by neutralization of rights of way of direct access to the sea;

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Fifth, freedom of the seas, with whatever changes of international law may be required to assure that freedom "in practically all circumstances ";

Sixth, limitation of armaments, military and naval.

2.

Discussion of the Senate Address. This address was widely recognized as the first formulation, within the sphere of practical statesmanship, of that world-order which has long been pursued as an ideal.

Nevertheless, in the discussion which it provoked, both at home and abroad, there was some tendency to regard it in an immediately partisan light.

In the United States Senate, a resolution calling for discussion was tabled by a strictly party vote.

The first expression of official European opinion came from the Russian Foreign Office. It specifically approved the President's position on access to the seas, limitation of armaments, Polish freedom and no crushing of the enemy.

German Note of January 31. Germany's response was contained in an official note under date of January 31, in which she formally expressed her acceptance of:

Self-government and equality of rights of all

nations;

Freedom of the seas and open door;
Repudiation of competing alliances;

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