ARNOLD BENNETT ON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE [The refusal of passports to Stockholm and the consequent failure of the plan for a conference, called forth this criticism from Arnold Bennett, the wellknown British author and pro-war radical.] Now that the idea of the Stockholm conference is, in the language of the reactionaries and their dupes, "decently buried," we may perhaps examine it with the detachment and the new vision with which one examines the dead. Three main objections have been raised to the conference. The first, and the most comprehensible, is based on a natural unwillingness to meet Germans except in physical combat. I understand and share this unwillingness. In spite of Lord Hugh Cecil and Dr. Lyttelton, I have not the slightest intention of loving the Germans, and, if I am to think kindly of them, I prefer to do so at a distance. Nevertheless, sentiment is sometimes a luxury, and luxuries may have to be abandoned in the days of danger. Representatives of the ruling classes of this country have already sacrificed sentiment to the welfare of prisoners. Real Englishmen have argued politely across a table in a room with real Germans while other real Englishmen and other real Germans were killing each other outside; and nobody was any the worse for the conference, whereas prisoners are going to be a great deal better for it. If such a deed can be done for the welfare of a few hundred thousand prisoners, surely it can be done for the welfare of the whole world. Moreover, the initiators of the Stockholm conference did not propose to force anybody to go to Stockholm. People whose feelings were too strong for their reason were at per fect liberty to stay at home. As often happens, however, with people whose feelings are too strong for their reason, perfect liberty for themselves did not suffice for these persons; they wanted perfect liberty for themselves, with the addition of perfect coercion for others. They would not go to Stockholm, and they would not let anybody else go. The attitude of Belgian Socialists was, fortunately, better than this. That Belgians should object to meeting Germans was inevitable, and not unadmirable. Belgian Socialists made no outcry; with much dignity they left the affair absolutely alone. Frenchmen might well have been excused if they had done the same. But French Socialists put reason before sentiment, and did desire to attend the conference. Truly, sentiment, noble as it may be, is very illogical. Headed by President Wilson, we are all busy telling the German people that they are under the thumb of a wicked and bloodthirsty autocracy, and that they must get a fresh government if they wanted to come to terms with us. Now, German Socialists have always been the enemy of the German government, except in the opening stages of the war, when they were doped. Assuredly, they are the enemy of the German government at the present moment. We have had a chance of meeting this enemy of the German government face to face and we have refused it. The second main objection to the conference is that attendance at the conference would prove that our will to win the war is weakening. I do not see how it would prove anything of the kind. Everybody in his senses must be aware that military considerations will put an end to the war, and no other. So long as any one of the principal nations remains convinced that in its army it possesses an instrument efficient to conquer, so long will the war continue, and it will go on until the conquest has been achieved. The war will stop either when the conquest has been achieved or when all the chief belligerents are convinced that conquest cannot be achieved. The aim of the Stockholm conference was not an armistice, but enlightenment, and its effects would have been seen, not during the war, but at the close of the war. It was intended to supplement, not to take the place of the military arm. And, assuming that our national will to win the war was, in fact, weakening, does anybody, even the war cabinet, suppose that the refusal of passports to Stockholm would give new strength to our resolution? Far from strengthening our resolution, it would weaken it still further. A few candid words about the British national spirit will be in place here. We have a pacifist party, very small, perhaps negligible, but not decreasing. We have a weary party, which was to be expected. For some grow too soon weary, and some swerve The diverse far-off image of Delight. The weary party need not trouble us. Beyond these two trifling parties there is nothing in Britain that is not solid for the intense continuance of the war. There is, however, a powerful and growing popular party which is anti-government. Anti-government must not be confused with anti-war. We have a war cabinet consisting of a Teuton, a self-glorifying traitor, a reactionary bureaucrat and the writer of Mr. Lloyd George's public letter to Mr. Henderson, with the addition of a labor representative who may or may not be kept in an outer office while the other four confabulate. The deeds and the misdeeds of this cabinet in 1917 have accorded with its personnel, and they have extremely antagonized the people of Britain. If the government chooses to confuse anti-war and anti-government, it only does so for its own purposes. The government owes its existence to-day to the fact that the national cause is a thoroughly righteous cause, and the mass of the nation is thoroughly determined on the triumph of the cause. To hint that the mass of the nation needs any stiffening from the oligarchy is ridiculous. The third main objection to the conference is that it is a pro-German device, and that even if it were not a proGerman device those clever Prussians would get the better of the simple-minded French, Italians and English, not to speak of the Russians. Well, if anybody is so ignorant of political individualities as to believe that the Swedish Socialist leader, Branting, would help a German device, or would not see through a German device, he must be left in his belief. Mr. Branting is the real originator of the idea of the conference. As for the Prussians getting the better of us across a table it is astonishing how the legend of Prussian superiority dies hard, how affectionately we cling to the legend. To my mind, the boot would be entirely on the other leg. There are at least two members of the British Socialist parties who would make mince meat of any Prussian in a contest of wits across a table. And I do not desire British participation in the conference because of my fear that the Germans would befool the Russians. I do not think they would. So far as national rivalries go, I desire participation in the conference because it presents an unsurpassed opportunity for pro-ally propaganda. German Socialists have already had one eye-opener at Stockholm. They would be absolutely staggered at a full conference. They would have such an experience as could not fail to react with enormous force against the German government. And, incidentally, the laborious work of the German censorship would be definitely undone in a few days or hours. The fanciful picture of the astute Prussian (so famous for his diplomatic finesse!) dominating a Socialist world-conference to his own ends strikes me as extraordinarily funny. I do not for an instant imagine that any member of the government takes the picture seriously. In my opinion, the opposition to the Stockholm conference is due to reasons quite different from those which have been avowed by the authorities. The true importance of the Stockholm conference resides, not in its opportunities for dialectic and propaganda and persuasion, but in the fact that it would constitute an unprecedented and supreme phenomenon of democracy taking care of itself, and taking care of the world, and of the future. And herein is the root of the opposition to the conference. Confining myself to the British opposition to the conference, I may point out that our ruling classes are strongly desirous of two things an economic war after the war, and a terrific extension of the British empire in Africa. I may also point out that the British working classes are opposed to these two notions, and that, if the working classes had the settling of peace terms, the peace terms would be of such a nature as to render both notions impossible. But the Stockholm conference would have discussed peace terms! Here alone is sufficient explanation of the opposition to the holding of the conference. But the origin of the opposition lies still deeper. It lies, not in any difference of opinion between the ruling classes and the masses of the nation about particular terms of peace, but in the fundamental objection of the ruling classes to the mass of the nation having any hand at all in the drafting of peace terms. The theory that international affairs ought to be and are the monopoly of an exclusive caste is still held by the exclusive caste. The Cecils, typical members of the caste, have recently voiced it, Lord Robert Cecil, with an honesty born of mediæval zeal, and Mr. Balfour, with an honesty born of the most profound and candid cynicism. Mr. Balfour, an extremely dangerous enemy of democracy, can stand up before the representatives of the people and calmly sneer at their pretensions to guide the ship of state, and so low are the representatives of the people fallen that not one per cent. of them dares to make an effective protest. It is natural that in such an anti-democratic atmosphere as now prevails any comprehensive scheme for the participation of the people in the molding of peace terms should be scotched by the representatives of privilege and the foes of popular freedom. The representatives of privilege generally have made a dreadful mess of diplomacy as a whole. To give one recent instance. The war would have been over by this time, but for the privileged diplomatic system |