of Germany's readiness to make peace, the Chancellor gave notice, at the reassembling of the Reichstag, of a proposal from the Central Powers to the Allies, to enter into peace negotiations.

The Emperor, it was announced, "in a deep moral and religious sense of duty toward his nation and, beyond it, toward humanity," "considers that the moment has come for official action toward peace." It was soon afterward made known that this peace movement had its origin in a letter of the previous October, in which the Kaiser instructed the Chancellor to make all necessary arrangements for such a move without delay. In the meantime the Central Powers had made a successful campaign against Roumania, a fact which it was felt would leave no opportunity for the misinterpretation of their peace offer as a confession of defeat.

The official German peace note (December 12, 1916), addressed to the neutrals for transmission to the Allied governments, is quite brief. It says that the four Central Powers make the proposal to enter forthwith into peace negotiations. They firmly believe that the propositions which they are prepared to bring forward for such negotiations are an appropriate basis for a lasting peace. "Their aims are not to shatter nor annihilate their adversaries." Their object is a guarantee for their nations of their existence, honor and free development. The note speaks of the war as having been forced upon the Central Powers, and calls attention to their military situation as demonstrating their invincibility.

Germany's separate note to the Vatican, of the same date, is somewhat more specific in its indication of the aims which Germany was fightng to realize and which must be secured in a peace satisfactory to her. These are "the integrity of her frontiers and the liberty of the German nation," and "the right which she claims freely to develop

her intellectual and economic energies in peaceful competition and on an equal footing with other nations." This latter clause may refer to her conviction before the war manifested notably in the Moroccan affair that she was being systematically excluded from an equal chance at colonial expansion; or it may refer more particularly to the plans of the Paris Economic Conference for a trade war after the war against Germany.

Allied Criticism of the German Peace Proposal. The German proposal was received coldly in all the Entente countries, both because of its failure to state definite terms, and because of what was regarded as its insincerity. It was at once denounced on the latter grounds by Premier Briand in the French Chamber as "a crude trap." 1 Speeches in the parliaments of the Entente by Sonnino, Pokrovsky, Henderson, Asquith, Lord Curzon, Bonar Law and Lloyd-George, revealed the unanimous conviction that no good results could be expected from a proposal which showed no sense of wrong-doing on Germany's part, which contained no hint of reparation for such wrong-doing, and offered no guarantee against its repetition. These views were summed up by Lloyd-George, speaking for the first time as Prime Minister, on December 19: 'Let me repeat again complete restitution, full reparation, effectual guarantees. Did the German Chancellor

1 A view which later events were held to substantiate. "In the light of subsequent events it seems most probable that the German peace offer was . . . a scheme to place the Allies in a diplomatic dilemma; if the Allies consented to negotiate, seeds of dissension might be sown among them; if the Allies brusquely rejected the offer, the German government in continuing the war would then stand justified in the eyes of the German people and might resort to extreme measures, ruthless submarine warfare, for instance."Edward M. Sait and Thomas Parker Moon in the Political Science Quarterly Record of Political Events, Sept., 1917 (Supplement).

use a single phrase to indicate that he was prepared to concede such terms? . . . The very substance and style of the speech constitutes a denial of peace on the only terms on which peace is possible." 1

The first official reply to the German note from any Entente country came from Russia, in the shape of a Duma resolution unanimously passed December 15. It was understood in this country that her allies had urged Russia to take advantage of this occasion to put an effectual quietus to the rumor that she was disposed to desert the Entente and make a separate peace. The Duma states that "it considers that a lasting peace will be possible only after a decisive victory, and after the definite renunciation by Germany of the aspirations which render her responsible for the world war and for the horrors by which it is accompanied."

3.

President Wilson's "Peace Note." It was in the midst of this unpromising situation that President Wilson's " peace note" of December 18 most unexpectedly appeared. Apparently the President had been contemplating this move for some time, waiting for the opportune moment; then the German peace note was interjected into the diplomatic situation.

1 Lloyd-George proceeds to quote in substantiation of this statement a passage from the German note which is amazingly different from the version printed in this country. In neither version does the passage make good sense. The State Department, in response to a request for a copy of the original or of an official version, replied that they have no copy of the German note for distribution. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in its useful collection of reprints and documents, has recourse only to the New York Times for its version of this and various other important state papers.

Secretary of State Lansing explained, in the note as sent to the Allies, that "The suggestion which I am instructed to make, the President has long had it in his mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time, because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It has, in fact, been in no way suggested by them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been independently answered, but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances."

The full grounds of the President's action are of course not public property; but the situation was that Germany showed herself not ready to state her terms except in a peace conference, and that the Entente seemed likely to answer in such a way as to close the door on peace discussion for an indefinite period. This may have led him to feel that he could delay no longer if he was to have any hope of success.1

Request for a Statement of Peace Terms. The President's note suggested to all the belligerents the advisability of making avowals "of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be

1 Further light may or may not be thrown on the President's decision to make his offer at this particular time, by the statement of Secretary Lansing, on December 21, that the country was "drawing nearer the verge of war," and was therefore "entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks." This alarming statement, which created a frantic sale of war-stocks, was followed the same day by a reassurance from Secretary Lansing that he "did not intend to intimate that the Government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality."

concluded, and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future," such avowals, moreover, as would make it pos

sible frankly to compare them."

The President, it is carefully stated, "is not proposing peace; he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an increasing longing."

"It may be," he points out, "that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on one side and on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared; that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference, and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future. . . . "He reminds them that "the concrete objects" for which the war is being waged "have never been definitively stated," and that such aims as have been adduced by the belligerents," as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world," are "virtually the same."

Common Ground. This common ground of aspiration," as stated in general terms," is as follows: Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this and against aggression or selfish interference of any kind.

war.

Each