Another case of a license granted by the law is that to enter and abate a nuisance. We have spoken of these licenses elsewhere, and need not repeat what was there said. It has been seen that the property licensed must keep strictly within the privilege; he becomes a trespasser if unnecessary injury is done.'

Abuse of License. A license, whether given by the owner himself, or by the law, may be lost by abusing it. Thus, one licensed to build an arch over a way abuses his authority if he obstructs the way in building it.' But, as respects the consequences of the abuse, a distinction which is of high importance is to be taken between the two classes of cases. The distinction is this: That if the authority was conferred by the law, an abuse not only terminates it, but revokes it; and it is presumed, from the misbehavior of the licensee, that he entered originally with the intent to do the wrong he has actually committed, and not in good faith under his license. The wrong-doer is thereupon held responsible as a trespasser ab initio; a trespasser in the entry itself, as in everything done afterward. Thus, if parties enter a public inn and demand entertainment there - the landlord being obliged by law to receive them—and if, after having entered, they abuse the license by riotous conduct, they not only *become trespassers, but their trespass [*317] dates from their entry. So the officer who distrains. property for taxes is a trespasser ab initio if, instead of proceeding to dispose of it as required by law, he misuses or misappro

184, following Ilsley. Nichols, 12 Pick. 270, in which, in an able opinion delivered by Chief Justice SHAW, a levy on chattels, which an officer broke into a dwelling-house to make, was held to be void. The same doctrine is laid down in People v. Hubbard, 24 Wend. 369, and Bailey v. Wright,39 Mich. 96. See, also, Attack

. Bramwell, 3 Best & S. 520: Oystead Shed, 13 Mass. 520; Snydacker v. Brosse, 51 Ill. 357. Where rooms over a store are used as a dwelling, breaking the outer door of the store to serve civil process is not a breaking of the outer door of a house. The

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dwelling in such case is to be considered as that portion of the building which is in fact occupied as a dwelling. Stearns . Vincent, 50 Mich. 209. A room used as a dwelling and a store is a dwelling as to breaking door to serve civil process. Welsh v. Wilson, 34 Minn. 92. An officer may enter premises of one man to seize goods of another, the defendant in the writ. Link . Harrington, 23 Mo. App. 429.

1 Ante, p. 51.

2 Cushing v. Adams, 18 Pick, 110.

3 Six Carpenters' Case, 8 Co. 290; S. C. 1 Smith L. C. 216.

priates it. In these cases the law has given an authority which the owner cannot resist, and as no choice is allowed him in respect to the person who is to exercise it, it is but reasonable that the law which confers the authority should withdraw it wholly when it is abused. But when the party himself grants a license, which he might, at his option, have withheld, there is no reason why the remedy for an abuse should be broader than the abuse itself. The licensee is therefore not a trespasser in his entry, but he is liable on the special case for exceeding his license, or for any misconduct after entry."

Boundaries. Where one's land is bounded on a public highway, it presumptively extends, not to the outer line, but to the middle of the road, and his supreme dominion embraces the whole, qualified only by the public easement. Says [318] PARSONS, *Ch. J.: "Every use to which the land may be applied, and all the profits which may be derived from

The cases respecting trespass ab initio will be referred to hereafter, when protection by process is considered.

Edelman v. Yeakel, 27 Penn. St. 26; Cushing. Adams, 18 Pick. 110; Faulkner v. Alderson, Gilm.(Va.) 221; Jewell v. Mahood, 44 N. H. 474; Ballard v. Noaks, 2 Ark. 45; Dumont v. Smith, 4 Denio, 319; Van Brunt v. Schenck, 13 Johns. 414; Stone v. Knapp, 29 Vt. 501; Ferrin v. Symonds, 11 N. H. 363.

Lade. Sheperd, 2 Str. 1004; Goodtitle v. Alker, 1 Burr. 133; Grose . West, 7 Taunt. 39; Doe v. Pearsey, 7 B. & C. 304; U. S. v. Harris, 1 Sumner, 21; Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25; Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 6 Pet. 498; Cole v. Drew, 44 Vt. 49; Webber

. California, &c., R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 425; Watkins v. Lynch, 71 Cal. 21; Chatham v. Brainerd, 11 Conn. 60; Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447. Dean v. Lowell, 135 Mass. 55; Chadwick v. Davis, 143 Mass. 7; Transue v. Sill, 105 Penn. St. 604; Helmer v. Castle, 109 Ill. 664. Where land was

described to center of highway excepting "the roads laid out over the land," the fee to the center of the highway passed subject to the public easement. Wellman o. Dickey, 78 Me. 29. Lands described in a deed as bounded by a public highway or street will be considered as bounded by the center, unless it clearly appears that it was intended to make the side line of the street a boundary instead of the cen ter. Moody v. Palmer, 50 Cal. 31. See Chicago v. Rumsey, 87 Ill. 348. If the land is bounded on "the side" of the highway, these words are presumed to exclude the highway. Hughes v. Providence, &c., R, R. Co., 2 R. I. 493; Hoboken Land Co. . Kerrigan, 31 N. J. 13; Anderson James, 4 Robt. 35; Grand Rapids, &c., R. R. Co. v. Heisel, 38 Mich. 62; Severy v. Cent. Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 194; De Peyster v. Mali, 27 Hun, 439; Kings Co. Ins. Co. v. Stevens. 87 N. Y. 287. But see, Low Tib betts, 72 Me. 92. A description as "a lot on the west side of M. street," carries title to the middle of the

it consistently with the continuance of the easement, the owner can lawfully claim." The herbage in the highway is therefore his, and he may maintain trespass against one whose cattle graze upon it, unless by law the cattle are permitted to roam at large. The growing trees in the highway also belong to the adjoining owner, except as they may be needed for the purpose of making the way or of repairing it; and if the highway officers sell trees thus standing in the road, and they are cut without necessity, they are liable in trespass for so doing. So it is a trespass on the adjoining owner for a person to deposit in the highway any thing not in any manner connected with the enjoyment of the easement, or to extend a structure on other lands out over it, or

to take a stand in the highway for the purpose of blackguardism

and abuse.'

It is competent, however, in appropriating lands for a public way, to provide for taking, not an easement merely, but the fee simple title, and where that is done, doubtless the rights of the adjoining owner are considerably restricted. It has been decided in Iowa that under such an appropriation the complete ownership and dominion passed to the municipal corporation by which the appropriation was made, and that if a deposit of [*319] mineral *should exist beneath the surface, and be worked by the adjoining proprietor, the corporation might recover from him the value of the mineral taken out. In Michigan a different view is taken; the appropriation of the fee being held to be only for the purposes of the easement, and for the other public purposes for which it is customary or proper to make use of land thus appropriated. Therefore, the earth in a city street, not needed for making or repairing it, belongs to the adjacent owner, and cannot be sold by the city.

So prima facie the land bounded on a stream of water is bounded by the center of the stream. This rule has been applied

Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb. 390. So, to use without the consent of the adjoining owner the street as a hackstand in accordance with an ordinance. McCaffrey v. Smith, 41 Hun, 117.

2 Des Moines v. Hall, 24 Iowa, 234. See, also, Milburn v. Cedar Rapids, &c. R. R. Co., 12 Iowa, 246. Compare Moses v. Pittsburgh, &c. R. R. Co., 21 Ill. 522; West v. Bancroft, 32 Vt. 367; Ohio, &c. R. R. Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana, 289; Hinchman v. Paterson, &c. R. Co., 2 C. E. Green, 75; State v. Laverack, 34 N. J. 201; Jackson v. Hathaway, 15 Johns. 447, 453. It would be otherwise, it seems, if the land were dedicated for street purposes only. Dubuque v. Benson, 23 Iowa, 248.

3 Cumming v. Prang, 24 Mich. 514; Bissell v. Collins, 28 Mich. 277; Griswold . Bay City, 35 Mich. 452. To the same effect. Robert v. Sadler,

104 N. Y. 229. In dedicating a street the owner cannot reserve the fee so as to prevent laying in it water pipes for public use. Wood v. National, &c. Co., 33 Kan. 590. Compare Delphi . Evans, 36 Ind. 90; West Covington v. Freking, 8 Bush, 121; Stevenson v. Chattanooga, 20 Fed. Rep. 586.

4 Bickett v. Morris, L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. Ap. 47; Cate's Exrs. . Wadlington, 1 McCord, 581; Hayes v. Bowman, 1 Rand. 417; Jackson v. Halstead, 5 Cow. 216; Walker . Board of Public Works, 16 Ohio, 540; State v. Gilmanton, 9 N. H. 461; Nickerson v. Crawford, 16 Me. 245; Browne e. Kennedy, 5 H. & J. 195; Ross . Faust, 54 Ind. 471; S. C. 23 Am. Rep. 655; Arnold v. Elmore, 16 Wis. 536; Piper v. Connelly, 108 Ill. 646; Norcross v. Griffiths, 65 Wis. 599. The owner of land on both sides of a stream owns the bed. Olson

to such large rivers as the Connecticut,' the Delaware,' the Mississippi, the Detroit, the Sandusky,' the Milwaukee,

the Sault Ste. Marie,' the Saginaw, etc.

Where this [*320] view prevails the rights of the public are rights of navigation, and of improvement for the purposes of navigation; and where the State interposes no obstacle, the owner may use the land covered by the water, or the water itself for his own profit. It has been held that the right to gather ice therefrom was exclusive, and that the owner might maintain an action against one who, by moving a raft in front of his grounds, prevented his gathering an ice crop. He may also rightfully carry out the shore by em