disinterment, and recover substantial damages, in awarding which, the injury to the feelings would be taken into consideration.1 In Indiana it has been said that "the bodies of the dead belong to the surviving relations, as property, and that they have a right dispose of them as such, within restrictions analogous to those by which the disposition of other property may be regulated." But the common law recognized no such property, though it did recognize a property in the shroud or other apparel of the dead as belonging to the person who was at the charge of the funeral.' Painful questions, which have never been passed upon by the courts, might arise, if a dispute should spring up among the relatives of the dead concerning the place where the body should be deposited. It has been decided, in an opinion of much research, that when the body has once been interred in a particular cemetery, without objection, the widow may be enjoined from removing it on the application of the heir, and the reasoning of the court would apply equally if the position of the parties were reversed. But in Pennsylvania it is held that the widow's con

Gorton ..Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508. See Van Houten v. Reformed Dutch Church, 17 N. J. Eq. 126. But if it is destroyed maliciously, or merely for the convenience of the parish, indemnity is due. Gay v. Baker, 17 Mass. 435; Voorhees . Presbyterian Church, 8 Barb. 135; S. C. 17 Barb. 103; Kellogg v. Dickinson, 18 Vt. 266; Cooper. Presbyterian Church, 32 Barb. 222; In re Presbyterian Church, 3 Edw. Ch. 155; Gorton v. Hadsell, 9 Cush. 508. A church member whose relatives are buried in a churchyard cannot from that fact deny the validity of an act allowing the church to raise the bodies in the yard on the ground that it violates the obligation of any contract. Craig e. First Presb. Church, 88 Penn. St. 42.

Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281. At the common law, the only remedy for the wrongful removal of a body buried in church grounds was by indictment. Regina v. Sharpe, Dears.

& B. 160; S. C. 40 Eng. L. & Eq. 581. A mortgagor of a cemetery lot may restrain the mortgagee from interfering with the bodies interred therein. Thompson v. Hickey, 8 Abb. N. C. 159.

2 Bogert v. Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 134, 138, per PERKINS, J. In New

York it has been held that a person in charge of a corpse holds it as a trust for all interested in it from family ties or friendship, and that equity will make such disposition as seems just under all the circumstances, and in a contest before burial between the child of a first wife and a second wife, the wish of the child was followed. Snyder v. Snyder, 60 How. Pr. 368.

32 Bl. Com. 429; Matter of Brick Presb. Church, 3 Edw. Ch. 155, 168; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 284; Pierce v. Proprietors, &c., 10 R. I. 227, 242.

4 Pierce v. Proprietors, &c., 10 R.I. 227; S. C. 14 Am. Rep. 667. See Guthrie Weaver, 1 Mo. App.

trol of the body ceases with the burial, and that thereafter its disposition belongs to the next of kin.'

For an injury to the monument an action of trespass might be brought by the owner of the burial lot; or, if there was no private ownership in the lot, then by the party erecting it.'

[*241]

*Exemption Laws. One of the most distinct instances of recognitions of the family, as such, for the purposes of legal remedy, is to be found in the constitutional and statutory provisions exempting property from levy and sale on legal process for the satisfaction of debts. These exemptions are, for the most part, made for the benefit of the family, and to householders only. The provisions are so different in different states that it would be idle to attempt, in any such space as is at our command, to make an abridged statement of the law. In many States the husband can only dispose of an interest in exempt property with his wife's consent, and if he fails to resort to the proper legal remedies for the protection of the exemption, the wife may bring suits for the purpose.

The benefit of the homestead is, in many of the States, continued to the family after the owner's death, so long as they, as a family, occupy it."

Master and Servant. The wrongs which the master may sustain in that relation at the hands of others are substantially confined to being deprived of services. Connected with this, however, may be incidental damages, such as expenses in care and attention for the servant, medicines, etc., when the loss is occasioned by some violence to the servant, or injury to his health, so that his care devolves upon the master, and perhaps other

incidental expenses in some cases. The principles which govern the recovery have been sufficiently indicated in speaking of parent and child. The wrongs which a servant might suffer at the hands of third persons would be redressed, independent of the relation.

INJURIES BY THE USE OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Within the last few years statutes have been passed in a number of the States giving to husband, wife, parent, child, or guardian, and sometimes to other parties, for injuries done by intoxicated persons, the right to maintain actions against the person or persons who may have sold or given the liquors *which caused the intoxication. Also for injuries to [*242] means of support; for the expense and trouble of caring for the intoxicated person; and for other injuries and losses which are particularly pointed out in the statutes, which are here copied. All these provisions are for the benefit and protection of the family, and are therefore here presented; but it has been deemed better to give them in detail, than to attempt to bring together their several provisions under one head."

Arkansas. An act applying to Washington county only provides that "every husband, wife, parent, guardian, or other person, who shall be injured in person or property, or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication of any person, habitual or otherwise, shall have a right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving intoxicating liquors, in said county of Washington, in whole or in part, of such person or persons, and recover full damages,' etc. The act is evidently defective, probably in consequence of some accidental omission."

Connecticut.

"Whoever shall sell intoxicating liquor to any

'See Schouler Dom. Rel. 631, 632, and cases cited.

We have not thought it worth while to give the provisions which exist in some of the States authorizing the wife to sue for and recover the moneys paid by the husband for

liquors illegally sold to him, or those which invalidate the leases of buildings to be used for the sale of liquors in violation of law, &c., except where they give special actions of tort.

3 Laws of 1873 p. 385.

person, who thereby becomes intoxicated, and while so intoxicated shall, in consequence thereof, injure the person or property of another, shall pay just damages to the person injured, to be recovered in an action under this statute; and if the person selling such intoxicating liquor is licensed, the recovery of a judgment for such damages shall be conclusive evidence of a breach of the bond."

Illinois. "Every person who shall, by the sale of intoxicating liquors, with or without a license, cause the intoxication of any other person, shall be liable for and compelled to pay a reasonable compensation to any person who may take charge of and provide

for such intoxicated person, and two dollars per day in [*243] addition *thereto for every day such intoxicated person shall be kept in consequence of such intoxication, which sums may be recovered in an action of debt before any court having competent jurisdiction.

"Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person, who shall be injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such person or persons; and any person owning, renting, leasing or permitting the occupation of any building or premises, and having knowledge that intoxicating liquors are to be sold therein, or who, having leased the same for other purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the sale of any intoxicating liquors that have caused, in whole or in part, the intoxication of any person, shall be liable, severally or jointly, with the person or persons selling or giving intoxicating liquors aforesaid, for all damages sustained, and for exemplary damages; and a married woman shall have the same right to bring suits and to control the same and the amount recovered, as a femme sole; and all damages recovered by a minor under this act, shall be paid either to such minor, or to his or her parent, guardian or next friend, as the court shall direct; and the unlawful sale, or giving away of intoxicating liquors, shall work a forfeiture of all

'General Statutes, Revision of 1875, p. 269, § 9.

rights of the lessee or tenant under any lease or contract of rent upon the premises where such unlawful sale or giving away shall take place; and all suits for damages under this act may be by any appropriate action in any of the courts of this State having competent jurisdiction.

"The giving away of intoxicating liquors, or other shift or device to evade the provisions of this act, shall be held to be an unlawful selling."

Statutes giving such action, it seems, are to be construed strictly. The wife can maintain no action unless she

can show *injury in person, property, or means of sup- [*244] port. Anguish or pain of mind or the feelings suffered

4

by her by reason of her husband's intoxication are not elements of damages. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded unless actual damages are proved, and then they may be if aggravating circumstances are shown; and the defendant, when exemplary damages are claimed, may show facts in mitigation, such as that he had forbidden his clerk, by whom the sale was made, to sell to the defendant, or that the wife and husband drank liquors together. Proof of injury to means of support need not be direct,

1

'Rev. Stats. 1874, p. 438, §§ 8, 9 and 13, re-enacting sections, 4, 5 and 7 of Laws of 1872, p. 553.

Freese. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Meidel v. Anthis, 71 Ill. 241; Kellerman . Arnold, 70 Ill. 632; Fentz v. Meadows, 72 Ill. 540. The landlord's liability does not cover reversioners or holders of contingent interests. Castle . Fogerty, 19 Ill. App. 442. The act only applies to those engaged in liquor traffic. It does not cover a case of giving a drink from kindness or courtesy. Aden v. Cruse, 21 Ill. App. 391.

Freese. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Meidel . Anthis, 71 Ill. 241; Fentz v. Meadows, 72 Ill. 540; Flynn v. Fogarty. 106 Ill. 263. She can recover only for such damage as is the direct proximate effect of a particular intoxication. Barks . Woodruff, 12 Ill. App. 96. The mere intoxication of the husband, unaccompanied with any injury to the person of the wife,

or to his or her means of support, gives no right of action. Confrey v. Stark, 73 Ill. 187.

4 Roth v. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283, explaining Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Meidel v. Anthis, 71 Ill. 241; Kellerman v. Arnold, 71 Ill. 632; Keedy v. Howe, 72 Ill. 133; Fentz v. Meadows, 72 Ill. 540; Bates v. Davis, 76 Ill. 222; Albrecht v. Walker, 73 Ill. 69; Brantigam v. While, 73 Ill. 561; Graham v. Fulford, 73 Ill. 596; Hackett v. Smelsley, 77 III. 109; McEvoy v. Humphrey, 77 Ill. 388; Cobb v. People, 84 Ill. 511; Schimmelfenig v. Donovan, 13 Ill. App. 47; Kadgin v. Miller, Id. 474.

5 Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496; Fentz v. Meadows, 72 Ill. 540; Brantigam v. While, 73 Ill. 561; Bates v. Davis, 76 Ill. 222. But the fact that the sales were made by a clerk in violation of instructions would be no defense to the action. Keedy v. Howe, 72 Ill. 133.

Roth v. Eppy, 80 Ill. 283; Hackett v. Smelsley, 77 Ill. 109. See Reget v.