invalid.] Certainly. It has also been held in modern cases that consent cannot give jurisdiction. In Vansittart v. Taylor (4 E. & B. 910), in the Exchequer Chamber, with reference to appeal upon a point reserved at the trial before the Common Law Procedure Act, Jervis, C.J., said at p. 912, "We are all agreed that jurisdiction cannot be given by the conduct of the parties, if we have none independent of it." So Lawrence v. Wilcock (11 A. & E. 941). That at all events this consent, to create jurisdiction, must have been entered upon the record, appears from Co. Litt. 125 b. (p.) If a venire fac. be awarded to the coroners where it ought to be to the sherife, or the visne commeth out of a wrong place, yet if it be per assensum partium, and so entered of record, it shall stand, for omnis consensus tollit errorem." Upon this authority, the conviction might have been supported if the indictment had alleged that the oath was administered by consent at the Westminster Sessions House, and so entered of record: and the wrong description of the place is another objection to the first count. [Lush, J.-" Westminster" is the word used in the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854, sect. 2, which gives the judges power to try causes in the same court at the same time.] This was not a trial under the Common Law Procedure Act. [BLACKBURN. J.-Not if there was a second Nisi Prius Court sitting at the same time? QUAIN, J.-If the oath had been administered in one of these courts it could not have been said to have been in Westminster Hall; these courts are outside the Hall itself, and ever since they have been built, which was in the reign of George IV., the jurisdiction could not have literally depended upon 18 Eliz. c. 12.] Further, as to the second count of the indictment, which alleged perjuries within the city of London, the ancient charters of the city show a right of trial in the city, and by a jury of citizens, for all offences committed and causes of action arising within its boundaries; (2 Str. 857; 2 Salk 644) but it is not necessary to go further back than the Central Criminal Court Act 1834 (4 & 5 Will 4, c. 36), which provides for the trial of all offences within the district defined by a mixed jury from all the counties comprised in the district. By a subsequent Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 24, s. 3, it is "enacted that every writ of certiorari for removing an indictment from the said Central Criminal Court shall specify the county or jurisdiction in which the same shall be tried; and a jury shall be summoned and the trial proceed in the same manner in all respects as if the indictment had been originally preferred in that county or jurisdiction." This section gives no power to the person who draws the certiorari to alter the county in which the indictment shall be tried from that in which the offence was committed. [BLACKBURN, J.-It is however a power to the court for that purpose.] The words do not express such a power, and the case of Reg v. Mitchell. (2 Q. B. 636), is an authority that a certiorari cannot alter the county in which an offence ought to be tried. adoption of the county in the certiorari must be at the peril of the prosecution, and here the second count was tried by a wrong jury. [See report of this point as argued at bar, 28 L. T. Rep. N.S. 342.] As to the trial, 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 7, enacts that only twenty-four days shall be appropriated after each term for trial of issues of fact, "Provided that if any trial at bar

The

[Q. B.

shall be directed by any of the said courts, it shall be competent to the judges of such court to appoint such day or days for the trial thereof as they shall think fit; and the time so appointed, if in vacation, shall for the purpose of such trial be deemed and taken to be a part of the preceding term." This section authorises only one appointment for a trial at bar beyond the twenty-four days after the term in which the appointment is made, and the proceedings therefore after the Long Vacation were invalid. [BLACKBURN, J.-That point has already been argued before us, and decided.] Next as to the discontinuance of the trial against the protest of the defendant;-for the purpose required, an adjournment in a criminal trial has never before been granted, and moreover there could be no power to adjourn over the time of the original appointment. [COCKBURN, C.J.-This was an exceptional case, and we established a new precedent to meet it. BLACKBURN, J.-No appointment was necessary for sittings during term.] Further the sentence clearly ought not to have been pronounced during the vacation: it should have been postponed to the beginning of this term. O'Connell and others v. The Queen (11 Cl. & F. 155), was a trial at bar under an Irish Act, 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 31, containing a provision exactly similar to this 7th section of 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70; Tindal, C. J., referring to the words of it in his written opinion of all the judges, said, at p. 250, "It was to be a day in term for the trial, not a day in term for the giving of judgment, or any other purpose." And Lyndhurst, L. C., at p. 325, expresses the unanimous concurrence of the law lords in the opinion of the judges upon the subordinate questions raised in the case. [BLACKBURN, J.— What is there in the words of the statute to support this dictum of the judges? COCKBURN, C. J.-They seem to have overlooked the section of the Act which gives power to a judge at Nisi Prius to pronounce sentence during sittings.] There might be a miscarriage of justice, and if sentence were pronounced immediately, no remedy, which is limited to a motion in term, could be obtained till it was partly, if not entirely carried out. The counsel for the prosecution, at p. 220, seem to admit that sentence could be pronounced only in term; and it does not follow that because express power to sentence immediately is given to a judge at Nisi Prius, it should necessarily belong to a court sitting at bar. [COCKBURN, C. J.-Except for that authority, it never would have occurred to me that the words "for the purpose of such trial" did not include the sentence, which seems to me to be part of the trial. BLACKBURN, J.-That_point was not before the judges in the O'Connell case, and was not material to their decision. At all events the defendant might now be brought up and sentenced again, if there were sufficient doubt about the propriety of a sentence in vacation.] That is so. [BLACK BURN, J.-For myself, I have no doubt about it, notwithstanding the dictum of Tindal, C. J.] Another point concerning the sentence is that the oath upon affidavit was not one which could found the crime of perjury. The Act 16 & 17 Vict. c. 78, which enables commissioners to take affidavits in Chancery, makes no provision for false swearing. [BLACKBURN, J.-The words creating the crime of perjury in 5 Eliz. c. 9 s. 6, are, if any

Q. B.]

[Q. B.

persons "by their own act, consent, or agreement wilfully and corruptly commit any manner of wilful perjury, by his or their deposition, in any of the courts before mentioned." The affidavit was part of a judicial proceeding in the Court of Chancery.] The 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, which makes transportation a punishment for perjury, cannot relate to an oath taken before a commissioner appointed under 15 & 16 Vict. c. 78. Besides these legal points, I move for a new trial on the grounds that the Lord Chief Justice in his summing up brought undue influence to bear upon the jury; that the court gave evidence to the jury which was not upon oath; and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Nothing was said by the defendant's counsel in support of the last two grounds for a new trial; but as to the undue influence of the Lord Chief Justice, the following passages in his summing up, which related to the conduct of the defendant's counsel at the trial were cited; and it was contended that they unduly influenced the jury against the defendant, and improperly induced them to find a verdict against him. "But, gentlemen," he said, "our position was rendered painful also from the fact that we had again and again to interfere with the address of the learned counsel in order to correct misstatements and misrepresentations which could not be allowed to pass without such interference on our part. When witnesses are misrepresented, when evidence is misstated, when facts are pervertedand that not for the purpose of argument in the cause, but in order to lay the foundation of foul imputations and unjust accusations against parties and witnesses-when one unceasing torrent of invective and foul slander is sent forth wherewith to blacken the character of men whose reputations have been hitherto without reproach-then it is impossible for judges to remain silent. It is not enough to say that the learned counsel should be allowed to go on with his address to the end, and that the judge should wait until it is his turn to speak, and then to set right matters which have been misrepresented and distorted. And especially is it not so in a case like this, where weeks and months might elapse before the judge would have an opportunity of expressing his opinion; for in the meanwhile what might happen? A temporary impression-perhaps that is all that it was hoped to achieve might have gone forth fatal to the honour and the character of the person assailed; Iwounds might have been inflicted which possibly never could have been healed. Therefore it was we felt it to be our duty to interpose and check the torrent ofundisguised and unlimited abuse in which the learned counsel for the defendant thought proper to indulge. And in what way, gentlemen, were our remonstances met? In an ordinary case, if in the heat of argument, in the fervour of oratory, in the zeal with which the counsel engages in a case, in the examination or cross-examination of a witness, the strict bounds of propriety may sometimes, and not unnaturally, be overstepped but this, I say for the honour of the Bar of England, happens very rarely indeed a word, nay, a hint, from the judge is sufficient to restrain the overflowing zeal within its proper and legitimate limits. But we were met by contumely and disrespect, by insult, by covert allusions to Scroggs and Jeffries-judges of infamous repute-as if in days when such a spirit as theirs animated the

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administration of justice the learned counsel would not have been quickly laid by the heels and put to silence." Also, Gentlemen, I will undertake to say that no three judges ever sat upon this bench or any other to whom the liberties of the Bar were more dear or more sacred than they are to my learned colleagues and myself. We know too well that the freedom of the Bar is essential to the administration of justice. We know that it would be an ill day indeed for this country if the freedom of the Bar were ever interfered with. It may be that it was here abused, but this is a rare, a singular exception, which perhaps only proves the rule. We did not interfere with the privileges of the Bar. We wished to check the licence of unscrupulous abuse to restrain that which, instead of being fair, legitimate argument, amounted to misstatement, misrepresentation, and slander." Again: "There never was in the history of jurisprudence a case in which such an amount of imputation and invective had been used before, and I sincerely hope there never will be another. Although the prosecution has been instituted by her Majesty's Government and carried on on behalf of the Crown, you have been told that every one connected with it, from the highest to the lowest, counsel, solicitors, clerks, detectives-everybody is engaged in a foul conspiracy-has resorted to the most abominable means in order to corrupt witnesses, against whom I should imagine that nothing was to be said, except this, that they might have been mistaken in the evidence they gave have been charged with taking bribes and committing perjury. Imputations of this kind are thrown out right and left. One man is called a felon, against whom there is no more reason for bringing such a charge than against any of us." His lordship also said: "Who could conceive it possible that such vile imputations could have been brought forward in a court of justice?" and added, "I once, on a particular occasion referred to by the learned counsel, attempted to draw a distinction between that which was legitimate and that which was forbidden in advocacy, and I illustrated the distinction between the fas and the nefas of advocacy by referring to the difference between the sword of the warrior and the dagger of the assassin." His lordship went on to say: "That the learned counsel for the defendant should begin by citing with approbation that expression of my opinion, and end by exhibiting all, nay much more than all, the nefas of advocacy, I must say surprised and astonished me beyond measure." Another passage was,- "The authorities of Stonyhurst are accused upon no ground of any sort or kind with not teaching morality to their students, and, with the design of corrupting their minds, they are said to have adopted a system under which youths are brought up to be men with the minds of women, with a covered hint at abominations half revealed, but from which one recoils and shudders, and all this with no more foundation than if the imputation had been brought against the authorities of Eton, Westminster, or any other of our great schools." Then the Lord Chief Justice went on to say, "The dead are served in the same way. Lady Doughty is charged with hypocrisy, because, as it is alleged, having discovered that her nephew had attempted the honour of her daughter, and had succeeded in that attempt, she showed him to the door with. bland smiles and with honeyed words."

BLACKBURN, J.-As to this latter part of the case we can give judgment at once. As to the other part of it, although none of us entertain any doubt as to the grounds upon which alone it would be proper to grant a rule, yet, as they may be of general importance in future cases, we will give our judgment on a future day in words more concise than we could use on the spur of the moment. As to the last point, however, I entertain no doubt at all. It is said that the conduct of the trial was such as to render the verdict unsatisfactory. The ground put principally by defendant's counsel was this: He said, and no doubt truly, that remarks of great severity were made by the judge upon the conduct of the counsel, which were calculated to influence the jury unfavourably to the defendant; but those remarks were intended to counteract the evil effect which, what the court considered to be the improper conduct of counsel might have upon the jury. It is quite true that when a judge animadverts on the conduct of counsel it has an effect damaging to the interests of his client; but it is not the exercise of an undue influence. The jury, who have heard all the evidence, are able to judge for themselves. Perhaps they cannot help connecting the conduct of counsel with the case he represents; but a client must suffer to some extent if he employs an injudicious or improper counsel. This is no ground for a new trial. I did not read all that was reported in the newspapers about the trial, but, as far as I know the facts, what fell from the judge was not only well deserved, but rightly said, and although it might be damaging to the defendant, yet I cannot think it had an undue or improper effect upon the jury. It is quite clear that on this ground no rule can be granted.

QUAIN, J.-I am quite of the same opinion. On the last point no grounds have been shown for a new trial. I am one of those who did not read the Tichborne trial, neither the speeches, nor the summing up. I could not help hearing of the case, but I had no judicial knowlege of it from beginning to end. I therefore decide exclusively on what Dr. Kenealy has laid before the court. He says imputations on himself personally were so strong and exaggerated that they had an undue influence on his client; but we have heard that the other two judges are of opinion that the observations of the Lord Chief Justice were deserved by the line of conduct which he adopted, and we must remember that the jury not only heard the language but witnessed the demeanour of the learned counsel. I agree with my brother Blackburn that the verdict cannot be set aside on this ground.

LUSH, J.-I entirely concur with my learned brothers. I think that the language of the Lord Chief Justice was not stronger than the occasion required. I had reason myself several times during the trial to make appeals to the defendant's counsel and I felt, as the Lord Chief Justice did, that a censure with regard to him was demanded from the bench, and the jury could not have been unduly influenced by such censure. Not only is there not a single observation of his lordship which I did not adopt, but I regretted he did not say more, and I adhere to the same opinion still.

COCKBURN, C.J.-I only wish to add the expression of my sincere regret that I should have had to state anything which should appear to have been harsh or ungenerous or unkind to the learned counsel. I will not add anything now that would

[Q. B.

savour at all of that character. I only hope that this is the last time we shall ever have any difference or dispute between the Bench and the Bar. Cur. adv. vult.

This

The

April 29.-BLACKBURN, J., delivered the judgment of the court. (Cockburn, C. J., Blackburn, Lush and Quain, JJ.)-In this case an indictment was found by the grand jury in the Central Criminal Court for perjury, committed within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court. It was removed into this court by a writ of certiorari, which, as required by stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 24, s. 3, specified Middlesex as the county in which it should be tried. On the application of the Attorney-General, it was ordered that the trial should be at bar. court in Hilary Term, under stat. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 7, appointed the case to be tried on the 23rd April 1873 (being a day in Easter Term), and every day up to and inclusive of the 1st Nov. 1873, being the day before the first day of Michaelmas Term; and further ordered that in case the trial should not terminate on or before the 1st Nov. the further trial should be adjourned till Michaelmas Term next, and be thereafter continued at such times as the court should then direct. The jury was taken from the county of Middlesex, and the trial at bar commenced. court did not sit continuously, but adjourned not only over Sundays and holidays, but also over days included in this period on which it might have sat. And, in particular, there was an adjournment from the 31st Oct. 1873, to the 17th Nov. 1873, which was a day in Michaelmas Term. To this last adjournment the defendant's counsel objected, and the court adjourned without any consent. The trial having been protracted, this court in Michaelmas Term, 1873, made a second order, appointing every day up to Michaelmas Term, 1874, for the trial. The trial proceeded, and on the 28th February, 1874, a day in the vacation before this Term, the defendant was found guilty, and the court then passed sentence on him of penal servitude on each count. Within the first four days of this Term the counsel for the defendant moved for a rule nisi for a new trial, or to arrest judgment, or for a venire de novo, on grounds which will be presently noticed, most of the objections having been taken and disposed of during the trial at bar. It must not be supposed that by entertaining the motion for a new trial we express any opinion as to the competency of the court to re-hear and reconsider points of law already decided by the same court when sitting at bar. It will be time to decide this point when it becomes necessary to do so, but we are desirous of guarding ourselves against any interference in favour of such a proposition from the fact of our having heard this application. We are all of opinion that no ground whatever has been shown for doubting that the proceedings, from first to last, have been perfectly regular, that the verdict was properly obtained, and is quite satisfactory, and that the sentence was properly passed by the court sitting in banco on a day which, by 7 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 7, was for the purposes of this trial at bar to be taken to be part of the preceding term, viz., Hilary Term, 1874. We pronounced at once our reasons for saying that there was no colour for the motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was unsatisfactory on account of the way in which it was obtained. On the other grounds we post

poned giving our reasons, not from any doubt entertained by any member of the court, but because, this being in some respects a new case, we were desirous of expressing our reasons precisely, so as to be an assistance to our successors if a similar case should occur again. We now proceed to deal with the applicant's objections, made as they arose in order of date, without regard to the order in which the counsel put them forward. The indictment, as already stated, was preferred in the Central Criminal Court, a new court created by statute 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, with a jurisdiction including the City of London, the county of Middlesex, and parts of the counties of Essex, Kent, and Surrey. The grand jury in that court had jurisdiction to find a bill for offences committed within any part of their jurisdiction. Trials in the Central Criminal Court are by the 4th section to be by juries "taken wholly from the said city or the said counties, or taken indiscriminately from the said city and the said counties." The certiorari is not taken away, and therefore an indictment found in the Central Criminal Court may be removed into the Court of Queen's Bench, and may be there tried, but the original Act does not contain any express provision as to the manner in which the jury are to be summoned in the Queen's Bench. As the issue to be tried is whether the offence charged by the indictment was committed within the jurisdiction of the Central Criminal Court, it may on the trial of any indictment appear that the offence was committed in any one of the five counties out of which that district is formed; and it did, in fact, appear in the trial of the case now before us that the perjuries assigned in one count were in respect of an oath taken in Chancery within the City of London, and that the perjuries assigned in the other count were in respect of an oath taken in the Court of Common Pleas in Middlesex. On this it was contended that the venire summoning a jury from Middlesex was originally wrong; or, at least, that when it appeared that one of the offences charged took place in London, the court should have ruled that the Middlesex juries could not try that offence. But the Legislature has, by a subsequent enactment, foreseen and provided for this difficulty. Statute 9 & 10 Vict. c. 24, s. 3, is as follows:-" And whereas doubts have been raised as to the proper place of trial, where indictments have been removed by writ of certiorari from the Central Criminal Court into the Court of Queen's Bench, be it enacted that no writ of certiorari for removing an indictment from the said Central Criminal Court shall specify the county or jurisdiction in which the cause shall be tried, and a jury shall be summoned and the trial proceed in the same manner in all respects as if the indictment had been originally prepared in that county or jurisdiction.' We cannot doubt that the true construction of the statute is that the Court of Queen's Bench shall have discretion to name in the certiorari the county or jurisdiction in which the trial is to take place, and that by the jurors from the jurisdiction named, the same issues shall be tried that would have been tried in the Central Criminal Court, had the indictment not been removed. These objections therefore fail. The next objection relates to the order of the court made in Hilary Term, 1873, directing that a number of days should be appointed for the trial ex

[Q. B.

tending beyond the then next term, and the long period then appointed having proved too short, a second order was made in Michaelmas Term 1873, appointing further days. It was contended that a trial at Bar, if it could be protracted beyond the first vacation after it began, must necessarily fail. It is a sufficient answer to cite the words of the stat. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 7:"If a trial at bar should be directed by any of the said courts, it shall be competent for the judges of such courts to appoint such day or days for the trial thereof as they shall think fit; and the time so appointed, if in vacation, shall, for the purposes of such trial, be deemed, and taken to be, a part of the preceding term." It is impossible, to use words more clearly declaring that the court should have the most absolute discretion to appoint such days as they should think fit for trial; and there is nothing either in the object of the enactment, or the language used, to require either that this power should be exercised once for all, or that it should be limited to an appointment of days in the vacation next succeeding the term in which the order was made. It was then contended that the adjournment of the court vitiated the whole proceedings. It is scarcely possible to suppose that this objection was seriously made. The court was sitting on a day which, for the purpose of the trial, was to be taken as part of the then preceding Term. It is incident to a trial that the court may, for sufficient reason, adjourn it, and there is nothing whatever, either in the words of the enactment or the object of the Legislature to take away this power from the Queen's Bench sitting on a trial at bar in what is by legislative enactment to be taken as part of the Term. Two objections were then made, arising on the evidence at the trial. It appeared that the trial at Nisi Prius, before the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas was, in fact, holden at the Sessions House at Westminster, and not in any sense of the words "within Westminster Hall,' It was argued that the sittings of the Court of Common Pleas at Nisi Prius in Middlesex were held only under the authority of the 18 Eliz. c. 12, which authorises sittings within the said "Hall called Westminster Hall, in Westminster." And therefore it was said that a witness on a trial at Nisi Prius, held, as this in fact was held, near to but not in Westminster Hall, could not be there guilty of perjury. We should be most reluctant to give any countenance to the notion that on a trial before one of the judges of the Superior Courts who has general jurisdiction over the subject, a witness might commit perjury with impunity on account of any defect or irregularity in the proceedings, especially when, as in this case, the irregularity, if it were one, was waived by the parties, who, though they cannot, by consent, give jurisdiction, can waive an irregularity. But it is quite unnecessary to consider that, for by the statute 33 Vict. c. 6, s. 5, " any number of judges at one and the same time can hold a sitting or sittings at Nisi Prius, either in London or Westminster, as may be deemed expedient by the court." The rooms in which the ordinary sittings of the Superior Courts are held in Middlesex are limited in number, and when more judges sit at Nisi Prius than usual some must sit elsewhere. It was for that reason the ejectment was tried in the Sessions House in Westminster, and we think it quite clear that the statute 33 Vict. c. 6, made such a course quite

regular. We by no means say the law previously was that the sittings at Nisi Prius were to be holden only in the usual courts which, if they are "within the hall called Westminster Hall," are only so constructively; but only that if it was so, it is so no longer. A further objection was made that the oath, on which the perjuries in one count were assigned, was taken in the Court of Chancery, before a commissioner authorised to take the oath by the 15 & 16 Vict. c. 78. It was said that the sentence of penal servitude on this count could not be justified, because the oath was taken in a manner not authorised by the law at the time of the 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, which imposed the sentence of transportation (now penal servitude) on perjury, was passed. The offence of perjury consists in taking a false oath in a judicial proceeding, and whether the oath is taken in a judicial proceeding before a court of common law, or acting under an earlier or later statute, it is equally an oath taken in a judicial proceeding, and equally perjury and equally punishable by penal servitude. One more objection was taken. The sentence in the present case was passed by this court when the verdict was delivered, not in term, but on one of those days which, by virtue of the statute 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70, s. 7, already cited, are "for the purposes of the trial to be deemed and taken as part of the preceding term." It was argued that the court could do nothing during those days but take the verdict, and that consequently sentence could not be then passed, but must of necessity be delayed until the next or some ensuing term. If this were so it would follow that we should treat the sentence actually passed as a nullity, and, on the application of the prosecution, grant a rule to bring up the defendant during term, and then pass the sentence that appeared to the court, as then constituted, to be the proper one. Great inconvenience would arise from pursuing this course, and no benefit to any one is likely to result; but still, if such was the course prescribed by the law, we must follow it, however troublesome and useless it might be. We are, however, clearly and undoubtingly of opinion that it was competent for the court to pronounce sentence at the time. As on this point an authority was cited, it is necessary to examine the question fully; for we dissent from that authority. All courts of Oyer and Terminer sit for the trial of the causes brought before them. If the issue raised during the trial of one of those causes be on matter of fact, it is to be tried by the jury under the supervision of the court. If it is matter of law it is to be tried by the judges; if matter of record by the record itself. The question what the sentence in a criminal cause should be is a question of mixed law and judicial discretion, to be guided by the facts proved on the taking of the verdict, and therefore is to be determined by the judges, and so it is properly and necessarily included in the word "trial." The trial by the court of the cause before it includes all those, and the word trial is not confined to taking the verdict. The Superior Courts sat at common law only during term time and at Westminster. When an issue of fact arose which required to be tried by the verdict of a jury, process was issued to bring up the jurors from the proper venue to Westminster, and the verdict was found there under the superintendence of the court sitting during term, and if for any sufficient reason the whole trial was not completed during

[Q. B.

the term in which it began, the cause was adjourned, and the trial completed at a future sitting or sittings of the court, which were necessarily holden in term time. As early as the Statute of Westminster the Second (13 Edw. 1., A.D. 1285), a remedy was provided for part of the inconvenience, expense, and delay arising from this state of the law. By that statute power was given to the Courts at Westminster to award a writ of Nisi Prius commanding the sheriff to bring the jury to Westminster in the next term, unless the justices of assize were to take the inquisition, and return the same to the Court at Westminster, where judgment should be given. In practice, it became a matter of course to award a writ of Nisi Prius in every case, unless either the Crown was a party concerned and refused its assent, or the court in its discretion thought fit to direct that the trial should be at bar on account of the importance of the case. In either case the trial proceeded in this court in term time at Westminster as at common law. It was not usual to issue a commission of assize in Middlesex, and consequently in cases in which the venue was in Middlesex, all trials remained as at common law till a much later period, when by various statutes, which it is unnecessary to state, the Chief Justices and Chief Baron were directed to hold sittings at Nisi Prius in London and at Westminster, and the award at Nisi Prius in town causes is therefore useless. In all respects material to the question before us, the law and practice is the same in town and in country causes. The direction of the court would more properly have been called a direction that there should be no award at Nisi Prius, than a direction that the trial should take place at bar, but the latter phrase has been in use so long that it would be pedantry to try to alter it now. Substantially, the law remained the same down to the passing of the 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70. Two inconveniences were found to result in practice, which the statute was designed to remedy. The first was that, in the comparatively rare cases in which there was a trial at bar, it must necessarily be in term time, to the great delay of all the ordinary business of the court, and if the trial was not completed within the term in which it began, it must, of necessity, be adjourned till the next term, and then completed. The other inconvenience was that when there was a criminal trial in the Queen's Bench and there was an award of Nisi Prius, the authority of the judge on circuit, or Chief Justice at Westminster, being not to try the cause, but simply to take the inquisition, sentence was of necessity postponed till the next term. Whenever that sentence was discretionary the court was very much guided by the report of the judge who presided when the criminal was found guilty; and when it was necessary to bring that report before the court, there was much delay and expense occasioned, both to the prosecution and the defendant. Both these inconveniences were, amongst others, remedied by the Act for the more Effectual Administration of Justice in England and Wales (11 Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 70). By the 9th section it was provided that the judgment might be pronounced by the judge at the sittings or assizes, subject to a power in the Court of King's Bench, within the first six days of the next ensuing term by granting a rule to amend the judgment. In Kez v. Lloyd (4 B. & Ald. 136) a motion was refused for