Hermeneutics and Human Finitude: Toward a Theory of Ethical Understanding

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Fordham Univ Press, 1991 - Language Arts & Disciplines - 291 pages
Having thought out the Enlightenment project of individualism, privacy, and autonomy to its end, Anglo-American ethical theory now finds itself unable to respond to the collapse of community in which the practices justified by this project have resulted. In the place of reasonable deliberation about the goals to be chosen and the means to them, we now, it seems, have only what MacIntyre has aptly called "interminable debate" among "rival" positions, debate in which each party merely contends with the others for its own advantage. And this circumstance MacIntyre himself seems unable to escape despite his best efforts. In further elaborating Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutical reception of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Hegel, and in referring simultaneously to Edmund Burke's parallel political rhetoric, among other tradition-oriented arguments in the English language, this book seeks a recollection of shared ethical principles, a recollection which alone, it is argued, might prevent the devolution of discussion into war with words and make possible some measure of consensus, however provisional and shadowed by dissent it will be.

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Contents

MacIntyre and the Disarray of Analytical Moral
1
Hegel and Kantian Moral
14
The Insufficiency of MacIntyres Alternative
38
Gadamers Modified Hegelianism as a Way Beyond
68
Language as the Medium of Understanding
105
Gadamers Divergence from the Critical Intention
117
The Ethical Implications of Gadamers Theory
179
Interpretation and Application in Ethical
188
Gadamerian Conservatism
267
Bibliography
283
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Page 124 - The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.
Page 181 - Thirdly, though the customs be both good as customs, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice.
Page 172 - Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that...
Page 181 - He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation.
Page 112 - Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.
Page 26 - Maclntyre, a virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices...
Page 210 - The lines of morality are not like the ideal lines of mathematics. They are broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand modifications. These exceptions and modifications are not made by the process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only the first in rank of the virtues political and moral, but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all.
Page 151 - In a right triangle the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of the other two sides or legs.
Page 6 - But we have — very largely, if not entirely — lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality.

About the author (1991)

P. Christopher Smith is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Lowell, Massachusetts.

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