In *2458. [Amended, 1881.] Upon what judgment, and to what county, the execution must have issued. order to entitle a judgment creditor to maintain either of the special proceedings, authorized by this article, the judgment must have been rendered upon the judgment debtor's appearance, or personal service of the summons upon him for a sum not less than twenty-five dollars, and the execution must have been issued out of a court of record; and, either 1. To the sheriff of the county where the judgment debtor has, at the time of the commencement of the spe ial proceedings, a place for the regular transaction of business in person; or 2. If the judgment debtor is then a resident of the State, to the sheriff of the county where he resides; or 3. If he is not then a resident of the State, to the sheriff of the county where the judgment-roll is filed; unless the execution was issued out of a court other than that in which the judgment was rendered, and, in that case, to the sheriff of the county where the tran script of the judgment is filed. Part of Code of Proc., 292, amended. Bartlett v. McNeil, 60 N. Y. 53; Schwinger v. Hickok, 53 id. 280; Bartlett v. Spicer, 75 id. 528; Chan tauqua County Bank v. White, 6 id. 236; Same v. Risley, 19 id. 369; McCartney v. Bostwick, 32 id. 53; Payne v. Sheldon, 63 Barb. 169; Bingham v. Disbrow, 14 Abb. Pr. 251; Jessup v. Jones, 32 How. Pr. 191; Belknap v. Hasbrouck, 13 Abb. Pr. 418, note; McEwen v. Burgess, 15 id. 473; s. c., 25 How. 92; Stryking v. Hicks, 2 Law Bulletin, 6. 2459. In what county judgment debtor, his bailee, etc., must attend. If the judgment debtor, or other person, required to attend and be examined, as prescribed in this article, or the officer of a corporation, required to attend in its behalf, is, at the time of the service of the order upon him, a resident of the State, or then has an office within the State, for the regular transaction of business, in person, he cannot be compelled to attend, pursuant to the order, or to any adjournment, at a place without the county wherein his residence or place of business is situated. Id., 292. Belknap v. Hasbrouck, 13 Abb. 418, n; McEwan v. Burgess, 15 id. 473; 25 How. 92; Gould v. Moore, 51 id. 188; Foster v. Prince, 18 id. 258; 8 Abb. 407; Anaway v. David, 9 Hun, 296. S2460. [Amended, 1881.] No person excused from answering on the ground of fraud. - A party or a wit ness, examined in a special proceeding, authorized by * See 2 Month. L. Bull. 94, 96. this article, is not excused from answering a question, on the ground that his examination will tend to convict him of the commission of a fraud; or to prove that he has been a party or privy to, or knowing of, a conveyance, assignment, transfer, or other disposition of property for any purpose; or that he or another person claims to be entitled, as against the judgment creditor, or a receiver appointed or to be appointed in the special proceeding, to hold property, derived from or through the judgment debtor, or to be discharged from the payment of a debt which was due to the judgment debtor, or to a person in his behalf. But an answer cannot be used, as evidence against the person so answering in a criminal action or criminal proceeding. Id., 292, amended. Barber v. People, 17 Hun, 366; Lathrop v Clapp, 40 N. Y. 328; Forbes v. Willard, 54 Barb. 520. 2461. Proceedings where judgment is against joint debtors. - Where the execution was issued as prescribed in section 1941 of this act, a debt due to, or other personal property owned by, one or more of the defend. ants not summoned, jointly with the defendants summoned, or with any of them, may be reached by a special proceeding, instituted as prescribed in this article, and founded upon the judgment. Id., 294, amended; see? 1871, ante. Billhofer v. Heuback, 15 Abb. Pr. 143; Field v. Chapman, id. 434; Produce Bank v. Morton, 67 N. Y. 199. before one judge Sections 26, 52, 2462. Proceedings commenced may be continued before another. and 279 of this act apply to a special proceeding, insti tuted as prescribed in this article; and the judge before whom it is continued, as prescribed in either of those sections, is deemed to be the judge to whom an order or warrant is returnable, for the purpose of any provision of this or the next article. New. § 2463. [Amended 1886.] Cases where this chapter is not applicable; what property cannot be reached.This article does not apply where the judgment debtor is a corporation created by or under the laws of the State, or a foreign corporation specified in section 1813 of this act, except in those actions or special proceed. ings brought by or against the people of the State. No does it authorize the seizure of, or other interference with, any property which is expressly exempt by law from levy and sale by virtue of an execution; or any money, thing in action, or other property, held in trust for a judgment debtor, where the trust has been created by, or the fund so held in trust has proceeded from a person other than the judgment debtor; or the earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services, rendered within sixty days, next before the institution of the special proceeding; when it is made to appear, by his oath or otherwise, that those earnings are necessary for the use of a family, wholly or partly supported by his labor. New. Morgan v. N. Y. & A. R. R. Co., 10 Paige, 290; Hinds v. Canandaigua R. R. Co., 10 How. Pr. 487; Hammond v. Hudson R. Iron Co., 11 id. 29; Sherwood v. Buffalo R. R. Co., 12 id. 136; see Bartlett v. Drew, 60 Barb. 648; 8. c., 4 Lans. 444; Fennin v. Malloy, 33 N. Y. Super. Ct. (1 J. & S.) 382; Campbell v. Foster, 35 N. Y. 361; Miller v. Hooper, 19 Hun, 394; Newell v. Cutler, id. 74; Tillotson v. Wolcott, 48 N. Y. 188; Dickinson v. Onderdonk, 18 Hun, 479; Van Vechten v. Hall, 14 How. 436; Martin v. Sheriden, 2 Hilt. 586; Whalen v. Tennison, 1 Law Bulletin, 22 Cummins v. Timberman, 49 How. 236; Bush v. White, 12 Abb. 21: Gerregani v. Wheelwright, 3 Abb. N. S. 264; Woodman v. Goodenough, 18 Abb. Pr. 265; Tripp v. Childs, 14 Barb. 85; Potter v. Low, 16 How. $49. ARTICLE SECOND THE RECEIVER. SEC. 2464. When and how receiver may be appointed. 2465. Notice to other creditors. 2466. Only one receiver to be appointed. Former receivership may be extended. 2467. Order to be filed and recorded. 2468. When property is vested in receiver. 2469. How receiver's title to personal property extended by relation. § 2464. When and how receiver may be appointed. -At any time after making an order, requiring the judgment debtor, or any other person, to attend and be examined, or issuing a warrant, as prescribed in article first of this title, the judge to whom the order or warrant is returnable may make an order, appointing a re ceiver of the property of the judgment debtor. At least two days' notice of the application for the order ap pointing a receiver, must be given personally to the judgment debtor, unless the judge is satisfied that he cannot, with reasonable diligence, be found within the State; in which case, the order must recite that fact, and may dispense with notice, or may direct notice to be given in any manner which the judge thinks proper. But where the order to attend and be examined, or the warrant, has been served upon the judgment debtor, a receiver may be appointed upon the return day thereof, or at the close of the examination, without further no tice to him. Code of Proc., 298. Chamberlain v. Greenleaf, 4 Abb. N. C. 92; Underwood v. Sutcliffe, 10 Hun, 453, reversed on another ground, 77 N. Y. 58; Dollard v. Taylor, 33 N. Y. Super. 496; Bingham v. Disbrow, 14 Abb. 251; 37 Barb. 24; Andrews v. Glenville Wool Co., 11 Abb. N. S. 78: Kemp v. Harding, 4 How. 178: Bunacleugh v. Boolman, 3 Daly, 236; Ball v. Goodenough, 37 How. 479; Meyers' Case, 2 Abb. 476; Baily v. Lane, 15 Abb. 373, n; Heroy v. Gibson, 10 Bosw. 591; Tood v Crooke, Sandf. 694; see Holbrook v. Orgler, 8 J. & Sp. 33; s. c., 49 How. Pr. 289; see, also, Whitney v. Welch, 2 Abb. N. C. 442; Pool v. Safford, 14 Hun, 369; Morgan v. Potter, 17 id. 403. § 2465. Notice to other creditors.-The judge must ascertain, if practicable, by the oath of the judgment debtor, or otherwise, whether an action, specified in article first of title fourth of chapter fifteenth of this act, or a special proceeding instituted as prescribed in arti cle first of this title, is pending against the judgment debtor. If either is pending, and a receiver has not been appointed therein, notice of the application for the appointment of a receiver, and of all the subsequent proceedings respecting the receivership, must be given, In such a manner as the judge directs, to the judgment creditor prosecuting it. Id., part of 298. 2466. Only one receiver to be appointed. Former receivership may be extended.-Only one receiver of the property of a judgment debtor shall be appointed. Where a receiver thereof has already been appointed, the judge, instead of making the order prescribed in the last section but one, must make an order, extending the receivership to the special proceeding before him. Such an order gives to the judgment creditor the same rights as if a receiver was then appointed upon his ap. plication; including the right to apply to the court to control, direct, or remove the receiver, or to subordinate the proceedings in or by which the receiver was ap pointed, to those taken under his judgment. Id., part of 298; see Rules 84 and 85. Howell v. Ripley, 10 Paige, 43. $2467. Order to be filed and recorded. An order appointing a receiver, or extending a receivership, must be filed in the office of the clerk of the county, wherein the judgment-roll in the action is filed; or, if the special proceeding is founded upon an execution issued out of a court, other than that in which the judgment was rendered, in the office of the clerk of the county, wherein the transcript of the judgment is filed. Id., part of 298. Genner v. Hepburn, 6 Law Bulletin, 29. § 2468. When property is vested in receiver. The property of the judgment debtor is vested in a receiver, who has duly qualified, from the time of filing the order appointing him, or extending his receivership, as the case may be; subject to the following exceptions: 1. Real property is vested in the receiver, only from the time when the order, or a certified copy thereof, as the case may be, is filed with the clerk of the county where it is situated. 2. Where the judgment debtor, at the time when the order is filed, resides in another county of the State, his personal property is vested in the receiver only from the time when a copy of the order, certified by the clerk in whose office it is recorded, is filed with the clerk of the county where he resides. Id., 298. Dubois v. Cassidy, 75 N. Y. 298; Wing v. Disse, 15 Hun, 190; Ritterband v. Baggett, 4 Abb. N. C. 67; Manning v. Evans, 19 Hun, 600; McEwen v. Brewster, id. 337; Underwood v. Sutcliff, ct. app., Apr. 1879, 20 Alb. L. J. 52; Griswold v. Tomkins, 7 Daly, 214; Lanigan v. New York, 70 N. Y. 451; Scroggs v. Palmer, 65 Barb. 505; Banks . Potter, 21 How. 469; Morgan v. Potter, 17 Hun, 403; Johnson v. Martin IT. & C. 504; Conger v. Sands, 19 How. 8; Lottimer v. Lord, 4 E. D. Smith, 183; Wilson v. Allen, 6 Barb. 542; Clan Ronald v. Wyckoff, 41 N. Y. Super. 527; Fenner v. Sanborn, 37 Barb. 610; Barnes v. Morgan, 3 Hun, 703; People v. Hulbert, 5 How. 446; Reed v. Champagne, 5 Week. Dig. 227; Ball v. Goodenough, 37 How. 479; Bostwick v. Menck, 40 N. Y. 383; Seymour v. Wilson, 15 How. 355; Porter v. Williams, 5 Sheld. 142; Thorn v. Fellows, 5 Week. Dig. 473; Fennin v. Malloy, 33 N. Y. Super. Ct. 382; Cooney v. Cooney, 65 Barb. 524; Wood v. Robinson, 23 N Y. 564; Gardner v. Smith, 29 Barb. 68; Palen v. Bushnell, 18 Abb. 301 Fessenden v. Wood, 3 Bosw. 550; Andrews v. Glenville Wool Co., 11 Abb. N.S. 78; Van Rensselaer v. Emery, 9 How. 135; Lowry v. Smith, 9 Hun, 514; Wardell v. Leavenworth, 3 Edw. 244; Dickerson v. Van Tine, 1 Sandf. 724; Branch v. Harrington, 49 How. 196; Baker v. Van Epps, 58 id. 401; Matter of Wilds, 6 Abb. N. C. 307; Smith v. Clarke, 1 Law Bulletin, 83; Rockwell v. Merwin, 45 N. Y. 166; Scroggs v. Palmer, 69 Barb. 505; Richards v. Allen, 3 E. D. Smith, 399; Tyler v. Whitney, 12 Abb. 465, 33 Barb. 327; Livingston v. Stæsel, 3 Bosw. 19; Union Bank of Troy v. Sargent, 53 Barb. 422; Weyman v. Childs, 44 id. 103. § 2469. How receiver's title to personal property extended by relation.-Where the receiver's title to personal property has become vested, as prescribed in the last section, it also extends back by relation, for the |