"You must submit to the ruination of your character, or, if you seek legal redress, twelve other men will sit in judgment upon your motives and conduct in rendering the verdict you did."

What was done in this case was to question the juror for the verdict rendered by him as an untrue verdict, and he was called upon to give the reasons and grounds of it; and the correctness of the verdict, and the sufficiency of the testimony to produce conviction in the mind of Welch and his fellow-jurors, was again tried before another jury as fully, to all intents and purposes, as if the proceedings by attaint had not been abolished. It can make no difference that the alleged libel is justified by plea. Justification is a good defense, but it must be proved by legal and competent evidence. The shield which the statute throws around jurors from being questioned and from suit for any verdict rendered by them cannot be broken or thrown aside for the purpose of trying the truth of the verdict rendered. The statute seeks to protect the rights of the public and of parties by proceeding against a juror who has been guilty of corrupt conduct in rendering a verdict by criminal prosecution.

The conduct of jurors is not above criticism either by the public press or private parties. No political, judicial, or administrative department of the government is beyond criticism. But just criticism is not libelous, neither is severe criticism. But to charge that a jury have perjured themselves in rendering a certain verdict is libelous. It may appear in a criminal case, to a person not acting under the responsibility of an oath, from the facts and circumstances developed at the trial, that the accused is guilty, and ought to be convicted. Yet to the juror

sitting upon the trial, every fact and circumstance must be consistent not only with the guilt of the accused of the crime charged, but the evidence must be of such

character and weight as to leave no reasonable doubt of his guilt in the mind of the jury. How are such questions to be tried in a libel suit charging perjury under a plea of justification and truth of the charge? What nicely poised scales do the second jury possess which shall enable them to enter the domain of conscientious conviction or reasonable doubt in the minds of the first jury, and weigh them to ascertain whether they have violated their oaths?

What has been said has application solely to the question under consideration; that is, to the right of defendcase like this to question a juror concerning a verdict rendered by him, or to inquire of him his motives or reasons for finding such verdict. This is sufficient for the present case. We think the question, and those succeeding it in the same direction, should have been excluded.

We think the court erred in excluding an article appearing in defendant's paper, after suit was commenced, in which the article charged as libelous was republished and comments made. It was offered to show that the defendant entertained malice against plaintiff, and was admissible for that purpose.

For the errors pointed out, the case must be reversed, and a new trial granted.

The other Justices concurred.

INDEX.

Head-note references are to pages.

Where there are several

notes on a page, the number of the note is added in parenthesis,
unless the reference is to all.

Cross-references are to subjects, and the same rule is followed as
to giving number of head-note.

ACCEPTANCE BY ASSIGNEES-See ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT
OF CREDITORS (4).

ACCEPTANCE OF TENANCY-See DAMAGES (1).

ACTION-See BILLS AND NOTES (2, 3); CORPORATIONS (8c); PARTIES
(3); PLEADING (5).

AFFIDAVIT.

An affidavit for a civil warrant which sets forth that the
defendant represented to the plaintiff that he was superin-
tendent for a railroad contractor, and authorized to hire
men and teams, and that he would pay $3.50 per day for
the services of plaintiff and his team, and furnish transpor-
tation to the place where the work was to be done, where
he would be furnished accommodations at $1 per day, and
that in reliance upon such representations, which were aver-
red to be false, plaintiff agreed to go to work at the price
stated, and on arriving at the place designated was informed
by a person claiming to be the contractor that defendant
had no authority to hire men or teams, and that plaintiff
would only be paid $2.25 per day, for which sum he worked
for a time and then returned to his home, while not as
83 MICH.-43.

673

AFFIDAVIT-Continued.

clearly framed as is desirable, is sufficient to give the court
jurisdiction. 547.

See APPEAL (1); EVIDENCE (18); FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
(2); PRACTICE IN CIRCUIT Court (2-4).

AGENCY-See CONTRACT (3).

AGENT-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (3).

AMENDMENT-See MORTGAGE (1); PleadiNG (3, 4); PRACTICE IN
CIRCUIT COURT (2-4).

ANTECEDENT DEBT-See PURCHASE FOR VALUE.

ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT-See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (4).

APPEAL.

1. An affidavit for an appeal from a judgment against two
joint defendants was made by one of them in behalf of both,
who executed the required bond, with one surety, but it
was not executed by his co-defendant, nor did he appear
in the circuit court; and it is held that the justice's judg-
ment, as to said defendant, remained unaffected by the
appeal, and that said defendant was not entitled to enter his
appearance in the circuit court, nor to a notice of trial. 50.
2. An order dissolving a preliminary injunction in so far as it
interfered with the right of possession of land by the defend-
ant, she being in such possession at time of the commence-
ment of the suit, and directing that complainant restore the
premises to the defendant, whose possession had been dis-
turbed by him under said injunction, is not an appealable
order. 263.

See CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS (5, 6); FORCIBLE ENTRY AND
DETAINER (2, 3).

ARGUMENT TO JURY.

1. It is not error for the court to order counsel to desist from
commenting in their argument to the jury upon alleged
entries in books of account which, though inquired about on
cross-examination, are not made evidence by the introduction
of the books. 116 (4).

2. An attorney is entitled to some license in his argument, and
the testimony to him may bear quite different inferences and

ARGUMENT TO JURY-Continued.

conclusions than might be deduced by a disinterested and
unbiased judge. 218 (2).

See CHARGE TO JURY (1); CRIMINAL LAW (1); EVIDENCE (2).

ASSIGNMENT-See MECHANIC'S LIEN.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

1. The failure of an assignee under an assignment for the
benefit of creditors to file the statutory bond will not entitle
a mortgagee whose mortgage is fraudulent as to creditors to
recover in an action of trover brought against the assignee
for the value of the mortgage interest in the assigned prop-
erty. 256 (2).

2. The filing and approval of a bond by an assignee under an
assignment for the benefit of creditors after the statutory ten
days will not operate to vest in him the title to the assigned
property. Id. (3).

3. A deed executed prior to the passage of the statute regulat-
ing the making of assignments for the benefit of creditors,
which purports to convey all of the grantor's property to the
grantees in trust for the use and benefit of his creditors
(with preferences), and which is signed and acknowledged by
the grantor and grantees, and placed upon record in the
proper office, is upon its face a valid conveyance of all the
grantor's property for the uses therein stated. 301 (1).

4. Joining in such a deed, and placing it upon record after the
execution was completed, is conclusive of acceptance by the
grantees. Id. (2).

5. In such a case a creditor obtained a judgment against the
assignor after the making and acceptance of the assignment
deed, and levied upon a portion of the assigned land, which
was sold without filing a bill in aid of execution. As a mat-
ter of fact the assignees never acted under or attempted to
execute the trust, and some years after the execution sale
they executed a quitclaim deed to the assignor of the land,
who conveyed it by warranty deed. And in a suit in equity
brought against the grantee in said warranty deed, in which
the complainant claimed title to the land through the execu-
tion sale and attacked the assignment deed as fraudulent and
void, it is held that the legal title passed to the assignees
under the assignment deed, and was vested in them at the
time of the execution sale, under which the purchaser