Ex.]

steamers.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. Kent aND OTHERS.

It follows that no right of the plt. is shown to have been infringed by the deft., and that the deft. is entitled to our judginent. Judgment for deft. Attorney for deft., Evans.

COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Reported by F. BAILEY and H. LEIGH, Esqrs., Barristersat-Law.

Friday, May 9.

and that he did not acquire thereby any considera fortune as alleged by the Crown.

On the 3rd Dec. 1859 the testator duly made n executed his last will and testament in writing, st therein described himself as "Alexander Tesm Sampayo, Baron de Sampayo, a Portuguese stije and an attaché to the Legation of H. M. F. May the King of Portugal, now residing at Barnes, in t county of Surrey," and he appointed defts to a executors thereof, who duly proved the same will: the 3rd June 1860, in her Majesty's Coati Probate.

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. KENT AND OTHERS. Revenue-Legacy duty-Domicil-Attaché to foreign embassy in England-Liability of to legacy duty-be Exemption from taxes-Nature and extent of the privilege.

The payment of legacy duty, or an immunity from
such payment, depends entirely on the domicil of the
party whose property is concerned.
The appointment of a foreigner, who has gained by
residence an English domicil, to be an attaché to the
legation of his own Sovereign in this country, does
not put an end to his English domicil or confer
upon him any right to revert to his domicil of
origin, and, consequently, on his death, his personal
property in this country is liable to legacy duty:
Heath v. Sampson, 14 Beav. 441, is a direct au-
thority to that effect.

The privilege of exemption from taxation and from
the operation of the civil and criminal law, accorded
to an ambassador, is a personal privilege founded
on the sacredness of his person and the rule of in-
ternational law by which, though actually resident
here, he is looked upon as being "extra terri-
toriam" and residing within his own country; but
no analogy arises, from such exemption during his
life, to exempt his personal property from legacy
duty after his death.

And, supposing the exemption to apply after his death, which is not the case, it would still only extend to a certain class of property which is not the subject of this information, viz., to such moveables as could not be interfered with without interfering with his personal comfort and dignity.

This was an English information by the AttorneyGeneral on behalf of the Crown; the object of which was to obtain from defts., who were the executors of the will of Alexander Texeira Sampayo, Baron de Sampayo, late of Barnes in the county of Surrey, deceased, payment of legacy duty in respect of the testator's personal estate; and the question for the decision of the court was, whether the testator was, at the time of his death, domiciled in England.

From the information, and the answer of the defts. thereto, it appeared that the testator, who died at Barnes on the 11th May 1860, was born of Portuguese parents, in 1795, in the Azores, then and now part of the dominions of the King of Portugal. In 1818 he came to England in the capacity of a commissioner, or agent, to manage in London the affairs and business of the "Oporto Wine Company," in which the then King of Portugal was largely interested, and continued to reside in London in such capacity until 1833, when the company ceased to exist. From 1828 to 1833 he also held, jointly with his late brother Francisco Texeira, Baron de Sampayo, the office of financial agent and representative of the Portuguese Government in London; and from 1833 to the time of his death he resided at Earnes, having thus had his fixed and permanent abode in England from 1818 to the time of his death in 1860, and having, as the Crown alleged, during all, or the most part of that period, been engaged in mercantile pursuits, and amassed a considerable fortune thereby. The defts. averring that, except from 1818 to 1833, as before mentioned, he was not engaged in mercantile pursuits,

The defts., in their answer, say the said wil w valid according to the law of Portugal, being may according to the law of the country in which testam actually was at the time of making it, although he wa, as they insist, at that time and at his death, dominet in Portugal.

It appeared that the testator had previously signed several testamentary papers in his own handwriting a one of which, bearing date 3rd Dec. 1857, and Winch, but for the execution of the said will of and Dec. 1859, defts. aver would have been his last will, the said testator stated as follows:-"As I am a fareigar who always intended to return to my country, m besides, being an attaché of the legation of H. M.F. Majesty the King of Portugal, in London, my property is not subject to legacy duty." The will of the lea Dec. 1860 was prepared by deft. Bircham, who wo testator's soliciter, and who, as defts. aver, omitted so much of the above passage as related to legacy day, without any communication thereon with, or instrations from the testator.

Application was made to defts. for payment of the legacy duty in respect of testator's personal estän and was refused by them on the ground that tes was, as appears from the facts set forth in the formation and answer, domiciled, at the time of s death, in the kingdom of Portugal; and also on a ground that the testator was, in 1857, appointed his late Majesty, the then King of Portugal, an attack (with the rank of baron) to the legation of his Majest in England, which appointment was duly notined to and recognised by H. M. then principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and was held by testator thenforward to the time of his death; and that in respect of such appointment he, in the year 1858, chainst and obtained from the Board of Inland Revenue exemption from the payment of assessed and ether taxes. Thereupon this information was filed, and the question now came on for argument.

The Attorney-General (Sir W. Atherton), the Solicitor General (Sir R. Palmer), Locke, QC ad A. Hanson (of the Chancery bar), appeared for the Crown, and argued that there was an animas e 3* tator's part to acquire an English domicil, and this p residing and engaging in trade in this country inn 1818 to 1833, and more especially by his resident here from 1833 to the time of his death, during whit latter period he was not engaged in mercantile parsuits, and during the whole of which period be ba not visited or held communication with his native country, thus showing a permanent residence without any animus redeundi, the factum also was conplete. The testator had thus previously to 1857 acquired an English domicil, which Engi domicil so acquired was not lost or destroyed by his appointment, in 1857, as attaché to the Portuguese embassy here, but continued to be his domicil to the time of his death. That, as to the declaration it a former will, its purpose appeared on its face; it was a legal argument, and not a res gesta; it was like a declaration post litem motum, and the only inference thence to be drawn was, an objection to pay legacy duty; but it could not alter the effect of acts previously done. That to effect a change of domied there

Ex.]

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL v. KENT AND OTHERS.

The Attorney-General in reply.

[Ex.

:

st be a concurrence of both animus and factum, and | sion, it did his person, from liability to taxation. They re there was no departure to any other place. But cited and referred to the following authorities: was said there was a constructive departure by Heath v. Sampson (ubi sup.); Hodgson v. De Beauason of his acceptance of this office, and the fiction schesne, 12 Mo. P. C. 285; Taylor v. Best, 14 C. B. extra territoriality, which was invented by jurists to 487; 23 L. J. 89, C. P.; Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. ve a more lively idea of the exemption of ambassadors 1480; La Virgnue, 5 Rob. Adm. Rep. 599; stat. om local jurisdiction, was put forward in support of 7 Anne, c. 12; Vattel, b. 4. c. 8, ss. 110 and 115; is theory. No doubt, apart from any question of c. 9, s. 120; the maxim "hereditas persona vicem -micil, ambassadors were entitled in a foreign country sustinet;" Wild. Inst. pp. 92, 94; Storey Confl. L. certain privileges and exemptions which extended to p. 48, s. 48, p. 49: Felix Droit Internat. vol. 2, p. eir attachés, and even to their servants; but it would 389; Grot. book 2, c. 18, No. 5; Ib. s. 9; Bynkere absurd to say that, because, for certain reasons of shoek, caps. 2, 10, 14; Wheaton's El., part 3, s. 17, tate policy and convenience, a foreign ambassador in p. 287 (Lawrence's edit.) ais country was supposed to be in his own country, herefore this fiction of extra territoriality applied to all he members of the suite, and that his coachman's omicil, for instance, was moved to Portugal. The xemptions from arrest and taxation, &c., were founded n the sanctity of the ambassador's person. At his leath the person with its sanctity was gone, and the question was, whether his personal estate left to A. B. and C. D. should be subject to duty, and the defts. as executors be held liable to pay it; both which questions they contended must be answered in the affirmative. In support of their argument they cited and referred to the following authorities:-Thompson v. The Advocate-General of Scotland, 12 Cl. & F. 1; the maxim “mobilia sequuntur personam;" Heath v. Sampson, 14 Beav. 441; Re Steer, 2 H. & N. 594; 28 L. J. 22, Ex.; Stanley v. Bernes, 3 Hagg. 373; see per Parke, B., 15 Jur. 255-6; Phillimore on Domicil, 137-147; Vattel, book i. c. 19, s. 219; Wheaton's Elements, 272; The Caroline, 6 Rob. Adm. Rep. 468; Re Bruce, 2 C. & J. 436; Bruce v. Bruce, 2 B. & P. 229, in notis, and 6 Bro. P. C. 566; Storey's Confl. Laws, p. 47, s. 43. [MARTIN, B. referred to Attorney-General v. Pottinger, 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 368; 6 H. & N. 733; 30 L. J. 284, Ex]

M. Smith, Q.C., Dr. Phillimore, Q.C. and Welsby, contra, for the defts., contended that length of residence without evidence of intention was not enough to change the domicil of origin, which was the least easily changed and the most easily reverted to. That even if the testator had acquired an English domicil prior to 1857, which they denied, his appointment as attaché in that year revived the domicil of origin. Since 1857 he was not resident in England so as to be liable to English burdens; he was resident here as the representative of the Crown of Portugal, and as such was residing here extra territoriam, and for all purposes was within the kingdom of Portugal, and if that were so as to taxation during his life, there could be no right to tax his estate after his death. That by the law of nations, which for this purpose is the Jaw of England, he was not subject to municipal law, not only as to remedy, but as to rights, and certainly as to burdens. There was a category of persons incapable of acquiring a domicil in England, and those entitled to the privilege of extra territoriality could not acquire it; the moveable property of a person privileged to pay no taxes during life could not be subject to taxes at his death, and there was no instance of such property ever having paid duty. The privilege during life and after death could not be separated, both being founded on the principle that the person was extra-territorial. Domicil was territorial. Here the law has said the deceased was out of the territory, therefore there could be no domicil, and as the duty depended on the domicil there could be no duty. Further, there were three sorts of domicil-domicil of birth, of choice and by operation of law. The present was a domicil by operation of law, and not dependent on factum or intention at all; and, whether the appointment revived the domicil of origin or not, it was sufficient to exempt his property, as, by admis

POLLOCK, C. B.-In this case I am of opinion that the Crown is entitled to our judgment. I think it is established by the case that bas been referred to in 4 Cl. & Fin. that the payment of legacy duty, or an immunity from such payments, depends entirely on the domicil of the party whose property is concerned, and the appointment of this gentleman, the Baron de Sampayo, as ambassador from the Crown of Portugal, does not appear to me to vary the matter; for, after the decision in the case of Heath v. Sampson, 14 Beav. 441, that a foreigner might die while actually filling the office of ambassador or envoy extraordinary to a foreign power, and yet be domiciled in England, it is impossible to say but that this gentleman, the Baron de Sampayo, might be domiciled in England, notwithstanding he was the attaché here. And then the question is, whether before his appointment, before his nomination to the office of attaché, he was domiciled here. The circumstances under which the residence commenced, the total absence of any evidence of communication with his own country, of any visit there, of any correspondence with anybody in that country, or anything that showed the least intention of returning, or of a continued connection with that country, would tend to give to his long residence here that effect which Lord Thurlow, in one of the earliest cases, says ought to be attached to length of residence. And I think the declaration which appears in a will--not in the last will, but in one made beforeis entitled, under the circumstances, to very little, if indeed to any, consideration at all. I come, therefore, to the conclusion that, at the time he was appointed attache, he was domiciled in England. I think his nomination as an attaché to the Portuguese legation does not put an end to the English domicil, and confer upon him any right to revert to the Portuguese domicil. I think his English domicil continued, and that it was not actually changed by the appointment. It appears to me, therefore, that he was, at the time of his death, and continued to be, domiciled in England, and consequently that the property in question was liable to the legacy duty. My opinion is, that the Crown is entitled to our judginent.

MARTIN, B.-I am of the same opinion. When the case comes to be understood it seems to me a very plain one. The claim made here is for legacy duty, which is a duty imposed by Act of Parliament upon the property of a deceased person, the exigencies of the State requiring that there should be imposed on such property a certain duty on the legacies that he leaves after his death. It has been established for years that, to ascertain what is the law with respect to personal property, you are to ascertain the domicil of the person to whom the property belongs; and it seems to be fixed and settled that, as a consequence of that, this question of the payment of legacy duty is to be governed by reason of the domicil. The question that first arises here is, is there anything under the circumstances of this gentleman having been an attaché to the Portuguese embassy at the time of his death which affects that? I think there is nothing at all; and I think there is nothing for this reason, that the case in 14

what does it amount to? It amounts to nothing ma than a sort of intention to return to Penal I find it stated, in the most direct terms, by Mr. Juta Storey, in treating of this matter, “ that if a persu has actually removed to another place, with an etion of remaining there for an indefinite time" wha I take it is exactly the character of this gentes residence in England," and is a place of present drais cil, it becomes his domicil, notwithstanding he may entertain a floating intention to return, at some forme period, to his own country.” Giving credit to the statement made by this gentleman, which I have s read, I think that indicates what his intention wasthat he had an intention of leaving England and turning to Portugal, most probably, in his mind. Es were there, it seems to me to exactly fit what Mr.Justice Storey states, and would not alter the domicl that be had. Giving credit to that statement, it appears t me that it is not sufficient to alter it. But it sens to me clear, that in 1857 he was domiciled in this country; that there is nothing in his appointment as attaché to alter that; and that it so continued, nitwithstanding he had an intention in his mind to retar to Portugal. Perhaps I am drawing too strong an inference from his statement, as to that being realy is intention. Assuming that to be so, I do not think a amounts to more than what Mr. Justice Storeys, and is not sufficient to alter his domicil. I am dieariy of opinion that the Crown is right, and is therem entitled to our judgment.

Bear. is a direct authority to the contrary. As long I give to that statement what I think that stateare as he lived he was relieved from the payment of taxes, by a gentleman of his station, is entitled to. I ra by that rule of international law which has been re-him full credit that that was stated bond pile. Tha ferred to, and it is reasonable and right and proper that it should be so. But this question arises after his death; what is there in the reason for the exemption which he was entitled to during his life to exempt his property after his death from the payment of legacy duty? I apprehend there is nothing, that no analogy arises, from his being exempted from the payment of taxes during his life, to exempt his property after his death. Is there anything in the circumstance that, at the time of his death, he filled the office of attaché to the Portuguese embassy? According to the case in 14 Beav. there is nothing. He may have filled the high post of an ambassador to a foreign State, yet, nevertheless, have retained his English domicil. That is the direct decision of that case. That being so, it appears to me that the question becomes a question of fact; where was this gentleman really domiciled? And, when once the domicil is arrived at, there is very little doubt about it. According to Storey, the more correct definition is, "that that place is properly the domicil of a person in which his habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom." That is a very clear definition. I turn to the definition as given by Dr. Phillimore in his book; and his definition is this: He states that, in his opinion, the American writers have laid down the more correct definition on the subject, and he says that the meaning is, "that it is the habitation fixed in any place without any present intention of removing therefrom." That is pretty nearly the same; and that is stated, by the learned author, to have been upon a review of all the authorities. Then, applying that to this case, what are the facts? This gentleman was born in 1795, and came to England in 1818, when he was only twenty-three years of age. He came as the agent of the Portuguese Government, to superintend the trade of Oporto wines, and so continued until the year 1833, when the business ceased. Up to that time, if I were asked to draw an inference as to what was his domicil, I should be inclined to say that his domicil was that of Por-weight to the considerations in favour of the testators tugal. From that time to the year 1857 he is living at Barnes, in a villa there, and there is not one act of his, during the twenty-four or twenty-five years, to show any other intention than an intention to reside in England. Applying those two facts to the cas", as stated by Dr. Phillimore, how can you fail to draw the conclusion that, from that year, he was as much domiciled in England as а man could possibly be?

BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. Setting aside for the moment the nature of the office, ante effect which it is contended by the learned counsel r the deft. it would have upon the acquired domicili the deceased, if he had one, I am clearly of op that the deceased had an acquired English domică z the time of his death. I will not go over the age ments which my brother Martin bas used, which an, to my mind, demonstrative. Giving the groast

intention, at soine time or other, to return, and use adopting any definition of domicil the most favourite to the defts., I am clearly of opinion that, sag aside for the moment the alleged operation of t pointment, he had acquired and had an Exa domicil at the time of his death. Then it is she effect of his taking this office was, as I understa argument, that in spite of any factum or anina dis Is there anything afterwards to show that continued residence here, and of his desire to be” a that was not the case? The circumstance that domicil here, that, in spite of those considerativas.the he was attached to the Portuguese embassy, in fact of his becoming an attaché would cause a my judgment, shows nothing. That was as much lose his acquired English domicil. It was put en is consistent with his intention to have an English domi- ground that an ambassador and his suite are exz cil, as it was not. It was an office of honour, show- territorial; that as soon as he is appointed attaché t ing the estimation in which he was held by the the Portuguese embassy he becomes, as it were, a Sovereign of the country to which he belonged, and Portugal; and the case is just the same as if he had which entitled him to certain benefits so long as he gone to Portugal, or gone on board a Portage retained it. Then, what is there to show that he had man-of-war. I am very clearly of opinion that that's not the intention to have England as his domicil, up not so; and I cannot help adverting to what was sad to the period that I have mentioned? According to by Lord Mansfield in the case of Mostyn v. Fangu: Mr. Justice Storey, for the purpose of altering his "It is a certain rule that a fiction of law shall ever domicil there must be two things, residence and inten-be contradicted so as to defeat the end for which it was tion. There is an utter absence of any evidence of invented, but for every other purpose it may be cointention whatever. Assuming that he had deter-tradicted." (a) Assuming that the Portagase mined that the domicil which, upon the premises I ambassador and his attaché must be considered as if have stated, is clearly shown was his domicil in 1857, they were in Portugal, it is only for certain purposes f should cease for all, there is this circumstance, that, protection, safety, dignity and comfort, and otherte in a will, or instructions for a will, which the profes-purpose of considering whether, after death, they ala sional gentleman who was directed to prepare it has stated to be in his own handwriting, he says: "I am a foreigner, who always intended to return to my own country; "then he goes on to state, "besides being an attaché, that his property is not subject to legacy duty."

domicil here so as to make them liable to the pay duty. As to that, the actual facts should be som I have no doubt that such an argument is not susta

(a) Cowp. 177; 1 Sm. L. C., p. 358-9, 2nd elit.

Ex.]

DIGEST OF MARITIME LAW CASES.

le. We are not to be supposed to be deciding anying contrary to the comity of nations; we are not ying that, if a man came here and continued an taché for forty or fifty years, he would thereby, mpliciter, acquire an English domicil, and that his roperty would be subject to the legacy duty. We firm nothing of the sort. What we do affirm is, that e. having acquired an English domicil, does not lose ipso fucto, without more, by taking the office of an ttaché. For these reasons I am satisfied that the Crown is entitled to our judgment.

[ADM.

fact of his becoming an ambassador, he lost his English domicil, which he might wish to keep. But nothing has ever been said or determined in support of the proposition contended for. A dictum certainly was put forward from this book, to the effect that the personal effects or moveables belonging to the minister, within the state where he resides, are entirely exempted from any jurisdiction. That seems a very broad proposition; but I find the next sentence is to this effect: Nor are the personal effects of which he may be possessed as a merchant carrying on trade exempt from the operation of the local law;" and following that out, in Taylor v. Best, the Court of C. P. laid down that this exemption as to his moveables affects the moveables which belong to him, or which could not be interfered with without interfering with his personal comfort and dignity as an ambassador, and by no means extends to all his property in this country. Taking the proposition relied on as if the exemption were to be the same after his death as when he was alive, which is not the case it would still extend only to a certain class of property, which is not the subject of this information, and which would interfere with his comfort and dignity. The proposition is a much more limited one than the learned counsel at the bar would have us suppose; and even if it were not, it has by no means the least application to the property which remains after his death.

The Attorney-General.-I presume the decree will be in the terms of the prayer? POLLOCK, C. B.-Yes.

Decree for the Crown as prayed, with costs. Attorney for the Crown, the Solicitor of Inland Revenue, Somerset-house.

Attorneys for the defts., Bircham, Dalrymple and Drake, 46, Parliament-street.

DIGEST OF MARITIME LAW CASES
(EXCEPTING SALVAGE AWARDS.)
FROM 1837 TO 1860.
(Continued from p. 836.)

Law Cases decided from Michaelmas Term 1859. This Digest will
contain all (except the Salvage Awards) decided from 1937 to Nov.
1859. A Digest of the Salvage Cases during the same period is
appearing in the LAW TIMES.]

WILDE, B.-I am of the same opinion. The priniple upon which the simple question, whether an ndividual's domicil in England has been determined or not, has been stated by the rest of the court. The facts show that this case comes within that principle. We have an extended residence in this country without any expressed intention of leaving it; we have length of time; we have no special purpose for which he was detained here; we have no declaration of any intention to leave; and finally, we have the individual dying in this country. All that makes out a very strong case of a domicil, according to the ordinary mode of considering it. Assuming that the next question in the argument is, whether the fact of his having filled the office of an attaché from 1857 did alter the domicil which he had previously acquired, it has been argued that it did, for the reasons mentioned by my brother Bramwell, that it puts him out of England, and puts him into Portugal. I agree with my brother Bramwell that that is straining the principles, or fictions, or statements of law to a purpose that never was intended when they were first put forward, and I am certainly fortified in that by the passage from Mr. Wheaton's book, which was so much relied on by Dr. Phillimore: "From the moment that a public minister enters the territory of a State to which he is sent, he is entitled to entire exemption from local jurisdiction, both civil and criminal; his person is sacred and inviolable. To give a more lively idea of his complete exemption from local jurisdiction, the fiction of extra territoriality has been invented, by which the minister, though in a foreign [N.B.-The LAW TIMES REPORTS, N. 8., will give all the Maritime country, is supposed to remain within the territory of his own Sovereign." So the passage cited from Grotius is to the same effect, in which he uses the term "quasi extra territoriam ;" no doubt that means nothing more than this, that for the purpose of illustrating the complete sacredness of the person of an ambassador in this country, and his immunity from the civil and criminal law of this country, he is to be looked upon as if he were residing within his own country. That means nothing more; and when that is applied to a case like the present, things that are totally different are confused together. It is said that he is freed from taxes during life, and from the operation of the civil and criminal law. It must be observed that the subjection to these laws does not depend upon domicil. A man while he is in England is subject to the civil and criminal laws of this country, though he may not be domiciled here, and as the obligation of these laws upon him does not depend upon his domicil, so his immunity from these laws will not show that his domicil is not here. It seems to me that the argument totally fails to make out that he ceased to be domiciled in England because he had these immunities as ambassador. But there is a wider and more dangerous ground taken-and I use the word "dangerous" not only in reference to people in this country, but to foreigners themselves-a more dangerous proposition has been attempted here, to this effect: that whether he is domiciled here or not, the laws of this country applicable to his property which might be subject to legacy duty cannot possibly apply. Domicil is a matter that has its rights, as well as its bearings against the individual. It ' would be very hard on a foreigner to say that, by the

FREIGHT (continued).

X. PAYMENT.

1206. Freight of a cargo from the West Indies having been paid by consignees to brokers within two months from the date of sending in the report, the broker subsequently absconding, found by jury to be a legal payment, although it was alleged to be the custom of the trade to pay it after the lapse of two months from that date: (Graham, &c. v. Kensington, &c., C. P., Dec. 17, 1842, Shipping Garette.)

1207. Freight on teak timber held by a jury to be paylength, breadth and depth; that is, by space and not by able by dock company's measurement, viz. by extreme bulk. The teak timber composing the cargo was very crooked: (Harley, &c., v. Roll, C. P., Dec. 13, 1844, Shipping Gazette.)

1208. Charter per month; assignment of freight; claim for payment after bankruptcy: (The Fifeshire; Boyd, &c. v. Mangles. &c., C. E. Jan. 24, 1849; Harrison's Digest, 3433, 3 Ex. 387; Shee's Tenterden, 74; see Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. of L. Ca. 702.)

1209. Independent of custom freight is not due until the consignee has had a reasonable time to learn whether he has received the full amount consigned to him, even although his own goods are shipped to him." The clause "weight unknown" does not affect the freighter's right to recover, but merely serves to exonerate the master." Observations as to the establishing of usage by evidence. The jury must be constrained to say it entered into the minds of the parties in making the contract, otherwise the usage has not effect: (American case: Soule, &c. v. Ranstead, &c. C. P.. Boston, U. S., 1849, Shipping Gazette)

1210. Case relative to payment of freight and discount for cash where the balance of freight was payable according to charter-party by good and approved bill at four months: (Johnson v. Gillespie, Greenock Sheriff's Court, Dec. 27, 1850, Shipping Gazette.)

1211. Charterers not liable to shipowner for freight paid by them to a shipbroker who acted as agent for the shipowner, and afterwards became bankrupt without paying their promissory note for its amount to the shipowner:

Re ANON.

(The Assyrian; Nicol v. Gilman, &c., Q. B., July 4, Nov. 41 ment through sea perils is unquestionable. Mr. Philip and 15, 1856, Shipping Gazette.)

1214. The master having sold cargo without necessity, and not being entitled to freight pro rata, held, on the authority of Campbell v. Thomson, 1 Stark. 499, and Chapman v. Benson, 5 Com. B. R. 358-9, that the shippers could not recover a loss of freight advanced from underwriters. Con1224 a. Charterer not liable for detention of ship caused sequences, as regards freight, of master selling cargo necessarily (The Louis Napoleon, Central Circuit Court, New-charter-party: (Pringell v. Mollett, 6 M. & W. 80; Eby ice, without express stipulation to that effect in foundland, Sept. 15, Shipping Gazette, Dec. 7, 1857.)

where the "stop" on the goods for freight was taken off, The jurisdiction of the Court for Relief of lase

and the consignees became bankrupt: (Green, &c. v. Dirom, dc., C. E., July 11, 1848, Shipping Gazette; see Maclachlan on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 425.)