Ex.] It was also said that the right of the Midland Comport ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton RAILWAY Co. [LA tion Company ever availed themselves of the right so ously from Birmingham to Gloucester in the same asconferred; but the Birmingham and Gloucester Com-riage, which is what the 6th section is intended to secur pany did, and have ceased to run passenger trains from Stoke to Abbott's Wood over their own line, and run them all over the loop line, as they were lawfully entitled to do; and if, by so doing they have released themselves from the obligation of running a cheap train direct from Birmingham to Gloucester, they are liable to the duty; but if they are still subject to the obligation, they are entitled to the exemption. Birmingham and Gloucester are two very large and populous towns; they are the two terminal stations of the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway, and there is not a word to be found in the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Act to show that, by the right given to the Birmingham and Gloucester Company to use the narrow gauge line to be provided for them, the Legislature meant to relieve them from the obligation of running the cheap train. If it has such an operation it was unforeseen, and would defeat the plain and obvious and manifest spirit and intention of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 85. The point, therefore, seems to me to be, am I constrained to put such a construc- POLLOCK, C.B.-The facts of this case have alrendy tion upon the 6th section as would defeat such in- been so fully stated by my brother Martin, that a U tention? The Act extends to Scotland as well as to quite unnecessary for me to repeat them, and I proced England, and, according to the judgment of Lord at once to deliver the judgment of my brother ComCampbell in Lord Braybrooke v. The Attorney-General, nell, my brother Wilde and myself upon the questiva delivered in the House of Lords on the 19th March before us. This is a claim made by the Attorney1861, (a) "is to be construed not according to the General on behalf of the Crown, under the 5 & 6 Vit technicalities of the law of real property in England c. 79, for duties on the money received by the railway or in Scotland, but according to the popular use of the company for the conveyance of passengers on ter language employed." (b) The train is to be for the line. The defence of the company is twofold. Fis conveyance of third-class passengers to and from the they say they are not the parties liable to be called in terminal and other ordinary passenger stations of to pay the duty at all. It ought, they say, to be paid the railway. It is to be continued so long as they by the Midland Railway Company, for whom ty carry other passengers over the line, and it is to ceive it. Secondly, they contend that, admitting the travel along the railway from one end to the other of liability to pay the duty, if due, it is claimed in resped each trunk, or branch, or line belonging to or leased by of receipts for the conveyance of passengers, at fares na them. This loop is a junction line, and does it either exceeding a penny for each mile, by a cheap tra "belong to," or is it "leased by," the Midland Company which the Midland Railway Company were counpeed within the meaning of the section? They have an to run by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 85, s. 6; and by the t absolute right to use it; they do use it in exercise of section of that Act no tax shall be levied upon sid their right, and no one can lawfully prevent them. If receipts arising from any such cheap train. Ta the word "belonging" is to be construed in the sense respect to the first point made by the defts. there is a of their being the owners of the soil, it does not belong difference of opinion on the bench. The duty is created to them; but if " 'belonging" is to be construed by the 5 & 6 Vict. c. 79; and by the 4th section of that in the popular sense of having the absolute right Act the duty is made payable by the party receiving to use it in the only way in which a railway the money. The defts. allege that they receive it t be used, namely, by running trains over it, for themselves, but as agents for the Midland Railway it is not a very strained use of the word" belonging" Company. We are all of opinion that, as they actaly to say that the line belongs to them. A road may be receive the fares from the public, they are respenstie said, with perfect propriety, to belong to a man who to the Crown for the payment of the duty, whi has the right to use it, as of right, although the soil may be the arrangements between them and any other does not belong to him. Again, the right which the company as to the mode in which the receipts Midland Company possesses is to have maintained for are to be disposed of or dividel. And this is their use, by the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhamp- the point which is principally urged in the answer of ton Railway Company, a line of railway on the narrow the defts, to the information of the Attorney-General, gauge subject to an annual payment to the Oxford, for the Midland Company themselves appear to have Worcester and Wolverhampton Company. This com paid the duties in question as to the other parts of the pany are the owners of the soil and of the rails, but line. As to the second ground of defence, namely, the Midland Company have an absolute right of way that the duty cannot be claimed from either company, over it at an annual payment which, in popular lanit appears to me that, in order to be entitled to exemp guage, may be well called a rent, and in my opinion these tion from duty, the train in respect of which the rights may be properly enough described as a railway exemption is claimed must be a compulsory train, azd or line demised to or leased by them at an annual rent. it must substantially comply with the conditions unT It was said that the public may have the benefit of the which alone such a train is by the 6th section allowed 6th section by a cheap train of the Midland Company to run. In my opinion the train in question, so far from Birmingham to Stoke, a cheap train of the Ox-it travels on what is called the loop line, is not a com ford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Company from pulsory train; but I think that no one can entertain Stoke to Abbott's Wood, and a cheap train of the Mid-a doubt that, as matter of fact, it does not comply land Company from Abbott's Wood to Gloucester. As suming the public to have this right, it is a very different one from the right to a train running continu " can (a) Reported 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 218. (b) Ibid, p. 220. with all the conditions, for it does not and cat stop and put down passengers at every passenger sta tion which it passes on the line. It may be observed that this is a case where the defts. claim the benefit of an exemption from a duty granted in very clear term and I think that they must bring themselves precisely Ex.] DIGEST OF MARITIME LAW CASES. [ADM. vithin the terms which create the exemption; for, as here is no equitable liability to a tax by coming as near as possible to the circumstances which make it payable, so also there is no equitable exemption by doing the best that can be done to come within the terms of the exemption. Now, first, is this a compulsory train ? Is the Midland Company bound to run a parliamentary train, as it is called, on the loop line? The words of the compulsory clause, the 6th, are : "All passenger railway companies shall, by means of one train at the least, to travel along their railway, from one end to the other of each trunk, branch, or junction line belonging to or leased by them, so long as they shall continue to carry other passengers over such trunk, branch, or junction line, once at the least each way on every week-day, provide for the conveyance of third-class passengers,' under certain conditions. Now, "the loop line "is not the railway of the Midland Company. It does not belong to them, and is not leased by them; they have merely a limited and restrictive permission to use it. Had they continued to use their old line for the conveyance of passengers, the compulsory clause would clearly have applied to the whole of their line. But it seems to me very doubtful whether they could be compelled to run a parliamentary train on the loop line, inasmuch as on the loop line they cannot comply with one of the conditions mentioned in the 6th section, and in my opinion they could not be compelled to run a parliamentary train on that line. If this be so, the train is voluntarily adopted for their own benefit, and a remission of the duty, or an exemption from the tax, cannot be claimed in respect of any cheap train, except a cheap train adopted under the compulsory powers of the 6th section. But another question, I think, arises before we can decide that the train in question is such a cheap train as the Act contemplates. Does it comply with the conditions of the 6th section? The object of the Legislature appears to have been to secure to "the poorer class of travellers," first, a convenient period of starting; second, reasonable speed in travelling; third, power to stop at every passenger station passed on the line; fourth, such accommodation in respect of protection from the weather as might be satisfactory to the Lords of the Privy Council; fifth, a charge not exceeding 1d. for each mile travelled. The cheap or parliamentary train is therefore made subject to certain conditions as to the hour of starting, which is to be fixed by the directors, subject to the approval of the Lords of the Committee. It is to stop, if required, at every passenger station which it shall pass on the line, which, I apprehend, means that the general arrangements of the train shall be such as to admit of a passenger stopping at any passenger station he may pass. There are other regulations which need not be more particularly specified. Now, I am unable to say which of these conditions is the most important, or that any of them can be dispensed with at the pleasure or convenience of the railway company. The cheap train that is entitled to be free from the duty, quoad the receipts of the cheap fares, is made subject to all the conditions, and to all equally. Cheapness in point of fare cannot be said to be the principal condition, and certainly it is not the only one. [N.B.-The LAW TIMES REPORTS, N. S., will give all the Maritime Trade and Plantations. The Lords of that Committee have declined to approve or to give any sanction to the train at all, because it runs over a line a portion of which does not belong to the company, and in which portion the company have a limited use only. And secondly, they have not power to stop and take up and put down passengers at every passenger station on the line. And the question is, whether the circumstances under which this occurs are such as to entitle the company to claim a remission of the duty, though they do not comply with the condition of stopping, if required, at every passenger station they pass. It has been suggested in the argument-and this view has been adopted by my brother Martin-that the 133rd section of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. clxxxiv. (Public Local Act), has, in effect, repealed the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 85, so as to dispense with "the condition of stopping at every passenger station. That section gave to the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway Company (now represented by the Midland Company) the privilege of using the loop line on the payment of what the defts. call a rent; but the clause itself calls it "a payment in lieu of tolls;" but the use by the Midland Railway is subject to a restriction which prevents them taking any passenger from one part of the loop line to another part. And the argument is that, having a parliamentary right to use the loop line subject to a restriction, they are entitled to a remission of duty, although the restriction prevents them from complying with the condition of stopping at every passenger station. The arrangement made under the 133rd section is one which might have been made by an agreement between the parties. As a mere agreement, it could not have affected the conditions of the 6th section of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 85, or have dispensed with the obligation to stop at every passenger station, and its insertion in a private Act is nothing more than a sanction of that agreement. It is quite contrary to all the rules for the construction of statutes to hold that such a clause, which merely registers an agreement between two companies, should operate by implication as a repeal of a Public General Act as to one of them. But the Midland Railway Company are under no obligation to use the loop line. If, however, they voluntarily abandon their own line, and cease to take passengers upon it, and voluntarily take to a line of which they have only a restricted use, and upon which they cannot comply with the conditions under which alone a cheap parliamentary train is required to run, in my judgment they cannot claim a remission of the duty under the 9th section: first, because the loop line is not their own line, nor is it leased to them; they have merely a restricted use of it on payment of a sum in lieu of tolls; and, secondly, because the restriction is such as to prevent them from complying with a condition which the Legislature has annexed to a parlia mentary cheap train. Judgment for the Crown. I should be clearly of opinion that such a cheap train, if the carriages had no seats, and the requirements of the Lords' Committee were altogether disregarded, and there were no protection from the weather at all, would be liable to duty, though only a farthing a mile were charged. The health of the traveller is quite as important, in a public point of view, as the saving of his time or his money. Now, the train in question does not comply with two of the conditions. It does not start at an hour approved of by the Lords of the Committee of the Privy Council for Attorney for the Crown, Solicitor of Inland Revenue. Attorneys for the defts., Messrs. Burchells, Parliament-street. DIGEST OF MARITIME LAW CASES Law Cases decided from Michaelmas Term 1859. This Digest will ADM.] DIGEST OF MARITIME LAW CASES. 1194. Freight being stipulated in bills of lading to be paid by the shippers," and "payable one month after sailing, ship lost or not lost:" Held that, in a question with the consignees, the shipowner had no right to detain the goods for freight: (The Alan Ker; Kirchner v. How, Supreme Court, Sydney, N. S. W., Oct. 8, 1855, Shipping Gazette.) Judgment affirmed by Judicial Committee of Privy Council, Dec. 16. 1857 (No. 1197 d), and still further established by that tribunal in Kirchner, &c. v. Venus, March 16, 1859, where the principles of law applicable to lien for freight and adVances of freight are amply treated of: (5 Jur. N. S. 395, P. C.; 33 L. T. Rep. 81; Maclachlan on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 434.) 1195. Some iron being shipped, the bills of lading for which stated the freight to be paid at port of loading, ship lost or not lost: Held, that the master had no lien for freight on the iron at port of destination: (The Torrent; Dynes v. Copp, Madras Supreme Court, Aug. 23, Shipping Gazette. Oct. 29, 1856. See also How v. Kirchner, &c., J. C. P. C., Dec. 16, 1857, No. 1197 a, and Kirchner, &c. v. Venus, J. C. P. C., March 16, 1859; 5 Jur. N. S. 395; No. 1194) 1195 a. Case of transhipment of cargo by master and transference of his right of lien. Where part of the freight has been advanced, the captain, on transhipping the goods in case of necessity, can transfer only his lien for the balance of freight, that is, the freight at risk: (Matthews v. Gibbs, Q. B., Nov. 19, 1860, 9 W. Rep. 200; 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 557; 1 Maritime Law Cases. 14.) 1196. Question as to master's lien on goods for freight paid in advance: (The Pilgrim; Joaquim and Jose D'Almeida v. David Gray, Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca, Aug. 28, 1856, Shipping Guzette. But see No. 1195.) 1197. Freight on goods not being paid by the shippers, according to the terms of the bill of lading, which were "freight payable here" (at the shipping port)" one month after sailing, vessel lost or not lost:" Held, that the master had a lien on the goods for the freight: (The Dumfriesshire; Middleton, &c. v. Fraser, &c, Court of Judicature of Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca, Aug. 28, 1856, Shipping Gazette. But see No. 1195.) 1197 a. Shipowner held to have, under a certain bill of lading, a lien against consignees for freight payable by shipper one month after sailing: (Neish v. Graham, HarriSon's Digest for 1857, 199; 4 Jur. N. S. 49; 27 L. J. 15, Q. B.; see Maclachlan on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 439.) 1197 b. Another case as to lien for freight payable before siling; bill of lading freight less than chartered freight: (Gilkison v. Middleton. Harrison's Digest, 199; 2 C. B., N. S.. 131; 26 L. J. 209, C. P., 1857; Maclachlan on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 384, 439.) 1197 c. No lien for chartered freight payable two months after vessels report inwards. Indorsee of bill of lading entitled to delivery of goods on pyment of bill of lading freight: (Foster v. Colby, 3 H. & N. 705; 28 L. J. 81, Ex.; Law Digest for 1859, 636; Maclachlan on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 439, 440.) 1197 d. Shipowner has not a lien on cargo at port of destination for freight payable at loading port: (How v. Kirch ner, &c., J. C. P. C., Dec. 16, 1857, affirming judgment of Supreme Court of New South Wales; see also Kirchner, &c. V. Venus, J. C. P. C., March 16, 1959; 5 Jur. N. S.; Maclachlan on the Law of Merchant Shipping, 370; and Von Ernsthausen, &c. v. Denny, Supreme Court of Calcutta, Aug. 21, Shipping Gazette, Oct. 3, 1860.) In the last-mentioned case the cargo was by bill of lading stipulated to be deliverable at the port of destination "on paying freight" at the loading port, but no right of lien was held to exist. (See No. 1195.) 1198. A ship being chartered to go to Madras to load a homeward cargo at 31. 15s. per ton, the master to sign bills of lading at any rate of freight required, at the request of the charterer's agent, he signed bills of lading for sugar at 1. per ton; the charterer stopped payment. The master was held to have a lien only for the bill of lading freight: (Shand v. Sanderson, 4 H. & N. 381; 28 L. J. 278, Ex.; Law Digest for 1859, 965; Maclachlan on the Law of Merchant Shipping 440.) 1198. Where a charter-party gave a lien for dead freight, but that was not specially mentionel in the bill of lading: held, that an action was maintainable against the shipowner for recovery of the goods on an offer to pay the freight only, and not the dead freight in security of which the shipowner withheld them: (Kerford v. Mondel, 28 L. J. 303, Ex.; 29 Law Digest for 1859, 965.) 1198 b. Freight being due upon delivery of cargo, the shipowner has a lien for it, but no right of action for freight accrues till delivery: (American case: H. O. Freeman and others v. A Cargo of Salt, U. S. Circuit Court, New York, Oct. 4, Shipping Gazette, Oct. 20, 1858.) VIII. Loss. a place about seven miles distant from the intended adzę port: Held, that there was a total loss of freight experi to be earned on shipowner's goods, and that the pen wa covered by the terms of an ordinary policy on fract (Devaux v. Janson, C. P., May 8, 1839, 5 Ding. N. C. 49, 7 Scott, 507; 3 Jur. 678; Hidyard's edit of Para o lesurance, 68; Arnould, 272; Phidips, 333) [Note by the compiler.-Serjt. Shee, in his 4th eftin a Marshall on Insurance (p. 221), inadvertently states ... the accident happened "in the course of the ship's E from the dock to the river," instead of in the act teng taken out of the dock.] 1200 a. A vessel having been stranded and soll at per f loading, was afterwards repaired by the purchaser at a m including the price paid for her, of 18301; her valse wit in England was 1000l. to 12001. The cargo was sent m in another vessel belonging partly to the insured. A jy gave a verdict against the underwriters for loss of the (Hall. &c., v. Secretan, C. P., Dec. 20, 1839, Shipping Cont 1200 b. Claim under mutual insurance freight pary Rule granted to show cause why award of adren allowing loss of freight of goods not shipped should min set aside on the ground, inter alia, that they had avrini in a matter not submitted to them: (Neptune and Bri Mutual Insurance Freight Policy v. Greenwell, de, Q. 1, Is 29, 1840, Shipping Gazette) 1200 c. In allowing loss of freight against a slip in far for damage or loss by collision, the expenses of amines ought to be deducted: (The Gazelle, Harrison's Digest, 1844; 8 Jur. 428, Ad.) 1200 d. If a ship can be repaired so as to bring home re entire cargo at a cost which would exceed the rate of the freight, but less than the value of the ship when » paired, there is not a total loss of ship or freight Alfred; Moss v. Smith, C. P., Jan. 17 and Feb. 7, Is 9 C. B. 91; Harrison's Digest, 2011; Arnould, 1:45; report of case published separately.) 1201. When a ship is at an intermediate port, and the master elects to repair her damages, the fact of the mos being ultimately found to amount to more than the air f the ship, will not, nor can the shipowner recover a tra loss of freight where the freight has been actually cartel and paid to the holders of a bottomry bond. Observic as to abandonment of freight: (The Lord Cochrane; Dew! v. Chapman, H. of L., July 24, 1819; 2 H. L. Cas. 15; Arnould, 1147.) [Note. The decision of the Court of C. P. in this case, noticed in Phillips, 1637 (6 Man. & Gr. 792), was revered if the Ex. Ch., and the reversal sustained, as above stufa, z the H. of Lon the 24th July 1849.] 1202. Although the freight afterwards earned by a ship wh is abandoned to the underwriters on ship belongs to the yet in such a case, when the cargo is delivered, and Dr freight earned for the benefit of these underwriters, there a not a loss on the policies on freight: (The Lawrel; Strin Marine Insurance Company v. Turner, H. L, Mach 3, laid, Nos. 2014, 4062; 4 H. L. Cases, 312; Arnould, 1156) 1203. A vessel bound from St. Jolin's to Liverpool, struct on Soldier's Ledge, near Yarmouth (U. S.), and it was fand that it would cost more than she was worth to get her of and repair her. In charging the jury the judge said, the the claim against the underwriters was correlative vit their right to abandon." Verdict against unterwrite for total loss of freight: (The Perthshire; Robertson Provincial Mutual and General Insurance Compass, S John's (N. B.) Circuit Court, Dec. 26, 1855, Skypa Grzette, Jan. 16, 1856) 120. A vessel sailed from Shields with a carge of codb for Aden, but after getting ashore was taken into Curhaven. The coals were there discharged, and being fand to be wetted with salt water, the shipowner declined to e ship them, on the ground that they were consequently ab to spontaneous combustion, and it would cost an unreas able sum to put them into safe condition. Shipowner be entitled to recover a total loss of freight from underwrite under a time policy effected on freight. The principle applicable to ship and goods is alike applicable to freigh Cases of Murdock v. Potts and Morley v. Jones, commenti upon : (The Charles Kerr; Michael v. Gillespas, C. P. Dec. 19, 1856, Jan. 19 and May 23, 1857; H&7) Digest, 102; 3 Jur. N. S. 1219; 26 L. J. 306, C. P.; 2 C. B. N. S., 627; see W. Rep.; Common Law Digest, 51; sis No. 592.) IX. MASTER'S POWER AS TO CONTRACTS OF AFFREIGHT- (See also Nos. 287, 1205, 1420, and the title 1205. Where the master of a ship agreed to pay out of the freight a debt previously incurred to agents of a British strip at Malta for other vessels of his owners, also wome 1199. "A partial loss of freight may be recovered on a de-necessary disbursements made by certain mortgagees ca de claration alleging a total loss:" (Benson v. Chapman, in error, 8 C. B. 950; Harrison's Digest, 2020) 1200. A cargo being purchased and ready to be shipped, and the vessel being ready to receive it, the vessel was broken to pieces, through the accidental giving way of her tackle and shores in being moved out of an artificial dock at vessel's arrival at Cork, it was held that the master ad no authority so to assign the freight, and that the assig of the owners were entitled to payment of the fract (The Sir Henny Webb, A. C., May 8, 1849; 13 Jur. 639) Wages of crew paid pro rata out of ship and fre (To be continued.) 3 BANK.] Re BAKER-Re ANDERSON-Re KEAT-Re MARKS-Re F. W. MILES. COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. Reported by D. C. MACRAE, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Thursday, Aug. 7. Re BAKER. [BANK. to recover the value of the piano, alleging that he had not sold but only lent it to Harris on hire. The action was defended, but the plt. recovered a verdict for 120l., and the costs were taxed at 581. The bankrupt was taken in execution, and had been in custody six months at the suit of Kirkman. Dowse submitted that his client had been put to pri-heavy costs by the bankrupt's vexatious defence of the action, which had brought him within the 159th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, and that he was not entitled to his discharge. Petition-Omission of place of business. Where a bankrupt omits his place of business from his petition, notwithstanding that he inserts his vate residence, his petition will be dismissed. This bankrupt, a commission agent, was opposed by Reed, upon the ground that he had omitted to insert in his petition his place of business. He bad, however, inserted his private residence, and his reason for the non-insertion of his place of business was that he had given it up a fortnight before he filed his petition. Mr. Commissioner FANE ordered the petition to be dismissed. Denney contended that the statute did not contemplate an action of trespass, and that it only applied to the vexatious defence of an action for a debt or money due by the bankrupt. Mr. Commissioner HOLROYD took this view of the meaning of the statute. It however appearing that Kirkman had forcibly taken possession of his piano after he had taken the bankrupt in execution, the Court thought he had no right to enforce the remedy against both person and property at the same time, and adjourned the sitting for granting the order of dis Setting aside future income-Bankruptcy Act 1861-charge, to enable the official solicitor to see what steps Sect. 159. income The court may grant an order of discharge subject to any condition or conditions touching any salary, pay, emoluments, profits, wages, earnings, or which may afterwards become due to the bankrupt, and touching after-acquired property of the bankrupt. This bankrupt, who came up for his order of discharge, was a clerk in the Commercial-docks, and his debts were of trifling amount. Aldridge, the official solicitor, said that the bankrupt's salary was 200l. per annum, and he submitted that out of that sum he should be ordered to set aside 501. per annum for the creditors. Sargood, for the bankrupt, contended that the court had no power to set aside income unless in cases where the bankrupt was proved to have been guilty of some of the offences specified in sect. 159 of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, and referred to the recent decision of the L. C. in Re Mew and Thorne. Mr. Commissioner FANE inquired where the decision was be found. Sargood said that the decision was very recent, but no doubt it would be duly reported in the Law TIMES. (a) Mr. Commissioner FANE directed a sum of 251. annum to be set aside for creditors. Monday, Aug. 11. per (Before Mr. Commissioner HOLROYD.) Re KEAT. Order of discharge-Vexatious defence of an action of trover-Sect. 159 Bankruptcy Act 1861. If the court shall be of opinion that the bankrupt has put any of his creditors to unnecessary expense by frivolous or vexatious defence to any action or suit to recover any debt or money due from him, the court may either refuse or suspend the order of discharge, &c.: Held, that the frivolous or vexatious defence of an action of trover is not a ground of opposition within the meaning of this Act of Parliament. This bankrupt came up for his last examination and order of discharge. He was opposed by Dowse for a creditor named Kirkman. Denney supported. It appeared that a customer of the bankrupt, named Harris, purchased, as he alleged, from Kirkman a pianoforte for 120., which he afterwards sold to the bankrupt, who parted with it to one Ballard. Kirkman brought an action of trover against the bankrupt (a) Sec 6 L. T. Rep. N. S. 732. could be taken to get back the pianoforte. Order of discharge adjourned accordingly. This bankrupt, a dealer in jewellery, applied for his order of discharge. He did not come up in formâ pauperis, nor was he adjudicated bankrupt by the registrar. Aldridge, the official solicitor for pauper debtors, having observed the absence of assets, Mr. Commissioner HOLROYD did not dismiss the bankrupt's petition, as he had ordered to be done under similar circumstances in some former instances, but intimated that the bankrupt could not have his order of discharge until he had paid a fee of three guineas to the official assignee-in reality to the fee fund— and two guineas to the official solicitor for pauper debtors. The bankrupt had previously paid 17. on his petition for stamp-duty, and 31. for messengers' charges, which also go to the fee fund of the court, and was prepared to pay 17. in addition for the stamp on the order of discharge, but Solomon objecting that, as it was not a pauper petition, the bankrupt was not legally chargeable with the fee payable to the official solicitor of such cases, nor with the official assignee's charges, Mr. Commissioner HOLROYD adjourned the order of discharge sine die. Thursday, Aug. 14. (Before Mr. Commissioner FANE.) Appointment of creditors' assignee-24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, s. 116. The statute provides that at the first meeting of creditors, or any adjournment thereof, it shall be competent to the majority in value of the creditors who have proved debts to choose an assignee or assignees of the bankrupt's estate and effects, and to be called the creditors' assignee, but it was BANK.] Re SIDDAL-EYRE v. BURMESTER. Held, notwithstanding, that upon the day for the last examination the case might be adjourned for the choice of an assignee, notice given to the creditors of such intention, and that, pursuant to such notice upon such adjournment, an assignee might be appointed. Sed quære? This bankrupt came to the court upon his own petition filed on the 3rd May 1862. The first meeting and the choice of assignees was appointed for the 20th May. No creditor, however, appeared, and no assignee was appointed. On the 20th June, the day fixed for the last examination, Chidley applied for an adjournment on behalf of a creditor, in order that an assignee might be appointed, and accordingly the case was adjourned until the 10th July, when a creditor named Bourne was appointed assignee. An order was thereupon made at the instance of Bourne for a private examination on the 1st Aug. The bankrupt duly attended, but the assignee not appearing, no examination was made, and on this day, the 14th Aug., [H. ∞ L engagements. Mr. Balmforth instructs me to cre the bankrupt. The COMMISSIONER.-It appears, then, that t are two distinct solicitors to the assignees; Mr. Lacaster for Mr. Balmforth, who desires that the birupt may not pass ; and Mr. Cariss for Mr. Tar who desires that the bankrupt may pass. I CIT recognise two solicitors for the assignees takings ferent views. The assignees must agree up solicitor to represent them. Lancaster.-I claim to be heard for Mr. Balm as a matter of right. It is very usual to have j solicitors to the assignees. The COMMISSIONER.-It is not uncommon a practice, for two solicitors to coalesce and agree to at together as one. But this is always a private am ment, of which the court knows nothing jadik The court recognises only one solicitor as acting ir the assignees. Here it is made known to me, cially," that two solicitors are appointed, and they take different views as to the matter before the cras Chidley, on behalf of the assignee, asked for a further Under these peculiar circumstances, I decide that the adjournment for the private examination of the bank- assignees (who are both in court) must vacate the rupt, on the ground that he had been unable to attend appointment of the two solicitors, and appoint anym on the 1st Aug. in consequence of the pressure of solicitor they please to represent them, and this te business. business of the last examination can proceed. Le Reed called the attention of the court to the ap-case stand over awhile, to enable the parties intere pointment of the assignee, at whose instigation these continued adjournments were being made, and suggested that the appointment was altogether illegal. The Act of Parliament specially provided for the mode of appointing an assignee, and specified the time when the appointment was to be made, which, according to the 116th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1861, was to be either "at the first meeting of creditors, or any adjournment thereof;" but in this instance no creditor had appeared at the first meeting, and there never was an adjournment for the choice of an assignee. Mr. Commissioner FANE doubted the power of appointment, and called for the papers connected with the proceedings, from which it appeared that the 10th of July had been advertised for the purpose of making the choice, and that being so, the learned commissioner was of opinion that the appointment was valid, and The application was granted. [Note.-The Act provides a special machinery for the time, place and mode of appointing an assignee. It also provides for the removal of an assignee under certain circumstances, and the re-appointment of a successor; but this appointment seems to have proceeded on the assumption that the court has a greater power for the appointment of an assignee under its general jurisdiction than that which is contained in the special provisions which are particularly applicable to this subject.-REPORTER.] LEEDS BANKRUPTCY COURT. (Before Mr. Commissioner AYRTON.) Where two assignees appear by separate solicitors, who Lancaster.-I appear for the assignees, to oppose. Barwick for the bankrupt.-I deny that you appear for the assignees. Mr. Town, one of the assignees, is in court, and says that he does not oppose the bankrupt. Lancaster-Here is a paper filed with the proceedings, signed by the two assignees, Mr. Town and Mr. Balmforth, appointing Mr. Cariss and myself to be joint solicitors. Mr. Cariss is absent, owing to other to confer together. After a considerable time spent in conference. Town signed a paper removing Messrs. Lancaster in Cariss as joint solicitors, and appointing Mr. Cara sole solicitor. Mr. Balmforth declined to sign th paper. Finally, the two assignees definitively informs. the court that they could not agree in appointing solicitor. The COMMISSIONER.-The assignees stating the they cannot agree in the appointment of a selten, let them both be removed from being assigers Appoint a day for a new choice, and let the last examination stand over. House of Lords. Reported by JAMES PATERSON, Esq., of the Middle Templa Tuesday, May 20. S. obtained an advance from the L. Bank, in terri Held (reversing the decrce of the L.JJ. in Ireland. that the L. Bank were in no better position in S. would have been as against E., for they had advanced money to S. on the faith of any agreat of E. to release the security. This was an appeal against a decree of the L. C. of Ireland. On the 20th Oct. 1854 the late John Sadir, M. P., Chairman of the London and County Bank, conveyed to Thomas Joseph Eyre, of Bath, certain estates in Ireland by way of mortgage, in security of certain advances of money, the deed providing that out of the rents 30001, should be annually paid by a |