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[V.C. W.

He very

V.C. W.] Re THE WINDING-UP ACTS, &c., re THE STATE FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY. can gather from the evidence, without the least inten- | Burton were not employed for that committee, theretion of returning during the time of the winding-up fore they and Mr. Chappel stand entirely free from If these gentlemen undertake to go about as their own getting up this case. Mr. Monk instructs his own pricanvassers, recommending themselves as from Mr. vate solicitor, Mr. Langridge, who instructed his LonAsberry, the largest shareholder, they should also have don agents, Messrs. Chilton and Burton, to support said, "He intends to be absent during the whole period this matter on behalf of Mr. Monk. Thereupon, being of this winding-up, he will not himself be present, but instructed to act on behalf of one, they very reasonably we shall take great care of your interests." I think the say, "You come as one shareholder to support it; but, of shareholders would not have concluded that Mr. course, the support of many is much better than the Asberry, the largest shareholder, was going to take support of one, and you may say the expense which a personal interest in this matter, but that if he may arise, in consequence of one appearing for all, could not do it himself he was going to take care would be much less." I do not see the impropriety of to name his own solicitor to look after his own that course. Then Mr. Langridge takes that course, affairs; but certainly they had not the least idea and does it in the most legitimate manner. that this was an application by a gentleman properly communicates with Mr. Kemp, acting as the who was anxious to be employed as accountant, and solicitor for this body of shareholers, and they did arbeing anxious to be employed as accountant, had range that they would appear together, and have for employed his own solicitor, he not having been their agents Messrs. Chilton and Burton, in London. appointed official manager. It is quite proper that Thereupon they appear, and all by one counsel. They the official manager, when appointed, should appoint do not instruct numerous counsel or numerous solicihis own solicitor, because of course he is the respon- tors, but they instruct one counsel to say to whom they sible person, but he used his own solicitor for the give their support. Thereupon the order is made for purpose of obtaining the appointment. In that state winding-up, and the gentleman who obtains the order of circumstances it seemed to me originally at cham- for the winding-up does not appear to take an active bers, that I ought not, under any circumstances, to part in it. But those who do support the winding-up order sanction the appointment of a gentleman who had the naturally present themselves in chambers, although assent of a large majority of the shareholders, no they are not to have any preference on that account. doubt, but which had been procured, as it seemed to Then what happens next is this: Messrs. Chilton and me, in a very improper manner. The question is, how Burton go down to this body of shareholders, and they a person seeking this office is to come before the represent to them that Mr. M'Creight, a person who the court. He should only be proposed by persons who they know, is a fit and proper person, and then have a right to propose him, as shareholders. I there happens this, which I thought was the case with can only say, I should never pay the slightest those other gentlemen who appeared before me. These attention to any appointment so sought for, under any gentlemen in business in London go down to the set of other circumstances. Upon that ground I proceeded at shareholders who are interested in this matter; they chambers, and I acceded to the wish that this appoint- are consulted by those shareholders, the shareholders ment should be reargued upon this as much as take their recommendation, and act upon this firm's other reasons, although objecting to the public time knowledge of the circumstance, and entirely of their being thus occupied. Now, on this second discussion, own free choice, and without pressure from Mr. I must say that Mr. Edwards' case comes out much worse. M'Creight in any way, who stands entirely back from It is not that merely Mr. Edwards appears by a person any sort of pressure, they say, "We take your recomnominally the solicitor of the shareholders, but it ap-mendation, and we shall concur in this appointment." pears that four or five solicitors who appeared before me in chambers, whom I supposed to be independent solicitors appointed by the shareholders, were, in fact, not So, but attended at the suggestion of Mr. Edwards, to support his views. This I consider a most improper misleading of the judge or the court-to give a thing the appearance of being supported by gentlemen who might have been conceived to have well advised their clients, and had instructed them after consultation and deliberation, which any man would do upon such a subject. Under these circumstances I have no hesitation in saying that his appointment would be most improper. I do not regard it as the application of the shareholders at all, but simply as the application of Mr. Edwards, made in the way which I have described. As regards Mr. M'Creight's original appointment, nothing can be more legitimate than the manner in which he was brought forward. The case is this: There was a gentleman anxious to have the company wound-up, namely, Mr. Monk, and there was a body of shareholders, amounting to twenty-five, at Lewes, who had been appointed as a committee for themselves and other shareholders, who for a twelvemonth had been watching the acts of the directors in this matter, and I suppose from having misgivings, which at last proceeded to strike the mind of that very apathetic body, the shareholders of a public company, and having been instructed, they were watching the proceedings and had their own solicitor, Mr. Kemp. The chairman of this committee was Mr. Monk, and this Mr. Monk ultimately, whether as a result arising from the deliberation of the committee or on his own account did not distinctly appear, but he instructed his own private solicitor to present a petition for winding-up. Messrs. Chilton and

Of course it is suggested, and of course it is what one would suppose would very likely happen, that Mr. M'Creight stands by, and there is an understanding that if you are appointed official manager you will appoint me your solicitor. That may possibly arise from the mutual confidence which the parties repose in each other; but that is a perfectly different case from that which I had to consider. I have, I believe, these twenty-five gentlemen represented in perfectly good faith, who, after deliberation and after opportunity of consulting others—and of course out of these twentyfive shareholders there must be some men of business, who may say, "These gentlemen come down from London recommending Mr. M'Creight, let us go and inquire whether some one else is not better." They had opportunities of so doing, and they all gave it deliberate consideration, and upon consideration they come to me and represent that this gentleman is a proper person. That is the proper mode of proceeding, and the course which should be taken in making the appointment of any person to act as receiver or the like. Of course it may be said that particular firms of solicitors are in the habit of recommending particular gentlemen as receivers, and that there very likely is a mutual understanding upon the subject. But still it is the client who is consulted, and it is shown that the clients did deliberate and did choose, and, having so chosen, brought their selection before the court. As regards Mr. Turquand, he gives some little colour to the canvassing, which course of proceeding I shall do all in my power to stop. He says, "I decline to allow any circular to be sent out until the winding-up order is made; but after that L do not think it improper to send out the species of cir

Re MOORE'S TRUST ESTATE-BOWKER v. HENRY AND OTHERS.

Solicitors, Mercer and Mercer.

Friday, March 14.

BOWKER v. HENRY AND OTHERS.
Partnership-Receiver.

A partnership existed which had various branch part-
nerships and businesses at various places, and in the
several sub-partnership deeds a proviso was inserted
that such partnerships should be determined by the
head partner of the general partnership firm upon
certain terms, upon giving certain notices.
The head partner being desirous of terminating one
of the then subordinate partnerships, the proper
notices were given.

V.C. W.] [V.C. W. cular." I think the sooner such a practice is discontinued | tively" in its ordinary and legitimate sense, as it the better. Mr. Turquand has only a small number of allotted the several families of children each to its supporters, and Mr. M'Creight has double his number. respective parent, and consequently there was a joint I prefer Mr. M'Creight to Mr. Turquand, whatever tenancy. But in the present case the testator has Mr. Turquand's capabilities might be. It is said, on sorted out the executors and administrators of each of the present occasion, that Mr. Turquand would now be the children, and consequently he has created a supported by 11,000 of Mr. Edwards' supporters, if I tenancy in common. Order accordingly. came to the conclusion that Mr. Edwards should not be appointed. I give no weight to anything of this kind. The only thing which there is now on my mind is, whether I should not exercise the power given to me under the Winding-up Aet, of appointing a fourth person, who is not nominated before me. The only reason I have for considering that has been that, in the course of the proceedings, Mr. Edwards brought this point before me, which I think is a very legitimate point for discussion-namely, that, considering the very large number of affidavits filed, and the spirit of acrimony in which they have been filed, I ought not to come to the conclusion that there was considerable danger in appointing Mr. M'Creight, who would, most probably, appoint Messrs. Chilton and Burton as his solicitors. I mean danger of the estate being wasted in vexatious proceedings, to the great detriment of the shareholders. After referring, at some length, to some collateral facts found in the affidavits, the Vice-Chancellor said:-I cannot assume that the shareholders, or Mr. M'Creight himself, would choose an improper person to carry on the proceedings. In ordinary circumstances the solicitor is appointed by the accountant, and he obtains the appointment; but here I think the shareholders should gravely, calmly This was a bill filed by the plt. for an account of and properly consider and exercise their deliberate partnership dealings and transactions; that certain choice before they make any selection as to their soli-notices dated the 10th Sept. 1861 might be declared citor. With respect to costs, I must give Mr. invalid; and for a receiver. M'Creight his costs out of the fund; but I think I cannot help adding, that my best way of marking my sense of the particular affidavits I have referred to, will be not to give the costs of those affidavits. Solicitors, Chapple, Doctors'-commons; Chilton and Burton; Doyle, Bath; Amory and Co.

Saturday, Feb. 22.

Re MOORE'S TRUST ESTATE. Tenancy in common- Will. The testator by his will directed his trustees to stand possessed of his general personal estate, "in trust for all and every his brothers and sisters, and their executors and administrators respectively for ever:" Held to be a tenancy in common.

The plt. denied the validity of these notices, and also
disputed the principle upon which the last balance-
sheet of the profits had been taken and made up.
He thereupon filed his bill for an account and for a

receiver:

Held, on motion for a receiver, that, until the validity or invalidity of these notices was determined at the hearing, a receiver would not be appointed, no prospective damage to the plt.'s concern in the meantime being alleged.

By certain indentures of partnership, dated the 15th March 1859, and made between the deft. Alexander Henry and his son-in-law George Wildes, therein described and since deceased, of the first part, and the plt. of the second part, after reciting that the said parties thereto of the first part had for some time past and did then carry on a general partnership business together as merchants and general commission agents at Manchester as aforesaid, and at Bradford, Huddersfield, Glasgow, Belfast and elsewhere, under the firm of Alexander and Samuel Henry and Co., and that the plt. had been a partner with the said parties thereto of the first part so far only as respected the branch or department of their said general business carried on at Manchester aforesaid, and called white muslin and dyed goods department," for a term which expired by effluxion of time on the 14th March then instant; and after reciting that the said James Sutherland by his will, dated in June 1807, parties thereto of the first part had agreed to admit, after other directions, bequeathed all his general per-as from the day of the date thereof, the plt. as a subsonal estate to trustees "upon trust to stand possessed thereof for and for the benefit of all and every his the testator's brothers and sisters, and their executors and administrators respectively for ever."

This was a petition presented to obtain the opinion of the court upon the effect of a clause in a testator's

will.

Giffard, Q. C. and Haddan, for the petition, contended that the words imported a joint tenancy: (Re Hodgson's Trusts, 1 Kay & J. 178.)

"the

partner with them in that portion of their business commonly called or known as "the shipping business," or "the shipping department," as then carried on upon the terms and under and subject to the conditions, stipulations and agreements thereinafter mentioned and contained, which related to the plt. and the relations between him and the said parties thereto, of the first Amphlett, Q. C. and Surrage were not called upon. part, but were not to affect the relations between the The VICE-CHANCELLOR. The case of Hodgson's said parties thereto of the first part inter se, or the Trusts is different from the present. There the testa-general partnership constituted between them by their tor desired that his trustees should divide a principal then existing deed of copartnership, and which was sum unto and equally between his sister's children thereinafter termed their exclusive general partnership; share and share alike; and in case any of them should die leaving issue of their or her body or bodies before their shares should become payable, then the share or proportion of each of them so dying should be paid to his or her children respectively, the children to stand in the place or stead of their respective deceased parents, and to be entitled to receive their respective parents' shares of the trust-fund accordingly. In that case I held that the testator used the word "respec

it was witnessed that, in pursuance of the said agreement, and in consideration of the mutual confidence which the said parties reposed in each other, it was thereby mutually covenanted, declared and agreed by and between the deft. Alexander Henry and the said George Wildes, deceased, that they should and would become, continue, and be partners together in that branch or portion of the business of the said parties thereto of the first part, commonly called or known as

V.C. W.]

REG. v. THE INHABITANTS OF CHIDDINGSTONE.

[Q. B.

"the shipping department," and in that branch only, I part of which had since been drawn out by the pit. for the term of five years, to be computed from the and that he, the deft., had always been willing to day of the date of the indenture now in statement, account to the said plt. on the footing of the terms of but determinable nevertheless as thereinafter men- the partnership deed; and he insisted that the parttioned; and it was thereby declared that the death nership, so far as the plt. was concerned, terminated retirement, or exclusion from the said partnership of on the 15th Nov. 1861, according to the notice given any one or more of the said partners should operate by him, the deft. only as a partial dissolution thereof, and as to such dying, retiring, or excluded partner or partners only. After providing for the advance of the capital, the time for stock-taking, division of profits, &c., &c., the Rolt, Q. C. and Karslake, in support of the motion, deed provided that in the event of a partial dissolution contended that the deft., by his answer, having subof the partnership by the death, retirement, or exclu-mitted to account, and it being proved that he was sion of any one of the parties, then the deft. Alexander Henry (and Geo. Wildes, since deceased) should be at liberty to proceed as in case of the expiration or total dissolution of the copartnership; that the defts. Alexander Henry and said G. Wildes, or one of them, should, upon the expiration or total dissolution of the said partnership, sell and dispose of all the stock-in-count consequent on a dissolution must be taken. The trade then belonging thereto, or should, at their option, be at liberty to purchase the same to themselves or himself at a fair valuation according to the then market price, and take upon themselves or himself the collection of the debts, &c.

The plt. now moved for a receiver of the partnershipassets, &c., until the hearing of the cause, offering himself as such receiver without salary.

George Wildes died suddenly, and the deft. Alexander Henry was the sole surviving head partner of the general firm. He subsequently became dissatisfied with the conduct of the plt. and of another sub-partner, and on the 10th Sept. 1861 gave the plt. and such other sub-partner, notices that the partnership between the plt. and the firm would be dissolved from and after the 15th Sept. 1861, and such notices were advertised by the said deft. in the London Gazette and other newspapers. The plt. had thereupon given a counter notice, and advertisements were inserted by him in the same newspapers that said deft. Alexander Henry was entirely unauthorised to give and disqualified from giving such notices.

The plt., by his bill, insisted that such notices were, in fact, invalid; and alleged incapacity on the part of the deft. to manage and conduct the business. He also insisted that the deft. was not at liberty, without plt.'s consent, to dissolve the partnership until its expiration by effluxion of time, as provided for by the partnership

deed.

The other sub-partner, to whom a similar notice had been given, declined to join the plt. in this suit. The deft. Alexander had been examined upon interrogatories in the suit and cross-examined thereon.

By the answer of the deft. Alexander Henry, it appeared that the business had been originally established by himself and his late brothers in 1828, and had then and since supplied nearly the whole of the capital required for carrying on the business; and at the last annual stock-taking, on the 15th March 1861, his share then was nearly 320,000, in addition to a sum of 245,000l. and upwards standing to his credit for moneys lent and advanced by him to the said firm; that there had been many sub-partnerships at Huddersfield, Belfast, Glasgow and several other places, under different departments, but that a proviso in all the arrangements relative to these sub-departments had always been inserted, to enable the head of the firm (which he the deft. now was) to determine the sub-partnership, in case he should consider it to the general interest of the firm so to do. The answer also alleged that no transaction of importance in the said business had ever been completed without his previous knowledge and approval, and that he was perfectly able to manage and conduct such business as he had lately done; that the notices given by him, and referred to in plt.'s bill, were so given in the exercise of his own independent judgment; that at the last stock-taking before mentioned there was only standing to the credit of the plt. in the partnership books a sum of 21167. 1s., some

wholly unable, from age and infirmity, to manage the business, some one should be appointed to protect the interests of the several parties until such account was properly taken; that the deft. having in effect adopted the notice given by the plt., the dissolution of the partnership was complete, and the ordinary acdeft. had contended that he was entitled, by the terms of the partnership deed, to buy out the plt. upon the footing of the last balance-sheet, as taken, of the profits, &c., and had given the notice for that purpose as provided by the deed; but the plt., by his bill, disputed the accuracy of the accounts upon which this balancesheet was founded, and thus the whole question as to the terms on which the accounts of the partnership were to be taken was uncertain. They referred to Evans v. Coventry, 3 De G. M. & G. 176.

Sir H. Cairns, Q. C. and J. J. H. Humphreys, for the deft. Henry, were not called upon.

The VICE-CHANCELLOR said, that whether or not the notices for the dissolution of the partnership were valid, and the terms upon which the accounts were to be taken, were the questions to be decided at the hearing, he should be deciding the whole case if he were now to turn the deft. out of the management of the business-andappoint a receiver; this would probably work irreparableinjury-and although of a great age and infirm, there was no evidence but that the deft. might, as he had hitherto done, conduct the management of the business by his agents. The answer of the deft. distinctly denied that the plt. was entitled to the relief prayed by the bill, putting in issue the very fact of the validity or invalidity of the notices, upon the validity of which, assuming them to be so, the character of the account of the partnership dealings and transactions of the firm to be taken, depended. He must therefore refuse the application for a receiver.

Costs to be costs in the cause. Solicitors, Langford and Co., and Johnson and Weatheralls.

Common Law Courts.

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.

Reported by JOHN THOMPSON, T. W. SAUNDERS, and C. J. B.

HERTSLET, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law.

Wednesday, Feb. 13.

REG. V. THE INHABITANTS OF CHIDDINGSTONE. Poor-law audit-Pauper lunatic-Common fund— Opening accounts-Arrears-Certiorari. A. B., a pauper lunatic, was in 1854 sent to the county lunatic asylum at the charge of the parish of C., from which parish she was then irremovable, and C. continued to pay for her maintenance up to the present time. In April 1858 two justices made an order, which was not signed till April 1860, ordering the payment of the expenses of the pauper's examination and the accumulated amount of maintenance, fc., from 1854 out of the common funds The county district auditor, in auditing the accounts for the half-year ending Michaelmas 1860, disallowed the sum charged against the parish of C. for

Q. B.]

REG. V. THE INHABITANTS OF CHIDDINGSTONE.

Upon certiorari calling upon the auditor to show cause why his certificate should not be varied, the court refused to interfere, and discharged the rule.

[Q. B.

the maintenance of the pauper for the half-year have made the certificate of disallowance and allowending Michaelmas 1860, but he allowed all the pre-ance as above; and my reasons for so much of the ceding charges. same as relates to said disallowance is, that under the said order of justices, of the 28th day of April 1858, the maintenance of the said lunatic for the half-year ending Michaelmas 1860 ought to have been charged against the common fund of the said union, and not against the said parish; and for the said allowance, that I have, by law, no power, as auditor, to reopen the accounts of the said half-year previous to the accounts of the half-year, to wit, the half-year ending Michaelmas 1860, now under my examination, the said accounts of the said previous half-years having been long since by me examined, audited and closed, and my functions of auditor in regard thereto having become terminated and discharged.

A writ of certiorari had been obtained on behalf of the ratepayers of the parish of Chiddingstone, in the county of Kent, calling upon George Matthews Arnold, the auditor of the West Kent audit district, to show cause why the allowance made by him on the 17th Dec. last in the accounts of the Sevenoaks Union for the halfyear ending Michaelmas-day 1860, should not be varied by crediting the parish of Chiddingstone with the sum of 150l. 18s. 4d. and debiting the common fund of the said union with the same sum.

The following is a copy of the auditor's certificate:"I hereby certify that in the accounts for the halfyear ending Michaelmas-day 1860, contained in the general parochial ledgers of and belonging to the board of guardians of the Sevenoaks Union, I have disallowed the sum of 112 17s. 8d., charged therein, against the parish of Chiddingstone for and in respect of the maintenance of Jane Medhurst, a lunatic, and I have transferred the said charge of 11. 178. 8d. to the debit of the common fund account entered in the said general ledger, and, subject to the said disallowance, I have allowed the said account in all other respects. My reasons for the above are as follow: that Jane Medhurst, a pauper lunatic, was, in 1854, sent to the Kent County Lunatic Asylum, at the charge of the parish of Chiddingstone, from which parish she was then irremovable from length of residence, her settlement being elsewhere.

"Witness my hand, this 7th day of Dec. 1860.
"(Signed) GEO. M. ARNOLD,
"Auditor of the West Kent audit district, which

comprises the said union and parish."

The

F. Russell showed cause.-The certificate of the auditor respecting the allowance and disallowance is legal and valid. The duty of the auditor at the time of making the certificate was confined to auditing the accounts for the half-year immediately preceding Michaelmas 1860, and he had then no power to examine into the propriety of charges made in the accounts of previous half-years, long ago audited and acquiesced in by the parties affected. parish officers and ratepayers of the parish of Chiddingstone had full knowledge, or at least means of knowing, during all the previous half-years in which the said lunatic was charged, that she was charged to the debit of the account of the said parish of Chidding"Her maintenance continued to be charged by the stone by the guardians of the Sevenoaks Union, in the lunatic asylum to the said parish and the guardians of accounts of the said union; and it was the duty of the union, who paid the same, also charged such pay- the overseers and ratepayers of the said parish to object ments in like manner to the said parish in their half- at the audit of each half-yearly account in respect of yearly accounts from that period up to the present the said union, to any improper charge made against time. them in each account, and as through laches and negli"The steward of the said asylum refused an applica-gence they had failed to object to the charges in respect tion to transfer the charge for the maintenance of the lunatic to the guardians of the union in respect of their common fund without an order of justices under the Lunatic Asylum Act 1853.

"Two justices on the 28th April 1858 made an order which was prepared for signature (but not actually signed till two years later) ordering the payment of 31. the expenses of pauper's examination, and 100%. 68. 8d. the accumulated amount of her maintenance at the asylum from the 10th March 1854 (when lunatic was sent to the asylum) to this date to be paid out of the common fund and this order was considered to be authorised by sect. 102 of the said Act; the order also similarly provided for the payment of the future maintenance. The total amount of maintenance from the period of the pauper being sent to the asylum up to the end of the Lady-day half-year 1860 is 150%. 18s. 4d.

"The further cost of maintenance for the half-year ending Michaelmas 1860 included in the accounts now under audit by me is the said sum of 117. 17s. 8d.

"The overseers of the parish of Chiddingstone, as ratepayers of that parish and otherwise, requested me, by their solicitor, to disallow the accumulated charge of 162. 16s., as entered in the union ledgers against their said parish, and, in lieu thereof, to charge the whole of such sum against the common fund

account.

"The clerk to the guardians, while admitting that the parish of Chiddingstone was equitably entitled to relief, contended that sect. 102 of the said Act was controlled by sect. 97, and that the justices could order the payment of the cost of twelve previous calendar months' maintenance only.

"Having heard what was alleged on both sides, I

of this lunatic in previous half-years, the auditor was
justified in exercising his discretion by refusing to open
accounts previously audited, even if he had the power to
do so. The justices had no power by law to make an
order ordering the guardians of the Sevenoaks Union to
pay any sum to the churchwardens and overseers of the
poor of the said parish of Chiddingstone in respect of
this lunatic. The order of justices, purporting to be
made in April 1858, but in reality made in April
1860, is wholly invalid and void, and
even if
not so, it can have no retrospective effect.
Barrow contra.-By 16 & 17 Vict. c. 97, s. 102, the
cost of the examination and removal of Jane Medhurst
to the Kent Lunatic Asylum, and of maintaining her
there, ought to have been charged to the common fund
of the Sevenoaks Union; at any rate the cost of her
maintenance since May 1858 ought to have been so
charged and borne. The reasons given by the auditor
in his certificate of allowance for refusing to transfer
the said costs to the common fund of the union, are
insufficient and inapplicable to the facts of the case.
[CROMPTON, J.-Can you lie by for ten years, and
then charge the common fund?] We did not know
of the five years' residence. [WIGHTMAN, J.—That
was unfortunate; still it was for you to find out the
chargeability; see how it would affect other people.]
Knowles v. Trafford and another, 26 L. J. 57, M. C.
[CROMPTON, J.-You ask us to order him, against his
own judgment, to allow all the arrears.] There is
nothing in the Acts to make the audit final.

WIGHTMAN, J.-It would be opening the whole
account. Why did you not call on him at the time?
By the COURT:
Rule discharged.

Q. B.]

SMITH V. VAUX-PARKER v. Green.

SMITH (app.) v. VAUX (resp.)
Alehouse-Opening house for the sale of beer-Sunday
-Evidence-11 & 12 Vict. c. 49.

At twenty minutes before one o'clock a.m. on Sunday
morning the outer entrance door of an alehouse was
wide open, the bar, tap-room and parlour were
likewise open, and in them were several men and
women, some of whom were residents in the parish,
a man and three women had a pint cup three-
fourths full of beer before them, and the landlady
was collecting the drinking cans. There was no
evidence as to the actual selling of beer after twelve
o'clock on Saturday night:

Held, that there was some evidence to justify a con-
viction for keeping the house open for the sale of
beer before half-past twelve, p.m., on Sunday.
This was a case stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.
At a petty sessions of the peace, holden at Notting-
ham, on the 8th Dec. 1860, before two of the justices
of the peace for the said county, Charles Smith, the
above-named app. was charged for that he the said
Charles Smith, on Sunday, 25th Nov. last, at the
parish of Arnold, in the said county, being a licensed
victualler, did open his house for the sale of beer before
half-past twelve o'clock in the afternoon, otherwise
than as refreshment for travellers, contrary to the
statute 11 & 12 Vict. c. 49. And the said deft.
being then present, accompanied by his attorney, the
said charge was duly heard, and upon such hearing
the justices convicted the said deft. of the said offence,
and adjudged him to pay a penalty and costs. And
the said deft. thereupon, pursuant to the provisions of
the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, gave notice and re-
quired the said justices to state and sign a case, &c.

CASE.

Upon the hearing it was proved in support of the information that the deft. was a licensed victualler at Arnold; that at twenty minutes before one o'clock on the morning of Sunday, the 25th Nov.-that is, before half-past twelve o'clock in the afternoon of that day-a police-officer, who was called as a witness, went to the house of the deft. and found the outer entrance door wide open, and there was free entrance for all comers from the street; that witness went direct into the bar and found that open; that witness also went into the tap-room and found that open; that witness also went into the parlour and found that open; that in the bar, and also in the tap-room; and also in the parlour, witness found several men and women, some of whom were unknown to him, and others of them witness knew to.be residents in the parish of Arnold, in which the house is situated; that witness saw in the bar one man and three women with a pint cup about three-parts full of beer on a table before them; that witness saw several men in the tap-room | and saw the wife of the deft. collecting drinking vessels called cans, used for drinking beer, from the table in the tap-room, but witness did not see whether there was any liquor in such cans ; that witness called the attention of the deft., who was in the tap-room, to the hour as shown by the clock, and the deft. used some abusive language in reply, but offered no explanation, and made no statement to account for the house being open at that hour.

At the hearing it was not alleged on behalf of the deft. that any of the persons in the bar, or in the taproom, or in the parlour, were travellers, nor was any evidence tendered or given on behalf of the deft.; but it was contended for the deft. that the evidence in support of the information did not show that the house was open for the sale of beer, and that the justices were not at liberty to draw inferences, but that an actual sale of beer on Sunday morning ought to have been proved in order to justify a conviction. Upon the facts proved as above stated, the justices found that the deft.'s house was open for the sale of beer before half

[Q. B.

past twelve o'clock in the afternoon of the said Sunday, and convicted the deft. accordingly.

The judgment of the court is requested as to whether the said justices were right in point of law in their determination.

Boden, Q.C., for the resps., in support of the conviction, contended that the conviction was right. There was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the house was open for the sale of beer within the prohibited hours. There was no necessity to prove any actual sale of the liquor at that time, provided the circumstances warranted such an inference.

Hayes, Serjt., for the app., contra, was called on.He contended that the leaving the house open for the departure of the guests was not sufficient evidence to justify the inference, and there was no proof of any sale of beer or any attempt to do so on Sunday morning. The charge was for opening the house on Sunday morning for the sale of beer, but the house had not been closed on the preceding Saturday night; there was no evidence of serving any one; the house was merely open to allow the guests to depart. [CROMPTON, J.-The house and doors being open was evidence for the justices, though perhaps the collecting the cans looked a good deal like the last act of the night.] Boden, Q.C. in reply.

WIGHTMAN, J.-I can't say that there is not some evidence. I don't know that I should have come to the same conclusion; but unless we see clearly there is no evidence we should not interfere.

CROMPTON, J.-I own I think the justices were right in their finding. Certainly on these facts there is some evidence to justify it. Conviction affirmed.

Friday, Feb. 14.

The

PARKER V. GREEN. Public-house-Permitting persons of bad character to assemble therein - Licence- Witness-9 Geo. 4, c. 61-14 15 Vict. c. 99. Twenty-four prostitutes and fifty men remained at the bar of a public-house for an hour or more. women were disorderly, and some of them swearing. At a later hour the same evening, fifty prostitutes and sixty men were there; some of the prostitutes being the same as were there at the earlier part of the evening. Several of the same prostitutes were proved to have been in the same house on other evenings. The deft. was present on these

occasions:

Held, that this was sufficient evidence of knowingly
permitting and suffering persons of notoriously bad
character to assemble and meet together in the house,
contrary to the Excise licence granted under 9 Geo.
4, c. 61:

Held, also, that an information for such offence was a
criminal proceeding, and that the deft. was not
admissible as a witness upon the hearing of it.
Case stated under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43.
At a petty sessions holden at the Guildhall, Ply-
mouth, on the 16th May 1861, an information pre-
ferred by Thomas Green, an inspector of police for the
said borough (the resp.) against John Parker (the app.),
under the 21st section of 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, charging
that the said J. Parker, on the 13th May 1861, at the
borough aforesaid, being a person duly licensed to sell
excisable liquors by retail, in his house and premises
there situate, did unlawfully and knowingly permit and
suffer divers persons of notoriously bad character to
meet and assemble together in his said house and
premises, against the tenor of his licence and con-
trary to the form of the statute, came on for hearing
before us, the undersigned, being two justices, &c.,
and upon such hearing the app. was duly convicted,
and we adjudged him guilty as of a first offence
against the provisions of the said Act, 9 Geo. 4, c. 61,
relative to the maintenance of good order and rule, and

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