INDEX. A. Abstracts of South Carolina Decisions, 462, 518. Abstracts of Massachusetts Decisions, 558. Accord and Satisfaction. An agreement of a creditor to take less than the face of his demand, upon receiving security for the amount to be paid, is a valid agreement, by reason of the additional benefit arising out of the security stipulated for. Phillips v. Burgher, 84. Action, 116. Adams, John Quincy, obituary notice of, 46. Ad damnum, 82. upon the side adjoining the defendant's land, acquires no presumptive privileges of light and air, if, during part of the time, he has hired the defendant's preinises. There must have been something resembling an adverse enjoyment of the privileges claimed. Whether the English doctrine respecting the privileges of light and air is to be received in this country, quære. Pierre v. Fernald, 72. Apportionment of Dividends, 372. Assent by grantees, 535. Address of Judge Edmonds, notice of, Attachments in the United States Courts. 232. Admiralty. It is an act of culpable negligence in a ferry-boat to run on a dark night through a crowded harbor, and rely solely upon a wooden frame compass, which would not traverse so easily as a lighter one which was on board at the time. The general rule of the maritime law is, that a vessel at anchor in a thoroughfare is bound to exhibit a light in a dark night. Where two vessels are guilty of negligence, the aggregate damage and costs inust be equally divided. Lenox v. Winnisimmet Co., 80. ADVANCEMENT OF THE LAW BY LAWYERS, 145. Advertising post-office letters. Any postmaster, who postpones the hearing of an application by the proprie tors of a newspaper, having the largest circulation, for the privilege of advertising uncalled-for letters, is liable in an action for damages to the estimated amount of the cost of advertising during such postponement. Rawson et al. v. Bagg, 26. Agency, 373. Alien passengers, 487, 524, Amendments, doctrine of, 91. The owner of a house in which windows have been opened for twenty years, On a scire facias against bail the defendant cannot object that the affidavit on which the principal was held to bail was insufficient. Bail was required in an action of assumpsit, but the recognizance of bail acknowledged before the sheriff and retained by him, describes the action as an action of debt: Held, nevertheless, that the recognizance was valid and sufficient. Reid v. White, 439. Bank, 535. Bank of U. States, 156. Where an act of incorporation of a banking company provided that notice of organization should be given on or before a certain date, and the bank was found to be in operation afterwards under the act, it is to be presumed that it was organized as early as the time prescribed. The bank of the United States (chartered by congress,) had no power to carry on banking operations after March 3, 1836, though it continued in existence two years longer for settlement of suits, &c. But on February 18, 1836, the state of Pennsylvania incorporated a banking company of the same name, in anticipation of the dissolution-the new company having, VOL. I.NO. XII.-NEW SERIES. 48 with one exception, the same stockholders and capital, the same name and style, and the same capacity, so far as a state institution could have the capacity of a national one. On March 10, 1836, the defendants proposed "to purchase of the Bank of the United States the property of the office at Burlington, as it was upon the 2d day of March, 1836." This contract was perfected April 1, 1836. Held, that it was a contract with the new company. Bank U. S. v. Lyman et al., 156 Barbour's Reports, notice of, 286, 423. Bill of Particulars, 156, Bingham on Infancy, notice of, 378. Boston City, ordinance of. That portion of the ordinance of the mayor and aldermen of the city of Boston, adopted July 12, 1847, which prescribes routes and streets on which certain lines of omnibuses were to pass, and prohibiting such vehicles from being driven on any other routes than those prescribed, and that which prescribes the stands of such omnibuses, are regulations which said mayor and aldermen may lawfully make, under the authority given by Stat. 1847, c. 224. The provisions (§ 8,) of the ordinance of July 12, 1847, which requires the payment of a stipulated sum, and the obtaining of a license, as conditions precedent to the setting up of an omnibus or stage coach, to run from the centre of Roxbury to the centre of Boston, is not authorized by the city charter, or the statutes of the commonwealth, and is therefore void. Commonwealth v. Stodder, 547. Bouvier's Law Dictionary, notice of, 524. C. A vessel ought not to be moored and lie in the channel or entrance to a port, except in cases of necessity; or, if anchored there from necessity, she ought not to remain there longer than the necessity continues. If she does, and a collision takes place with a vessel entering the harbor, she will be considered in fault. A vessel lying in the channel of a port from necessity, is bound in the night time to show a light. In cases of collision, a fault of one vessel will not excuse any want of care, diligence, and skill in another, so as to exempt her from sharing the loss and damage. The Scioto, 16. Collateral security, 204. Common-carriers, 44. Compound interest, 217. Confession of Judgment, 585. Conflict of Laws, 304. Conspiracy to defraud. Where, on the trial of an indictment for conspiring to cheat, the substantial proof consisted of showing the defendants' insolvency at the time of making large purchases for cash, unaccompanied with any representation of ablility to pay, or false pretence or artifice to induce credit, an instruction, "that if the defendants were at the time so deeply insolvent that they could have no reasonable expectation of paying for the goods in the ordinary course of their business, they committed an offence against the insolvent law, which might be the subject of an indictment for a criminal conspiracy," was held erroneous. Held, further, that the correct instruction should have been no more unfavorable to the defendants, than for the jury to inquire, "Whether they made the purchases in question, without expecting to CASE OF PATTEe v. Greeley, 241, 325. pay for them, and not intending to pay Charter, 535. Chilton's Digest, notice of, 379. When a collision takes place between a vessel under sail and one at anchor, the prima facie presumption, if there be any fault, is that it is on the vessel under sail. A vessel entering a harbor is bound to keep the most vigilant watch to avoid collision with other vessels in motion or lying at anchor. In the night time she ought to have her whole crew on the deck on the look out. When a collision takes place by the fault of one of the vessels, she is responsible for all the damage. But if it happens without fault in either party or if there was fault, and it cannot be ascertained which vessel was in fault —or if both were in fault, then the damage and loss is divided between them in equal shares. for them." The test of the reasonable expectation of a party, is not a just one in criminal matters; it should be of good or bad intention, and not of a mistake in judgment. A sale "for cash," where the goods are parted with by the vendor, without insisting upon payment upon delivery, supposing no false pretence or representation to be used by the purchaser to obtain possession of them, is in law a sale upon credit, so far as relates to the question of fraud or criminal liability of the purchaser. An indictment for a conspiracy to effect an object, not criminal in itself, should generally set out the means by which the conspiracy is designed to be carried out. An indictment for a conspiracy to cheat held bad, which only charged that three defendants, (with circumstances of time, place, and recital of evil intention,) "lawfully conspired, combined, confederated and agreed together, one P. S. to injure, cheat and defraud of his property, merchandise, goods and chattels." Commonwealth v. Eastman, et al. 256. Constitutional law, 7. Statutes of the several states which impose a tax upon passengers arriving from abroad, are unconstitutional, although states may pass quarantine laws, and impose penalties and exact payment of expenses, such laws not being regulations of commerce. Smith v. Turner, Norris v. Boston, 487. Construction of Will, 371, 372. Contract, 356, 357. Copyright, 42, 372. Corporation. When an act of the state which grants a charter to a private corporation is necessary before the corporation can be organized under the charter, no forfeiture can be occasioned by non-user, nor can an abandonment of the charter be imputed to the corporation afterwards organized. A charter granted by a state to a private corporation is a contract executed on the part of the state by the passage of the law making the grant. The assent of the grantees of the charter is to be presumed, and no written or formal acceptance is necessary. If there be no person designated in the charter in whom the franchise is to vest, it remains in abeyance until the association is formed, when it immediately vests in the corporators. If there be a person so designated, the franchise vests immediately in him, and it is immaterial whether he is the direct beneficiary, or only a trus tee appointed for the benefit of the corporators afterwards to be organized. Attorney-General v. Williams, 535. Corry, W. M., Correspondence with Chief Judge Birchard, 37, 87. Costs, Rule in relation to. The complainants had brought a bill in equity against the respondents for an alleged infringement of copyright. The case having been referred to the master, at a former term, was argued on his report, and the court refused to grant an injunction, but ordered the case to be continued to enable the complainants to bring a suit at law if they saw fit. The respondents moved that the bills be dismissed with costs, but Woodbury, J. held, that the case seemed to come within one of the exceptions to the general rule, that costs must go with the prevailing party. The exception was, that where the remedy in equity was refused, and yet the party plaintiff might proceed at law, costs would not be allowed. But the complainants must stipulate that they will not proceed at law or costs will be allowed. It was ordered that costs should be refused to both parties, if the com plainants should, within ten days, enter a The rights of sheriffs and executive officers of courts to seize counterfeit coin, &c., considered on the general grounds of preventive justice as well as of statute regulation. When counterfeit coin has been seized under the direction of a prosecuting offcer to be used as evidence against a person awaiting trial, and for the further purpose of preventing its circulation, an action of trover will not lie against the sheriff, especially if the owner fail to show that the coin was put into its present form without his knowledge or at least against his consent. Spaulding v. Preston, 453. County Commissioners, powers of, 77. Covenants. The doctrine of dependent and independent covenants discussed. Wells v. Howard, 345. Curious Mistake, 45. EFFECT OF A BANKRUPT'S CERTIFICATE The acts and admissions of one of sev eral joint contractors or promisors, are admissible as evidence against all, more especially if the party making the admissions, was acting as the agent of the others, and the admissions relate to acts within the scope of his authority. If a note is payable to S. J., cashier, or order, &c., parol evidence is inadmissible, to prove that the bank, of which S. J., is cashier, was the real party in interest, and such a note is not evidence, in an action of money had and received, or of an account stated, brought in the name of the bank. If the banking company, though not the payees, were the real owners of the note, and there had been an actual accounting with them, or their agents, such proceedings might constitute sufficient evidence to support the declaration described above: but an accounting with third persons to whom the beneficial interest of the bank has been assigned in trust for specified purposes, would not. Bank U. S. v. Lyman et al. 157. The true date of the execution of an instrument, differing from that appearing on its face, may be shown by parol testitimony. Pattee v. Greeley, 253. As a general rule, a party cannot be a witness in his own cause. Nor will he be permitted to avail himself of evidence by indirect means, which would be rejected as incompetent, if offered directly. In cases of criminal prosecutions for a cheat, perjury, &c., the party aggrieved is a competent witness for the prosecu tion. But where he has been used as a witness for the prosecution, the record of conviction is inadmissible in a civil proceeding instituted by him for relief against the fraud. In an action for the infringement of a patent, within the county of Albany, in the state of New York, brought by parties claiming the exclusive right to the patent in that county: held, that a party who was possessed of the exclusive right to the patent in several counties in that state, but who had no interest in the patent in the county of Albany, and no interest in the suit in which he was called, was a competent witness for the plaintiffs. But a verdict for the plaintiffs could, under no circumstances, be evidence for such witness, in a trial at law or in equity, on the merits of the patent, although it would be admissible on a preliminary motion for an injunction in a suit in equity. The record of such verdict would be evidence for such witness only where his own deposition would be competent, that is, where the application is to the sound discretion of the court, as on a preliminary motion for an injunction. Buck v. Hermance, 321. Letters coming from the custody of an insolvent's assignee, purporting to be addressed to the insolvent, are not to be received as evidence against him, of facts stated therein, but only, if sufficiently connected with the insolvent in the first instance, of the fact of such statements having been so addressed to him, in order to show his further action thereon. A party's action upon written communications addressed to him though admissible as evidence against him in the nature of a confession or admission of the truth of those statements, is not entitled to the same weight as his action in refer ence to communications made orally. An estimate not under oath, signed by two appraisers, is not admissible as their joint appraisement, unless both are called to testify to it. On the trial of conspirators, for conspiring to cheat, it is competent to show their general credit, and ability to purchase upon trust. So, evidence is admissible of other transactions in the way of purchases, at or about the time of the acts laid in the indictment, than those acts, for the purpose of proving their criminal intention. So, of their drawing against bills of lading purporting to show consignments of goods, when no such goods were owned by them at the time of filling out and forwarding such bills. It is within the discretion of the court to permit a prosecuting officer, after clos ing his case in evidence, to cross-examine a defendant's witnesses to points not sufficiently proved in his opening. Letter-press, or copying-machine copies of letters are not admissible as standards of comparison, from which the jury may infer whether a disputed signature, or writing, is that of a defendant's. Commonwealth v. Eastman et al. 256. Equity, 171, 350. A court of equity, will not, in a contest between persons who profess to be manufacturers of quack medicines, interfere to protect the use of trade marks, by injunction. A complainant, whose business is imposition, cannot invoke the aid of equity against a piracy of his trade marks, Fowle v. Spear, 130. Evidence, 545. Evidence, to prove general custom inad missible, 79. Evidence in Equity, Gresley on, Notice Factor, 373. Final judgment, 78. F. In a proceeding to recover a fine for the exercise of banking privileges without authority of law, the question of the forfeiture of the charter of the banking corporation from non-user, cannot be raised until the forfeiture is declared in the proper and usual way; the corporation can continue to exercise its franchise. Att'y General v. Williams, 535 Former judgment. A plea of former judgment in favor of the defendant, is a plea in estoppel, and must have the proper commencement and conclusion of such a plea, relying on the estoppel. The former judgment is no estoppel unless it were rendered on the merits; but that fact need not be averred in the plea. Reid v. White, 439. Franchise, 535. Fraudulent intent, 31. Freeman's Trial, Notice of, 137. G. the treasury department in refusing to pay the amount recovered, or any part of it, to such attorney, and the question whether such power of attorney be duly executed, are questions to be decided according to the descretion of the respective officers of the treasury; nor can the courts of the United States interfere in any way to guide or control the executive officers, or to entertain any appeal from Gholson, James H., Obituary Notice of, his decision. McElrath v. Mcintosh, 400. 288. Gordon's Digest, Notice of, 186. The word "grants" in the second section of the act of the Republic of Texas, introducing the common law, has a general meaning including all grants, and is not restricted to "grants of land." Att'y General v. Williams, 535. Greenleaf on Evidence, Notice of, 379. Greenleaf, Professor, Letter of, to Law Students, 188. Habeas Corpus. H. If a writ of habeas corpus be applied for on behalf of any person unlawfully restrained of his liberty without authority from such person, an action of trespass may be maintained by the person restrained against the person interfering,— but not otherwise. Linda v. Hudson, 33. HAMPDEN, DR., Case of, 49. Highway. An inhabitant of a town, as well as a stranger, may maintain an action against the town for damages caused by a defect in the highway. Strout v. Durham, 116. Highway, Dedication of, 505. Hilliard's Elements of Law, Notice of, 424. Holcombe's Law of Debtor and Creditor, Insanity. In actions arising ex delicto, the insanity of the defendant, at the time of committing the injury, may be a defence to the action; and if the defendant labors under a partial insanity, it is not necessary to show that the act in question was the immediate and unqualified offspring of the particular delusion, to make the defendant irresponsible. In an action of slander, evidence of the insanity of the defendant is admissible to repel the legal presumption of malice, and in mitigation of damages. Evidence of hereditary insanity in the defendant's family is admissible in civil as well as in criminal cases. Pratt v. Ford, 420. Insolvent Law. A person intending to take the benefit of the insolvent law, may, in the absence of any fraudulent intent, lawfully transfer a note to any one, who proposes to become his surety for the fees of a master in chancery. The title of a third person cannot be set up in defence to an action on a note, regularly and honestly negotiated. Fogg v. Willcut, 31. Insolvent Law, Construction of, 34. INSOLVENTS, MONTHLY LIST of, 47, 95, 142, 191, 240, 288, 336, 384, 432, 480, 528, 570. Interest, 217. Ireland, State Trials in, 282. I. Incorporation, Act of, 156. Indorsers, Notice to, 156. Infringement of Patent, 321. The Courts of the United States have no authority to enjoin the officers of the government against performing any act not merely ministerial. The question whether a power of attorney from an Indian woman to another person, to recover the amount due to said Indian woman upon a land reservation (agreeably to the Indian treaties) and to retain half the amount recovered, as a compensation, is so far contrary to the policy of the resolution of March, 1848, as to justify the officers of |