will have fair fields and flocks. So ought the wilderness of ancient law to be cleared, and the fields be sowed by civilized

man.

To such work, lawyers alone are, or should be, competent. It can be done only by united, conventional, studied action. Then alone will there be symmetry in the laws.

The process by which this work is to be done is logically analytic. The great idea should be followed to its remotest ramifications; and this process seems to be most in harmony with the spirit of the time, which is inquiring, philosophical and theorizing. Evidence enough of this appears in the general course of inquiry and thought, in the political movements, to some extent even, in the legislation of the day.

But as things are, no law can be followed far but it runs against some legislation. Most statutes encounter others at some points. Therefore, point by point is settled by arbitrary enactment. To frame a system, then, the synthetic process is required, unless the maxim stare decisis be abandoned.

worse.

Now, this is precisely what is going on, in consequence of another fact. In these United States, there are now as many as eight hundred volumes of reports of decisions. In the courts of the United States alone, nearly sixty volumes. In England there are as many as some thousands of volumes. There are treatises without number. All these are authorities, better or It is perfectly plain they cannot all be known or consulted. The cases, as they become numerous on each subject, after a while begin to wear the rough edges off of each other. If a principle is not sound in one state, it may be uniformly adhered to, but it is soon assailed in another state, and so the process goes on; but it goes very slowly. Cases on various points must at last become so numerous, that they can be of no practical use until they are classified; in other words, till the great principle which they ought at first to have laid down to settle and decide them all, without controversy, has been eliminated by the lawyers out of the multitude of cases which have arisen in a century. What would be said of the architect, who, to build his arch, should try, one after another, all possible shapes, till at last he hit the one which would stand, when he had a slate, and in his head principles, on which he could in a little while reckon just what must be built to form a true

and perfect structure? The very multiplicity of books will render them useless, till the law, by some process, be abstracted from them. Digests, even, must at last be digested, and the authority appealed to will at last be rarely the individual case, but the result of the cases, the pith of them, and the law.

It seems possible that a plan might be devised, by which the labor of years might be saved on this slow and burthensome process; simply by the profession, by some united action, lending to its work just the same labor for its improvement and perfection, as any mechanic would in his craft. Such united action of the whole body of the profession throughout the United States, securing, as it would, the vast amount of learning of the entire country, and the experience of so many states, would at once bring together material for the work, which the separate states could never collect. It would almost ensure the establishment of certain principles as rules of law, which would infuse new spirit into legislation, and have none of the odious features of ordinary law reforms, and few of the evils and inconveniences resulting from sudden changes in settled rules. At some future time we hope to show how the plan proposed would lead to entire harmony and uniformity in the laws throughout the United States, a result that would be of incalculable advantage to the people of the Union.

Recent American Decisions.

Circuit Court of the United States, Massachusetts District, May Term, 1848.

UNITED STATES v. LOCKMAN.'

Whether proof of partial burning will sustain an indictment under Stat. 1804, ch. 40, quare?

A minor who ships on board a vessel without the knowledge of his parents, "belongs" to the vessel so far as to render him liable under the above statute. In criminal and capital cases, a jury must act on strong probabilities. The mere possibility that this fire might have been occasioned by spontaneous combustion, or might have

1 This report is made up from the minutes of counsel.

been set by accident, is no answer to strong evidence making it probable that a particular person set it.

THIS indictment charged that Lyman Lockman, on the 20th of April, 1848, "on the high seas, did wilfully, and corruptly, burn the ship William Thompson, of New Bedford, he the said Lockman then and there being a mariner on board thereof, and belonging to said ship William Thompson. And the said ship William Thompson being the property of citizens of the United States, and said Lockman not being an owner of said ship." It was founded on the statute 1804, ch. 40, sec. 1, which provides that any person, not being an owner, who shall, on the high seas, wilfully and corruptly cast away, burn, or otherwise destroy any ship or other vessel, unto which he belongeth, being the property of any citizen or citizens of the United States, or procure the same to be done, and being thereof lawfully convict ed, shall suffer death."

"

The fire took place at the Sandwich Islands. It appeared that the vessel, which was a whaler, in April, 1847, a few hours after she set sail for the North-West Coast, at about nine or ten o'clock in the evening, was found to be on fire in the forehold. She was taken back into port and found to be considerably damaged by fire. In a few weeks she was repaired, and went on her voyage. Several of the crew were seized and charged with the offence, but, on examination before the consul, Lockman was sent home to be tried, with two witnesses against him. The vessel arrived at New Bedford the first of April, 1848.

Charles L. Woodbury, for the United States.
Charles M. Ellis, for the prisoner.

It was testified, on the part of the government, that a grating which separated the forecastle from the forehold, where the fire was, had been broken; that the forehold had in it a great deal of old junk, rigging, tar, &c.; that the prisoner was seen working at the bulkhead, and creeping out of the forehold through the hole; that the prisoner had said "that he had been in the forehold; that he had got some tar and rope-yarn in a sack, and would burn the ship before he would go to the North-West Coast in her; that he had tried to fire the ship before, but he had only two matches, and they would not go;" that after the fire he had said that "he wished he had a spade, and he would cut off the captain's head;" that after the fire, the pris

oner having been flogged to make him tell what he knew about it, he said, in reply to the question if he knew who did it," that he did not know anything else." It also appeared that the vessel had been previously on fire, and that at that time the prisoner was confined, and two others of the crew were sent home charged with that offence; that the conduct of the captain was harsh; that the crew were also dissatisfied with their grub, and said they wished the vessel sunk or burned before they had to go in her. It was further shown that the owners acted as citizens of the United States.

On the part of the prisoner it was testified that there were great complaints among the crew of the William Thompson; that they were generally dissatisfied; that several had been heard to say that they would throw the captain overboard or sink the ship before they would go on to the North-West in her; that Lockman was under age, not twenty; that he shipped without the knowledge or consent of his father; and that he was quiet and orderly on board ship.

The court desiring the questions of law in the case to be stated, the counsel for the prisoner contended that the evidence I did not support the indictment, the evidence being that the prisoner was brought into the United States prior to the time alleged in the indictment; that there was no legal contract binding the prisoner to service in the ship, and therefore he did not belong to the ship under the statute, which did not apply to passengers, persons from other ships, or the owner, but only to those holding a certain relation, that of the ship's crew; that the property of the ship could not be shown without the bill of sale, the vessel having been built by persons not then owners of her; and that the citizenship of the owners could not be shown, except by proving their birth or legal naturalization; and that the only burning punishable under the act must amount to a substantial destruction of the ship, such being the force of the words "otherwise," and "or" in the act, and its necessary grammatical construction; that the act was the same as if it read, "shall destroy by casting away, burning, or any other means;" that this appeared also from the statutes from which this act is framed; and because the statutes, when intended to apply to cases of mere setting on fire, used appropriate language; and that the cases of De Londo, (2 East, Pl. c. 1098,) and United States v. Johns, (1 Wash. C. C. R. 363,)

S. C. (4 Dall. 412,) being upon the same words, should be held to apply to this point.

On the part of the government, it was argued that the time was immaterial; that no proof of ownership or citizenship was required, if the ship carried the American flag; that the law applied to any one on board the ship; and that the statute was only the enactment of an admiralty offence, and applied to any burning, however slight.

Upon the question of the partial burning, WOODBURY, J. stated that, if the case arose under 2d sec. of the act, the court should consider the law settled on the grounds urged by the prisoner's counsel; that his learned associate was more strongly inclined than he to the opinion that a case of partial burning would not be within the statute, which could apply only to cases of destruction of the ship; but that he could not consent, without precedent, and considering that there was some difference in the objects of the two sections, in case of a crime of so grave a character, and one which could not be reached unless by this law, to let the prisoner go free, without first having the opinion of the supreme court of the United States. He accordingly proposed to certify a division of opinion and have the cause carried up. But the prisoner desiring to have the jury pass upon the case, the court consented, reserving for the pris oner the question of law. The cause was then argued to the jury upon the facts.

For the prisoner it was contended, that there was no proof that the prisoner was guilty; that if the evidence were all taken as true, still the hemp, sails, &c. stored in the forehold might have taken fire by spontaneous combustion, and several cases were cited of like sort; or that the fire might have taken accidentally from lights in the forecastle; and that the evidence was suspicious, and if the ship was set on fire, it was quite as probable, if not more so, from the evidence, that the fire was set by some one beside the prisoner.

The government urged that the threats, the preparation, and the fire following, showed conclusively that the prisoner was guilty.

WOODBURY, J. urged upon the jury the performance of their duty. The courts and juries are to administer the laws as they exist, not to make or unmake them. The jury must remember their oaths, and march up to their duty.