veyance there are frequently indications which specifically determine the intentions of the parties, and that decisions pronounced in such cases are in effect only decisions upon the particular instruments, and are misleading when taken as authorities upon the general question. Of this kind were the decisions in Hare v. Horton, 5 B. & Ad. 715, Trappes v. Harter, 3 Tyrr. 603, and Waterfall v. Penistone, 6 E. & B. 876; as to the two last of which it is only necessary to refer to what was said about them in Ex parte Reynall, 2 Mont. D. & De G. 522, Mather v. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 536, Walmesley v. Milne, 8 W. R. 138, 7 C. B. (N. S.) at pp. 133, 134, and Cullwick v. Swindell, 15 W. R. 206, L. R. 3 Eq. at pp. 253-255.

And here, though somewhat out of the track of the inquiry what are and what are not fixtures, it may be convenient to notice two points which have arisen and been decided with respect to mortgages which have included fixtures, although both seem sufficiently clear. The first is that a mortgage of premises will carry, not only things affixed at the time of the execution of the mortgage, but also things subsequently affixed by the mortgagor in possession. This has been frequently held, and it will be sufficient to refer to Ex parte Belcher, 4 Dea. & C. 703, 716 and Walmesley v. Milne, 8 W. R. 138, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 115. The second point is that an equitable mortgagee has in this respect the same rights as a legal mortgagee. This point has been decided as often and almost as early as the other. Ex parte Reynall, 2 Mont. D. & De G. 443; Ex parte Price, id. 518; Ex parte Tagart, De G. 531; Williams v. Evans, 23 Beav. 239; Longbottom v. Berry, L. R., 5 Q. B. 123.

Fifthly, the same question arises where a writ of fi. fa. has been executed against the goods and in the house of the execution debtor, being the owner of the freehold, and articles affixed by him have been reckoned as part and parcel of the land so as to escape the operation of the writ.

With respect to the instances above mentioned, it is to be observed that the cases of heir and executor, and mortgagor and mortgagee, have been expressly treated as identical by the court of exchequer chamber in Climit v. Wood, L. R. 4 Ex. 328, and by Wood, V. C., in Mather v. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 536, and the same view has been acted on in several earlier cases.

The case of heir and executor and vendor and purchaser were so treated in Colgrave v. Dios Santos, 2 B. & C. 76. The cases of sheriff and houseowner under a f. fa. and mortgagor and mortgagee were so treated in Winn v. Ingilby, 5 B. & A. 625, and in Mather v. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 550; and although in Haley v. Hammersley, 3 De G. & J. 587, Lord Campbell declined to rest on the analogy, he did not deny it.

Sixthly, the question of what are fixtures also presents itself in the inquiry arising under various acts of parliament, what things can be reckoned as part of a tenement so as to increase its annual value. This question, arising under settlement law, has been judged by the case of heir and executor. Rex v. Otley, 1 B. & Ad. 163. The like question might formerly have arisen with respect to the £10 household franchise, and may now arise with respect to the lodger franchise, under 30 and 31 Vict. c. 102, § 4. Thirdly, the question has been raised in connection with poor rates, which are directed to be assessed according to the annual value of the rated property; but the decisions under this head make the point immaterial, since it has been held that if the annual value of tenements is in fact enhanced by the use of the thing, it makes no matter whether it

(the thing) is or is not a fixture. "Even where the machine has not been attached, a house has been held ratable in respect of it, if the value of the house was increased by the machine." Lord Denman, C. J., King v. Birmingham and Staffordshire Gas Light Company, 6 A. & E. 631; see, also, Queen v. Southampton Dock Company, 20 L. J. M. C. 155.

It is a similar question whether things are part of a house or building so as to enable the owner to require a company, acting under the lands clauses consolidation act, 1845, to take the whole by a notice given in pursuance of section 92 of that act. Gibson v. Hammersmith Railway Co., 11 W. R. 299, 32 L. J. Ch. 337.

Seventhly, it also presents itself under the doctrine of the common law that larceny can only be committed of goods and chattels, but not of any thing attached to or forming part of the land; but no assistance is derived from decisions upon this subject, though the analogy has misled at least one decision on a question arising between landlord and tenant. Grymes v. Boweren, 6 Bing. 438. It arises in several other cases which turn upon the question of whether the things in question are goods and chattels. Thus,

Eighthly, at common law it depends on whether the things in question are or are not goods and chattels, whether an action of trover will lie for them, or whether their price can be recovered under a count for goods bargained and sold. Here the question of fixtures or no fixtures is directly in point, and decisions that an action would not lie because the things sued for were so affixed as to make them no longer goods and chattels would seem to be authorities upon the question of fixtures, clear of all embarrassment caused by the tenant's exceptional privilege of removal. And so the matter was, in fact, treated in Minshull v. Lloyd, 2 M. & W. 450, where Parke, B., expressly says (at p. 459) that though the fixtures there were removable (tenant's) fixtures, the tenant's right of removal would not have entitled him to sue in trover for them; and so it was expressly decided in Macintosh v. Trotter, 3 M. & W. 184. And this seems the reason of the thing, notwithstanding an expression to the contrary in the judgment of Maule, J., in Wilde v. Waters, 16 C. B. 651, which appears to countenance the idea that the tenant could maintain an action of trover where other persons could not; and it is also in accordance with what was said in the Exchequer Chamber in Dumergue v. Rumsey, 12 W. R. 205; 2 H. & C. 790. An action of trover, then, will only lie if the fixtures have been severed and then converted, as in Dallon v. Whittem, 3 Q. B. 961; if they have not, the remedy is by a special form of action, as in London and Westminster Loan and Discount Company v. Drake, 7 W. R. 611; 6 C. B. (N. S.) 798.

The point with respect to the action for goods sold and delivered was decided in Lee v. Risdon, 7 Taunt. 188, where that form of action was held not to lie for the price of fixtures, they not being goods and chattels. Ninthly, it arises under the "order and disposition clause of the Bankruptcy Acts, and under the Bills of Sale Act, the first of which refers only to "goods and chattels," and the second to "personal chattels." As to the first, since, after some conflict of opinion, it has become settled that the words of the clause do not include removable (tenant's) fixtures, decisions as to what things are so affixed as not to come within this clause are decisions as to what are and what are not fixtures properly speaking. Ex parte Barclay, 5 De G.

M. & G. 403, 410. Under the second act a similar question arose in Mather v. Fraser, 4 W. R. 387; 2 K. & J. 536, where, on the ground that the property included in a mortgage consisted of fixtures, the vice-chancellor held that it did not need registration under the act. Tenthly, if the fact of annexation to the freehold is by itself sufficient to prevent the right of distress attaching to things so annexed, notwithstanding the things so annexed are as between landlord and tenant removable by the tenant, a decision against the right of distress would be a clear decision as to the question of fixtures in general and would stand wholly unrelated to the exceptional privilege of removal. Such was the case of Hellawell v. Eastwood, 6 Ex. 295, which, however, has, apparently withont much consideration of the ground of the decision, been repeatedly distinguished in fixture cases on the mere ground that it was a case between landlord and tenant. See 12 Cl. & F. 312; 2 K. & J. 536; L. R. 5 Q. B. 137. It is difficult to know what to do with a case which is set aside and left standing out of the way, while the grounds on which it is decided are overruled. That decision clearly proceeded on the ground that the machines there distrained were not part of the freehold (any more than carpets), and that (which tests the former) they would have gone to the executor and not to the heir, both these propositions have been since authoritatively denied (see the cases cited). Either it must be taken that, though the rules there laid down as tests of fixture or no fixture have been approved, yet their application is dissented from; or, if that case was rightly decided, it will follow that, although the landlord cannot distrain upon his own fixtures, which must needs be part of the thing demised (as was the case in Pitt v. Shew, 4 B. & A. 206, though the distinction was not noticed), yet he can distrain upon the tenant's (removable) fixtures, provided, that is, it can be done without damage; and every case which distinguishes Hellawell v. Eastwood, on the mere ground that it was a case between landlord and tenant, tends to affirm the latter proposition.

The instances above enumerated fall into three classes: first, those where the question has been whether the things in question fall strictly under the description of goods and chattels (7, 8 and 9); second, where the question has been whether they form part and parcel of the land, so as to increase its annual value, or to be freed from execution under fi. fa., or from distress (5, 6, 10); and third, whether, as part and parcel of the land, they are recovered, transmitted and alienated with it (1, 2, 3, 4). The first two questions seem identical, nor is it possible to find any difference capable of an explanation between any of the three.

Let us, therefore, seek in the cases thus enumerated the test of what are fixtures; and although it is not possible to find any reason for the application of different rules to those several cases, or to find in the decisions themselves any principle of distinction laid down, yet, that it may be seen what was the nature of the authorities cited, it shall be stated to which class each case quoted belongs.

First, then, to convert a movable into a fixture, an actual annexation is necessary; it is not sufficient that the thing stands fast by its own weight, even though it has a fixed bed or foundation prepared for it. In Rex v. Otley, 1 B. & Ad. 161, a settlement case, where, unless a wooden windmill resting on a brick foundation were reckoned as part of the tenement, the annual value would not be enough to create a settlement, Bayley, J., said, at p. 165: "The question is, whether

the mill be parcel of a tenement? To be so, it must be part or parcel of the freehold. Now, it is not parcel of the freehold unless it be affixed to it, or to something previously connected with it. Here, the mill was not affixed to the land, but merely rested on a foundation of brick."

The sessions have found that, if it had stood upon the ground, it would have worked as well. If it had, the only difference would have been that it probably would have rotted. This is analogous to the case of a barn set upon pillars, and that is nothing more than a chattel. The windmill in this case would clearly have gone to the executor, and not to the heir; and Parke, J., says at p. 166: "To constitute a tenement it is necessary that the structure should be affixed to the soil or to something annexed to the soil. Here the windmill rested merely upon the brick foundation, without being annexed to it by cement." To the same effect is Horn v. Baker, 9 East, 215, a case under the order and disposition clause; Wansborough v. Maton, 4 A. & E. 884, a case of trover; Wiltshear v. Cottrell, 1 E. & B. 674, a case between vendor and purchaser; Mather v. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 559; Ex parte Astbury, 17 W. R. 997, L. R. 4 Ch. 630, 638, 9, and Longbottom v. Berry, L. R. 5 Q. B. 129, 139, No. 30, cases between the mortgagor and mortgagee. See also Beaufort v. Bates, 10 W. R. 200, 3 De G. F. & J. 381. The object and effect of the fixed structures in these cases being merely to raise the articles in question off the ground, but not to keep them fast and immovable by fixing them to the ground, or to any thing annexed to it, the cases differ from that where a thing is held firm by fitting, without any fastening, into a hole prepared for it. In this last case, however, the same rule has been applied, and looms fitting into an ironed hole in the floor, called a loom-foot, were held (between mortgagor and mortgagee) not to be fixtures. Kay v. Hutchinson, 23 Beav. 413; see also Boyd v. Sharrock, 16 W. R. 102; L. R. 5 Eq. 79, 80. Poles for clothes lines, fitting into wooden sockets in the ground, might furnish another example; although the wooden tops used to keep the water out of the sockets, when the poles were not in use, would be an instance on the opposite side. If a thing, though standing by its own weight, is besides embedded (as in Ex parte Astbury), it scarcely needs to be said that it is not within the above description.

But, secondly, it is not necessary in order to make a thing a fixture that any very considerable force should be required to disengage it. "Every thing (says Maule, J.) is removal; it is in all cases but a question of degree." 16 C. B. 641, in Wilde v. Waters. But although the degree, materially and physically, to which a thing is affixed may be so great as to supersede every other consideration, yet in the lesser degrees of fixedness the question is largely determined by the nature of the article and the purpose of its annexation. How slight an annexation will suffice to establish the character of a fixture, if the remaining circumstances are favorable, may be seen from what is said by Wood, V. C., in Mather v. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 536. According to the old rule of law, if that which would otherwise have been a chattel had been affixed to the soil, whether by nails, screws or otherwise, it passed along with the soil to which it was so fixed. In the relation of landlord and tenant, but in that relation alone, the rule of law was relaxed for the encouragement of trade." This case, which was between mortgagor and mortgagee, is in accordance with the decisions in the simi

lar cases of Place v. Fagg, 4 M. & R. 277; Walmsley v. Milne, 7 C. B. (N. S.) 115; Ex parte Reynall, 2 Mont. D. & De G. 443; Ex parte Cotton, id. 725; Ex parte Belcher, 4 Dea. & C. 703; Cullwick v. Swindell, 15 W. R. 206; L. R. 3 Eq. 249; Boyd v. Sharrock, L. R. 5 Eq. 72; Climie v. Wood, L. R. 4 Ex. 528; Longbottom v. Berry, L. R. 5 Q. B. 123, to which may be added (on account of the opinions expressed in it, although, according to Dallas, C. J., it did not necessarily turn upon the question of fixture or no fixture) the case of Stewart v. Lombe, 1 Brod. & B. 506, where a windmill, similar in other respects to that in Rex v. Otley, differed from it in being fastened by ties to the ground. The parallel cases of Fisher v. Dixon, 12 C1. & F. 312, between heir and executor; Wilde v. Waters, 16 C. B. 617, a case of trover (as to which see also Dumergue v. Rumsey, 12 W. R. 205; 2 H. C. 777, per Williams, J., 790); Rex v. St. Dunstan's, 4 B. & C. 686, a settlement case; Winn v. Ingleby, 5 B. & A. 625, a case of fixtures taken under a fi. fa. against the owner of the freehold of the house; and Horn v. Baker, 9 East. 215, a case of order and disposition (followed by other cases which are summed up in Exc parte Barclay, 5 De G. M. & G. 403, are all to the same effect. Colegrave v. Dios Santos, 2 B. & C. 76, a case of trover between vendor and purchaser, may be also referred to, but it is in fact no authority as to what are fixtures, for some of the things there sued for were clearly fixtures, and for that reason the plaint necessarily failed in the whole. See per Abbott, C. J., p. 78.-Solicitors' Journal.

LEGAL OBITUARY.

JUDGE HIRAM DENIO.

Hiram Denio, formerly judge of the court of appeals, died at his residence in Utica, on Sunday, the 5th of November.

He was born at Rome, in this State, on the 21st of May, 1799. He commenced the study of the law with Judge Hathaway, at Rome, in 1816, and afterward went to Whitesboro and entered the office of Storrs & White, where he remained until 1821. In that year he became a partner of Wheeler Barnes, Esq., a lawyer in established practice at Rome. In October, 1825, he was appointed, by the court of general sessions, district attorney to succeed Samuel Beardsley, Esq., and held the position for nine years. Meantime, and in 1826, he removed to Utica and became a partner of E. A. Wetmore, Esq. In 1834 Mr. Denio was appointed a circuit judge for the fifth circuit. In 1836 he formed a copartnership with the Hon. Ward Hunt. In June, 1853, he was appointed to fill a vacancy on the bench of the court of appeals, and was twice afterward elected to that position, retiring in 1866.

Judge Denio married, in May, 1829, Miss Ann H. Pitkin, of Farmington, Conn., by whom he had three children, one only of whom survives.

In October, 1868, he was stricken by a paralytic stroke, from which he never fully recovered, and his death was anticipated for some time before it occurred.

As a judge, Mr. Denio held a very high rank. His broad views, sound judgment and great legal learning, gave to his opinions a weight and value not always accorded even to the opinions delivered from the appeals bench, while the purity and benevolence of his heart and the rectitude of his life endeared him to all who had the honor to know him personally.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In an equity suit, lately decided in the court of appeals, which had been brought by executors against a hundred or more parties, for the purpose of settling a large estate and directing its distribution among contesting parties, I observe that, in the opinion given on its decision, the court say: "The heirs of the daughter have not appealed from the judgment. They are the only parties prejudiced by that provision of the judgment, etc. This provision of the judgment cannot be corrected by this court."

And again: "The two defendants last named have not appealed from the judgment, and cannot, therefore, ask for any modification thereof favorable to them."

Are we to understand, from this language, that the court of last resort cannot modify a judgment in favor of a respondent? That when the court has got possession of a case it can modify only in behalf of an appellant? And that, unless a party puts himself in the position of an appellant, he can have no judgment or decision in his favor in the court of appeals but an affirmance?

Such has not hitherto been understood to be the jurisdiction of the court of last resort in this State. But now, for nearly one hundred years, whenever the court got possession of a case by a valid appeal by any party, it has been the invariable practice for it to make such decree as was just, without any reference to the position any party might occupy as appellant or respondent.

The old court of errors never recognized any such limitation to its powers of doing complete justice. The cases of the James will, in 14 Wendell, and the Lorillard will, in 16 Wendell, show very clearly the former practice, and it is pretty important that it should be known, if there is to be a change of so salutary a rule, and if so, upon what it is founded.

No authority is cited, in the opinion I have referred to, for the position taken, and I have looked in vain in the constitution and the statutes for such authority.

The constitution merely says: "There shall be a court of appeals," and does, in no respect, speak of its powers. 7 N. Y. St. at Lar. 810, § 2.

The statute says: "The court of appeals instituted by the sixth article of the constitution shall possess all the powers and jurisdiction heretofore possessed by the existing court of appeals." 7 N. Y. Stat. at Lar. 670.

The then existing court of appeals had "full power to correct and redress all errors that have happened in the present supreme court and court of chancery and that may happen in the supreme court organized by this act, and all laws relating to the court for the correction of errors, the jurisdiction, powers and duties thereof, shall be applicable to the court of appeals."

And the court "shall examine all errors that shall be assigned or found in any record brought up, and shall reverse or affirm such judgment or give such other judgment as the law may require." 4 N. Y. St. at Lar. 557, §§ 8 and 10.

The powers of the old court of errors were defined by the Revised Statutes, in these words: "The court shall examine all errors that shall be assigned or found in any record brought from the supreme court, and shall have power to reverse or affirm the judgment of the

supreme court, or to give such other judgment as the law may require. 2 N. Y. St. at Lar. 173, § 25.

And upon any decree of chancery being brought by appeal to the court, that court shall examine all errors that shall be assigned or found in such decree, and shall have power to reverse, affirm or alter such decree and to make such other decree therein as justice shall require. Id. § 27.

And the Code, § 12, says: "The court of appeals may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or order appealed from in whole or in part, and as to any or all of the parties."

Now, allow me to ask, for the information of the bar, if any of your readers will be so good as to point out to us practitioners, whether there is indeed any such great change in the administration of the court of appeals, and if there is, upon what authority it is founded? It is of the last importance that we should know, and that at once. Yours,

A PRACTITIONER.

GENERAL TERMS.

2d Tuesday in November, third department, Schenectady.

3d Tuesday in November, fourth department, Syra

cuse.

2d Monday in December, second department, Brooklyn.

LEGAL NEWS.

The United States supreme court decides that a State cannot levy a tax upon the tonnage of a vessel. George C. Bates, Esq., has been appointed United States prosecuting attorney for Utah.

W. W. Goodale, a prominent lawyer of Oneida, Madison county, N. Y., died very suddenly on the 24th ult., of paralysis.

The attorney-general, in his report to congress, will show that the new department of justice has incurred much less expense than under the old system, where each department had a law bureau by itself.

Two New Jersey farmers, Simon Kent and Thomas J. Vangiesen, have applied to Surrogate Lawton, of Albany, N. Y., for letters of administration upon the estate of Anneke Jans. They claim to represent the heirs, 105 in number, mostly residents of New Jersey.

A pocket book, the property of the claimant of the Tichborne baronetcy, has been found at Wagga Wagga, where he formerly resided. The book contains some important entries in the handwriting of Decastro, and its possession is being contested by the agents of the litigants in Tichborne v. Lushington.

Hon. William M. Evarts, late attorney-general, and Hon. Benjamin R. Curtis, late a justice of the United States supreme court, have been appointed counsel for the United States before the tribunal which is to meet in Geneva on the Alabama question. Mr. Evarts accepts the appointment. Judge Curtis is expected home from Europe within a few days, and the appointment awaits his return. Mr. Cushing, of Massachusetts, and Mr. Meredith, of Pennsylvania, had previously been appointed. Mr. Cushing has accepted the appointment, and Mr. Meredith has declined from inability, as it is understood, to make the sea voyage at an inclement season of the year. It

is expected that Judge Curtis will accept, in which case the government will be represented before the tribunal by Messrs. Cushing, Evarts and Curtis.

A Washington special to the New York Tribune says, that misstatements have been made in regard to the delivery of the decision in the legal-tender case, decided by the supreme court last spring. Chief Justice Chase, it is thought, will give the dissenting opinion, but thus far no opinion or written decision has yet been prepared, and it is not yet known who will prepare the decision of the court. It will not be announced until the last week of the present adjourned term.

In the United States supreme court, on the 30th ult., after the business of the court was concluded, Attorney-General Akerman rose and announced the death of Hon. Thomas Ewing. Mr. Akerman paid a high tribute to the memory of the deceased gentleman, and presented resolutions adopted by the members of the bar on Saturday. The chief justice in reply said: "The court shares with the bar sentiments expressed by their resolutions, which will be entered upon the records in accordance with their request. We all feel that whatever honors can be paid to the memory of Mr. Ewing are properly paid. This is the record of a youth, patient in toil and full of aspirations, of a manhood worthily employed in various and honorable public trusts, and in forensic labors which gave us frequent occasion to note the remarkable grasp and vigor of his intellect, and the great variety and extent of his attainments, protracted and serene old age, and of the calm and peaceful death, surrounded by children worthy of their father. To a family and friends the death of a relative and friend so honored and beloved, however long deferred, comes always too soon, counting our selves as not least affectionate among the friends of Mr. Ewing. We yet find, and doubt not that all near to him in friendship or relationship will ever find consolation in reflecting upon the greatness of the example he has left for the imitation of his countrymen."

Little by little the cumbrous forms of marriage ceremony are being dispensed with. Recognizing marriage as a civil contract, people are getting to reduce it to its briefest terms. It need not take five minutes, when once it was strung out for an hour or two. What effect this will have on civilization in general is too ponderous a question for present consideration We wish simply to show how simply and neatly the thing is done in Illinois. It is said that the young justice was green. We do not think so. He was smart. But here is the "record" as we cut it from a daily newspaper:

"A green young justice of the peace out in Illinois was recently called upon, for the first time, to perform a marriage ceremony. He nervously looked through "Every Man His Own Lawyer" and "Haine's Township Laws," but failed to find the desired form. The crowd grew impatient, and he told the couple to hold up their right hands. This done, he pronounced the following charge: 'You and each of you do solemnly swear that in the cause now upon hearing, you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; and that you will love, honor, cherish and obey each other during the terms of your natural lives, so help you God.' Both answered solemnly, 'I will,' and the justice charged them a dollar each and pronounced them man and wife."

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 18, 1871.

REVISION OF THE FEDERAL STATUTES. The commissioners appointed last session of congress for the purpose of revising and consolidating the statutes of the United States are pursuing their labors with much zeal and success. Several titles have been already consolidated, while so much preliminary work has been gone through, in respect to all the titles, that these may be expected to appear henceforth in rapid succession. The commissioners are of opinion that their functions are merely to prune the statute books of all obsolete and contradictory provisions, and to re-distribute the remainder on a logical plan under appropriate heads. The commissioners consequently do not trouble themselves with questions of legal amendment. A reform of the mere letter of the law, however, is sometimes as difficult of accomplishment, and as slow to receive the sanction of a legislature, as if the amendments related to substantive doctrine. When the whole law is welded into a single act, and is then presented as one harmonious whole to a legislative assembly, such a body naturally is slow in passing so comprehensive a measThe commissioners for revising and consolidating the statutes of the United States have adopted an ingenious and very effective device for overcoming this legislative repugnance to swallowing camels, even when they are declared to be the merest matters of form. The commissioners do not intend fusing the statutes of the United States into a single whole, possessing such an epic unity of parts that none of them could be omitted without disfiguring the whole work. On the contrary, they are preparing not one consolidation act for the whole Union, but a series of distinct statutes, any one of which may be accepted or rejected by congress without in the least interfering with the legal merits of the adjacent revised statutes, as far as a similar recognition is concerned.

ure.

Even though possibly congress may not adopt all the statutes prepared by the commissioners, yet, under the mode of digestion and arrangement referred to, it is certain that the commission will not end, like so many enterprises of a similar character, both here and elsewhere, in a total failure.

professional man is a matter that calls for the utmost attention of the legislature. No matter, indeed, how scattered the statutes on any particular branch of law may be, the compiler of a text-book usually collates and arranges them, or at least treats of them, in the logical and not the chronological order. But there are many statutes in the federal archives that are not the subjects of any text-book; and there are also many text-writers who fail to exhaust the category of statutes to which they apply themselves. An authoritative selection of the statutes, therefore, is a work which no private competition can supersede or render useless.

The present commissioners have divided their labors into seventy-two heads or titles, and under each of these they are placing side by side, in logical order, the disjecta membra of the statutory provisions relating to each head or title. Let us, for instance, at present endeavor to ascertain what the law is, that relates to the executive power. In order to acquire this knowledge we must search the federal statutes from first to last, and we must then study such enactments or sections of enactments as we find relate to the topic we are considering. Even after the most scrutinizing process we can hardly be certain that we have performed an experimentum crucis, and omitted no provision whatever that bears upon the question in hand. But it is not likely that commissioners appointed for the special purpose of revision will overlook any statute or section relating to any branch of their labors. However, even if they are guilty of the most culpable degree of negligence in this respect, the public are guaranteed against any injury that would otherwise result from the commissioners' remissness. The legislature will declare that the statutes and sections not comprised in the commissioners' drafts are repealed. The public are then released from all further anxiety as to whether the inductio made by the commissioners is complete or not. The legislative fiat makes it so.

Bentham it was who first directed the attention of Anglo-Saxon nations to the importance of a wellexpressed legal system, as distinguished from one aiming at jural perfection. "Whate'er is best administered, is best," is the sentiment of the highly philo- | sophic poet, Pope. But, without going to the extent of supposing that forms of law are more important than its substance, no one will deny that whether the law be in itself good, bad or indifferent, the facility with which a knowledge of it can be attained by the

A revision and consolidation of the federal statutes is more practicable and necessary than a similar process respecting the enactments of any State. Statutes of the latter class have a foundation in the common law, which the federal statutes have not. Our great constitution, like the orb of day, was launched on space without any thing to support it but the eternal principles of natural justice. The articles of the constitution, therefore, and the federal statutes rest on no unseen or uncertain foundation. They can be treated alone and singly, without reference to any extraneous body of law. But State statutes are only a very small part of the whole civil law of the State. A case in any of the New York courts is argued, not only on the basis of the statutes passed by the State of New York, but also with reference to the common law of England, and the statutes of England passed before the rise of the American Union. Nor can a single case decided in any of our States or in the