Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment: The Irony of Constitutional DemocracyAbraham Lincoln worried that the "walls" of the constitution would ultimately be leveled by the "silent artillery of time." His fears materialized with the 1913 ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which, by eliminating federalism's structural protection, altered the very nature and meaning of federalism. Ralph A. Rossum's provocative new book considers the forces unleashed by an amendment to install the direct election of U.S. Senators. Far from expecting federalism to be protected by an activist court, the Framers, Rossum argues, expected the constitutional structure, particularly the election of the Senate by state legislatures, to sustain it. In Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment Rossum challenges the fundamental jurisprudential assumptions about federalism. He also provides a powerful indictment of the controversial federalist decisions recently handed down by an activist U.S. Supreme Court seeking to fill the gap created by the Seventeenth Amendment's ratification and protect the original federal design. Rossum's masterful handling of the development of federalism restores the true significance to an amendment previously consigned to the footnotes of history. It demonstrates how the original federal design has been amended out of existence; the interests of states as states abandoned and federalism left unprotected, both structurally and democratically. It highlights the ultimate irony of constitutional democracy: that an amendment intended to promote democracy, even at the expense of federalism, has been undermined by an activist court intent on protecting federalism, at the expense of democracy. |
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Contents
The Supreme Court Judicial Activism and the Protection of Federalism | 11 |
Constitutional Structure Federalism and the Securing of Liberty | 67 |
How the Framers Protected Federalism | 93 |
The Senates Protection of Federalism in the First Congress | 125 |
Marshalls Understanding of the Original Federal Design | 157 |
Altering the Original Federal Design The Adoption and Ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment | 181 |
The Supreme Courts Attempts to Protect the Original Federal Design | 233 |
Conclusion | 281 |
289 | |
Cases Cited | 297 |
301 | |
About the Author | |
Other editions - View all
Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment : the Irony of ... Ralph A. Rossum No preview available - 2001 |
Common terms and phrases
action activity adoption American approved argued argument authority Bank Bill of Rights branch called City Commerce Clause Committee Cong Congress congressional considered Constitution continued Convention created debate decision delegates Democrat determine direct election discrimination effect enforce equal established executive exercise fact Farrand federal government Federalist Florida Fourteenth Amendment framers give granted held History House individual insisted instructions interests interstate commerce issue James John judges judicial Judiciary jurisdiction Justice legislative legislatures limited Madison majority Marshall matter means measures mode necessary noted object opinion original party passed political practice present President Press principle prohibited proposed protect question ratification reason Records refused regulate rejected remedy Representative Republican resolution Review secure Senate separation Sess Seventeenth Amendment sovereign immunity sovereignty structure suit Supreme Court understanding United University violate Virginia vote York