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REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

Cause removed from State Court on the ground of diverse citizenship will be remitted by the Supreme Court of the United States to the Circuit Court with directions to remand it to the State Court, even after the trial and the prosecution of writs of error, when it appears from the record that the citizenship of the parties at the commencement of the action, and at the time of filing the petition for removal, was not sufficiently shown. Jackson v. Allen; Brown v. Allen, S. Ct. U. S., Oct. 28, 1889.

Suit by alien cannot be removed to the Federal Courts on the ground of local prejudice, the privilege of removal on this ground being given only in controversies between citizens of different States of the United States. Cohn v. Louisville, N.0. & T. R. R. Co., U. S. C. Ct., S. D. Miss., July 6, 1889.

REVENUE LAWS.

Insertion of additional charges on entries and invoices, by the importer, in order to avoid onerous penalties imposed by the appraisers for their omission, renders the payment of the increased duties caused thereby involuntary, although such penalties may be illegal. Robertson v. Franks, S. Ct. U. S., Oct. 28, 1889.

Vessel driven ashore by stress of weather has not “arrived" within the limits of the collection district within the meaning of the United States statutes, and the unloading of her cargo, without authority of the customs officer, does not subject it to forfeiture. The Cargo ex Lady Essex, U. S. D. Ct., E. D. Mich., July 15, 1889.

SALE.

Agreement to purchase goods to be manufactured at a specified price, cannot be rescinded by the purchaser, after receiving a portion of the order, but the vendor may proceed to manufacture and tender the residue of the goods ordered, and if not accepted, may resell them at public auction at the place of delivery, after notice to the purchaser; such sale, when fairly made, with reasonable diligence, judgment and care, will be evidence to fix the market value of the goods. John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Lock-Stitch Fence Co., S. Ct. Ill., Oct. 31, 1889.

Executory contract of sale required the vendor to deliver iron of a specific quality on board steamers at Liverpool to be sent to the vendee in New York; in the absence of any express agreement to the contrary, the vendee's right of inspection continued until the iron arrived at New York, and the carrier was not his agent to accept the iron as corresponding to the contract. Pierson v. Crooks, Ct. App. N. Y., Oct. 8, 1889.

Notice of rejection was given the vendor one month after the arrival of the first lot of iron, which was delivered in three shipments, each being inspected within ten days after its arrival; the delay in inspection and rejection was not so great as to be unreasonable as a matter of law. Id.

Title to certain bags of coffee purchased on credit and by the pound out of a large number stored in a warehouse, where the bags are so marked as to be easily identified and nothing remains to be done except to weigh the coffee, in order to determine the price. vests immediately in the purchaser. Sanger v. Waterbury, Ct. App, N. Y., 2d Div., Oct. 22, 1889:

SLANDER.

Statement by physician that he had sent some of the silk thread used in a certain manufactory to the State Board of Health for examination, and that the Board had reported that the thread contained arsenic in sufficient quantities to be dangerous to the workmen using it, is not such a statement as would place every one hearing it under such a moral obligation to repeat it that the physician must be held to have contemplated and authorized its repetition until it reached the workmen. Elmer v. Fessenden, S. Jud., Ct. Mass., Nov. 26, 1889.

Statements made by a stockholder of a railroad company before a stockholders' meeting, attributing drunkenness and incapacity to one of the officers of the company, are privileged, if made in good faith, and the fact that attorneys of the company, who are not stockholders, are present at the meeting, does not take away the privilege. Broughton v. McGrew, U. S. C. Ct., D. Ind., June 9, 1889.

SUNDAY LAWS.

Contract for advertising in the Sunday edition of a newspaper is void, as the issuing, publishing and circulating of a newspaper on Sunday, not being a work of necessity or charity, is unlawful, and such contract, being void because it stipulates for doing what is unlawful, is incapable of ratification. Handy v. St. Paul Globe Publishing Co., S. Ct. Minn., July 8, 1889.

Whether shaving a man on Sunday for hire is a work of necessity, is a question to be submitted to the jury. Ungericht v. State, S. Ct. Ind., June 19, 1889.

TELEGRAPHS.

License tax cannot be imposed by either State or municipal authority upon a telegraph company, whose lines are used for the transmission of messages to all parts of the United States, and are thus instruments of interstate commerce. City of St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., U. S. C. Ct., E. D. Mo., June 19, 1889.

Message to physician was not delivered promptly, causing delay in his reaching the patient; it was a question for the jury whether the patient was injured by the delay and whether the result would have been different had the message been promptly delivered; and where the non-delivery was occasioned by the observance of certain rules as to closing the receiving office, the reasonableness of such rules was also for the jury. Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co., S. Ct. Utah, June 21, 1889.

TELEPHONES.

Acknowledgment of deed by a married woman through a telephone, when three miles distant from the notary public, is valid, where there is no allegation of fraud, duress or mistake, and evidence in

contradiction of the notary's certificate, made out in due form, is not admissible, in the absence of any such allegation. Banning v. Banning, S. Ct. Cal., Sept. 2, 1889.

Contract with owner and licensor of the patent under which a telephone company operates, that it will furnish telephonic facilities to a certain telegraph company, to the exclusion of all other telegraph companies, is void, and the telephone company must furnish equal facilities to all persons or corporations applying to it. Commercial Union Tel. Co. v. New England Telephone, and Tel. Co., S. Ct. Vt., June 27, 1889.

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TRADE-MARKS.

Cough cherries," as applied to a confection, are not descriptive of the qualities of the article, but are sufficiently arbitrary and fanciful to be appropriated as a trade-mark. Stoughton v. Woodward, U. S. C. Ct., W. D. Wis., Aug. 6, 1889.

USURY.

Mortgagee, whose mortgage recites that it is subject to a groundrent of a specified amount and who buys in the mortgaged property under foreclosure proceedings, cannot subsequently set up as a defence to such ground-rent that it was a mere device to conceal a usurious loan to the original owner of the land. Fulford v. Keerl, Ct. App. Md., Nov. 15, 1889.

VERDICT.

In action on contract a verdict "for plaintiff," without stating for what amount, is fatally defective, and, after it has been recorded and the jury has separated, it cannot be amended by the court. Gaither v. Wilmer, Ct. App. Md., Nov. 15, 1889.

WILLS.

Bequest to daughters of testator, to take effect "in the event of any of my said daughters becoming a widow, or otherwise becoming lawfully separated from her husband," is not void as against public policy, upon the ground that it encourages the legatees to become separated from their husbands. Born v. Horstmann, S. Ct. Cal., Sept. 20, 1889.

Direction by testator that her executor shall carry on a mercantile business for the benefit of her son, and shall have power "to sell or make such other disposition of my real and personal estate as the safe conduct of such business shall seem to require," subjects the general assets of the estate to the payment for goods purchased on credit by the executor, in the course of carrying on such business. Willis v. Sharp, Ct. App. N. Y., June 4, 1889.

Legatee, who has killed the testator for the purpose of preventing the revocation of a will made in his favor, cannot take under such will. Riggs v. Palmer, Ct. App. N. Y., Oct. 8, 1889.

Unsoundness of testator's mind will not in itself prevent a will from being adjudged valid, when it appears that such unsoundness did not affect the character of the will. Durham v. Smith,

S. Ct. Ind., Oct. 29, 1889.

JAMES C. Sellers.

INDEX.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE.

ACCIDENTAL.

Is properly defined as "happening by chance; unexpectedly taking
place; not according to the usual course of things, or not as expected.
665.

Death caused by jumping from a platform, four or five feet from the
ground, is accidental. 665.

ACCIDENT.

It is not essential that a person injuring another should not mean to
do so, in order to render the injury accidental. 42, 44.

Injury caused by violent running is not the result of accident. 46.
Death caused by stroke from the handle of a pitchfork, which the
insured was using, is accidental. 47.

Death caused by exercising with Indian clubs is not accidental, when
the injury is received in the usual way of taking such exercise,
and is not occasioned by some unforeseen circumstance, interrupting
the usual course of exercise. 49.

Hanging one's self, while insane, is death by external, violent and
accidental means. 51.

Injury internally inflicted by another is an accident. 52.

Shooting of the insured, a deserter from the army, by an officer who
sought to arrest him, does not avoid an accident policy which is res-
tricted to death "not the result of design.' 52.

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Death caused by the exertion of controlling a runaway horse is acci-
dental. 56.

BURDEN OF Proof.

Where the insured is killed by his own pistol, the beneficiary must
show that its discharge was accidental. 51.

When the insured is found shot through the heart, the burden is upon
beneficiary to show that the death was accidental. 55.

EPILEPSY.

Death in a bath, as the result of an epileptic fit, is not within an acci-
dent policy. 56.

But drowning in a stream, into which the insured had fallen, while
in a fit, is covered.

56.

So also is death from falling, while in a fit, before a moving engine.
56.

EXPOSURE to Danger.

Stepping from a railroad train which at night had stopped upon a
draw-bridge, and falling through a concealed hole in the bridge, does
not avoid a policy, which excepts injury resulting from "voluntary
exposure to unnecessary danger," or walking or being on the road-
bed or bridge of any railway. 49.

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Shoveling snow from a crossing by a railroad employe, is not "un-
necessary exposure to danger."

52.

Crossing a railroad trestle at night is "voluntary exposure to unneces-
sary danger." 56.

EXTERNAL and Visible Signs.

In exception to an accident policy, apply only to bodily injuries not
resulting in death. 381.

VOL. XXXVII.—51

797

ACCIDENT INSURANCE-(continued.)

GAS. See POISON.

Exception of death by "inhaling gas" does not cover the case of one
who accidentally inhales illuminating gas, while sleeping, but refers
to the medicinal use of gas only. 55, 381.

INTENTIONAL INJURIES.

Exception of intentional injuries, inflicted by insured or any other
person, includes death by assassination for purposes of robbery. 42,

45.

Recovery cannot be had under policy excepting death "by inten-
tional injuries," where the insured was shot and killed by a third
person, without provocation. 120.

INTOXICATING LIQUOR.

Where a policy excepts death or injury while the insured is "under
the influence of intoxicating drink," and the insured, while intoxi-
cated, is shot by another person, although no connection exists be-
tween the intoxication and the injury, recovery cannot be had on the
policy. 47.

MEDICAL TREATMENT.

Death from an overdose of opium, which had been prescribed by a
physician on account of sickness, is not covered by a policy which
excepts death caused by "medical treatment for disease."
MILITARY Service.

48.

One employed in the army to build bridges, and, while thus engaged,
killed by robbers, is not in military service, within the meaning of a
prohibition in a policy of insurance. 47.

NOTICE OF INJURY.

When one insured by an accident policy, which required immediate
written notice of any injury sustained to be given to the company,
received an accidental injury to his eye, which he did not at the time
regard as dangerous, but which subsequently caused the total loss of
the eye, notice mailed a month after the accident was in time. 729.
POISON.

Death from poison taken accidentally is not covered by the words,
"die by his own hand, voluntary or otherwise." 49.

But where death or injury caused "by the taking of poison" is ex-
cepted, an involuntary taking by mistake is within the provision.

49.

Death from a malignant pustule, caused by handling the skins of
diseased animals, is within an accident policy, which excepts death by
taking poison. 55.

So also is death caused by accidentally inhaling illuminating gas.
55.

POLICY.

General terms will be construed to cover everything within their
scope, save what is expressly excepted. 42, 45.

PROXIMATE Cause.

Death from apoplexy, caused by an accidental fall, is within an acci-
dent policy. 56.

PUBLIC CONVEYANCE.

Engineer, riding on his own engine, is traveling by "public convey-
ance for the transportation of passengers." 47.
RAILROAD RULES.

Where a passenger is injured by being thrown from a car platform,
where he is standing in violation of the rules of the railroad, no re-
covery can be had under a policy covering only injuries received
while riding "in compliance with all rules and regulations" of the
carrier. 49.

RAILWAY EMPLOYES.

Exemption of, from a clause in a policy, excepting from its benefits
injuries which result from being upon the platforms of moving

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