RECENT AMERICAN DECISION. Court of Appeals of Kentucky. HUTCHCRAFT'S EXECUTOR v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD. It is not essential, to make out a case of injury through external, violent, and accidental means, that the person injuring the insured did not mean to do so. Where an accident insurance policy is expressed in general terms and specified things are excepted from the operation of the general terms, the latter are to be construed as covering all things coming within their scope, except those expressly excepted. An exception, in an accident insurance policy, of intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person, includes death by assassination for purposes of robbery, and no recovery can be had on the policy. APPEAL from Bourbon Circuit Court. William Lindsay and Russell Mann, for appellant. BENNETT, J. May 29, 1888. During the time that appellant's testator held two tickets of insurance in the appellee's company, insuring his life in the sum of $3000 each against death "through external, violent, and accidental means,” he was waylaid and assassinated for the purpose of robbery. The appellee interposed two defences to the appellant's action to recover these sums: First, that the appellant's testator having been killed by intentional "means," his death was not accidental within the meaning of the terms of the policy, which insured him against death "through external, violent, and accidental means;" second, that the proviso in the policy expressly exempted the appellee from liability in case the appellant's testator came to his death through injuries intentionally inflicted by another person. These defences will be disposed of in their order. 1. In each ticket the appellee covenanted to pay $3000 to Hutchcraft's representative, if he should be killed “ through external, violent, and accidental means." Accidents are of two kinds: First, those that befall a person without any human agency; as the killing of a person by lightning. Here the elemental properties of lightning and its flash are not caused or controlled by human agency; but the fact that the person was struck by unintentionally placing himself within its range is as to him an accident. Second, those that are the result of human agency. The latter are divided as follows: First, that which happens to a person by his own. agency, as if he is walking or running, and accidentally falls and hurts himself. Here he falls by reason of his agency in walking or running, but he did not intend to fall. He did not foresee that he would fall in time to avoid it. The fall was therefore accidental. Second, that which befalls a person by the agency of another person, without the concurrence of the latter's will; as where one standing on a scaffold uniutentionally lets a brick fall from his hand, and it strikes a person below. Here the dropping of the brick, as it was not intended by the former, and was unforeseen by the latter, is in the broadest sense an accident. Third, that which a person intentionally does, whereby another is unintentionally injured; as where one intentionally fires a gun in the air, and accidentally shoots another person. Here the act of firing the gun was intentional, but the shooting of the person was unintentional. Therefore, on the part of the person firing the gun, the shooting of the other would be accidental, though not in as broad a sense as in the former case, because some part of his act was intentional; but as to the person shot, it was by purely accidental means. Fourth, so also, as we think, if one person intentionally injures another, which was not the result of a rencontre or the misconduct of the latter, but was unforeseen by him, such injury as to the latter, although intentionally inflicted by the former, would be accidental. When the injury is not the result of the misconduct or the participation of the injured party, but is unforeseen, it is as to him accidental, although inflicted intentionally by the other party. It is conceded that in the three instances first named the injury would be by accidental means. Nor doubtless will it be denied that, if a person were to maliciously fire his gun into a crowd of persons for the purpose of general mischief, or were to maliciously wreck a train of cars for the purpose of injuring whomever may be aboard, whereby one or more persons were shot or mashed, the casualty befalling these persons, so far as they were concerned, would fall within the term of accidental means. In other words, we do not regard it as essential, in order to make out a case of injury by accidental means, so far as the injured party is concerned, that the party injuring him should not have meant to do so; for, if the injured party had no agency in bringing the injury on himself, and to him it was unforeseen-a casualty-it seems clear that the fact that the deed was wilfully directed against him would not militate against the proposition that as to him the injury was brought on by "accidental means." 2. That part of the proviso that is germane to the second ground of defence is as follows: "And no claim shall be made under this ticket when the death or injury may have been caused by duelling, fighting, wrestling, lifting, or overexertion, or by suicide (felonious or otherwise, sane or insane), or by intentional injuries inflicted by the insured, or any other person." The fact that the insured engaged in a duel or fight, though forced upon him; the fact that he engaged in a wrestling match, however innocent; the fact that he engaged in lifting, though never so cautious; the fact that he over-exerted himself, though never so innocent of an intention of doing so whereby he received injuries-are expressly excluded from the operation of the policy. Also the fact that the insured commits suicide, although insane, therefore in a legal sense accidental, excludes him from the benefit of the policy. The remaining clause stipulates for a further exemption of the appellee's liability in the event that intentional injuries are inflicted upon the insured by himself or any other person. It is contended by the appellant that the meaning of this clause is, that, "if the insured intentionally inflicted injuries upon himself, or if any other person intentionally inflicted injuries upon him, with his consent, or at his instance, then the appellee shall not be liable." A moment's reflection will show that the clause will not admit of this construction. The clause, when placed in juxtaposition with its antecedents, reads as follows: "No claim shall be made under this ticket when the death or injury may have been caused by intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person.” The sentence, though awkwardly expressed, is complete, and clearly expresses the idea that, if the insured intentionally kills or injures himself by the infliction of bodily wounds, he thereby breaks the condition of the policy; or that, if he is intentionally killed or injured by any other person, by the infliction of bodily wounds, the condition of the policy is thereby broken. Therefore to add the words, "with his consent or at his instance," would have the effect of torturing the meaning of the language used beyond its legitimate import. By the terms of the coutract the company undertakes to indemnify against death or injury effected through external, violent, and accidental means." By virtue of this undertaking the company would be liable, if the death or injury should be effected by any external and violent means whatever, that was as to the insured accidental, except in so far as the company by its proviso limited its liability; for it is a well-known rule of construction, that, where the undertaking of a party is expressed in general terms, as in this case, and specified things, as in this case, are excepted from the operation of the general terms, such terms are to be construed as covering all things coming within their scope, except those that are expressly excluded. As, therefore, the assassination of Hutchcraft was as to him an unforeseen event -a casualty-his taking off was through external, violent and accidental means. But we also think the clause of the proviso that excludes the appellee's liability, in case death or injury is intentionally inflicted by any other person, applies to this case. We think, however, that said clause was intended to apply to such injuries by other persons as are intentionally directed against the insured, and not to such injuries as the insured may receive at the hands of the third persons who are attempting to do mischief generally, or who are attempting to injure any particular individual other than the assured, or class of individuals, or any kind of property; for in such cases it cannot be said that the injury was intentionally aimed directly and individually at the insured. The judgment of the Circuit Court, overruling the demurrer of the appellee's answer, is affirmed. What are "accidents," within the meaning of accident policies and what the effect of provisos or exceptions in such contracts, can best be ascertained by a brief review of some of the principal cases upon this subject, and the chronological order will answer for this purpose as well as any. Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co. (1853), 21 Pa. 466. The condition of the policy was that it should be void if the insured "shall die by his own hand in, or in consequence of, a duel." Death was caused by swallowing arsenic. It was held, that such a death was within the condition. "When the parties have put their contract in writing, their rights are fixed by it. One rule of interpretation is, that we must never attribute an absurd intent, if a sensible one can be extracted from the writing. No absurdity could be greater than a stipulation against suicide in a duel. The words die by his own hand' must, therefore, be disconnected from those which follow; standing alone, they mean any sort of suicide." Southard v. The Railway Passengers' Asso. Co. (1868), 34 Conn. 574, U. S. D. C. The policy insured against death or injury "by violent and accidental means, within the meaning of the contracts and conditions annexed." The conditions specified certain modes of death or injury which were excluded from the policy. It was held, that the specified exclusions did not operate to make the principal terms more largely inclusive, but that the death, though violent, must still fall strictly within the principal terms and be caused by means that were accidental as well as violent. The insured was hurt internally by jumping in great haste from a standing railroad car at a station, and running a considerable distance, but his action was not necessary to his safety, but was voluntarily undertaken to effect an important object which required haste. The injury was not caused by "accidental means within the meaning of the contract." Per SHIPMAN, J. "The policy is one of indemnity against bodily injuries effected through violent and accidental means within the meaning of this contract and the annexed conditions.' Had the terms of the contract stopped at the words 'violent and accidental means,' there would be no difficulty in disposing of the question; for there was no accident, strictly speaking, in the means through which the bodily injury was effected. It would not help the matter to call the injury itself that is, the rupture-an accident. That was the result, and not the means through which it was effected. Both were done by the claimant voluntarily, in the ordinary way, with no unforeseen, accidental, or involuntary movement of the body. There was no stumbling, or slipping, or falling. There was nothing accidental in his movements, any more than there was in his passing down the steps of his hotel or in walking on the street, during each of which he might have had a stroke of apoplexy. Thus, in jumping from the car and running, there was more violence, or, properly speaking, more force; but there was no more accident than in any ordinary movement of the body. All the accident there was, was the result of ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual way. The conditions exclude death, when caused by duelling, fighting, etc. Now, it may be said that the exclusion of these specified causes, leaves, by fair implication, death from all other causes and under all other circumstances included in the contract. But, in applying the well |