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pellate Court of the proper district. There is no reason why there should not be an appeal from the adverse ruling of a Judge when a receiver is applied for, or when an injunction is applied for. It is not an unusual proceeding in the courts of Cook County, it takes place every day, to adjourn from court room where a receiver is disallowed or an injunction is denied, to another court room and make the same motion continuously from court room to court room, until somebody is found who will grant an injunction or grant a receivership.

There is also a change proposed that the appeal should be taken within twenty days instead of thirty days, as is the present law. And also that the appeal be docketed within forty days instead of sixty days, as is the present law.

The second section is of great importance: "The force and effect of such interlocutory order in the court below shall not be impaired by such appeal," that is the present law, "but the appellant shall give bond with surety, to be approved by the court, or by the clerk of the court, to secure costs in the Appellate Court, in such reasonable sums as the court shall fix. Provide, however, that if the aggrieved party shall, upon such prayer or appeal, offer to execute and file, for the benefit of the opposite party, an appeal bond with surety, to cover the amount involved in such litigation, and the costs of said appeal, then the court, when such appeal is perfected, may in its discretion enter an order vacating the injunction, or the order appointing a receiver, as the case may be."

The third section provides that if an appeal is "dismissed for want of prosecution, or if such appeal be adjudged vexatious or taken for delay by the court, the Appellate Court may allow to the appellee a reasonable solicitor's fee, not to exceed $100, to be taxed as a part of the costs of the appeal." This has become necessary by reason of the practice of taking appeals for delay.

The present law does not allow an appeal from the order

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of the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court. Section four covers this part:

"An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any order of the Appellate Court, either affirming, reversing and remanding, or reversing the order of the court below, if an injunction is the only relief prayed for in such cause. But only in such cases where the amount involved is $1,000, or over, exclusive of costs; and in cases of receiverships, or upon applications refusing to appoint a receiver, where the amount in controversy is $1,000 or over, exclusive of costs. Provided, however, that if the case involves questions of law of such importance, either on account of principal or collateral interests, that it should be passed upon by the Supreme Court, such Appellate Court may grant an appeal to the Supreme Court on petition of the aggrieved party."

"Whenever the appeal from an interlocutory order in cases mentioned above shall involve a franchise, freehold or the validity of a statute, such an appeal shall be taken direct to the Supreme Court." From these extracts we may see how important this section is. As it is now,it is impossible to go to the Supreme Court with an interlocutory order involving either the freehold, the validity of the statute or franchise, because there is no statute providing for it. The proposed act continues: "Or, if the Appellate Court, upon examination of such appeal, shall determine that such a question of a franchise, freehold, or the validity of a statute, is involved in such appeal, said Appellate Court shall at once certify such appeal to the Supreme Court for its determination; or, if the opinion of the Appellate Court upon any appeal is not unanimous, then such Court may, in its discretion, without decision, certify such appeal to the Supreme Court for its determination, and said Supreme Court, shall dispose of such appeal as herein provided in other cases." This is patterned after the Federal statute, and also from the statutes of New York.

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Section six adopts the like practice in other cases where one of two persons are affected, either one may by appeal remove the suit to the Appellate Court. The proposed act provides that "if the appeal is dismissed by the Supreme Court for want of prosecution, or if such appeal is adjudged vexatious or as having been taken for delay, the Court may allow the appellee a reasonable solicitor's fee, not to exceed $150, to be taxed as part of the costs of such appeal, and all the costs of such appeal shall be taxed against the appellant, as in other cases."

"No appeal to the Appellate Court or Supreme Court shall be dismissed by reason of any informality or insufficiency of any appeal bond," if the appellant shall give a good bond within a reasonable time.

The ninth section is, "The obligee in such bond given in an appeal to the Appellate or Supreme Court, as the case may be, may, on breach of the conditions thereof, have and maintain an action at law, as on other bonds, and if such bond remains unpaid for a period of twenty days after written notice to the obligors or one of them, to pay the same, the obligees may recover a reasonable attorney's fee, not to exceed $50, to be taxed as part of the costs of such suit."

I wish to say that since the publication of this pamphlet last year, this pamphlet having been distributed among the members of this Bar Association and among the members of the City Bar Association not members of this Association, there has not been heard one complaint against this proposed law, on the contrary, there have been several commendatory statements made in its favor, and I believe some members of the Commission have also spoken favorably of it, although I do not believe they have dealt with it, perhaps waiting for the action of this assembly. It is a very important law, more so to the City of Chicago, perhaps, than to the other counties, because there is hardly a day in the city that a receivership

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is not applied for, or that an injunction is not applied for. As this matter is of the highest importance, it might well rest until the Practice Commission has been heard from. In view of that fact, I move an adjournment.

JUDGE GLENN: Before adjourning, the Committee on Grievances would like to make a report upon the motion that was referred to them yesterday, in the case of Moses Salomon, to strike his name from the roll of membership.

PRESIDENT WOOD: Will you withdraw the motion to adjourn to hear the report?

MR. MOSES: Certainly.

PRESIDENT WOOD: The motion is withdrawn, we will hear the report.

JUDGE GLENN: The motion was to strike from the roll of membership the name of Moses Salomon on account of unprofessional conduct. Your Committee, upon examination into the matter, found that the Supreme Court had entered an order disbarring him from the practice of law in this State. Your Committee was directed by the Association to give him notice to appear before the Committee this morning and show cause, if any he had, why his name should not be dropped, or stricken from the roll as a member of this Association. He appeared before us this morning and paid up his dues, which were nine dollars, and then submitted a letter of resignation, asking to withdraw his membership, and your Committee think that his request should be granted, and that his name should be dropped or stricken from the roll, and this is presented as their report. We recommend the passage of such a resolution.

MR. ZEISLER: It seems to me the recommendation is a little bit inconsistent; either we accept the resignation, or we drop the name of Mr. Salomon from the roll, strike it from the roll. We can do only one or the other, we can not do both. If we accept his resignation, as I understood the Chairman of

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the Committee in the first portion of the report to recommend, then there is no occasion for taking the action contemplated yesterday, of striking the name from the roll. Therefore, I beg to move an amendment to the motion, namely, that the resignation of Mr. Moses Salomon be accepted.

The motion was seconded.

JUDGE GLENN: There is no particular objection, as it occurs to me, with reference to the amendment that is suggested; the gentleman acted honorably about it, came forward, paid up his dues, accepted the situation that he was placed in by the Supreme Court, and thought it was all right to have his name stricken from the roll.

PRESIDENT WOOD: Does the Chair understand Judge Glenn to accept the amendment?

MR. GLENN: I say, I see no objection to it, I will accept it if it is more satisfactory in that shape.

PRESIDENT WOOD: It is moved by Judge Glenn that the resignation of Mr. Moses Salomon be accepted, as a member of this Association, and his name be dropped from the roll. I understand that the motion by Mr. Zeisler is that the resignation be accepted, the latter part being omitted. The mover of this motion has accepted the amendment without objection. Are you ready now for the question? All in favor of the motion will say aye. Those opposed, no. The ayes have it, and the resignation of Mr. Moses Salomon as a member of this Association is accepted, and it will follow necessarily that the Secretary will drop his name from the roll.

MR. MATHENY: May I say, that there are a number of copies here of the eulogy upon John Marshall, by Horace Binney, and any member may have one by calling for it; there are also some extra copies of the Law Reform Report of 1899, and of the report of the Committee on "John Marshall" Day.