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the court is in session, work together, not only while listening to oral argument but also while passing judgment upon records.

By the Act approved June 11, 1897, the salary of the Supreme Court Judges thereafter elected was increased to $7,000. By the Act approved April 17, 1899, each of the Judges is allowed to appoint a private secretary, at a salary of $2,000 per annum. While the salary of the Judges is not what we conceive it ought to be, and is not commensurate with the great importance of the office, the ability demanded, nor the arduous labors to be performed by the Judges, yet we regard it as sufficient to enable them to spend more time at Springfield, and considering that this was one of the purposes of increasing the salaries, the Judges ought to act accordingly, we have no doubt that it will result in inconvenience to individual Judges, but the members of our Supreme Court must bear in mind that the people in electing them to the highest judicial office in this State, have the right to expect that the judges will place themselves into that situation in which they can best serve the public and most wisely and effectively administer their trust.

In conclusion, we recommend that a committee of five be appointed by the President of the Association, to present a memorial to the Judges of the Supreme Court on this subject, or to take such other action in the premises as may appear most expedient, with the end in view of securing consolidation not only in theory but in fact, of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

FRANK H. Scott,


JAMES C. COURTNEY, VICE PRESIDENT Wood: Gentlemen, you have heard the report of the committee, what action does the Association desire to take upon it?

MR. ZEISLER: I move it be adopted.
MR. SHERMAN: And its recommendations.
Which motion was seconded and carried.

MR. STEVENS: I desire to present a minority or dissenting report on the subject of Judicial Administration.

Report read as follows:
To the President and Members of the Illinois State Bar Association:

GENTLEMEN: As a member of the Committee on Judicial Administration, I cannot approve the report of a majority of that committee, as read, and dissent from it for the following reasons:


First. It does not, according to my information, state the fact with reference to the method adopted by the Supreme Court in the consideration and decision of causes.

Second. Because, in my judgment, the Supreme Judges have a right to prepare and write opinions at any place they may see fit.

Third. I do not understand that the Supreme Court discourages oral argument, or that it has adopted any rules preventing attorneys from making oral arguments, in all proper cases. I have found the court not only ready and willing, but anxious to hear oral arguments, where any light could be thrown upon the subject by the attorneys, in addition to what was contained in his printed brief and argument. In my judgment, the criticisms of the Supreme Court contained in the report, are not just and well founded. I cannot concur in the assumption of facts therein stated, or in the language used, and therefore declined to sign such report, and now briefly present my reasons therefor.

Respectfully submitted,

J. S. STEVENS, Member of the Committee on Judicial Administration. VICE PRESIDENT Wood: The Chair will call for the supplemental report of the Committee on Memorial to the Supreme Court on Admissions to the Bar; Mr. Julius Rosenthal is recognized.

Report read as follows: To the Honorable the President and Members of the Illinois State Bar


Since the elaborate report to this Association by the Committee ou Admission, published in last year's proceedings, several occurrences have taken place, of great interest and importance in the history of admission to the bar in this State, and worthy to be chronicled as a sequel to the said former report.

An Act was passed by our Legislature at its last session, (Session Laws, 1899, page 81), which contained in substance the following provisions:

First.-Applicants who commenced their study prior to November 4, 1897, and continued it for tuo school years' courses of study, consisting of thirty-six weeks each, in a law school of this State, shall be admitted upon diploma of such law school up to December 31, 1899, which diploma shall be received by the Supreme Court of this State and a license of admission to practice “shall” thereupon be granted by the court to the holder of such diploma.


Second. - Students who have studied for a period of two years (i. e. 104 weeks) in a law office in this State, or partly in a law office in this State and partly in a law school in this State, and whose studies began prior to November 4, 1897, “shall” be admitted to practice upon satisfactory examination.

Third.—Two Justices of the Supreme Court may henceforth issue a license admitting to practice.

Fourth.-Subsequent changes in the rules of the Supreme Court in force at the time applicants commenced the study of the law shall not affect the applicant, and a license shall be granted him, notwithstanding the changing of the rule.

This Act tended to work a partial repeal of Rule 39 of the Supreme Court in the following points:

A. It reduces the study "for a period of three calendar years' under the rule of the Supreme Court to two school years (i. e. twice 36 weeks), as to students in law schools of this State, during a fixed period.

B. Students in law offices in this State must study for a period of two years (i. e. twice 52 weeks) instead of three years as under the rule.

C. Upon the diploma of a law school in this State the Supreme Court is ordered by the Legislature to issue a license in the given case. Under the Supreme Court rule a diploma is of no avail.

D. Two Justices of the Supreme Court are empowered to issue a license instead of a majority of the court.

This Act does not affect applicants for admission coming from law offices outside of this State and law schools of other States, embracing a large number from Harvard, Yale, Cornell, Ann Arbor, Columbia, etc., all of whom can be admitted only after a three calendar years' study upon examination, and not on diploma.

Under the Act we were to have three classes of students, 72 week students, 104-week students and 156-week students, each to be admitted in a different way.

As to students who began their law studies on or after November 4, 1897, no provision seems to be made.

The main intention of the Act appears to be to legislate in favor of Illinois law schools and Illinois law offices.

The whole law was conceived in the strictest spirit of protection to home manufacture, mainly supported and aided by the tendency to commercialism, which has shown such pernicious influence upon the management of many of our law schools and the study and practice of the law.

The Act was passed with an emergency clause, with very little debate by the House of Representatives by 139 to 1, and with but one PROCEEDINGS.

dissenting vote by the Senate, and immediately approved by the acting Governor on the 21st of February, 1899, (See Session Laws, 1899, page 81). It is generally referred to as the Campbell Act. So our State was saved!

It must be acknowledged that the machinery set to work all over our State by the law students to agitate for the repeal of Supreme Court Rule 39, worked like a charm. Their zeal and energy and influence in every county for months and months prior to the convening of our Legislature deserves full recognition and was crowned with full success. Should they henceforth prove their influence upon our Legislature in a more deserving cause, we may congratulate our commonwealth upon their participation in our public affairs. But the time has not yet come to allow the students in our institutions of education and learuing, be they common schools or high schools or law schools, to dictate the course and methods of preparation and instruction.

Soon after the passage of the Act diplomas were presented to the Supreme Court with a petition, asking for the granting of licenses upon them. The petition was resisted by the chairman and one of the Legal Education Committee of the Chicago Bar Association, and also by a member of high repute of the Chicago bar. A hearing was had, learned briefs were filed on both sides, and, in the course of the month of June, the Supreme Court, by Chief Justice Cartwright, rendered an elaborate, strong and in many respects highly important opinion, declaring the act unconstitutional. (Judge Phillips writing a dissenting opinion and Judge Boggs concurring with him).

It would be unjust to attempt to state in a few words the gist and argument of the opinion. Suffice it to say that the main points of the opinion of interest to us now are: that the Legislature in passing the Act, encroached upon the powers granted by the constitution to the judicial department of the government; that the admission of attorneys to the bar of the court was properly a judicial and not a legislative function that the court and not the Legisla ture was the ultimate judge of the fitness of applicants, and that the Act of the Legislature is obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition against special legislation.

The opinion and dissent are published in full in the Chicago Law Journal Weekly of the 23d of June, 1899, and in the Chicago Legal News of July 1, 1899. (In re Applica tion of Henry M. Day et al.)

The Law Examiners bestow high praise upon the effect of Rule 39 of our Supreme Court upon the applicants for admission.

Every examination shows better results as to the candidates' knowledge of and acquaintance with the legal principles, and their training in general. They apply themselves to their study with more energy, PROCEEDINGS.

conscience and seriousness and a higher standard is attained. Many a law student, who became satisfied of his unfitness to become a lawyer, has dropped out, the chance to be admitted upon diploma from his teacher being gone. During the past year 243 applicants have been examined, whereof 202 were admitted (three ladies among them). Ia addition thereto about 40 were admitted upon foreign license.

There is another occurrence to be mentioned. The Grievance Committee of the Chicago Bar Association caused a suit to be brought in the Circuit Court of Cook county, to enjoin one B. A. L. Thomson from practicing law as an attorney until he obtains a license from the Supreme Court. The matter was fully argued before Judge Riley, who entered a decree as asked, enjoining Thomson permanently from practicing law in courts of record and holding himself out as a lawyer, the injunction to remain in force until the Supreme Court has found he is qualified. The valuable opinion is reported in the Chicago Legal News of May 13, 1899, page 318.

Special recognition and thanks are due to the Chicago Bar Association and its Grievance Committee for the energetic, persevering and arduous work in their endeavors to purify the bar of this city, by driving out of the halls of justice hundreds of persons unlicensed to practice law. Hundreds of pretenders were in this way gotten rid of, and our courts have begun to heavily fine for contempt parties pretending to be lawyers and practicing before them.

In conclusion I would say that this Association ought to be watchful that Rule 39 have a fair chance and trial. It will take some time yet before the highest results can be attained.

The enemies of the rule are watchful, and what happened in our Legislature last February may happen again in 1900 through the same means, or through a pressure upon the electors of the State on the occasion of electing a new judge to the highest bench. Let be on our guard!




VICE PRESIDENT Wood: Gentlemen, you have heard the report of the committee, is there any action the Association desire to take upon it, if not, it will be placed on file and published in the proceedings of the Association. The Chair understands that there is a supplementary report of the Committee on Admissions. If the report is ready the gentleman having it in charge will present it.

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