alienation, and the hypothecation of landed property.

2d. To pay all charges and taxes under whatever form or denomination they may be, that are levied, or may be levied hereafter, upon city or country property.

3d. To render them directly amenable to the Ottoman civil tribunals in all questions relating to landed property, and in all real actions, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, even when either party is a foreigner. In short, they are in all things to hold real estate by the same title, on the same condition, and under the same forms as Ottoman owners, and without being able to avail themselves of their personal nationality, except under the reserve of the immunities attached to their persons and their movable goods, according to the treaties.

Art. III. In case of the bankruptcy of a foreigner possessing real estate, the assignees of the bankrupt may apply to the authorities and to the Ottoman civil tribunals, requiring the sale of the real estate possessed by the bankrupt, and which by its nature and according to law is responsible for the debts of the owner.

The same course shall be followed when a foreigner shall have obtained against another foreigner owning real estate a judgment of condemnation before a foreign tribunal.

For the execution of this judgment against the real estate of his debtor, he shall apply to the competent Ottoman authorities, in order to obtain the sale of that real estate, which is responsible for the debts of the owner; and this judgment shall be executed by the Ottoman authorities and tribunals only after they have decided that the real estate of which the sale is required really belongs to the category of that property which may be sold for the payment of debt.

Art. IV. Foreigners have the privilege to dispose, by donation or by testament, of that real estate of which such disposition is permitted by law.

As to that real estate of which they may not have disposed, or of which the law does not permit them to dispose by gift or testament, its succession shall be governed in accordance with Ottoman law.

Art. V. All foreigners shall enjoy the privileges of the present law, as soon as the Powers on which they depend shall agree to the .arrangements proposed by the Sublime Porte for the exercise of the right to hold real estate.

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America, have caused the said Protocol and Law to be made public for the information and guidance of citizens of the United States.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this twentyninth day of October, in the year of our P 1 Lord one thousand eight hundred and

*■ "J seventy ^four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the ninetyninth.

% the President: U. S. Grant.

Hamilton Fish, 'Secretary of State.

Proclamation Commanding the Dispersion of all Disorderly and Turbulent Persons in Warren County, Mississippi, December 21st, 1874.

By the President of the United States of America. A Proclamation.

Whereas, it is provided in the Constitution of the United States that the United States shall protect every State in the Union, on application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence; and

Whereas, it is provided by the laws of the United States that, in all cases of insurrection in any State, or of obstruction to the laws thereof, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States, on application of the Legislature of such State, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), to call forth the militia of any other State or States, or to employ such part of the land and naval force as shall be judged necessary for the purpose of suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed; and

Whereas, the Legislature of the State of Mississippi, now in session, have represented to me, in a concurrent resolution of that body, that several of the legally elected officers of Warren county, in said State, are prevented from executing the duties of their respective offices by force and violence; that the public buildings and records of said county have been taken into the possession of, and are now held by, lawless and unauthorized persons; that many peaceable citizens of said county have been killed, and others have been compelled to abandon, and remain away from, their homes and families; that illegal and riotous seizures and imprisonments have been made by such lawless persons; and, further, that a large number of armed men from adjacent States have invaded Mississippi to aid such lawless persons, and are still ready to give them such aid; and

Whereas, it is further represented, as aforesaid, by said Legislature, that the courts of said county cannot be held, and that the Governor of said State has no sufficient force at his command to execute the laws thereof in said county and suppress said violence, without causing a conflict of races and •endangering life and ^property to an alarming extent; and

Whereas, the said Legislature, as aforesaid, have made application to me for such part of the military force of the United States as may be necessary and adequate to protect said State and the citizens thereof against the domestic violence hereinbefore mentioned, and to enforce the due execution of the laws; and

Whereas, the laws of the United States require that, whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the President, to use the military force for the purposes aforesaid, he shall forthwith, by proclamation, command such insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within a limited time.

Now, therefore, I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States, do hereby command said l disorderly and turbulent persons to disperse and * retire peaceably to their respective abodes within five days from the date hereof; and that they refrain from forcible resistance to the laws, and submit themselves peaceably to the lawful authorities of said county and State.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this twentyfirst day of December, in the year of our [l..s] Lord, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, and of the Independence of the United States, the ninety-ninth. By the President: U. S. Grant.

Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State.

Civil Service Extended, August 31, 1874:, Executive Order, No. 4.

[Official.]

It appearing to me, from their trial at Washington and at the city of New York, that the further extension of the civil-service rules will promote the efficiency of the public service, it is ordered that such rules be, and they are hereby, extended to the several Federal offices at the city ana in the customs district of Boston, and that the proper measures be taken for carrying this order into effect,

August 31, 1874. U. S. Grant.

[See allusion to "Civil Service Reform" in his Sixth Annual Message p. 54.]

Extending the Period for the Adjudication of the Alabama Claims, June 2, 1875.

By the President of the United States of America:

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas: By the eighth section of the act of Congress, entitled "An Act for the creation of a Court for the adjudication and disposition of certain moneys received into the Treasury under an award made by the tribunal of Arbitration,

constituted by virtue of the first article of the treaty concluded at Washington, the 8th of May, Anno Domini, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, between the United States of America and the Queen of Great Britain, approved June 23, eighteen hundred and seventy-four, it is provided that the judges of the court created by this act shall convene, in the city of Washington, as soon as convenient after their appointment; and the said court shall exist for one year from the date of its first convening and organizing; and should it be found impracticable to complete the work of the said court before the expiration of the said one year, the President may by proclamation extend the time of the duration 'thereof to a period of not more than six months beyond the expiration of the said one year; and in such case all the provisions of this act shall be taken and held to be the same as though the continuance of the said court had been originally fixed by this act at the limit to which it may be thus extended;" and

Whereas, It has been made satisfactorily to appear to me that the said court convened on the 22d of July, 1874, and that a large portion of the business of said court still remains undisposed of, and that it is found impracticable to complete the work of the said court before the expiration of the said year from its first convening and organizing.

Now, therefore, be it known that I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of the said eighth section of the act of Congress aforesaid, do hereby extend the time of the duration of said court of commissioners of Alabama claims for a period of six months after the 22d day of July, A. D., 1875.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto signed my name, and have caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this 2d day of June, A. D., 1875, and of the Independence of the United States, the ninety-ninth.

By the President: U. S. Grant,

Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State.

indictment containing four counts, under sections 3 and 4 of the act of May 31, 1870,* (16 Stat., 140,) against two of the inspectors of a municipal election in the State of Kentucky, for refusing to receive and count at such election the vote of William Garner, a citizen of the United States of African descent. All the questions presented by the certificate of division arose upon general demurrers to the several counts of the indictment. ,

In this court the United States abandon the first and third counts, and expressly waive the

* For copy of this act, see McPherson's Hand-Book of Politics for 1870, pp. 546-550, or McPherson's History of Reconstruction, same pages.-—Ed.

consideration of all claims not arising out of the enforcement of the fifteenth amendment of the Constitution.

After this concession, the principal question left for consideration is, whether the act under which the indictment is found can be made effective for the punishment of inspectors of elections who refuse to receive and count the votes of citizens of the United States, having all the qualifications of voters, because of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

If Congress has not declared an act done within a State to be a crime against the United States, the courts have no power to treat it as such. (U. S. vs. Hu'dson, 7 Cranch, 32.) It is not claimed that there is any statute which can reach this case, unless it be the one in question. Looking, then, to this statute, we find that its first section provides that all citizens of the United States, who are or shall be otherwise qualified by law to vote at any election, etc., shall be entitled and allowed to vote thereat, without distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, any constitution, etc., of the State to the contrary notwithstanding. This simply declares a right without providing a punishment for its violation.

The second section provides for the punishment of any officer charged with the duty of furnishing to citizens an opportunity to perform any act which by the constitution or laws of any State is made a prerequisite or qualification of voting, who shall omit to give all citizens of the United States the same and equal opportunity to perform such prerequisite and become qualified on account of the race, color, or previous condition of servitude of the applicant. This does not apply to or include the inspectors of an election, whose only duty it is to receive and count the votes of citizens designated by law as voters, who have already become qualified to vote at the election. ( The third section is to the effect that whenever, by or under the constitution or laws of any State, etc., any act is or shall be required to be done by any citizen as a prerequisite to qualify or entitle him to vote, the offer of such citizen to perform the act required to be done, "as aforesaid," shall, if it fail to be carried into execution by reason of the wrongful act or omission "aforesaid" of the person or officer charged with the duty of receiving or permitting such performance or offer to perform, or acting thereon, be deemed and held as a performance in law of such act; and the person so offering and failing as aforesaid, and being otherwise qualified, shall be entitled to vote in the same manner and to the same extent as if he had in fact performed such act; and any judge, inspector, or other officer of election, whose duty it is to receive, count, etc., or give effect to the vote of any such citizen, who shall wrongfully refuse or omit to receive, count, etc., the vote of such citizen, upon the presentation by him of his affidavit stating such offer, and the time and place thereof, and the name of the person or officer whose duty it was to act thereon, and that he was wrongfully prevented by such person or officer from performing such act, shall for every such offense forfeit and pay, etc.

The fourth section provides for the punishment of any person who shall by force, bribery, threats,

intimidation, or other unlawful means, hinder, delay, etc., or shall combine with others to hinder, delay, prevent, or obstruct any citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote or from voting at any election.

The second count in the indictment is based upon the fourth section of this act, and the fourth upon the third section.

Rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the United States can be protected by Congress. The form and the manner of the protection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discretion, shall provide. These may be varied to meet the necessities of the particular right to be protected.

The. fifteenth amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one. It prevents the States, or the United States, however, from giving preference, in this particular, to one citizen of the United States over another, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Before its adoption this could be done. It was as much within the.power of a State to exclude citizens of the United States from voting on account of race, etc., as it was on account of age, property, or education. Now it is not. If citizens of one race having certain qualifications are permitted by law to vote, those of another having the same qualifications must be. Previous to this amendment there was no constitutional guaranty against this discrimination. Now there is. It follows that the amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right which is in the protecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. This, under the express provisions of the second section of the amendment, Congress may enforce by " appropriate legislation."

This leads us to enquire whether the act now under consideration is "appropriate legislation" for that purpose. The power of Congress to legislate at all upon the subject of voting at State elections, rests upon this amendment. The effect of article I., section 4, of the Constitution in respect to elections for senators and representatives is not now under consideration. It has not been contended, nor can it be, that the amendment confers authority to impose penalties for every wrongful refusal to receive the vote of a qualified elector at State elections. It is only when the wrongful refusal at such an election is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, that Congress can interfere and provide for its punishment. If, therefore, the third and fourth sections of the act are beyond that limit, they are unauthorized.

The third section does not in express terms limit the offense of an inspector of elections, for which the punishment is provided, to a wrongful discrimination on account of race, etc. This is conceded, but, it is urged, that when this section is construed with those which precede it, and to which, as is claimed, it refers, it is so limited. The argument is that the only wrongful act on the part of the officer whose duty it is to receive or permit the requisite qualification, which can dispense with actual qualification under the State laws, and substitute the prescribed affidavit therefor, is that mentioned and prohibited in section 2, to wit: discrimination oh account of race, etc., and that consequently section 3 is confined in its Operation to the same wrongful discrimination.

This is a penal statute and must be construed strictly; not so strictly, indeed, as to defeat the %lear intention of Congress, but the words employed must be understood in the sense they were obviously used. (U. S. vs. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat, 8$.) If, taking the whole statute together, it is apparent that it Was not the intention of Congress thus to limit the operation of the act, we cannot give it that effect.

\ The statute contemplates a most important Change in the election laws. Previous to its adoption, the States, as a general rule, regulated in their own way all the details of all elections, iliey prescribed the qualifications of voters and the manner in which those offering to vote at an election should make known their qualifications to the officers in charge. This act interferes with this practice and prescribes rules riot provided by the laws of the States. It substitutes, under cer'tai'ri circumstances, performance wrongfully prevented for performance itself. If the elector 'makes and presents his affidavit in the form arid 'to the effect prescribed, the inspectors are to treat this as the equivalent of the specified requirement of the State law. This is a radical change in the •practice, and the statute which creates it should be explicit in its terms. Nothing should be left to construction if it can be avoided. The law ought not to be in such a condition that the elector may act upon one idea of its meaning arid the inspector upon another.

The elector, under the provisions of the statute, is only required to state in his affidavit that he 'has been wrongfully prevented by the officer from qualifying. There are no words of limitation in this part of the section. In a case like this, if an affidavit is in the language of the stat%te, :it ought to be sufficient both for the voter #nd the inspector. Laws which prohibit the doing of things and provide a punishment for 'their Violation should have no double rneaning. A citizen should riot unnecessarily be placed where, by an honest error in the construction of i: penal statute, he may be subjected to a prose.cutidnfor a false oath, and an inspector of elections should hot be put in jeopardy because he, 'with equal hoftesty, entertairis an Opposite opiriidh. If this statute limits the wrongful act which will justify the affidavit to discrimination on account of race, etc.*, then a citizen who makes an Affidavit that he has been wrongfully prevented fey the officer, which is true in the ordinary sense of that'term, subjects hirnself to indictment and trial, if not to conviction, because it is not true that he has been prevented by such a wrongful act as the statute contemplated; and if there is ^16 such limitation, but any wrongful act of ex;clusrdri will justify the affidavit and give the right ;t6 Vote ^without the actual performance of the prerequisite, then the inspector who rejects the vote because he reads the law in its limited sense and thinks it is confined to a wrongful discrimination oh account of race, etc*, subjects himself ^'prose'cution, if hbt to punishment, because he ^'misconstrued the laSv. Penal statutes ought fcot to1 be expressedinlanguage souncertain. If

the legislature undertakes to define, by statute, a new offense and provide for its punishment, it should express its will in language that need not deceive the common mind. Every man should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a crime1;

But when we go beyond the third section and read the fourth we find there no words of limitation, or reference, even, that can be construed as manifesting any intention to confine its provisions to the terms of the fifteenth amendment. That section has for its object the punishment of all persons who, by force, bribery, etc., hinder, delay, etc., any person from qualifying or voting. In view of all these facts 'we feel compelled to say that in our opinion the language of the third and fourth sections does not confine their operation to unlawful discriminations on account of race, etc. If Congress had the power to provide generally for the punishment of those who unlawfully interfere to prevent the exercise of the elective franchise without regard to such discrimination, the language of these sections would be broad enough for that purpose.

It remains how to consider whether a statute, so general as this in its provisions, can be made available for the punishment of those who majr be guilty of unlawful discrinimatibn against citizens of the United States, while exercising the elective franchise, on account of their race, etc.

There is no attempt in the sections now under consideration to provide specifically for such art offense. If the case is provided for at all, it is because it comes under the general pr6hibitidn against any wrongful act or unlawful obstruction in this particular. . We are, therefore, directly called upon to decide whether a penalstatute enacted by Congress, with its limited powers, which provides in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional jurisdiction, can be limited by judicial construction so as to make it operate only on that which Congress may rightfully prohibit and punish. For this purpose we must take these sections of the statute as they are. We are ndt able to reject a part which is unconstitutional arid retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, if there be any such, from that which is not. The proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or disregarding words that are in the section, but by inserting those that are not "now there. Each of the sections must stand as a whole or fall altogether. The language is plain. There is no room for construction, unless it be as to the effect of the Constitution. The question, then, to be determined is, whether we can introduce words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is general only.

It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courtsto step inside and Say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. The courts enforce the legislative will when a^certained, if ^ithin the constitutional grant df power. Within 'its legitimate sphere* Congress is supreme and beydnd the control of the courts, but if it steps outside of its constitutional limitations and attempts that which is beyond its reach, the courts are authorized to, and when called upon in due course of legal proceedings must, annul its encroachments upon the reserved power qf the states and the people.

To limit this statute in the manner now asked for, would be to raake a new iaw, not to enforce an old one. Thk is no part of our duty.

We must, therefore, decide that Congress has not as yet provided by " appropriate legislation" for the punishment of the offense charged in the indictment, and that the circuit court properly sustained the demurrers and gave judgment for tlie defendants.

This makes it unnecessary to answer any of the Other questions certified. Since the law which gives the presiding judge the casting vote in cases 6f division, and authorizes a judgment in accordance with his opinion, (Rev. Stat., sec. 650,) if we find that the judgment as rendered is correct, we need not do more than affirm. If, however, we reverse, all questions certified, which may be considered in the final determination of the case a^cpording to the opinion we express, should be answered.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Clifford concurred that the indictment is bad, but for reasons widely different from those assigned by the cpurt. His opinion covers eight printed pages, but there is no summary of his points which compactly presents them.

Mr. Justice Hunt dissented. The following are the points of his dissenting opinion:

1. The fourth count of the indictment charges in substance that the two defendants, inspectors of election, rejected the vote of Garner at a municipal election of the city of Lexington on account of his race and color, he being a citizen of the United States of African descent and a qualified voter.

2. The argument that the 3d and 4th sections of the statute of May 30, 1870, (16 Statutes, 140,) are invalid because they dp not use the terms race or cplor, is not sound, for the reason that they are to be understood as having incorporated into theni by reference by the use of the words "as aforesaid" the words without distinction of race or color. Refusing a qualified vote by the "wrongful act aforesaid," means a wrongful act on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

3. The right of voting secured by the 15th amendment is to a particular class of persons, to wit, citizens of the United States, and not for any particular class of elections. Wherever the right to vote exists in such a person, its denial or abridge ment on account of race, color, or previous condition, at any election, national, State, or municipal, is forbidden by this amendment.

4. A denial by the inspectors of a municipal election, on account of his race or color, of the right of a citizen of the United States to vote at such election, he being qualified in other respects, is a denial by the State within the "15th amendment; and this, although such denial is illegal and in violation of the statute of the State. The word "State" in this amendment includes the agencies and instrumentalities of the State. The inspectors of elections are the agents of the State,

having jurisdiction over the subject of receiving and rejecting votes and certifying the results of elections. Although they act illegally and in excess of authority, their certificates are conclusive and their acts are binding upon all parties until vacated by judicial proceedings. For these purposes they are the State.

5. It is competent to Congress to protect and secure this right, by providing for the punishment by fine and imprisonment of those who violate it. The power of enforcing the amendments is not limited to giving an appeal or writ of error to the United States courts from the erroneous decisions of the State courts made upon the subject.

6. If an indictment contain counts that are good and counts that are bad, a judgment of guilty upon the whole indictment will be sustained.

7. In the present case the judgment has been entered discharging the defendants from the whole indictment. As the indictment contains some good counts this judgment is erroneous. It should be reversed and a trial upon the indictment ordered.

The "Grant Parish" case, under the Enforcement Act of 1870.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No. 339.—October Term, 1875.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana.

The United States, Plain-
tiffs in Error,
vs.
William J. Cruikshank,
William D. Irwin, and
John P. Hadnot.

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opin ion of the Court.

This case comes here with a certificate by the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Louisiana that they were divided in opinion upon a question which occurred at the hearing. It presents for our consideration an indictment containing sixteen counts, divided into two series of eight counts each, based upon section 6 of the enforcement act of May 31, 1870. That section is as follows:

"That if two or more persons shall band oxconspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of this act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same, such person shall be held guilty of felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be fined or imprisoned, or both, at the discretion of the court—the fine not to exceed five thousand dollars, and the imprisonment not to exceed ten years—and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to, and disabled from holding, any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States." (16 Stat., 141.)

The question certified arose upon a motion in arrest of judgment after a verdict of guilty gQn~