proper time displayed, it will not be necessary to discuss the charges of negligence and misconduct made by the libellants.

The evidence is, that the signal of the coal boats was a candle, contained in an old and battered lantern, lighted when the steamboat was at a short distance and approaching the coal boats in the same channel, at a speed of ten miles an hour, but time enough (if the libellants are to be credited) to enable the steamer, by changing her course or reversing her engine, to avoid the collision. But some of the respondents' witnesses depose that this light was not seen, and could not be seen until it was too late to prevent the accident; others say that it could not be seen at all until the time of collision, while all concur in saying that it was insufficient, and that if sufficient, it was exhibited too late for the boat to alter her course or reverse her engine.

There is evidence that it has been customary for coal boats to use at night when navigating the Ohio, a candle, enclosed in a tin lantern, as a signal light, but whether occasionally, as steam vessels neared them, or during the whole night, we are not informed; but it is proved that the lights of other coal boats were distinctly seen all the night of the collision. The Act of Congress which requires steamboats to keep a signal light or lights from sundown to sunrise cannot, by judicial decision, be extended to coal boats; but it serves to show a wise precaution against one cause of collision, which will strongly apply to other crafts navigating the Ohio at night. The same reasons which made this law expedient, strongly apply to coal boats floating on a river with a narrow channel, such as the Ohio, on a dark night. There is then obviously more danger of a coal boat descending that channel without a light, being run down by a steamer also descending and in proximity, than of a collision between two steamers navigating the same channel in proximity, one with and one without such a light.

But the Court can do nothing more than adopt the spirit of the act referred to, so far as it may have a bearing upon the question of negligence, by requiring in all cases that a conspicuous signal light shall be exhibited by coal boats navigating the Ohio at night, so long before a collision as not to make the right of action and the award of damages to depend upon a controversy, as in

this case, whether such a light was shown one minute, or ten or fifteen minutes, or any such brief time before the collision. Unless such a rule is established to govern future cases of this nature, libels for damages arising from such collisions must always involve conflicting and doubtful testimony, too unsafe for an opinion decisive of important rights. Whether a signal light was exhibited within a period of five or ten minutes before collision; and whether the colliding boats were a mile or a half or a quarter of a mile apart at the time, would generally depend upon the memories of men alarmed and excited by impending peril, and too apt to be influenced by feelings little calculated to elicit the truth, and lead the mind to a just conclusion.

It may not be expedient to fix any time during night when it will be incumbent upon coal boats floating in the Ohio to be provided with signal lights, but it will always be required of the owners of them satisfactorily to prove beyond a reasonable doubt or dispute, in cases of alleged collisions, that they have taken precautions to avoid them by the diligence and care indicated. Believing that these precautions were not observed by the libellants in the case before the Court, the libel must be dismissed, with costs.

In the District Court of Allegheny County.

REYNOLDS v. CLARKE.

(Vol. I., p. 5, 1853.)

1. The Youghiogheny River, by the laws of this Commonwealth, is a public highway, and a riparian owner's right extends only to the water's edge. Every citizen has the right to an unobstructed passage across this river; and the owner of a coal boat has no right to block up the passage of a riparian owner.

2. Though an act may be a public nuisance, yet the individual who suffers special damage may institute suit, and may recover.

3. If an act is done through ignorance or inadvertence, merely nominal damages are recoverable; but if it is done wantonly, and with malice, these circumstances may be taken into consideration to increase them.

THIS was an action on the case by Reynolds, the owner of a farm fronting on the Youghiogheny River, to recover damages against Clarke, the owner of canal boats moored on the river in front of Reynolds' land, which boats were alleged to have been moored so as to obstruct the safe and convenient passage across the river, to and from plaintiff's land.

On the trial, it appeared in evidence, that the plaintiff was in possession of a tract of land fronting 160 feet on the Youghiogheny, a navigable river, and by the laws of Pennsylvania, a public highway. The defendant, Clarke, owner of an adjoining lot fronting 60 feet on the river, was, and for some years had been engaged in the coal trade, loading coal boats on the Monongahela River, and navigating them to a Southern market. By the course of the trade the boats were loaded at the mines on the Monongahela River, and brought around to the Youghiogheny, and there moored until a freshet or sufficient depth of water occurred to take them out of the Monongahela River. In dry seasons the boats were sometimes several weeks in the Youghiogheny waiting for a rise of water, and during that time were occasionally rigged there and fitted out for navigation.

It further appeared, that in December, 1850, and in the spring of 1851, the defendant brought his boats opposite to the land of the plaintiff, and moored them a short distance from the shore in such a manner as to render the passage from the plaintiff's usual skiff landing inconvenient. On complaint being made, he refused to change their position, whereupon this action was brought.

The defendant insisted that the passage was never entirely obstructed, and that a passage could be effected by going around the boats, or from a different landing below that used by the plaintiff. It was also claimed that the coal trade was a highly valuable and important trade, and that the coal boats had a right to moor in the river at the places most convenient, and to remain there as long as their convenience required: that there had been no damage shown by the plaintiff, and he could not sue for a public nuisance.

The jury were instructed in substance as follows, by

WILLIAMS, A. J.-This is an action on the case by which the plaintiff seeks to recover, for an injury which he alleges has been inflicted upon him by the manner in which the defendant moored his boats and kept them moored in the Youghiogheny River opposite to the plaintiff's land. That river is navigable, and by the laws of this Commonwealth is a public highway. The plaintiff's land abuts on the river, and his ownership is limited to the water's edge. In common with all other citizens, he

right to an unobstructed passage across the river. The defendant has also a right to navigate the river with his coal boats, and to moor them in the river. But the rights of each party are subject to the rule that they must be exercised without unnecessary injury to others.

The plaintiff claims that the defendant's boats were moored opposite to his land, in such manner as unreasonably and without necessity to obstruct the passage across the river to and from his land, exposing the plaintiff and his family to inconvenience, trouble and danger, in effecting their passage across the river. This presents the main point for your inquiry. Were the defendant's vessels moored in such manner as to offer unnecessary trouble and inconvenience to the plaintiff in crossing the river, and were they kept so moored for an unreasonable length of

time?

It is said that the place afforded a convenient and usual harbor to coal boats during low water, and while being rigged and fitted up. But the plaintiff's land abutted upon the river as a highway, and he has a right to the reasonable and necessary enjoyment of the highway for safe and convenient passage. Coal boats are vehicles for navigating the highway, and their owners can have no more right to block up or obstruct the passage of those fronting upon the river than belongs to the owners of vehicles on land. While every man has a right to travel a public highway,

and may even, in case of accident or necessity, load, unload, or remain with his wagon for a reasonable time in one position, no one has a right to place his vehicles in front of another's property and keep them there so as to cut off or obstruct his neighbor's passage. The owners of coal boats have a right to navigate the Youghiogheny River, to load, unload, moor, and stay as long as

they please. Nevertheless, if they abuse that right so as to work a private injury, they are liable to an action. The question for you will be, whether the defendant in this case has abused his right. If, therefore, you shall find that the defendant did moor his coal boats opposite the land of the plaintiff in such manner as unreasonably to obstruct the passage of the plaintiff across the river, and subject him to trouble and danger, or kept them so moored for an unreasonable length of time, this action is maintainable.

It is said that such act would be a public nuisance, and that an individual cannot sue for a nuisance to the public. But the action is brought for the special injury sustained by the plaintiff, and suit may be brought by any one suffering a special injury from a public nuisance.

Should you find the facts to be as claimed by the plaintiff, another question arises as to the rule of damages. In general, a party is entitled to such damages as he may prove to have been occasioned by the injury. Where the title or ownership of property is in issue the value may be usually ascertained without difficulty. But in cases of this nature the damages depend upon the nature of the injury and the circumstances under which it was inflicted.

If the defendant's acts were committed through inadvertance or in ignorance of the injury inflicted, and the boats were removed upon complaint being made, merely nominal damages might be an adequate redress to the plaintiff. Or if the defendant was in the exercise of what he believed to be a right without any hostile intention to his neighbor, such damages as in the opinion of the jury would compensate the actual injury should be rendered. But if the boats were moored in their position as claimed by the plaintiff with intention wantonly to injure him, and do him malicious annoyance, that would be a circumstance to be taken into consideration in the assessment of damages and may enhance them.

The jury rendered a verdict of $40 for the plaintiff.

See Pittsburgh v. Scott, 1 Barr 309; Zimmerman v. Union Canal Co., 1 W. & S. 350; Lehigh Valley Railroad v. Trone, 4 Casey 206.