regretted that the law is not otherwise. The jury have, in this case, found the full amount of the plaintiffs' claim. It would certainly be consistent with justice that the plaintiffs should be allowed to take judgment for the amount admitted to be due by defendant, enforce its payment by execution, and proceed for the residue. A Court of Chancery, where it appears from the answers of a defendant that he has in his hands a specific sum which he admits to be due to the complainant, and other matters in the suit are contested, will order the admitted debt to be paid to the complainant without waiting for a final decree: Clarkson v. De Peyster, Hopkins 274. No reason can be assigned why the same practice should not prevail in a court of law, except that "the simplicity of the common law does not tolerate such an incongruity in its forms.' Until, therefore, the Legislature, or the Supreme Court (if that Court has the power), shall see fit to change the practice in this respect, we must adhere to the rule as we find it. Judgment for the defendant on the reserved point, non obstante veredicto, and the prothonotary is directed to enter the same, on the payment of the verdict fee. This case is uniformly and improperly cited as Dodds v. Crozier. It was affirmed in the Supreme Court, but is unreported. And see Brazier v. Banning, 8 Harris 345; Bradford v. Bradford, 1 P. L. J. R. 388; Hayes v. Robb, Id. 394; and contra, Coleman v. Nantz, 13 P. F. Smith 178. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. GASTON'S APPEAL. (Vol. I., p. 98, 1853.) The investigation of an auditor in a guardianship account must be confined strictly to exceptions filed. APPEAL from the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County. William Gaston was guardian of Margaret Lytle and John Lytle, and the money received for them was the rent of a farm. He filed on the same sheet two accounts under a general caption, "Account of William Gaston, Guardian of John S. Lytle and Margaret Lytle, now Margaret McConnell." The accounts were separate, but the debit sides of both were precisely similar. Exceptions were filed to the account on behalf of Margaret, the principal one being to the omission of the guardian to charge himself with one year's rent of the farm. There was no exception made on account of interest, but the auditor undertook to allow one to be added. He also reported a statement of the account of Gaston as guardian of John S. Lytle, and charged the guardian with the amount of missing rent coming to John S. Lytle. The Court confirmed the report, and the guardian appealed. The opinion of the Court was delivered by LOWRIE, J.-It is not a matter of course to charge a guardian with interest on the moneys of his ward, collected by him, and from the date of collection, when the sums are so small as in this instance, and there is a probability that part of it will be needed for the ward's support. In this case no exceptions were taken to the account filed on the subject of interest, and therefore the auditor had nothing to do with it. It was referred to him to ascertain the truth of the exceptions filed, and they alone indicated to the accountant the matters on which he was to be prepared with evidence. The interest allowed by the auditor in favor of Margaret McConnell ($35 93) must be stricken out. The guardian settled his account with the above-named ward, and with her brother, John S. Lytle, at the same time, and they are docketed in one case; but they are plainly distinct in form, and necessarily so in substance, and they ought not to have been treated as one. John is of age, yet he filed no exceptions, and therefore the auditor had nothing to do with his account. It was not necessary that John should be heard in order that the Court might correct this irregularity of the auditor, nor with the record before us showing these facts is it necessary here. DECREE. This cause came on for hearing on an appeal by William Gaston, from the decree of the Orphans' Court of Allegheny County, settling the accounts of said William as guardian VOL. 1.-4 of Margaret Lytle, now Margaret McConnell aud John S. Lytle, and was argued by counsel on behalf of said William and of the said Margaret, and therefore it is ordered and decreed, that said decree be reversed and set aside, so far as relates to the account of said William, as guardian of the said Margaret; and this Court now proceeding to make such decree as the said Orphans' Court ought to have made therein, do order and decree that the balance due by the said William to the said Margaret is two hundred and thirty dollars and twenty cents, and that he pay the same to her. And it appearing by the record that John S. Lytle has filed no exceptions to the account of the said William, as his guardian, it is further ordered and decreed, that the confirmation of the auditor's report on said account of the said John be reversed and set aside, and that the said account do stand subject to all proper proceedings as if the said report and confirmation had never been had, and the whole case is remitted to the said Orphans' Court, to be further proceeded in according to law. See Okie's Appeal, 9 W. & S. 156; Yundt's Estate, 6 Barr 35; Wither's Appeal, 4 Harris 151; Mengas' Appeal, 7 Id. 221; Yoder's Appeal, 9 Wright 394. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. SHORT V. RUDOLPH. (Vol. I., p. 98, 1853.) Where an attorney becomes bail for an appeal contrary to a rule of Court, the proper course is not to quash the appeal, but to perfect the bail. If this is not done, the attorney is liable on his recognisance. ERROR to the Common Pleas of Allegheny County. This was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace. The attorney for the appellant entered into recognisance as bail for costs. A rule was granted to show cause why the appeal The appellant asked leave to perfect the should not be quashed. bail, and the Court made the rule absolute. This was assigned for error. The opinion of the Court was delivered by LOWRIE, J.-The rule that prohibits an attorney from becoming bail in any action, is a valuable one; but it is a rule of practice and not a test of the validity of the contract of bail. If he does become bail he cannot use the rule to avoid his liability. If no one else objects to the act it is good, and if objections be made, the defect is curable, just as in the case of insufficient bail. The irregularity of taking an attorney as bail is good ground, not for quashing an appeal, but for an order to enter other bail within a specified time after objections. It is ordered that the rule absolute for striking off the appeal be reversed and the appeal reinstated. In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. (Vol. I., p. 114, 1853.) An administrator who is entitled to the balance in his hands, in right of his wife (payable prior to 1848), cannot, as to that sum, commit such a breach of his bond as will make his surety liable. If the surety in such case is intrusted with the money for the wife, he may be liable as trustee, but not on the bond. ERROR to the Common Pleas of Washington County. This was an action of debt against Thomas Miller, the surety of Thomas Kane, surviving administrator of Simon Montague, deceased. The decedent died intestate and without issue, leaving his mother, Rosannah Montague, and his sister, wife of Thomas Kane, surviving him. Letters of administration were granted to Rosannah Montague and Thomas Kane. Mrs. Montague, who was the acting administratrix, presented a petition to the Orphans' Court for an order to sell real estate for payment of debts. This was granted, and the estate was sold for $1585; but before the payment of the purchase-money Mrs. Montague died. Thomas Kane then presented his petition for leave to make a deed for the land sold. This petition was granted on the giving of security, and the bond on which suit is brought was given, with Thomas Miller as surety, who, it seems, refused to go into the bond unless he could have the keeping of the money. Thomas Kane afterwards filed his administration account, showing a balance in his hands of $677 88, which was confirmed. It was offered to be proved, that Miller acknowledged having this balance in his own hands, and promised to pay it to Mrs. Kane or to invest it for her when requested. Thomas Kane died after the filing of his account, and James Noble was appointed administrator de bonis non of Simon Montague, deceased. On the trial of the cause before Gilmore, P. J., the plaintiff offered to prove that Miller, the defendant, refused to become a surety in the bond unless he could have the management of the funds-that this was agreed to by Kane-that Miller received the money and afterwards stated that he had the balance in his hands for the use of Mrs. Kane. This was objected to, on the ground that this suit was brought for money in the hands of the administrator, and that if it was in his hands he had a right to it, as husband of the only legal representative. The Court answered this proposition in the affirmative, saying: "This proposition is confirmatory of the evidence of the defendant, that Mrs. Kane was the only heir of Simon Montague. If so, a payment of the money to the husband, Thomas Kane, would discharge the bond, as the money would become his by his marital right; if he did not actually receive it, still, Miller could not receive the money except by his sanction, and if he thought proper to create Miller a trustee for his wife, it would still be a proper disposition of the money, and the condition of the bond would be saved; and if the money was not reduced to possession by the husband in his lifetime, Miller can be sued as trustee, but not for any breach of the condition of the bond." This rejection of testimony was assigned for error, after a verdict and judgment for defendant. The case was argued by Watson and Montgomery, for plaintiff in error. They contended that the mere receipt of the money by Kane, as administrator, did not reduce the property into possession, so as to defeat the wife's right of survivorship, and cited Blunt v. Buttard, 5 Ves. 515; 12 Id. 497; Lodge v. Hamilton, |