sion must accompany the transfer, or follow it as speedily as the nature of the case will admit. The vendor must reserve to himself no rights, interest, privilege, profit or advantage that cannot be reached by execution. The want of any one of these requisites will vitiate the sale, and render it utterly null and void as to creditors.

If a vendee buys goods to put them out of the reach of creditors, the contract is fraudulent, though he has paid a full price, presently advanced. Clemens v. Davis, 7 Barr 264.

A transfer of personal property which creates a trust, secret or avowed, in favor of the grantor, renders the transaction fraudulent and void in law, though it be mingled with provisions in favor of preferred creditors. Shaffer v. Watkins, 7 W. & S. 219; McCullough v. Hutchinson, 7 Watts 434.

Cadbury v. Nolen, 5 Barr 320.—A. made a sale of chattels, and transferred the securities to B., his judgment creditor. B. may avoid the sale by an execution, if it was fraudulent as to creditors, and that whether there was an actual fraudulent intent, or but constructive fraud by reason of non-delivery of possession. You will apply these principles to the evidence in this case.

If the sale by Thomas to his father was not bonâ fide, and for a sufficient consideration, the plaintiff cannot recover.

If the purchase and sale were made for the purpose of putting the property out of the reach of Thomas' creditors, so as to prevent it from being seized and sold for his debts, the fact that the notes taken were given to a portion of his creditors, will not make the transfer valid, and the plaintiff cannot recover.

If you believe from the evidence, that there was an agreement between Thomas and his father, secret, or open, at the time of the sale, and as part of the consideration thereof, that the son was to have his living out of the proceeds of said goods, the sale was fraudulent and void in law, and the plaintiff cannot recover. If, on the other hand, you find that the sale was bonâ fide, and for a sufficient consideration-that the possession accompanied and followed the transfer, as I have before instructed you-that there was no condition annexed to the transfer by which Thomas was to have a living out of the store-and that the sale was not made for the purpose of hindering, delaying and preventing

his creditors from levying on his property, the plaintiff may

recover.

If you find these facts to be in favor of the plaintiff, then your next inquiry will be as to the amount of damages. In a case like the present, if the plaintiff is entitled to recover at all, the measure of damages will be the cash value of the goods at the time of the sale, with interest thereon.

On the other hand, if you find the sale to have been made for any of the improper purposes before enumerated, you have nothing to do with the question of damages, but your verdict will be for the defendant.

See Kepner v. Burkhart, 5 Barr 478; Brady v. Haines, 6 Harris 113; Chancellor v. Schott, 11 Id. 68; Hugus v. Robinson, 12 Id. 9; Dick v. Cooper, 12 Id. 217; Born v. Shaw, 5 Casey 288; Bunn et al. v. Ahl, 5 Id. 387; York County Bank v. Carter, 2 Wright 446; Graham v. McCreary 4 Id. 515; Brown v. Kellar, 7 Id. 104; Evans v. Watson, 6 P. F. Smith 54; Hartman v. Diller, 12 Id. 37; Craver v. Miller, 15 Id. 456; Leech v. Shantz, 2 Phil. 310.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

COLLINS v. COLLINS.

(Vol. I., p. 198, 1854.)

A parol gift of land is not consistent with any subsequent acts of control or ownership by the donor, and if such are proved, the Court should give a peremptory instruction to the jury against the validity of the gift.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Butler County.

The

The parties to the suit are children of William Collins. land in dispute was devised by him to them, in certain proportions; and the plaintiffs below, who are the defendants in error, brought the ejectment to recover their shares. James Collins claimed to hold seventy-three acres of the land by a parol gift from his father. To substantiate this, he showed that the old man, on several occasions, declared he had given it to him and designated the corner marks and boundaries of it to other per

sons, and that he had taken possession, made improvements and paid the taxes. There was evidence that the payment of the taxes was required by the old man, and that he exercised some acts of control over the seventy-three acres after the alleged gift.

AGNEW, P. J., delivered a charge to the jury very strongly in favor of the plaintiff's right to recover, and against the validity of the gift.

A verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs for all the land, except the part devised to James Collins.

The case was argued by S. A. Purviance for the plaintiffs in error, and Messrs. Sullivan and Smith for defendant in error.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

KNOX, J.-This case exhibits an attempt, on the part of a son, to claim more land than his father had devised to him, upon the pretence of a parol gift. As usual in cases of this kind, the evidence of the alleged gift consists of declarations made by the father to strangers, in the absence of his son, many years before the trial; whilst on the other hand, a state of facts is shown utterly irreconcilable with the allegation of the plaintiff in error. The Court below left the facts to the jury, with a strong intimation that the bar of the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries was not avoided; and so the jury found.

Under the authority of Moore v. Small, 7 Harris 461, Rankin v. Simpson, Id. 471, the learned Judge of the Common Pleas should have given positive instructions to the jury, that the alleged parol gift was not established. But as these cases were not reported when this cause was tried, they furnished no guide, and the jury was suffered to pass upon the facts.

There was no error committed of which the plaintiff in error can complain.

Judgment affirmed.

See Irwin v. Irwin, 10 Casey 525.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

CONRAD ET AL. v. KELLOG.

(Vol. I., p. 202, 1854.)

1. A promise to pay the debt of another, made after the original indebtedness was contracted, requires a consideration to support it, aside from the mere existence of the debt. If made at the time of the original contract, the consideration between the principal parties is enough.

2. A written promise by a third person to pay the balance due from one party to another on a settlement between them, "on demand," was held, to negative the idea that it was in consideration of forbearance; and there being no other consideration shown, the plaintiff had no right of action against the guarantor.

ERROR to the Common Pleas of Susquehanna County.
Opinion by

LEWIS, J.—When a promise to pay the debt of another is made at the same time with the principal contract, and becomes an essential ground of the credit to the principal debtor, the whole is an entire transaction, and the consideration extends to the guarantor Snevily v. Johnston, 1 W. & S. 309. Where the promise is endorsed without date upon a note given for the principal debt, the presumption is that it was made at the time the note was given: Arnsbaugh v. Gearhart, 1 Jones 482. The case last cited covers the rule of presumption, as far as it is proper to go in favor of sustaining the engagements of one man to pay the debts of another. Where the principal debt has been contracted upon the credit of the debtor alone, and not upon the credit of a third person, the law will not hold the latter bound by his subsequent promise to pay unless it be shown that some new consideration passed at the time of such promise. In the case before us the principal debt was not only a pre-existing one, but it was due at the time of the promise of the guarantor. That no extension of time was given, is manifest from the terms of the collateral promise itself, which is to pay "on demand." There is no evidence whatever that the principal debt was contracted at the time of the contract of guaranty. On the contrary, it is stated that the debt then due was ascertained by a "settlement" "that day made." The term "settlement" implies the

pre-existence of demands which formed the subject of it. As there was no evidence of any consideration to support the promise, the Court of Common Pleas was correct in rendering judgment for the defendant upon the point reserved.

Judgment affirmed.

In the District Court of Allegheny County.

DOUD'S ADMR. v. WOLF.

(Vol. I., p. 207, 1854.)

When a person domiciled in another State of the Union, at the time of his death, had a claim against a citizen of Pennsylvania, it was held, that the administrator of the domicil could sue for and recover the debt here, without first taking out letters of administration in Pennsylvania.

ON motion for a new trial.

HAMPTON, P. J.-The defendant's counsel move the Court for a new trial, and assign as a reason that the Court erred in allowing the plaintiff to recover without taking out letters of administration in this State.

The plaintiff resides in Ohio, where the intestate was domiciled and died, and letters of administration were granted. The intestate never resided in Pennsylvania, and had no estate here, real or personal. The defendant resides in Lawrence County. No objection was made to the authentication of the letters of administration; but defendant's counsel rely on the supposed rule, that a foreign administrator cannot sue in the Courts of this State without taking out letters of administration here. In support of this position, they cite the sixth section of the Act of 15th of March, 1832 (Dunlop 458), which provides, that "letters testamentary and of administration shall be granted only by the register of the county within which was the family or principal residence of the decedent, at the time of his death; and if the decedent had no such residence in this Commonwealth, then by the register of the county where the principal part of the goods and estate of such decedent shall be; and no letters testamentary or of administration, or otherwise, purporting to authorize any person to