ages. Up to the value of the property thus fixed by the parties themselves the carrier remains liable for negligence as fully as ever. It furthermore appears upon the face of the bill of lading that the company's charge for transporting the package was to be based upon the value of the property contained in it, which the shipper was permitted by the terms of the bill to declare, and that the valuation of $50 was adopted, for the purposes of the contract made by the bill, simply because the shipper, who was the only one of the parties to the transaction who knew the contents of the package, failed to disclose their nature or more accurately fix their value when requested to do so. Such an agreement is neither unjust nor unreasonable. Hart v. Penna. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. 151, 28 L. Ed. 717, is the leading federal case upon this subject, and it has frequently been relied on by the Supreme Court of the United States in more recent cases. That suit was brought to recover damages for the loss of five horses injured in transit under a bill of lading which stated that the transportation was undertaken "on the condition that the carrier assumes liability on stock to the extent of the following agreed valuation: If horses or mules, not exceeding $200 each; * if a chartered

a

car, on the stock and contents in the same, $1,200 for the car load." The plaintiff claimed $19,800 as the value of the horses, but the court sustained the defendant's objection to evidence of any greater value than $1,200, and the verdict was for that amount. The plaintiff contended that the carrier could not lawfully fix an arbitrary limit to its liability for damages for its own negligence. The Supreme Court in their opinion say: "It is not asserted that the plaintiff named any value greater or less, otherwise than as he assented to the value named in the bill of lading by signing it. The presumption is conclusive that, if the liability had been assumed on a valuation as great as that now alleged, a higher rate of freight would have been charged. The valuation named was the agreed valuation, the one on which the minds of the parties met, however it came to be fixed, and the rate of freight was fixed on condition that such was the valuation and that the liability should go to that extent and no further. * The limitation as to the value has no tendency to exempt from liability for negligence. It does not induce want of care. It exacts from the carrier the measure of care due to the value agreed on. The carrier is bound to respond in that value for negligence. * There is no violation of public policy. On the contrary, it would be unjust and unreasonable, and would be repugnant to the soundest principle of fair dealing and of the freedom of contract

ing, and thus in conflict with public policy, if a shipper should be allowed to reap the benefit of the contract if there is no loss, and to repudiate it in case of loss." The opinion concludes as follows: "The distinct ground of our decision in the case at bar is that where a contract of the kind signed by the shipper is fairly made, agreeing on a valuation of the property carried, with the rate of freight based on the condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss or damage by the negligence of the carrier, the contract will be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protecting himself against extravagant and fanciful valuations." In Hart's Case the shipper signed the bill of lading, but in Brehme's Case there was no other evidence of the shipper's assent to the terms of the bill of lading than that arising from his acceptance of it, and upon that ground it was strenuously insisted upon the plaintiff's brief in this court that the alleged special contract had not been proven, but our predecessors held that "the receipt executed by the appellee and accepted by the appellant [the shipper] constituted the contract between the parties," and that they were bound by its terms. A bill of lading delivered by the carrier to the shipper and accepted by him, although without his signature, is presumed to have been read and acquiesced in by the shipper, and to constitute the contract of carriage in the absence of fraud, imposition, or mistake. 6 Cyc. 417, 5 A. & E. Encycl. of Law, 293; Hutchinson on Carriers (3d Ed.) §§ 408, 409; Cau v. Texas & Pac. R. Co., 194 U. S. 431, 24 Sup. Ct. 663, 48 L. Ed. 1053. It is the duty of the shipper to inform the carrier of the real value of the goods transported, and, if he fails to do so when requested or by his silence assents to the value inserted by the carrier in the bill of lading, and thereby secures a lower rate of transportation, he ought not in our opinion to be permitted when the property has been lost, even through the carrier's negligence, to repudiate the value stated in the bill and recover damages in excess of it.

We are aware of the fact that there is some diversity of opinion among the courts of the different states upon the right of a common carrier to limit by any form of contract its liability for losses arising from its own negligence, but upon an examination of the cases the decided weight of authority will be found to be in harmony with the views which we have expressed.

The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

(N. J.

=

(70 N. J. E. 809)

(75 N. J. L. 737)

་

CENTRAL R. CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF TAXES. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Nov. 18, 1907.) Error to Supreme Court. Proceeding by the Central Railroad Company of New Jersey against the board of equalization of taxes. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff brings error. Holmes, for plaintiff in error. Affirmed. George General, for defendant in error. The Attorney PER CURIAM. the act of 1905 (P. L. 1905, p. 189) has been The constitutionality of recently affirmed by this court (Bergen & Dundee R. Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 67 Atl. 668) and needs no further discussion. The Supreme Court in the present case held that the plaintiffs in error were not entitled to the relief sought by reason of the way in which the facts were presented to the state board of

equalization, but sustained the power of that board under the statute creating it (P. L. 1905, p. 123) to act upon a proper presentation of the facts. Since that decision this court has decided that the state board has not the pow er claimed for it. Equalization, 67 Atl. 38. The necessary result Jersey City v. Board of is the affirmance of the judgment in the present case, and it is unnecessary to consider the question whether the state board of equalization has jurisdiction in cases of this character. The Supreme Court has recently decided adversely to this jurisdiction. Tuckerton R. Co. v. State Board of Assessors, 67 Atl. 69. The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

(70 N. J. E. 803)

CLAWSON v. BREWER et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 18, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Suit by Clement C. Clawson against Aurelia Lee Brewer and others. Decree for complainant (67 N. J. Eq. 201, 58 Atl. 598), and defendants appeal. Affirmed. Thomas S. Henry, for appellants. Charles H. Halfpenny and Robert H. McCarter, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The decree in this case is affirmed, for the reasons contained in the opinion delivered in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Emery.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, HENDRICKSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, DILL, JJ., concur. GRAY, and

(74 N. J. L. 850)

DOYLE v. ROESSLER & HASSLACHER CHEMICAL CO. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 17, 1907.) Error to Supreme Court. Action by John Doyle against the Roessler & Hasslacher Chemical Company. There was a judgment for plaintiff rendered by the Supreme Court (73 N. J. Law, 521, 64 Atl. 156), and defendant brings error. Willard P. Voorhees, for plaintiff in error. Affirmed. George S. Silzer, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. The judgment of the Supreme Court brought up by this writ of error is affirmed, on the grounds set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Reed in that court, reported in 64 Atl. 156, 73 N. J. Law, 521.

(70 N. J. E. 805) NAUGHTON v. ELLIOTT. rors and Appeals of New Jersey. (Court of Er1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill June 18, for specific performance by William Naughton against George W. Elliott. Decree for complainant (68 N. J. Eq. 259, 59 Atl. 869), and defendant appeals. Affirmed. William J. Leonard and Richard V. Lindabury, for appellant. Frederick W. Hope and James D. Degnan, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion delivered in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Emery.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, HENDRICKSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ., concur.

cery. Bill by Henry Puster, as receiver of the United States Gasoline Engine Company, against the Parker Mercantile Company. From an order sustaining a plea to the jurisdiction of the court and dismissing the cause (59 Atl. 232), plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Robert H. Hudspeth and J. Merritt Lane, for appellant. Robert M. Boyd, Jr., for respondent.

PER CURIAM. The order in this case is affirmed, for the reasons contained in the opinion delivered in the Court of Chancery by the Chancellor.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, HENDRICKSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ., concur.

(74 N. J. L. 849)

STATE v. MAHANEY. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 17, 1907.) Error to Supreme Court. John Mahaney was convicted of crime, and he brings error. Affirmed. Ward & McGinnis, for plaintiff in error. William H. Speer, for the State.

PER CURIAM. The judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed, for the reasons given in the opinion of Mr. Justice Reed in that court, reported in 62 Atl. 265.

STATE v. MURDACA. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. Dec. 6, 1905.) Error to Supreme Court. Nicholas Murdaca was convicted of crime, and brings error. Affirmed. Charles C. Black, for plaintiff in error. William H. Speer, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. An examination of the assignments of error, and the bills of exceptions, and the causes filed for reversal, and the entire record before us, discloses no ground for reversal. The judgment will therefore be affirmed.

THE CHANCELLOR, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, and DIXON, GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, HENDRICKSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GRAY, and DILL, JJ.,

E. Van Hovenberg, for appellant. William B. Gourley, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the Prerogative Court by the Ordinary.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, HENDRICKSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ., concur.

(70 N. J. E. 807)

WOLTERS v. SHRAFT et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 18. 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill by Celina M. Wolters against Robert Shraft and others. From a decree of the Court of Chancery (69 N. J. Eq. 215, 66 Atl. 398), dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. James R. Nugent, for appellant. Elwood C. Harris, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion delivered in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Stevens.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and GARRISON, FORT, GARRETSON, HENDRICKSON, PITNEY, SWAYZE, REED, BOGERT, VREDENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ., concur.

Ac

HOLLAND v. CARRIGAN et al. (Supreme Court of Rhode Island. May 6, 1907.) Appeal from Superior Court, Providence County. tion by John Holland against Edward F. Carrigan and others. Decree for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed, and cause remanded for further proceedings. Harry C. Curtis, for complainant. Rathbone Gardner and P. Henry Quinn, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. We agree with the superior court that the transaction complained of was entered into by the complainant on his own suggestion, without solicitation or persuasion from any other person, that he thoroughly understood the tenor of the conveyances and transfers which he made, that they were supported by a valid consideration, and a court of equity ought not to set them aside. The decree of the superior court is affirmed, and this affirmation will be certified to the superior court, and the cause remanded thither for further proceedings.

(70 N. J. E. 810)

ANDERSON V. SUPREME COUNCIL, CATHOLIC BENEVOLENT LEGION, et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. June 18, 1906.) Appeal from Court of Chancery, advised by Vice Chancellor Emery, whose opinion is reported in 69 N. J. Eq. 176, 60 Atl. 759. William Newcorn and Freeman Woodbridge, for appellant. John P. Owens and Thomas Anderson, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion delivered in the Court of Chancery by Vice Chancellor Emery.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE and FORT, GARRETSON, HENDRICKSON, PITNEY, VRE DENBURGH, VROOM, GREEN, GRAY, and DILL, JJ., concur. GARRISON, SWAYZE, REED, and BOGERT, JJ., dissent.