which a powder found in the possession of the defendants had on writing in a check similar to that by the alteration of which the forgery was committed, and the check upon which the effect testified to by the witnesses was produced may be exhibited to the jury: People v. Brotherton, 47 Cal. 388.

Comparison of hands: See post, SS 764-766 [754-756]. Miscellaneous. The opinion of experts as to the value of servicehere legal services-is not binding on the jury; they may use their own knowledge and experience: Leitensdorfer v. King, 7 Col. 436. Where a contract relates to the mechanic or scientific arts, it is common and prudent to admit the opinion of experts to explain it, and where the evidence otherwise tends to limit or enlarge the apparent meaning of the words used, the opinions of witnesses who are in the habit of making and executing such contracts are almost indispensable: Reynolds v. Jourdan, 6 Cal. 112. A stock-raiser is a competent witness to estimate the damage done to cattle by falling through a wharf: Polk v. Coffin, 9 Id. 56. When the value of the work is in issue, it is competent to ask a witness skilled in the business, and who has made an estimate, how much time it would take to do the work: Swain v. Naglee, 17 Id. 416. A person who has been engaged in measuring and selling water to miners for four or five years is sufficiently an expert to give his opinion as a witness upon the effect which a dam across a stream will have in raising the water in the channel above: Blood v. Light, 31 Id. 115. Expert testimony as to the habits and instincts of domestic animals, and the kind of fence necessary to restrain them, will not be received; the experience of the jury renders it unnecessary: Enright v. S. F. & S. J. R. R. Co., 33 Id. 236; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. 136. So expert testimony cannot be given to show whether a bullet wound could be inflicted by a shot fired from a certain direction: People v. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303; People v. Smith, 4 Pac. C. L. J. 213. A practical miner, who has used blasting-powder for years, and used a large amount of a certain powder, can be asked his opinion, based upon experience, as to the safety of that powder: Sowden v. Idaho Q. M. Co., 55 Id.

443. A witness cannot be asked what Oct. 11, 1862, is the meaning of an expression used $696. by another in conversation with witness; the meaning is for the jury, and is not a matter for expert testimony: People v. Moan, 3 West Coast Rep. 633. Hypothetical questions containing erroneous statements of facts cannot be asked experts: Wells v. Adams, 7 Col. 26. Where a ball was fired, it is a question for an expert to determine from the result whether the ball came from far or from near, and it is held that one not an expert was not competent, though he had made experiments to determine what was proof of that fact: State v. Justus, 11 Or. 178.

The

Sanity of testator of instrument. See, as to expert evidence of sanity, Hammond v. Woodman, 41 Me. 177; S. C., 66 Am. Dec. 238, and note thereto. It was held that a witness, even though not an expert, who detailed a conversation had between himself and another, might also in connection therewith state his opinions, belief, or impression as to the state of the mind of such person, as these seemed to appear to the witness at the time of the conversation: People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 32. opinion of a non-professional witness, based on his own observation, is admissible to prove the mental condition of another. The jury is to judge of its weight: Parkhurst v. Hosford, 10 Saw. 401. To the same effect, see Sutton v. Reagan, 5 Blackf. 217; S. C., 33 Am. Dec. 466; Potts v. House, 6 Ga. 324; S. C., 50 Am. Dec. 329; and a large collection of cases in Lawson's Expert Evidence, 476. Evidence of intimate acquaintance with the party is competent to prove mental sanity: Foley v. Parker, 6 Or. 105. In People v. Wreden, 59 Cal. 392, it was held that the lower court erred in ruling out the question, "From his [accused's] appearance, his actions, his condition, and conversation, what was the state of his mind?"

Common reputation. - Evidence of common reputation is received in regard to public facts on ground similar to that on which public documents not judicial are received, namely, the interest which all have in their truth, and the consequent probability that they are true: Price v. Cunell, 6 Mees. & W. 234; and see Noyes v. White, 19 Conn. 250; and see McEwan v. Portland, 1 Or.

300. A witness testifying to common reputation need not state where he got his information: Mosely v. Davies, Il Price, 162.

Hearsay evidence is for the most part allowed in matters of general or public interest, as a boundary: Goddard v. Parker, 10 Or. 102. It has been a matter of much dispute whether it should ever be received to affect a private right. But even by those judges who have favored its admission it was always considered as only auxiliary to other evidence which had laid the foundation of the right: Doe v. Thomas, 14 East, 323; Morewood v. Wood, 4 Term Rep. 157. Even in regard to boundaries of parishes and towns it has been held that hearsay evidence is received only where such boundary is of remote antiquity: Vanderslice v. Hanks, 3 Cal. 45. But in Goddard v. Parker, 10 Or. 103, it is held that under the statute of this state, evidence of common reputation is admissible to establish private boundaries. See, as to proof of boundaries in this state, title 9, chapter 5, ante. Common reputation cannot be admitted as evidence to prove partnership: Sinclair v. Wood, 3 Cal. 98; approved: Hudson v. Simon, 6 Id.

455.

Common reputation is admissible on a question of ownership: § 776 [766], subd. 12; Wilson v. Maddock, 5 Or. 480; Bartel v. Lope, 6 Id. 321.

Evidence of title by common reputation is not admissible in an action to recover real property, where the plaintiff's title dates back eight years only: McEwan v. Portland, 1 Or. 300. Usage. Evidence of usage is admissible either to interpret the meaning of the language of a contract or to ascertain the nature and extent of the contract in absence of express stipulation and where the meaning is equivocal and obscure: Cutter v. Powell, 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. 1. If a contract contains an express warranty, such as "in good order," etc., evidence of a custom, the effect of which

would be to relieve the warrantor of liability on his warranty, should be rejected: Polhemus v. Heiman, 50 Cal. 441. The custom of merchants is not admissible to vary the plain meaning of a written contract: Corwin v. Clayton, 4 Id. 204. In an action for services rendered in the capacity of secretary, against a corporation, it was held that defendant might show that by the usage and custom of the corporation no compensation was payable, and that plaintiff, as a member of the corporation, was prima facie fixed with notice of the custom: Fraylor v. Sonora M. Co., 17 Id. 595. If a custom exists among miners, in locating tunnel or hill claims, of establishing a front line from which they run back to a perpendicular plane dropped from the center line of the summit, such custom might explain the meaning of the phrase "running back into the hill": Reamer v. Nesmith, 34 Id. 628. Evidence was admitted to show that by the custom of the country the word "thousand,' when applied in a lease, meant one thousand two hundred: Smith v. Wilson, 3 Barn. & Adol. 728; that in the port of Algiers "in turn to deliver" had acquired a particular meaning: Robertson v. Jackson, 2 Com. B. 412. So evidence was admitted to show what is the meaning of a "delivery in London": Bourne v. Gatliffe, 3 Man. & G. 643; "sailing with convoy": Lilly v. Ewer, Doug. 72; to show what was meant by "stubble": Callahan v. Stanley, 57 Cal. 476. In an action on a written contract for the sale of stock by a member of a board of brokers, to be delivered to the buyer in thirty days, to recover the amount of the first payment, if the contract acknowledges the receipt thereof, the plaintiff may, notwithstanding, give evidence of the custom of the board of brokers, to account for the delivery of the contract without receiving the money: Winans v. Hassey, 48 Id. 634.

Contents of writing: See § 691 [681].

Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281. Thus it is held that courts will judicially recognize public laws of a state or the United States: Haight v. Child, 34 Barb. 186; Swinnerton v. Columbian Insurance Co., 37 N. Y. 174; Hewett v. Harvey, 46 Mo. 368; Brown v. State, 11 Ohio, 276; Brown v. Harmon, 21 Barb. 508; Platt v. Crawford, 8 Abb. Pr., N. S., 297; Morris v. Davidson, 49 Ga. 361; Bagly v. Chubb, 16 Gratt. 284; Butler v. Robinson, 75 Mo. 192. Public and private official acts of the legislature will be judicially noticed: People v. Hagar, 52 Id. 171; Dolph v. Barney, 5 Or. 192. That private acts of the legislature were not within the knowledge of the court before the code, see Ellis v. Eastman, 32 Cal. 449. Courts will take judicial notice of the system of surveys adopted by the United States: Richards v. Snider, 11 Or. 197.

Treaties or proclamations will be judicially noticed: Lacroix v. Sarrazin, 15 Fed. Rep. 489; United States v. Reynes, 9 How. 127; Dole v. Wilson, 16 Minn. 525; Dunning v. New Albany etc. R. R. Co., 2 Ind. 437; Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Id. 124; S. C., 9 Am. Rep. 639; and see Hill v. Baker, 32 Iowa, 302; S. C., 7 Am. Rep. 193. The judicial districts, People v. Robinson, 17 Cal. 371, and terms of court, Talbert v. Hopper, 42 Id. 400, Boggs v. Clarke, 37 Id. 241, were judicially taken notice of. Courts will judicially notice their own records: State v. Hoeflinger, 36 Wis. 393; State v. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475; Robinson v. Brown, 82 Ill. 279; State v. Schilling, 14 Iowa, 455; and officers and their signatures: Mackinnon v. Barnes, 66 Barb. 91; Masterson v. Le Claire, 4 Minn. 163; Norvell v. McHenry, 1 Mich. 227. And see Himmelmann v. Hoadley, 44 Cal. 213. Courts will not take notice of municipal ordinances: Harker v. Mayor etc., 17 Wend. 199; Garvin v. Wells, 8 Iowa, 286; Porter v. Waring, 69 N. Y. 250; Lucker v. Commonwealth, 4 Bush, 440; Winona v. Burke, 23 Minn. 254. Signing of a patent by the President, and sealing with the seal of the United States, will be taken judicial notice of: Yount v. Howell, 14 Id. 467.

Seals of foreign states are judicially noticed: Lazier v. Westcott, 26 N. Y. 146; S. C., 82 Am. Dec. 404; Lincoln v. Battelle, 6 Wend. 475; Stauglein v. State, 17 Ohio St. 463; and so are the seals of foreign public officers: State v. Williams, 5 Wis. 308; Ragland v. Wynn, 37 Ala. 32; Dewees v. Colorado Co., 32 Tex. 570, etc.

Accessions to office, etc.: Weatherbee v. Dunn, 32 Cal. 108; Ede v. Johnson, 15 Id. 53.

Laws of nature, etc. - Courts will take judicial notice of the time of harvest in the counties where they preside: Mahoney v. Aurrecochen, 51 Cal. 429; of the time of the rising of the sun on a given day: People v. Chee Kee, 61 Id. 404; to satisfy the mind of the court in regard to this latter fact, it was held competent to introduce Ayer's American Almanac. Courts take notice that Napa valley is in the state of California; People v. Smith, 1 Id. 13; when the tide ebbs and flows at New Orleans: Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Id. 147; S. C., 63 Am. Dec. 113; of matters of public history: Swinnerton v. Columbian Ins. Co., 37 N. Y. 174; Fayne v. Trealwell, 16 Cal. 220; Rice v. Shook, 27 Ark. 137; Smith v. Stevens, 82 Ill. 554; Howard v. Moot, 64 N. Y. 262; Simmons v. Trumbo, 9 W. Va. 358; Williams v. State, 67 Ga. 260; of the geography of the country: Hinckley v. Beckwith, 23 Wis. 328; Winnipiscogee Lake Co. v. Young, 40 N. H. 420; People v. Snyder, 41 N. Y. 397; Wright v. Hawkins, 28 Tex. 452; Gilbert v. Molnie, 19 Iowa, 319. As to noticing matters of science and art: Luke v. Calhoun Co., 52 Ala. 115; Adler v. State, 55 Id. 16; State v. Goyette, 11 R. I. 592; Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37; People v. Chee Kee, 61 Cal. 404; Clough v. Goggins, 40 Iowa, 325; Briffit v. State, 58 Wis. 39; S. C., 46 Am. Rep. 631.

Other instances. - Courts take judicial notice of the result of the census, and may resort for information to the certified return of the superintendent of the census: People v. Williams, 64 Cal. 87.