generally believed by the Christians, or by others, since several ecclesiastical historians, who wrote after Eusebius, particularly Ruffin and Sozomen, make no mention of the appearance of the cross in the heavens."

In modern Spiritualism Dr. Lee professes full belief, but ascribes the phenomena produced to the direct agency of the devil and his legions. "In most cases," he says, " it may be safely assumed that evil spirits personify the souls of the departed. That such spirits are the deadly foes of man so long as he is in his period of probation, may, for all Catholic Christians, be also assumed." But does not this assumption involve the very point that is to be proved? Proceed in this way, and you may assume anything, and so by assumption uphold all the extravagancies of superstition and fanaticism. He relates a

story told him by a clergyman of the Church of England who attended a séance. The usual manifestations took place. The table made remarkable gyrations, and seven feet to the ceiling:

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"I was so shocked and horrified at what I beheld, and now so firmly convinced that the remarkable actions we had witnessed were the result of the invocation and intervention of evil spirits, that I declined, in language most positive and unmistakable, to have any further part in such unlawful performances.

"When further attempts were made to obtain fresh manifestations, taking from my neck a small silver crucifix, which had been blessed by a high ecclesiastical dignitary, I made a mental act of faith in the Blessed Trinity, and holding the small crucifix in my closed hand, placed my hand clasping it on the table, saying mentally, If this be the work of evil spirits, may God Almighty, for Christ's sake, stop it!'

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The moment I did this, the table, which had been moving about strangely in several directions, and by varied

Dr. Lee informs us that this communication was received in 1856, and as "the last day" was then to be in twenty-five years, or 1881, the end is not now far off!

From the examples of Dr. Lee's extreme credulity we have already given, it is needless to remark that he is a thorough believer in witchcraft, magic arts, and necromantic power, by which Oriental jugglery is effected :-}

"So likewise as regards India, it is impossible to set aside the facts, which

the pretended supernaturalism of the Davenport Brothers, of Mr. Home, and other spiritualistic tricksters, can now be produced at pleasure by such skilful performers as we have referred to, and there is no more evidence to warrant the belief Dr. Lee professes, that Indian jugglery is the effect of necromancy, than there is to justify the opinion that the wonders of modern conjuration are produced by Satanic agency.

Dr. Lee is evidently sincere in what he writes, but sincerity, no matter how sincere, is no excuse for folly-no excuse for the evil that may be wrought by preaching a grovelling creed of superstition and credulity.

That such a work as Glimpses of the Supernatural should be published by a clergyman of the Church of England, is a melancholy sign of the degeneracy that has afflicted a portion of the Protestant mind of our day; and if the Church in England loses its hold on the affections of the Protestants of England, and shares the fate of the Church of Ireland, the dénoument will be brought about not so much by the attacks of dissenters or infidels as by the gross and revolting Romanism of Dr. Lee, and of those who sedulously labour with him to remove Protestant landmarks, and restore the degrading beliefs, sensuous worship, and pagan ceremonials of popery.

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As one about to travel in a foreign country ordinarily acquaints himself-either by reading, or by conversation with persons who may have been wayfarers before him, cerning the history, the locality, and the circumstances of the new land, so one about to enter on the study of a subject, like the science of law, should necessarily strive to know something of its history, its development and its characteristics.

It is obvious that, to a professional student of law, constitutional his tory should be one of the earliest subjects to which he devotes attention, because therefrom he derives a knowledge of the causes which originated the leading charters or statutes of the realm, and without which he could form no accurate notion of the common law of the country. The cause or origin of a statute, if doubtful in import, is often an index to its interpretation, and a knowledge of the common law is but a knowledge of the protection and safeguards afforded every one without respect of persons. The constitutional history of a country involves the constitutional law of the country, and that constitutional law, including matter relating to the sovereign power and

the state, involving the relations of subject and ruler, dealing with questions affecting their mutual dependency, their reciprocal duties and obligations, the legislative and executive powers of either, opens a wide field of comprehensive interest. Thus, a study of constitutional law, in addition to its own great advantages by reason of that comprehensiveness, aids in preventing the mind becoming narrowed by a too exclusive application to the practical workings of a profession. Coleridge once observed that the study of the law, when sedulously pursued, acts on the mind like a whetstone, it sharpens but narrows the blade; an observation made at a time when technicalities were in the ascendant, when the substance was lost in the shadow, when wire-drawn distinctions exercised the legal mind; but still the saying is not unworthy of being regarded as a warning against a too subtle, a too exclusive application of mental resources to details, and as affording a hope that, by a free and liberal exercise of thought in the generalization and systematization of legal principles, as much accuracy of thought, as much facility of reasoning, as much capacity of inference and deduction may be realized, as though a lifetime were

spent in elaborating the most hidden of theories.

There is an observation of Mr. Hallam to this effect ("Middle Ages," vol. ii. 338): "The fault of students of the law is in studying it rather as an art than a science, with more solicitude to know its rules and distinctions than to perceive their application to that for which all rules of law ought to have been established, the maintenance of public and private rights."

Regarded in this light, a book like that of Sir Henry Maine, on "The Early History of Institutions," is of great value. It is a harking back, as it were, on old echoes, speaking to us of times and customs and usages whose origin is forgotten, and tracing with wonderful accuracy the stream whence are fed many modern fountains whose flow still irrigates our judicature.

Archaic

laws or ancient institutions may be studied as sources of archæological knowledge, or as developing legal principles; they are storehouses of the customs and usages of a people, or they intimate the origin of settled maxims; they are useful in the consideration of legislative measures, as affecting the health, the habits, or resources of the people. So it is that a work like "The Early History of Institutions" becomes eminently suggestive and invites discussion. It is carrying further the mode of investigation adopted by Sir Henry in his "Ancient Law;" and as that treatise dealt with the Roman law and its development, so the present book is conversant with the old Irish law of the Brehons, as illustrated by the tracts published under the direction of the commissioners for publishing the ancient laws and institutes of Ireland. There is the subject of kinship as the origin of societythe tribe and the land-the chief and his orders-the divisions of the family organization-the diffusion

of legal ideas-all discussed in the original mode and manner of an accomplished inquirer. But as to this Brehon law itself, notwithstanding the interest attached to any narrative of the occupation, life, or habits of a people, we are disposed to think le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle. It possesses no judicial power, it contains no legislative sanction, it is but a collection of facts having reference to the social connections of the Irish people, and all the judgments recorded are nothing but decisions on submissions to the Brehons as ordinary arbiters in controversy. Like most early laws, the acts specified in them, and which would now be regarded as crimes, are treated as torts, and the judgments are entirely pecuniary, in the shape of assessed damages.

The composition or fine for murder was recognized instead of capital punishment, and was divided between the kindred of the slain person and the judge. Of course the authenticity of the Brehon laws has been questioned, and the period of their promulgation is also matter of great doubt. By some they are ascribed to the fifth, by others to the eighth, and by others to the thirteenth century; and as they contain references to Anglo-Saxon and Norman usages, it has been not unreasonably surmised that the degenerate colonists of Ireland adopted the Brehon law in their respective territories, and that thus interpolations of many and varied kinds, adapted to those septs who had intercourse with the English the pale, became numerous. The Brehon law was condemned by the statute of Kilkenny (40th Edw. 3) and its use and practice made high treason; but this statute only affected the English of the pale, it did not include the Irish: "It is accorded and established, that hereafter no Englishman have debate with another Englishman, but according