A DIGEST OF ALL THE REPORTED CASES ON MAGISTRATES, PAROCHIAL, AND MUNICIPAL LAW, FROM 1856 TO 1867. ALEHOUSE. ALEHOUSE. Licensing Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 61)-County and borough justices, jurisdiction of-Borough justices have no jurisdiction to grant licences for inns and alehouses under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, except in such boroughs as have separate courts of quarter sessions: (Candlish v. Simpson, 30 L. J. 270, Q. B.; 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 437.) Licensing Act- Refusal of justices to renew licence unless the applicant would take out a licence for the sale of spirits.-The refusal of an applicant to take out a licence for the sale of spirits is not a sufficient legal ground for the refusal of justices to grant a renewal of a licence to keep an inn, alehouse, &c., under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61. Applications were made to justices at the general annual licensing meeting to renew certain licences to keep an inn, alehouse, and victualling house under 9 Geo. 4, c. 61. Applicants for the last few years had only taken out an excise licence for the sale of ale, beer, &c., and not a licence for the sale of spirits. The justices obtained a list of all licensed persons in the borough, and resolved not to renew the licence of any person who had not, during the past year, taken out an excise licence to sell spirits, and they refused accordingly. The decision of the justices being upheld on appeal, subject to a case for the opinion of this court: Held, that the justices had not exercised their jurisdiction, and that they were wrong in refusing to renew on the above ground: (Reg. v. Sylvester, L. T. Rep. N. S. 793, Q. B.; 31 L. J. 129, Q.B.) Licence-9 Geo. 4, c. 61-Class of house to which licence extends.-Under the Geo. 4, c. 61 (an Act to regulate the granting of licences to keepers of inns, alehouses, and victualling houses in England), justices have no power to grant a licence to sell excisable liquors with the condition attached that they are not to be drunk or consumed on the premises, or to any other class of houses than inns, hotels, alehouses, and victualling houses wherein the liquors may be drunk or consumed upon the premises: (Reg. v. Wilkinson, 10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 370, Q. B.) L. J. 262, Ex.; 10 Jur. N. S. 545; 10 L. T. Rep. N. S 342.) Beerhouse-Ale and beer licence-4 of 5 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 2-Fulse certificate of character.-The app. having obtained a certificate of character from six of his neighbours, presented it to the officers of Excise for the purpose of obtaining a licence for the sale of beer. It was proved that the deft. had for some years previously cohabited with a woman without having gone through the ceremony of marriage; but no act of indecency of any kind was proved against him: Held, that the justices were not, on this evidence, bound to convict the app. on an information under the 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 2, charging him with unlawfully making use of the certificate, knowing the same to be false: (Leader, app., v. Yell, resp., 33 L. J. 312, C. P.) Refusal to grant licence-Quarter sessions-9 Geo. 4, c. 61.-A court of quarter sessions, at an annual licensing meeting, refused to renew a licence to keep an inn, alehouse and victualling house under stat. 9 Geo. 4, c. 61, on the ground that the applicant declined to take out an excise licence for the sale of spirits: Held, that this was not a sufficient legal ground for such refusal: (Reg. v. Sylvester, 2 B. & S. 322.) guilty 4, c. 61, ss. 13, 21, Schedule C.-An innkeeper Innkeeper-Offence against licence-" Gaming' -9 Geo. Geo. 4, c. 61), by which it is provided "that he shall not of an offence against the tenor of his licence (under 9 knowingly suffer any unlawful games or any gaming whatsoever in his house or premises," if he allow private friends of his own, in his own private room in the licensed premises, to play at cards for money: (Patten, app., v. Rhymer, resp., 29 L. J. 208, Q. B.; 2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 353.) Disorderly house-Town Police Act-10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, s. 35-Information-Recovery of penalties.-A licensed alehouse is a place of public resort for the sale of refreshments, within the Town Police Act, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 85, s. 35, and the keeper of it is liable to penalties under that section for allowing prostitutes to assemble therein; although he may also at the same Ale and beerhouse- Fair-Save of beer without licence-time be guilty of an offence against the tenor of his 11 Geo. 41 Will. 4, c. 64, s. 29-25 & 26 Vict. c. 22, s. licence, under 9 Geo. 4, c. 62. A local Act for the im12.-Sect. 12 of 25 & 26 Vict. c. 22, repeals sect. 29 of 11 provement and management of the town of L., after Geo. 4 & 1 Will. 4, c. 64, and takes away any right, incorporating certain sections of the 10 & 11 Vict. c, 89 privilege, permission or exemption from prohibition that (amongst others the 35th), enacted, that penalties may have previously existed to sell beer by retail at fairs recovered before justices, not otherwise directed to be without a licence: (Huxham, app., v. Wheeler, resp, 33 paid, should be awarded to the corporation of the towe AMENDMENT-APPEAL. or the commissioners under the Act, according as the proceeding for the penalty was taken on behalf of one or other of those bodies. An information, under the 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, s. 35, against the keeper of a house of public resort for the sale of refreshments, was laid by the clerk to the commissioners, but he had no authority from them, express or implied, otherwise than from having published by their orders a printed notice that the above 35th section would be enforced in the town: Held, by Cockburn, C. J., that the information being for an offence against public policy might be laid by anyone, without authority from the party to whom the penalties to be recovered were to be awarded, so long as he professed that the recovery of the penalties should enure to the benefit of that party; by Crompton, J., that authority from the commissioners to prosecute on their behalf sufficiently appeared on the facts: (Cole v. Coulton, 29 L. J. 187, Q. B.; 6 Jur. N. S. 689; 2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 216.) "Traveller"— Who is-Refreshment-room at a railway station-Sunday trading-2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 42.-A person who has taken a railway ticket for a journey by railway at the usual time before the starting of the train, is a traveller within the meaning of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, 8. 42. A. went to the Victoria Station, Pimlico, on a Sunday, and obtained a ticket to proceed by a train which was to leave the station at ten minutes before one o'clock, p.m. At twenty minutes before one o'clock the refreshment-room at the said station was opened, and thereupon A. went in and was served with some fermented liquor: Held, that he was a traveller, and that no penalty was incurred: (Fisher, app., v. Howard, resp., 10 Cox C. C. 144, Q. B.; 11 Jur. Ñ. S. 305.) Sale of fermented or distilled liquors within the prohibited hours on Sunday-"Traveller"-11 & 12 Vict. c. 49. Where a licensed victualler has opened his house on Sunday within the prohibited hours for the bona fide supply of refreshment to travellers arriving at an adjacent railway station, the mere fact that refreshment has been supplied to persons residing within a mile of the house, and who did not come by the train, will not justify a conviction under the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 49, s. 1: (Peache, app., v. Colman, resp., 1 L. Rep., C. P. 324; 12 Jur. N. S. 273.) Opening house for the sale of beer-Sunday-Evidence 11 12 Vict. c. 49.-At twenty minutes before one o'clock a.m. on Sunday morning the outer entrance door of an alehouse was wide open, the bar, tap-room, and parlour were likewise open, and in them were several men and women, some of whom were residents in the parish, a man and three women had a pint cup threefourths full of beer before them, and the landlady was collecting the drinking cans. There was no evidence as to the actual selling of beer after twelve o'clock on Saturday night: Held, that there was some evidence to justify a conviction for keeping the house open for the sale of beer before half-past twelve p.m. on Sunday: (Smith v. Vaux, 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 46, Q. B.) APPEAL. I. IN CRIMINAL CASES. I. IN CRIMINAL CASES. In criminal cases-Colonial courts.-Though in strictness the Crown has authority, by virtue of the prerogative, to review the decisions of all colonial courts, whether the proceedings be of a civil or criminal character, unless the Crown has parted with such authority, yet the inconvenience of entertaining an appeal in criminal cases is so great that it will not be allowed except in very peculiar circumstances. Thus where a colonial police court, from which no appeal lay to the civil court, had decided a criminal matter, which in substance was of a civil nature, and affected the rights of property generally in a colony, and could not easily be put in the form of a civil action, leave to appeal was allowed: (Falkland Islands Company v. The Queen, 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 103, Priv. C.) II. FROM JUSTICES. Transmission of case to Superior Court-Town agent.A party convicted by justices on an information applied to them for a case for a Superior Court, under stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2. The case was delivered by the justice's clerk to the app.'s attorney on the 31st Dec. 1862, who gave notice of appeal and a copy to the opposite attorney; and on the 1st Jan. 1863, sent by post the original to his London agent to be lodged in court. The London agent received the case the next day, but did not lodge it until the 10th: Held, that the case had not been duly transmitted to the court according to the statute. Quare, whether, if such a case is duly put into a regular course of transmission to the court, e. g. by post, and does not reach it within time in consequence of something over which the sender has no control, this is a compliance with the statute: (Re Banks, app., v. Goodwin, resp., 3 B. & S. 548; 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 740, Q. B.) Time for application to justices for case-Sect. 2.-Sunday is to be computed in the three days allowed for an application to justices to state a case for the opinion of one of the Superior Courts under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, Queen, resp., 4 C. B., N. S., 264.) s. 2, although it be the last day: (Peacock, app., v. The Conviction-Sum adjudged to be paid-Penalty-Costs.By the 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 14, justices may convict, and the party so convicted is to pay such penalty, damage, or compensation as the justice shall adjudge, together with the costs of conviction, to be settled by such justice. By sect. 25, in all cases where the sum adjudged to be paid on any conviction shall exceed 21., and in all cases where imprisonment is adjudged, the party convicted may appeal: Held, that the right of appeal existed only where the sum which the party was adjudged to pay, by way of penalty, exclusive of costs, exceeded 21., or where imprisonment was awarded as a punishment for the offence. (Reg. v. The Justices of Warbeer-wickshire, 25 L. J. 352, Q. B.; 2 Jur. N. S. 930; 27 L. T. Rep. 235.) Beerhouse-Keeping open-Evidence-Gift of A. B. went to a beerhouse; the door was shut; the landlady said she could not draw, it was past the hour, but she said she would give A. B. a drop of beer, which she did. She refused money, but said, "You may send me some greens," which was done: Held that there was no evidence to justify a conviction for selling beer after the hours prescribed by the Act for closing: (Petherick v. Sargent, 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 48, Q. B.) (See Beerhouse-Innkeeper.) AMENDMENT. Order of justices, omission in-Amendment of, when brought rp by certiorari-12 & 13 Vict. c. 45, s. 7.—An order was inade for the removal of F., a pauper, from the parish of B. to the parish of H. The execution of this order was duly suspended in consequence of the illness of F. After the death of F. an order was made upon the officers of the parish of H, for the payment of the expenses of relieving him. The justices who made this last order described themselves as justices, &c., for the borough of B., in the county of S. The order, having been brought up by certiorari, was amended by the court, by adding the words "in and"efore the word "for:" (Reg. v. The Inhabitants of Hellingley, 28 L. J. 228 Q. B.; 5 Jur. N. S. 626) Sunday-Delivery of case to app.'s attorney.-Under sect. Statement of case- -Transmitting case to the court2 of the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, the app. must transmit the case within three days after receiving the same to the court named in his application; and when the last of such three days falls upon a Sunday, it is too late to transmit it the day following. An attorney who appears to conduct the case for the app. before the justices is a proper person (unless his authority be revoked) to whom to send the case when stated by the justices, and it will be deemed to be received by the app. at the time when received by such attorney: (Pennell, app, v. The Churchwardens of Uxbridge, resps, 5 L. T. Rep. N. S. 685, Q. B.) Sending notice of appeal to resp.-If notice of appeal under the statute 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2, be not given to the resp. before the case is lodged in court, the case will be struck out. It is not sufficient to post the notice of appeal to the resp. within the three days allowed for lodging the case, if it does not reach the resp. until the day after the case is transmitted to the office: (Ashdown v. Curtis, 31 L. J. 227, Q. B.; 8 Jur. N. S. 511; 6 L. T. Rep. N. S. 331, Q. B.) APPEAL. Objection not raised at hearing cannot be raised upon appeal.-App. was convicted before justices of knowingly permitting persons of bad character to assemble in his public-house. At the hearing, it was objected on his behalf that the persons assembled were there only for the purpose of refreshment. The justices, being of opinion that there was no evidence to that effect, convicted the app. A case was stated for the opinion of the court whether, upon the facts there stated, the conviction was right or wrong. On appeal, it was contended that there was no evidence, on the facts stated, that the app. knowingly permitted the said persons to assemble: Held, that this objection, not having been raised before the justices, could not be raised upon appeal. Conviction affirmed: (Purkis v. Huxtable, 1 E. & E. 781.) Refusal of justices to disallow item in surveyor of highways' account.-A refusal by justices to make an order for the disallowance of a particular item in the accounts of a surveyor of highways, is ground for an appeal under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43: (Townsend, app., v. Read, resp., 10 C. B., N. S., 308; 30 L. J. 320, C. P.) Refusal of justices to make contribution-Order for payment of debts of union.-A refusal of justices to order payment of money under a contribution order is no bar to a future proceeding to enforce it. And such refusal is ground of appeal to one of the superior courts under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43: (City of London Union, app., v. Acocks, resp., 8 C. B., N. S., 760.) Question of fact.-The court will not entertain an appeal from a decision of a magistrate under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, upon a question of fact: (Newman, app., v. Baker, resp., 8 C. B., N. S., 200.) Time for entering into recognisances.-When justices convict, and, upon being immediately thereupon applied to for a case, accede at once, it is sufficient under stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 3, that the app. enter into a recognisance within three days from the determination, and before a case is stated and delivered to him, though the recognisance be not entered into "at the time of making such application :" (Chapman, app., v. Robinson, resp., 1 E. & E. 25.) Transmission of appeal to the court-Notice-Condition precedent-Waiver. By the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2, which empowers justices to state a case for the opinion of the Superior Courts, it is enacted, that the app. "shall within three days after receiving such case transmit the same to the court named in his application, first giving notice in writing of such appeal, with a copy of the case so stated and signed, to the other party:" Held, that the transmitting the case to the court, and the giving notice with a copy of the case to the resp. within the time named, are conditions precedent to the right of the app. to have the case heard; and that an objection arising from the omission to do so cannot be waived. Quære, whether it might not be sufficient, if the app. had done all in his power to comply with the statute, though he might have failed to give such notice and a copy of the case to the resp. within the proper time, if such failure arose from the resp. keeping out of the way: (Morgan, app., v. Edwards, resp., 5 H. & N. 415.) Practice. Upon the argument of a case stated by justices under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, no objection can be relied on which was not taken before the justices: (Motteram, app., v. Eastern Counties Railway Company, resp., 7 C. B., N. S., 58; 6 Jur. N. S. 583.) Sending notice and copy of case to resp.-Condition precedent-Hearing of appeal.-By 20 & 21 Vict c. 43, s. 2, which gives power to justices to state a case for the opinion of the Superior Courts, it is enacted that the app. "shall, within three days after receiving such case, transmit the same to the court named in his application, first giving notice in writing of such appeal, with a copy of the case so stated and signed" to the resp: Held, that the giving such notice with a copy of the case to the resp. is a condition precedent to his right to have the case heard by the court: (Woodhouse, app., v. Woods, resp., 29 L. J. 164, Q. B.) Giving notice and copy case to the other side-Time for. -Under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2, the app. must, within three days after receiving the case from the justices, transmit the same to the court, "first giving notice in writing of such appeal. with a copy of the case so stated and signed, to the other party to the proceeding:" Held, that this is a condition precedent to the right to have the case set down for argument: (The Local Board of Health of Gloucester v. Chandler, 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 722, Q. B.) Right to to begin.-The general_rule in appeals is that the resp. begins; but when under stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, the app. insists that a complaint has been wrongfully dismissed, the app. is to begin: (Jones, app., v. Taylor, resp., 1 E. & E. 20.) Question of fact.-The court will not remit a special case stated under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, to the magistrates to be amended, where the object of such amend ment is merely the ascertainment of a question of fact, and not the supplying a defect in the case stated for the purpose of raising a question of law: (Tottenham, app., v. Nowlan, resp., 9 Ir. Law R. 26, App.) Service of notice on respondent.-On the hearing of an appeal, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, s. 2, the resp. not ment of the court, must show that the decision of the appearing, the app. in order to entitle him to the judgjustices was wrong. The resp. not being to be found, notice of appeal and copy of the case was served on her attorney within three days after the app. received the case, and they afterwards and before hearing came to her hand: Held, a sufficient compliance with the above section: (Syred v. Caruthers, 27 L. J. 403, Q. B.; 31 L. T. 178.) III. TO QUARTER SESSIONS. Conviction by justices-Notice of appeal-Refusal to hear appeal - Entering into recognisances with reasonable promptitude.-Habeas corpus return setting out a conviction by two justices under stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, whereby prisoner was sentenced to six weeks' imprisonment, and an order of sessions, purporting to be made on dismissing an appeal against this conviction, whereby the prisoner was ordered to be imprisoned pursuant to the conviction. By affidavits it appeared that prisoner was convicted on a Saturday; that he entered into recognisances before the convicting justices, pursuant to stat. 6 Geo. 4, c. 129, s. 12, which were perfected on the Friday next after the conviction; that on the ensuing Monday the sessions sessions, in all cases of appeal, not otherwise directed by were held, and the appeal called on. By a rule of the law, notice in writing must be given on or before Satur day se'nnight preceding the session. Counsel appeared for the convicting justices as resps.; and on their objec tion the sessions dismissed the appeal, because this rule was not complied with: Held, that the sessions, if they thought the notice given not sufficient for a trial then, might have entered and respited the appeal, but were not justified in refusing to hear it under the circumstances; that the order of sessions was, therefore, not a sufficient ground for the person's detention: Held, also, that the recognisances having been entered into with reasonable promptitude, the execution was suspended until the appeal was heard, or finally dismissed through the app.'s default; and that neither of these events having happened, the conviction did not afford a ground for detention. For these reasons the prisoner was liberated, the court treating the recognisances as still in force. But the court, on the facts brought before it by the affidavits, ordered a mandamus peremptory in the first instance to issue to the sessions to enter continuances and hear the appeals, so that justice might be doae. Semble, that where no notice is prescribed by an Act giving an appeal, there must, on principles of common law, be reasonable notice given to the resps. before the apps. are entitled to be heard, though any mode of giving the information on which the resps. could act may be sufficient: (Re Blues, 5 E. & B. 291.) Against refusal of justices to grant billiard licences.→ No appeal lies against a refusal of justices to grant a billiard licence under stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 10: (Ex parte Chamberlain, E. & B. 644.) fresh grounds of appeal.-The app. against an order of Against order of removal-Adjournment--Delivery of removal delivered to the resps. notice of trial of the appeal, and a statement of grounds of appeal, fourteen days before the next sessions. The appeal came on at those sessions. After the resps.' counsel had begun to state his case, the sessions, on the application of the apps.' counsel, adjourned the appeal to the next sessions, on the ground of the absence through illness of a |