recovered his health during his tour in Egypt, and that on his return he is ready to resume his crusade in favour of fiscal reform with even greater energy and confidence than he has already displayed. No exact date, as far as I know, has yet been fixed for his reappearance in Parliament; but, for reasons easily intelligible, I should fancy it was more likely to be after than before the introduction of the Budget. EDWARD DICEY. The Editor of THE NINETEENTH CENTURY cannot undertake THERE are hopeful signs of an awakening interest in Imperial affairs. We have been bidden to think Imperially,' and no wiser counsel could be given if it is implied that the thinking is to be sober and earnest, eschewing all vainglory, and directed to safeguarding our magnificent inheritance, to developing our unrivalled resources, and to raising the standard of happiness and prosperity among the millions of many races who live under the flag. The foundations of the Empire were laid by wars of which we still bear the burdens. Inherited aptitudes and the heroism of our sailors and soldiers determined our onward progress. We built, if not more wisely, at least more extensively than we knew, and although the statement that we blundered into greatness may be more epigrammatic than exact, want of purpose and of scientific direction of means to ends has been apparent at many periods in our chequered history. In days when other nations were also without definite aims or without 'The substance of this proposal was embodied in a peech made by the writer at the Town Hall, Melbourne, on the 9th of November, 1903. VOL. LV-No. 327 3 A power to prosecute them, our shortcomings in the domain of statesmanship were not markedly disadvantageous. The old order has passed. The territorial extent of the Empire, by conquest and absorption, has grown to vast dimensions. We have no need for further expansion, and our watchwords henceforth should be development and consolidation. Meanwhile, other great Powers, profiting by lessons which we have imperfectly learned, are directing their Imperial policies with well-considered purpose, and are carefully organising their resources accordingly. Our haphazard methods have become worse than inadequate in face of modern requirements. The maintenance of the British Empire and of the high ideals which it ought to represent is a supremely important factor in the progress of the world. How shall we bring due forethought to bear upon Imperial questions? How ensure the development of neglected national resources ? How inspire British citizens under many skies with an abiding sense of union based upon common patriotism, common interests, and common dangers? These are the problems of the twentieth century. Upon their solution the maintenance of the Empire, untarnished in honour and intact in territory, must depend. To attempt to solve them is, in the only true sense, to think Imperially There is a fascination in constitution making, and it is natural that schemes of Imperial Federation should be evolved which are either permanently impracticable or wholly premature. If the Empire had been built up on any consistent design, which permitted the selfgoverning communities to grow up as conscious partners in Imperial affairs, it is possible, though not certain, that Federation might now be within the scope of practical politics. We must, however, accept the situation as it stands, and in any case it is necessary to take full account of the effects of distance and of special conditions which must differentiate the progress of our great offshoots from that of the motherland. Having lately spent the two most interesting and most instructive years of my life in Australia, where I had excellent opportunities for studying the tendencies and the aspirations of our brothers in the South Pacific, I am more than ever convinced that formal schemes directed towards closer political union are visionary and may be harmful. Such schemes can assume practical shape only by the operation of natural forces, which may be guided and strengthened, but cannot be constrained. For the present, our main objects must be to increase by every means the mutual knowledge of Great and Greater Britain, to take our fellow-subjects oversea into our counsels as often as possible, and to lose no opportunity of co-operating with them for Imperial objects. The greatest common interest of the British people is security against aggression, and in South Africa we have seen the co-operation of gallant troops from every part of the Empire. That thousands of valuable lives and millions of treasure could have been saved by foresight and brain power scientifically applied is generally admitted. In these matters example is better than precept, and when we have made ourselves as efficient in the military sense as the Japanese, our great Colonies will follow our lead. Second only to security as the supreme common interest of the British people is intercommunication, in the widest sense of the term. A maritime Empire must fall to pieces if its ocean communications cannot be maintained in war, while in peace the frequency and the efficiency of the means of interchange under the national flag are-as the Germans well understand-essential for the welding together of scattered units. If we must regard as visionary all projects aiming at closer political union, and if, for the present, we are compelled to defer the hope of an Imperial organisation for purposes of defence, is it possible so to strengthen our maritime communications as to secure definite and lasting national advantages? At the first Colonial Conference held in 1887, Mr. Hoffmeyr proposed that a 2 per cent. duty should be imposed as a surcharge upon all foreign goods discharged at all Imperial ports, the proceeds to form a fund hypothecated to purposes of defence, special reference being made to the Navy. This remarkable suggestion, conceived in a broadly Imperial spirit, did not receive as much consideration as it merited; but in 1887 the idea of a general tax, however small, upon all foreign imports would have been scouted in this country. Public opinion has since moved far, and the main principle of Mr. Hoffmeyr's plan would not now be met with an unreasoning non possumus. The practical objections which impressed me at the time, and which wider experience has powerfully confirmed, still remain. The difficulty of applying an Imperial Fund to purposes of defence, without giving rise to heart-burnings, jealousies, and recriminations, appears to be insuperable. The Navy alone stands in the position of being the ubiquitous guardian of all members of the Empire alike; but its functions are at present imperfectly understood at home, and are far from being generally grasped in Greater Britain. To attain full comprehension of the nature of these functions in war requires an amount of study which few can undertake, and powers of imagination in which we, as a nation, are singularly deficient. Thus local demands for the permanent presence of squadrons of specified strength in certain waters would inevitably be preferred, and irritation would be engendered by the non-compliance which elementary strategic considerations might inexorably dictate. Further the Navy, to be effective, must be centrally administered in peace, and subject to general direction from the Admiralty in war, while the allocation of an Imperial Fund among various competing naval services would be inextricably bound up with the general policy of which the threads are held in London. Failing the existence of a Federal body, Greater Britain could have no voice in determining this allocation, and wide-spread dissatisfaction would hence be aroused. Finally, the duty which Mr. Hoffmeyr proposed would suffice to pay little more than one fourth the present cost of the Navy, leaving the balance to be provided by the people of the mother country. If, on the other hand, Mr. Hoffmeyr's Fund were applied to military purposes, the difficulties would be greatly increased. It is almost impossible to secure agreement at home as to the relative values of the multifarious means of defence, and geographical conditions vastly complicate such questions. Who could hope to decide, in such a way as to secure general acceptance, whether the addition of guns at Esquimalt or an increase of garrison at Thursday Island was the more urgent Imperial requirement; whether it would be wiser to defend Lough Swilly or Wei-hai-wei; whether submarine mines in the Hugli were preferable to a Marconi installation at Cape Town; whether the Australian Light Horse should be re-armed with an automatic carbine, or an anti-torpedo boom should be provided at Port Royal? Innumerable conundrums of this kind would present themselves. They are sufficiently difficult in the case of a limited area such as the United Kingdom; they become insoluble when spread over the world. All that can be predicted with certainty is that each separate member of the Empire would regard expenditure elsewhere as money thrown away, from its point of view, and that a policy of sops and compromises to local opinion would inevitably arise involving a hopeless disregard of all principles, with consequent waste on a large scale, and yet failing to prevent general dissatisfaction. On all grounds I believe that this plan must be dismissed as impracticable. If, however, we turn to the second great national requirement and consider the application of Mr. Hoffmeyr's Fund to the strengthening of the maritime communications of the Empire, most of the difficulties will be found to disappear. Any improvement of the means of transport on any main Imperial route must confer direct benefits at both ends and at all intermediate points, while so intensely complex are the ramifications of British trade that any fresh development, or any increased facilities on any line, must spread indirect advantages far and wide throughout the Empire. I propose, therefore, to halve Mr. Hoffmeyr's special impost, which at 1 per cent. would yield an annual income of about 4,600,000l. I need not attempt to decide from what source this regal revenue would be drawn. If, as we are sometimes told, the exporter is the ultimate payer of an import duty, then the foreigner will provide us with ample means for the development of our mercantile marine. If the importer or the consumer is mulcted to this small extent, it will be admitted that the burden would be trivial. If the tax is divided among the three, it becomes an altogether negligible quantity. It is at least certain |