D'Erlon and to others who would listen to him, as doubting whether it would be possible to dislodge from its position by a front attack English infantry commanded by Wellington. I will merely quote, however, the words of the Prussian Field-Marshal Müffling, who was on the Duke of Wellington's staff at Waterloo. Speaking of the British soldiers of that day, he says: For a battle there is not perhaps in Europe an army equal to the British; that is to say, none whose tuition, discipline, and whole military tendency is so purely and exclusively calculated for giving battle. The British soldier is vigorous, well fed, by nature brave and intrepid, trained to the most rigorous discipline, and admirably well armed. The infantry resist the attacks of cavalry with great confidence, and, when taken in the flank or rear, British troops are less disconcerted than any other European army. These circumstances in their favour will explain how this army, since the Duke of Wellington has led it, had never yet been defeated in the open field.'

The action of the Germans in determining the result of Waterloo is not a matter of opinion, but of history. Why, however, the Kaiser should have made statements concerning it historically inaccurate and calculated to give offence is a subject worthy of consideration. It is probable that his remarks would not have attracted so much attention as they did were it not for the position of international affairs. It has been the invariable practice of the guides of public opinion in Germany to excite contempt as well as hatred for the nation they propose to attack. For some considerable time before the raid on Austria in 1866, a number of German writers and politicians, known as the Gotha school, were untiring in their efforts to excite contempt for Austria, and they employed all their ingenuity to make their countrymen believe that Austria had been of little or no assistance in the overthrow of Napoleon, and that the Monarchy of the House of Hapsburg was a hindrance to the spread of German civilisation. Previous to the war with France in 1870, those who formed German opinion persistently minimised or ignored the great services France has rendered to the cause of culture, and insisted so strongly that France was a decaying State, that their countrymen entered into the great struggle with their western neighbour full of confidence as well as of enthusiasm. Since the formation of the German Empire, mainly through the writings of Treitschke, who, I venture to think, has had a greater and more abiding influence on the German mind than Bismarck himself, it has been instilled into Germany that the real enemy of Germany is England, and that the English power is a mockery and a delusion. The German people have to be taught that the English nation has a position in the world which it acquired owing to civil dissensions in Germany, and to which it is in no way entitled. All the sins of England, great and venial, from the perfidy of Lord Bute during the

Seven Years' War to the questionable conduct of Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870, in selling, during the war, weapons which passed into the hands of the French out of English arsenals, are all remembered and carefully taught to every schoolboy in the country. The attempt of the Kaiser to misrepresent the story of Waterloo is a part of this system.

The rapid decline in the international position of England since the death of Lord Palmerston is the dominating factor in the history of the nineteenth century. One of the causes of this decline is, as it appears to me, the system by which a seat in Parliament is a practical necessity for a Minister of the Crown. This system, under former political conditions, worked fairly well. When nomination boroughs existed, it was possible at any moment to secure the entrance into Parliament of men suited for the highest offices of State who, for want of fortune or pliability of character, or because of strength of conviction or other reasons, were unable to acquire or to maintain the confidence of large constituencies. The Reform Bills of the nineteenth century abolished nomination boroughs. The effect of this legislation was clearly enough perceived by men so widely different as Hegel, the philosopher, and Talleyrand, the shrewdest of statesmen. The maintenance in a Reformed Parliament of the old system, under which a seat in Parliament was necessary to enable a Minister to defend his policy before the representatives of the nation, is out of date and mischievous. It hampers the choice of the Prime Minister in the selection of his colleagues, and deprives the Crown of the services of some of the prime intellects of the nation. The great want of England is the adjustment of her political system, so as to secure for her the service of the best of her highly gifted sons.

At the present moment we have reached a critical period of history. A conflict of interests has arisen between two Powers in the Far East, which not only involves the future of Russia and Japan, but also, to a considerable extent, that of the British Empire. It may be necessary for this nation to take up arms on the side of Japan. The international situation is, however, complicated in the extreme. The cardinal principle of the foreign policy of Germany is to obtain at almost any cost the support of Russia for schemes of aggrandisement. The lengths to which she will go to gratify her eastern neighbour may be seen in the debate in the Reichstag of the 19th of January, in which the action of the German Government in practically handing over Russian subjects who have fled to Germany to the Russian police without any form of trial in Germany was defended by Baron v. Richthofen. Possibly she has some understanding with Russia already, and the fact that Russia has left the Baltic without any of her ships of war points to the conclusion that she counts on German help as regards that sea. Germany,

we may be sure, will follow in a general way the same policy which Prussia followed during the Polish insurrection in 1863. know how General Alvensleben was sent to St. Petersburg from Berlin to arrange the well-known Prusso-Russian Convention regarding the suppression of that insurrection. The consequence of Bismarck's policy on that occasion was to acquire from Russia a free hand for his schemes for the spoliation of Denmark, the destruction of the Germanic Confederation, the expulsion of Austria from reconstructed Germany, and finally the conquest of Alsace. Germany is sure to follow this precedent for the furtherance of schemes of aggrandisement. Of these, the most pressing is the scheme for the disruption of the Swiss Confederation, and for the ultimate absorption of Holland into the German Empire.

As regards France, whatever engagements she has entered into with Russia will, we may be sure, be fully met. During her long and glorious history, France has always shown herself conspicuously honourable and even chivalrous as an ally. At the same time, in so far as she is free, we may judge her probable action by considering her real interests. The object of French foreign policy at this moment is the peaceful acquisition of Morocco. To accomplish this, the assistance of Great Britain is of prime importance. Moreover, the interests of the French Colonial Empire touch British interests at many points. France can only benefit by reducing the friction such a situation involves. There is reason to believe that some of the most important questions between the two countries, especially those which affect France in the Mediterranean, are in a fair way of settlement. It would be a sore disappointment, especially to those Frenchmen who look with hope to the acquisition by their country of a great Colonial Empire, if these negotiations with England were not brought to a satisfactory conclusion. I am satisfied, moreover, that war with England would now be exceedingly unpopular with a very large number-perhaps even the majority of the French middle classes. France has begun at last to realise that the differences between her and England in recent years have owed their bitterness, if not their existence, to the ingenuity of a third Power, which has used them to the detriment both of England and France.

As regards Germany, she cannot enter into a conflict with England for the present. Such an event would result in a dislocation of trade, and consequent increase of discontent among the already discontented masses of her people, and the disaffection now spreading even in the army might develop to such an extent as might bring about that German Revolution which Heine used to prophesy.

The plain course for our statesmen to pursue in the present crisis is to give Germany visible proof that England is determined, and

has the power, to shape her own policy in accordance with her own interests. They will make no impression on the German mind by uttering feeble platitudes about the terrible consequences of war. These are treated in Germany with the derision they deserve. In that country more than anywhere else in Europe men realise that antagonism is a universal law in nature, and that there are certain international problems which can only be solved by blood and iron.

There are many faint signs visible that England is at last waking up to this truth, and to the necessity of a consistent and comprehensive foreign policy, which, if upheld without infirmity of purpose, would at once alter radically the relations between Great Britain and all the Great Powers. Contempt for England would give way to respect, and we should hear no more speeches from the Kaiser or his Ministers of the kind to which we have been recently accustomed.

ROWLAND BLENNERHASSETT.

A COLONIAL COMMENT ON THE REPORT OF THE WAR COMMISSION

IN no part of the Empire has the Report of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, together with the evidence on which the Report is founded, been read with deeper interest than in the country which was the actual theatre of the war. It must be confessed, however, that surprise and disappointment are felt at the fact that no colonial officer was examined by the Commission; and, what is perhaps of more importance, South Africa was not represented by any member of the Commission. Lord Strathcona watched over the interests of the Canadian contingent, and Sir Frederick Darley represented the Australian troops; and both these gentlemen took good care (and very properly so) that the services rendered by their fellow-countrymen were fully recognised, and that their actions were not misrepresented in any way. Remembering that South Africa put into the field from first to last 60,000 men, or double the force of all the other colonies. collectively, it might have been well to appoint a member on the Commission holding the same relative position to South Africa as that held by Lord Strathcona to Canada. The omission to call any colonial officer as a witness is much to be deplored. It is obvious that the colonial officers who held high commands during the war had exceptional opportunities of forming opinions on many points of the greatest importance in connection with the subjects to inquire into and report upon which was the duty of the Commission. And it is clear that the evidence given by colonial officers would have been unbiassed by any hope of future promotion or fear of offending those in high places. As a result of the omission above referred to, evidence given by Imperial officers, which would certainly not have been allowed to pass unchallenged, was accepted as final and conclusive. I refer more particularly to the answers given in regard to the organisation and officering of the Colonial irregular corps. The statement was more than once made that colonial irregulars preferred being commanded by Imperial officers of the regular army. Even so great an authority as Lord Roberts himself said, in answer to Question 10234, that such was his belief. Now I think that every colonial officer of ex