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ence in extent and duration beyond our calculations. opens a perennial fountain, that will send forth a thousand streams of salvation. These will strike their channels into every famishing waste, will make glad the wilderness, and cause the deserts to sing for joy.

Liberia sustains these hopeful relations, and justifies all these animating prospects. Much has already been done. The native tribes look on, and wonder. They behold their countrymen enjoying all the blessings of the most favoured nation. They may not at once apprehend the cause of the difference; but they see it, and feel it, and will very soon learn the reason, and teach it to others. The report of the colony will travel forth from tribe to tribe, waking up the sympathies of a long neglected and forsaken people. Her coasts will soon be lined by Christian settlements, which will gradually invade the interiour regions of darkness and pollution. The African missionary from Liberia, will meet his Christian brother from the Cape of Good Hope, and they mingle in prayer and praise together. The light will spread from mountain to valley, and from river to river, until the sleep of ages shall be broken, and the song of salvation fill the chorus of a redeemed and regenerated continent. Then will Africa's first tribute of praise ascend to God, the gracious giver of all these mercies; and next, will the blessing of many ready to perish come upon the Colonization Society.

These benefits, form, as we think, a full defence for the friends of this great measure. We commend this brief and imperfect sketch, to the dispassionate consideration of our fellow citizens. A cause which, in its early stages, engaged so much of piety and prayer; which has been distinguished by so many illustrious tokens of divine approbation, should not be pushed aside by prejudice or clamour. We should be

slow to believe, that such pure spirits as Mills, Finley, and Ashmun, that such exalted statesmen as Washington, Marshall, and Lafayette, would give the countenance of their names, or devote the anxious labour of their lives, to a device of cupidity, or a scheme of oppression.

ART. V. PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND..

By REV. LEONARD WOODS, D. D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Andover, Mass.

In the series of Essays on the Philosophy of the Mind, which I propose to write for THE LITERARY AND THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, it is far from my design to bring forward the whole range of topics commonly treated in systems of mental philosophy. In regard to the particular objects which I shall aim to accomplish, this would be unnecessary. My design is to attend specially to those parts of mental philosophy, which have usually received a less degree of attention, than they seem to deserve;-to those parts also which are attended with uncommon difficulties; and most of all to those, which have an important bearing on moral and theological subjects. I shall introduce topics like these in that order which I find most convenient, and bestow upon them just so much attention as their importance appears to me to demand. I shall do all in my power to free every subject which comes under discussion, from an indefinite and vague phraseology, to investigate it thoroughly, and to present it in a clear and satisfactory light; and thus, so far as my honest endeavours shall avail, to promote a just mode of thinking and speaking, particularly among young Ministers and Theological Students.

Mental acts to be classified, and referred to mental faculties. Use of the words, volition, will, affection, and voluntary.

THE philosophy of mind with which we are concerned, is the philosophy of the human mind, not of minds belonging to other orders of intelligent beings. And the philosophy of the human mind, is the knowledge and scientific description of man, considered as intelligent and moral. A careful attention to this point will frequently be of use in preserving us from confusion and mistake. Suppose we are perplexed in our inquiries respecting the nature and operations of the intellectual or moral faculties; the perplexity may often be removed by shifting our language and our mode of investigation, and making our inquiries relate to man himself, or to his mind, which is indeed himself, considered as intelligent and moral. The question in the more proper and exact form, is not, how does such and such a faculty act; but how does man act; or how does the mind act? What we call the faculties of the mind, are not so many different agents. There is only one agent, the mind. And when it is said, there are different intellectual and moral powers or faculties in the mind, the meaning is, that the mind itself acts in dif

ferent ways, and so makes it manifest that it is able, or has power to act thus. It is, I apprehend, in this way, that we come to consider the mind as possessed of different powers or faculties. But as this point is of radical importance in mental science, I shall treat it more at large.

To every one who carefully investigates the subject, it must be evident, that we are led to attribute different faculties to the mind, from the different classes of mental operations of which we are conscious. We perceive that certain acts of the mind have, in some respect, a resemblance to each other. The resemblance may be greater or less. There is no need of its being complete. For example; my mind recalls what is past. I have an idea of what I was acquainted with last week, or last year, or many years ago. The things recollected may, as to their own nature, and as to the times and circumstances in which they took place, be different; and the acts of the mind relative to them may in various respects be different,-may be strong or weak, pleasant or painful, etc. In one respect, however, they are alike. They relate to what is past. With reference to this point of resemblance, this common relation, I give them a common name, recollection. To express each of these acts of my mind, I say, I recollect, I remember. The word relates to them all equally, in that particular respect in which they are alike. The difference which exists among these acts of the mind in other respects, must be expressed by other words. This word, recollection, or remembrance, expresses these mental acts only in that one respect, in which they have a common resemblance. After thus classifying these mental acts, which I am conscious of performing, and which I denote by the word recollection, I take one step more; that is, I attribute them to a particular faculty of the mind; or I refer them to my mind, as possessing a power or faculty to perform them. In other words, I refer them to my mind, which I find to be so constituted, or to have such power, that it puts forth acts of recollection. To this power or faculty I give the name of memory; still ascribing the power and all its acts to myself. I say, I have the power or faculty to recollect, and I do recollect. And as I find that I perform acts of recollection permanently, I speak of this faculty as permanent, and regard it as an essential attribute of my mind, and of other minds like my own.

I shall give one more example of this process in classifying

our mental acts. I am conscious of certain actings or feelings of my mind towards others, which I call affections; and I give this general name to them, whether they have the nature of attachment, or aversion, and to whatever objects they relate. I do this, because, how different soever they may be in other respects, they all agree in this, that they are feelings of the mind or heart towards particular objects. With reference to this point of resemblance, I give them a common name, affections, or emotions. And regarding myself as the agent, I ascribe to myself a power to exercise these affections. Or, if I regard myself as the subject of them, I consider myself as capable or susceptible of them. In this way I come to speak of myself as having a power, faculty, or capacity for the exercise of affections. And the word affection, which generally denotes the emotion of the mind, may be used, as it sometimes has been, to denote also the mental faculty. But this faculty has more frequently been called the will, or heart.

But it is clear, that the objects of science and the purposes of life cannot be accomplished, without making other and more particular classifications of those operations of the mind which are called affections. Suppose we should stop with a classification so general as this; how could we intelligibly point out the various kinds of emotions included in this large class? In what way could we make a distinction between love and hatred, desire and aversion, and other feelings which differ from each other? While conscious of a great difference, we should have no word to express it, but should be obliged to give all our affections the same name.

There is, then, an obvious necessity of making a more particular classification of these acts of the mind, and of having words appropriated to each of the classes formed. This brings us to the different kinds, or species, included under the general head above given. The process here is the same as in forming the general class. We notice those emotions which imply attachment to an object, or complacency in it; and with reference to this point of resemblance, we call them love. We notice other emotions of an opposite nature, and call them dislike, or hatred. This is another kind or spe

cies of affection.

But we have occasion to go still farther. Even those affections which are included under the name of love, are found to differ, in some important respects, from each other.

If then we would be exact and definite in our discourse, and express just what we mean, we must make still more particular classifications. There is a set of feelings, called love, which aim at the welfare of intelligent beings, without regard to their moral character. To this set of feelings we may give the name of benevolence. There is another set of feelings, which directly relate to the character of their object, and imply delight in it. These we may call complacency. Some of the affections have such a relation to moral objects, as God, his law, and his government, that we may properly call them moral or religious affections,-retaining the general term, and marking the class by a particular epithet. Or we may include them under a name which is more common in religious discourse, and call them piety or holiness. Again; affections arise in our minds towards our natural relations; and these we call natural affections. These again we divide into parental, filial, and conjugal affections; and of the parental we make two classes, the paternal and maternal. Affections which regard money as their object, we denominate avarice; those which regard honour or promotion as their object, we denominate ambition; and those which regard the welfare of our country as their object, patriotism. On the same principles we form various other classes of affections.

I have given these examples for the purpose of showing how we proceed in classifying the mental operations, in giving names to the different classes, in referring them to the mind as the agent, and in ascribing to that agent a power or faculty adapted to such operations.

After proceeding thus far in the consideration of this subject, we can very readily detect the fallacy of what certain writers advance; namely, that the mind must have just so many faculties, and that from the very nature of an intelligent, moral agent, they cannot be either more or less.-They might, with equal propriety, say, the vegetable world must have just so many kinds of vegetables, and the mineral world, just so many kinds of minerals; and that they cannot be either more or less; and that air and water must have just so many powers, principles, or elements, and that from the very nature of air and water, these powers or elements cannot be either more or less. But who asserts any thing like this in the physical sciences? Farther improvement in these sciences has rendered it necessary that the classificaVOL. I.

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