and in their social arrangements; and to suppose that they will be abandoned when assailed in this manner, is to suppose a state of things in which they would be abandoned without any effort; it is to suppose that the world are no longer enslaved by their prejudices and passions; it is to mistake the case, both with respect to the nature and relations of these evils, and with respect to the nature and design of Christianity, and the obligations and duties of its disciples.

Combined religious efforts to suppress such evils of the world, originate in a zeal which is not according to knowledge; a zeal which assumes gratuitous responsibilities, both with respect to the means to be used and the ends to be accomplished; a zeal which is characterized by much vehemence of feeling, by impatience of delay, and by censure and intolerance of those whose co-operation is withheld, or cautiously given; a zeal which magnifies its selected object above all others, and makes the violent and exclusive pursuit of that object, the test of character; a zeal which has far more respect to the results which it proposes, than to the means of attaining them; a zeal which is so connected with the passions, as rarely to survive the period of novelty and of the first temporary excitement. There is, in the exhibitions of this kind of zeal, a boldness which defies opposition, a seeming recklessness of consequences, an apparent indifference to the evils which its operations must unavoidably occasion, and a severity of temper, to which the feelings and sympathies of Christians generally are wholly averse. Under the influence of this zeal, men doubtless mistake their responsibilities and duties with respect to the objects which they aim at; they mistake the position which belongs to them in relation to their fellow men, and to the divine providence and government, and the manner in which, by their agency, they are to serve and honour God. They are deceived by the combined influence of erroneous views and undue excitement. They make religion to consist too little in the love of God, and the weightier matters of the law, too little in the graces of the Spirit, and too much in those outward efforts which respect their fellow men. Efforts proceeding from such zeal have done incredible and remediless evil to those for whose benefit they were professedly made, frustrated the grace of God, and shipwrecked the character and hopes of many of those engaged in them; but they have

no tendency or adaptation to do good, and it is to be hoped, that they may be avoided, or at least that no great proportion of the followers of Christ will at any time be so unwise, so deceived, and led astray, as to repeat them.

There doubtless is to some extent, at the present time, a state of feeling and opinion in the religious community, tending to originate and sanction methods of public and systematic opposition to the vices and evil customs of the world, which, if the view here taken of the subject is correct, cannot be reconciled with the Gospel. Have we not indeed witnessed instances of associations formed for the avowed purpose of such aggressive operations, commencing with extraordinary zeal, employing special means of excitement, stirring up opposition, and proceeding as though the fate of religion itself, with all its institutions and hopes, depended on the issue of the particular enterprise thus undertaken? In the progress of such efforts have we not witnessed, on the part of those most absorbed in them, a spirit of censoriousness and denunciation, an exhibition of feelings and a resort to measures, very diverse from the meekness, gentleness, forbearance, kindness and benevolence which belong to the Christian character? Have we not seen in some instances a degree of intemperate, and almost rabid, violence and recklessness, dishonourable to any cause, and especially to one professedly religious in its character?

Considering now the fertility of our times in schemes of this questionable kind, it becomes the indispensable duty of all Christians, to examine the objects which are preferred for their support, before they engage in them. It is not enough to sanction an object, that it comes in the name or garb of religion, or that it proposes a result in itself desirable. Many other things are to be considered, and among them, whether the object is legitimately one for associated Christian effort; whether its pursuit is consonant with the genius of Christianity, and the example of its Founder and first teachers; whether those are safe guides who are to conduct it; whether their character for piety, wisdom, and consistency, entitles them to confidence in that respect; whether they are earnestly and habitually engaged in the support of the institutions of the Gospel, and of those evangelical objects which, by common consent, claim the first and best efforts of ministers and private Christians, or whether their zeal passes by those, in search of new and more exciting enterprises; VOL. I.

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whether they excel others in their temper, their humility, and all those graces and virtues which are the essential attributes of the Christian character, and by which religion is made to appear in its true light to the world; whether they exhibit as much love, reverence and piety towards God, as zeal for the good of their fellow men; and also, whether the means which they propose to employ are such as they should be. Those who desire to do good, and to avoid doing or being the occasion of evil, and who feel a just sense of responsibility for all their conduct, may find objects enough which will bear examination, to occupy their prayers and efforts; and if they are beset by those of a different description, they are bound to refrain from them, and let them alone.

ART. VIII. MORAL REQUISITES FOR THE Knowledge OF DIVINE THINGS.

By Rev. C. S. HENRY, Junior Pastor of the West Church, Hartford, Con. Von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung, von F. Heinrich Jacobi. On Divine Things and their Revelation, by Frederick Henry Jacobi.

THOLUCK Somewhere quotes a saying from Goethe, which has a profound truth: "The great and deepest theme of the history of the world and of man, is the conflict between faith and unbelief." These two words are doubtless to be taken in their widest sense; faith, as a disposition to admit, and unbelief, a disposition to deny, what cannot be rendered certain by demonstration or logical deduction. Man is prompted to faith by an inward necessity, and yet in his fallen nature there is a strong tendency to unbelief. These two dispositions exist in continual counteraction; and hence the want of consistency in unbelief. If a man determines to admit nothing as true that cannot be logically demonstrated, there is, in strict consistency, no stopping place short of Atheism. But the inward necessity of faith opposes this result; hence the various inconsequent systems of skepticism. But if we admit that between ourselves and the knowledge of the infinite and of divine things, there is a gulf, over which we cannot construct a bridge of logical deductions,

there remains nothing for us, but either to give all up, and hold to nothing, or else to pass the gulf by faith.

Perhaps no period in the history of the world presents a more interesting spectacle of the conflict between faith and unbelief, than has been shown in Germany since the time when Kant first broke up the slumbers of dogmatic thinking, by overthrowing the pretended demonstrations in which the Wolfian philosophy included all human and divine things. Kant proved the impossibility of logically demonstrating the objective reality of God and divine things; but not choosing to ground the knowledge of them on revelation, he had recourse to a moral or practical foundation for these truths. But his system was soon followed by the theories of Fichte, and of Schelling, each endeavouring, in a different way, to remove the opposition between matter and spirit, God and the world; and, though more consistent than Kant, yet still failing to resolve the problem of the personality of God, of human freedom, of immortality, and the objective nature of evil, they were in turn swept away.

Amidst the activity and diversified results of speculation, which marked the springing up of German rationalism, FREDERIC HENRY JACOBI exerted a great influence. He was opposed to Kant; but he could not admit the results of Fichte and Schelling. He allowed that the latter were consistent; but he could not follow them; he could not give up his belief in a personal God, in human liberty, and in personal immortality. He therefore rejected speculation as the ground of the knowledge of divine things, and referred them to an immediate feeling, or intuitive perception. This is the doctrine advocated in his work "On Divine Things." But at the same time he appeared in hostility to all revealed religion, all historical grounds of faith. The latter he seemed to hold as unfit to afford a true knowledge of divine things, as speculation.

In thus doing, he stripped the truths which feeling compelled him to believe, of their chief glory, by disconnecting them from the doctrines of Redemption and Grace.

We happen to have some deeply interesting letters of Jacobi, in which he speaks out of the fulness of his heart, of the frail and hollow support he finds in such a philosophy, and of the felicity of those who can rest on revelation. But before his dying day we are told that he betook himself to prayer; that he blessed God for the grace that enabled him

to pray, and died declaring that all his hopes rested on grace.

It is not intended to go into any farther statement or examination of the work of Jacobi. We rather prefer to follow the course of thought suggested by its leading doctrine, and by the history of the author's latter days, and call the attention of our readers to the MORAL REQUISITES FOR THE KNOWLEDGE OF DIVINE THINGS. The discussion of this subject seems especially suitable to our country and our times.

There is perhaps no cause of skepticism in regard to the knowledge of divine things, that has a stronger influence over minds of a certain order, than the spectacle of innumerable conflicting systems, each claiming to be derived, with uncorrupted purity, from the living fountain of truth. It is true, indeed, that minds of another cast, and especially such as have gained a settled repose to themselves, are enabled, from their own stand-point, to extend a discriminating observation over the strife of opposing views; and discerning in each several system its principle, its method, and its results, may perceive in them their respective points of divergence and harmony-their part of truth and of errour; and so far from seeing ground for despondency or skepticism, may derive only more steadfast conviction of the truth. But in the far greater number of instances, the survey of the thousands that differ, and the many that therefore must err, is unquestionably connected with the temptation to despondency, doubt and indifference. Now in such cases, to attempt a speculative criticism of the various discordant systems of divine things, is by no means the way to gain that "quietness and assurance forevermore" which the mind and heart incessantly demand. It is of far more importance that the mind be directed to those practical conditions, which are indispensable to the knowledge of spiritual truth. Divine things are not objects merely for the understanding, or for the speculative intellect. "Do the will of my Father, and ye shall know of the doctrine; ye must become as little children, if ye would enter into the kingdom of heaven," says the Founder of Christianity. This may sound like mysticism to many a mind; but what if it be true, in spite of the name? What if Christianity, like many other subjects, and with equal right, require experimental conditions for the apprehension of its truth and evidence? What if, like many other subjects, and with equal right, knowledge and