The temperate view of our faculties, and of the advantages resulting from their improvement, offers us a prospect of blended light and shade; calling forth at once the virtues of hope and diffidence, which too seldom adorn the same intellect. To suppose that the mind must powerfully influence the conduct, is only to assign it the natural pre-eminence, by which it was made the delegated ruler of this lower creation. The wise regulation and culture of the mind must therefore be highly beneficial, and we may expect from it the happiest fruits. But man is not a being of pure intellect—he is made up also of appetites and passions which are often most powerful in persuasion, when the mind is weak in restraint. To impose upon these reluctant energies an authority

Qui fœdere certo

Et premere, et laxas sciret dare jussus habenas

is the great office of intellect; and unless it be so employed, its powers are, to individual welfare, worse than useless:for it becomes treacherous to its important charge, and only increases the impetuosity, or allurements of those willing principles of evil, which are always sufficiently violent, and sufficiently seductive. The improvement of knowledge and taste undoubtedly affords the means of ennobling the moral character. But it would betray much ignorance of the actual state of human nature, to rely solely on acquisitions, which may be worse than superficial. It is not an acquaintance with the particulars of a science or an art-it is not Poetry, nor Eloquence, nor History, which can be made to bear often on the daily exigencies of life, so as to enlighten and determine the conduct. Neither is any general notion of right and wrong which we may derive from philosophical studies, more effectual, when real wants and inclinations influence the will.— How weak an instrument then must the mere diffusion of letters, of science, or of taste, prove, in bringing about that great moral reformation which benevolence would rejoice to anticipate. And yet how effectual in its tendency, toward

some amelioration in the character and happiness of mankind, if with the extension of the means of acquiring knowledge, and intellectual enjoyments, the habits are also disseminated, which make knowledge and taste, as it were, essential parts of ourselves. Not those habits of exclusive and pedantic affectation, which serve only to pamper a momentary vanity, but those serious dispositions of mind and heart, which induce us to search diligently and modestly after Truth; and that, from a steady regard to the proper end of such pursuitsmoral excellence.

In most discussions on this subject, the powerful effects resulting from the prevalence of mental acquirements, appear to be too readily assumed. We hear them spoken of as if they were the sole causes of the greatness or decline of nations— but surely it argues some forgetfulness of the history and constitution of man, to rank them so highly as the arbiters of human destiny. A little attention to the progress of our faculties, must convince us that many principles of conduct exist before the intellect is developed. The wants and instincts even of our infancy, and the impressions which may unconsciously be made by the conduct of those who watch over our helplessness, are perhaps enough to determine the complexion of the future character. For when the mind begins to expand it is too feeble, in its first efforts, to obtain frequent controul over the will; and in after life, it seldom entirely shakes off the restraints imposed by its early weakness. The mental character is therefore, originally, rather an effect than a cause; and when it operates upon the regulation of moral conduct, it only repays with interest what it had derived from the parent source.

If we look to the productions which have obtained the admiration of the civilized world, how decidedly may we trace this strength of moral prepossessions. The unusual vigour of intellect seems only to have afforded the means of

giving an extraordinary illustration to the peculiar markings of character. The mind, unconscious of its dependence is obedient to those habits, which have served to give a bias to the affections; and we may often lament the unhappy celebrity which has thrown a veil of beauty over deformity, and bestowed elevation and dignity on those excesses which serve to degrade our nature. Nor can we complain that what is truly amiable and excellent, has been deprived of similar advantages from the triumphant efforts of Literature and the Arts. An immortality has been also given to some of the best and purest sentiments;—they have been brought before us, as if they were copied from beings, more secured from error, and more perfect in goodness than those whom we usually meet with in the ordinary intercourse of life: and they were indeed copied from minds influenced by a purer moral taste. In these instances, also, the heart has inspired the Genius.

But we need not look so high for proofs, that the acquired principles of morality most frequently give the leading direction to the suggestions of the intellect. The common experience of life must convince us, that what we often think a peculiar talent for any pursuit, is only the choice which the will prescribes to the judgment. And indeed how can it well be otherwise, when we consider the extreme difficulty of making retired pursuits predominate over the daily and hourly realities, which find so easy an access to the springs of conduct. There are but few who have any correct notion of mental labour. To abstract the thoughts from objects, which are every moment importunate in their solicitations, and to fix the mind's eye deliberately and attentively on its own conceptions:-to estimate them in all their relations and consequences; and then so to impress on us the result, as to make it become a part of our moral nature;-a principle of future conduct; clashing perhaps with many received and cherished habits:-this effort must be allowed to be extremely difficult; and yet, without this, we cannot suppose that the mind can effectually correct the perverseness of disposition.

By the manner in which information is most generally received into the mind, it is rather acknowledged as an accessary than as a principle. If our attention be directed to Literature, it is chiefly that we may acquire those graces of conversation and intelligence, which may make us acceptable in well-informed society, or qualify us for some specific employment. If we are engaged in scientific pursuits, they are usually regarded as satisfying natural curiosity; or as merely subservient to the wants of life; or as the means of individual distinction:-and the great lessons which they are so sublimely capable of teaching, are only incidentally inculcated. The Fine Arts, also, are too seldom considered as the means of improving our conceptions of ideal excellence, and bestowing a more exalted character on the moral taste. And thus, we are apt to forget that our own best interests, together with the general welfare and happiness, might possibly be promoted by a judicious application of our powers. The desultory habits which are encouraged by the wide diffusion of the means and facilities of improvement, are also calculated to weaken, and without much care, ultimately to destroy, the beneficial influence of knowledge. A careless perusal of opinions can have only a vague and indecisive effect on the character. Nothing indeed can be more idle than ordinary reading. The eye ranges over the page, without awakening the powers of comparison and judgment; and if the sense be tolerably understood, it is all that seems essential. The interpretation of the author's meaning is too often mistaken for the assent of the reader's mind; and thus every opinion seems to have equal weight, but, perhaps, not one leaves a decided and useful impression. The objects also which the professed lovers of intellectual pursuits most frequently propose to themselves, are calculated to withdraw the attention from that point which should be regarded, however distant, as the focus of human attainments.-Lord Bacon calls this "mistaking, or misplacing the last and farthest end of knowledge," the greatest of all the errors which impede its advancement; and

he enumerates various prepossessions, that often divert us from a profitable use of our faculties; and in all of which we may find exemplified, the mastery that capricious disposition too readily obtains over the mind. "Men," says he, "have "entered into a desire of knowledge, sometimes upon a natural "curiosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain "their minds with variety and delight; sometimes for or"nament and reputation; and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction; and most times for lucre "and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true account "of their gift of reason, to the benefit and use of men,

99

66

66

But this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if contemplation and action may be more nearly "and straitly conjoined and united together, than they have "been." *

To secure this happy combination, it is most essential that we should above all, cultivate the great principles of moral improvement :-that we should bring to our pursuits, not a mind freed from all prepossessions, but a mind subject to that best of influences, which will secure at least an honest application of its powers. If we expect such a disposition to grow naturally out of our pursuits, we shall certainly deceive ourselves. The goodness of Providence has placed at our disposal, a great means of advancing our usefulness and our happiness; and if we take care to cultivate that acute sense of what is excellent, which is the best protection of a vulnerable reason, and the surest guide of an erring judgment, we may look abroad through nature with the confidence that befits a manful exercise of our entrusted powers. We may explore the mysteries of science; we may range over the treasures of learning; we may indulge in the delights of imagination:the moral sense will accompany our thoughts in all these excursions; and while it purifies the sources of enjoyment, it

* On the Advancement of Learning. Book 1.

C