These, be it remembered, are the divisions of the army whose motto

is supposed to be

Semper paratus.' Let us see how the other divisions would fare. Supposing the various processes indicated in the above table as being necessary had been safely gone through and a respectable contingent were able to take the field, there would then remain the duty of falling back upon our remaining reserves for the double purpose of keeping the two first corps up to their proper strength, and of filling up the enormous gaps in the remaining six of our paper armies. It is interesting to find that for this operation there would be available no less than 363 men of the first class army reserve, or about two men per line battalion, and 12,064 of the militia reserve who may or may not be a trifle better than raw recruits. Side by side with these facts it is instructive to study the calculations which experience has supplied as to the average waste of a battalion in time of war, which is variously estimated at from 40 to 70 per cent.

There may be, and doubtless are, admirable reasons to account for

these deficiencies. But it must not be forgotten that, after all, the formation of an efficient reserve is the very essence of the short service system. But if the assistance we are likely to obtain is no greater than would appear from the latest figures upon the subject, the British public may fairly complain that they have got a scarcely perceptible halfpennyworth of bread to a most intolerable deal of sack.'

Sir Garnet Wolseley tells us that the long service was like

The Bight of Bennin,

Whence few come out, though many go in.

The quotation might be applied with still greater propriety to the capacity of the present system for absorbing those who ought to pass through the active army into the reserve. Between 1871 and 1878 no less than 184,110 recruits joined the army, yet at the present time the reserve which these short service men were supposed to feed has not yet reached the modest figure of 20,000 men. Indeed it appears from very careful calculation that even under the most favourable conditions our infantry reserve can never exceed 45,000 men. Where are the rest of the recruits who have been enlisted? The facts given under the head of waste' explain how the deficiency arises, but they do not and cannot supply us with a reason for wishing that so microscopic an addition to our resources should be allowed to continue.

Leaving the subject of the two promised army corps, we come to the linked battalion scheme, which, while it insured the permanent efficiency of the regiments in the field, was to preserve intact the esprit de corps and solidarity so characteristic of the regimental system. It is interesting to observe how these arrangements have worked in practice.

There is no soldier's grievance which comes home so readily to the British public as the complaint that regimental traditions are broken up and ruined by the pernicious plan of drafting men from one corps to another. The hardship and unwisdom of it are so palpable that it is difficult to understand what can be said for a system of which it appears to form so essential a part. That it was a practice widely resorted to was well known and deeply regretted in the army. It was not until the present time that the public had an opportunity of judging to what an extent it prevailed. By a brief calculation from the figures hereafter referred to we find, for instance, that in five regiments which took the field in 1879 no less than 1,414 out of a total strength of 4,435 men were drafted from other battalions. These men, be it remembered, had in all probability never seen their officers till the day of embarkation, and doubtless many of them were

re-transferred as soon as they had learnt to know and trust their leaders during the vicissitudes of a campaign.

As regards the question of age the present condition of our infantry force seems as unsatisfactory as it can possibly be. Every-day experience and scientific opinion unite in regarding a young man under twenty as scarcely formed, and unable, except in rare instances, to bear the hardships of a soldier's life. The report before referred to is instructive on this point. In paragraph 59 we find the opinion of Surgeon-Major Adams formed as the result of the inspection of 25,000 recruits, to the effect that it is not only pernicious to the interests of the service, but also cruel, to expect a lad in his "teens” to do the work of a full-grown man.' In the next paragraph we find an extract from Professor Parkes's valuable work on military hygiene, in which he speaks of the immaturity of the recruit of eighteen years of age, and dwells upon the necessity for withholding him from the active duties of a soldier's life till he is at least twenty. It is not necessary to dwell upon these expressions of opinion, nor indeed to supplement them as they might be supplemented by the evidence of almost every witness who was examined. The conclusion which they point to is one which we should all support from our own knowledge. Indeed, Sir Garnet Wolseley himself is fully alive to the evils which attend the employment of very young soldiers; but he seems to derive some comfort from the fact that ten or twenty years ago things were just as bad or even worse than they are now. For the general public who are not concerned about the merits of any system, whether it be old or new, but who simply desire a serviceable army, this is perhaps not much consolation. But, be this as it may, it is not easy to believe that the condition in which regiments took the field formerly was worse than what it appears to be at present; and whether better or worse, the service state of our battalions seems so hopelessly bad that it is hard to conceive of a change which would leave them less efficient than they are. The following are a few statistics as to the condition of the regiments which embarked for active service in Africa in 1879-regiments, be it remembered, which were presumably first on the roster for foreign service, and therefore supposed to be ready to start fully manned and equipped at the shortest notice.

6

Sir Garnet appears to attach considerable importance to the fact that the soldiers who followed Wellington in the Peninsula were exceedingly bad characters. So doubtless they were. They may have been brutal, unreasoning, cruel, but the fact remains that, to accept the writer's own quotation, they could go anywhere and do anything;' and not only could do so, but did whenever the occasion arose. After all, the first requisites of a soldier are that he should fight well and march well. If he possesses these qualifications, but adds to them others less desirable, so much the worse. But the antithesis which is suggested is neither a fair nor a reasonable one. The choice is not necessarily between immoral soldiers who can march and fight, and young men of exemplary character who cannot march at all, and who are not always able to fight."

The temper of the age, the general feeling with regard to the conduct of war, and the spread of education are all influences which have been at work during the last sixty years, and which have borne fruit in the army no less than in civil life.

The fact that a recruit is enlisted for ten years instead of six is no reason why we should 'brutalise him and treat him as an unreasoning being; but it is quite conceivable that it may be a very strong reason why we should expect him to be an experienced and seasoned soldier in the one case and not in the other.

The dictum' expressed by Sir Garnet Wolseley to the effect that success in war depends upon the skill of the general and not upon the excellence of the men is barely half the truth. It is something like a truism to say that in the Peninsula days, as at present, splendid success was only secured when really able and scientific generals commanded in the field;' and that then as now, when incompetence directed our military operations, failure and disgraceful disaster were the result.' But even this statement must be taken subject to important qualifications. In the first place, if we eliminate the phrase 'splendid success' and content ourselves with instances where victory has rewarded our arms even though unattended by great and immediate results, many instances will at once occur in which one part of the proposition at any rate has been falsified. At Albuera, at the Alma, at Inkermann, it was emphatically the good qualities of the soldiers and not the skill of the general which gained the day. And, indeed, in the last instance it is hardly necessary to deny to the heroic defence of the heights of Inkermann a first place not only as regards the valour displayed, but also as regards the importance of the results obtained by it.

In short, the obvious fact is this, that a good general will do best with good troops, and even with bad ones may sometimes achieve Good soldiers, on the other hand, will sometimes help an

success.

3 See evidence of Colonels Glyn, Pemberton, and others.

incompetent commander out of a difficulty. But there is no reason at all for permitting any other combination than the first oftener than can be helped. To hold otherwise would simply mean that an economical and well-advised administration would deliberately look for its recruits in the ranks of the halt and the maimed, whose loss would be the least felt by the community, and whose infirmities would present no obstacle to a really able and scientific general.'

Sir Garnet Wolseley, in common with some others, seems to be of opinion that the failure is rendered less important by proving that, after all is said and done, things were just as bad twenty or thirty years ago. This form of argument might be relevant in discussing the point as to who was responsible for the greatest amount of failure. But it is not an argument which ought to be addressed to the public, to whom the question of a good or bad army is everything, while that of the merits of this or that reformer is, in comparison, nothing.

That the army which we now possess is not a good one, but on the contrary a very bad one, seems to be the teaching of every line of the recently published report.

One of the greatest difficulties experienced in bringing about any radical or useful reform in army matters is the impossibility of making the public realise the magnitude of the disease. Our troops are so scattered, are so little en évidence, that popular attention is never concentrated upon them with the intensity which characterises it in detecting the shortcomings of those branches of the public service which come in contact with men's daily lives.

It requires a catastrophe to convince us that anything is wrong, and even the temporary agitation which some more than usually flagrant collapse creates, subsides almost immediately, and we relapse into our usual happy-go-lucky indifference.

It is most unfortunate that this should be so. It is most unfortu nate that an Aldershot field day or review cannot be reproduced once a month in Hyde Park.

It requires no military knowledge, no educated eye, to realise that the little companies which pass in brief array before the saluting point are not, either in numbers or in physique, what a British regiment ought to be. Let any one, fresh from reading Napier's description of our infantry on the field of Albuera, place himself as near as he can to the flagstaff at an Aldershot review. Let him bear in mind the passage that describes how nothing could stop that astonishing infantry; no sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front; their measured tread shook the ground; and then apply it to what he sees. The quotation may