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on board ships in times of peace and in times of war, and at all times performing their duty to the entire satisfaction of the authorities under whom they served. There must have been cogent reasons and not purely sentimental ones for such service, which has covered so long a period under such varying conditions. It is believed and urged that strong reasons have existed for the retention of marines on board ship and that they are equally as potent to-day as they have been in the past. Legitimate rivalry between the different branches of the service has always existed and always will, and within bounds this tends to higher efficiency. Many years before it was asserted that the morale of the enlisted men of the navy had reached a state which it has now attained it was argued by certain officers that there was no necessity for a guard of marines on board ship as a restraining influence over the enlisted personnel of the navy, and even in those days an unsuccessful effort was made to take marines from ships. As illustrative of this fact the attention of the department is invited to an article which appeared in the Boston Journal in 1836 in which strong reasons are advanced against the withdrawal of marines from ships, which was then advocated. Copy of this article is appended marked "A.”

4. It thus appears that almost from the very beginning of the navy there have been unsuccessful attempts made to disassociate the marines from service on board ship, and a brief reference thereto seems pertinent.

5. In 1852 the commandant of the Marine Corps, for the purpose of presenting to Congress an argument in favor of an increase of the corps, addressed communications to most of the officers of high rank of the navy, asking their views on the subject of said increase, and there are now on file at these headquarters copies of communications from the officers to whom communications were addressed, and all urge in the strongest terms an increase in the Marine Corps, basing their views on the specific necessity of marines for duty on board ship, owing to their usefulness and efficiency. 6. In 1864 a resolution was introduced in Congress to transfer the Marine Corps to the army, and again the commandant called upon officers of the navy for their views, when such distinguished officers as Farragut, Porter, Dupont, and all the leading officers of the navy placed themselves on record in no mistakable terms as opposed to said transfer, because of the fact that it would tend to decrease efficiency of the naval service. The arguments which were then advanced for the retention of the marines on board ship are as potent to-day as they were then and carry conviction with them. The letters would be embodied in this paper but for the fact that they are numerous and lengthy, but the department's attention is earnestly invited thereto, and they will be submitted if it so directs.

7. In 1867 a second resolution was introduced in Congress to abolish the Marine Corps and transfer it to the army, when Admirals Farragut, Porter, Wilkes, Dupont, Stribling, and all the leading officers of the navy again placed themselves on record as opposed to this transfer because of its tending to decrease the efficiency of the naval service. The arguments used by them are, like the ones above referred to, equally as potent to-day as they were at that time, and the department's attention is invited thereto, and they also will be transmitted to the department if it so desires. 8. In 1874 the commandant of the Marine Corps, in order to fix the status of the corps with regard to the naval service, and looking especially to the necessity of an increase thereof, called on the then leading officers of the navy for an expression of opinion as to their usefulness as part of the naval service, and again in no equivocal or mistakable terms did all the leading officers of the navy place themselves on record to the effect that in their opinion the Marine Corps, especially so far as pertains to its duty on board ship, was an indispensable branch of the naval service.

9. In 1890 the Admiral of the Navy, Admiral D. D. Porter, being called upon for his opinion with regard to H. R. 6102, to equalize the grades of the officers of the Marine Corps, that distinguished officer placed himself most strongly on record as favoring an increase of the corps for the purposes of the naval service. In that communication, to which attention is invited, the following excerpt appears pertinent:

"I have had the marines under my observation since the year 1824, when I first joined an American man-of-war, a period of sixty years, and during all that time I have never known a case where the marines could not be depended on for any service. Without that well-drilled police force on shipboard an American man-of-war could not be depended on to maintain discipline and perform the arduous duties assigned her." 10. From 1874 until 1894 there appears to be no attempt made to change the status of the corps, and it served continuously with the navy and without apparent friction. 11. In 1894 a small number of naval officers again advanced a proposition to dispense with marines on board ship. They were few in number, and were opposed not only by a majority but by the leading officers of the navy. About this time the department was called upon to determine whether the marine guard of the Raleigh should be reduced in numbers, and after a careful consideration of the matter declined to do so. The wishes of the movers of this proposition being thus frustrated by the department,

petitions were circulated for signature among the crews of the vessels of the navy, addressed to the Congress of the United States, asking for the withdrawal of marines on board ship. The attention of the department being called to said petition, the Secretary deemed it his duty to issue a special order addressed to the service reprobating this procedure on the part of the enlisted men, which was apparently nurtured by the few officers previously referred to.

12. The Secretary's views are embodied in Special Order No. 16, dated July 31, 1894, to which the department's attention is invited, and especially to the following excerpt therefrom:

"Advantage is taken of this opportunity to state that the department, after maturely considering the subject, and particularly in view of the honorable record made by the United States Marine Corps, which has been part of our navy since its organization, is convinced of the usefulness of the corps, both ashore and afloat, and of the propriety of continuing it in service on shipboard."

13. That same year, 1894, Senate bill 2324 was introduced, which had for its purpose the transfer of the Marine Corps to the army and in that way cause their removal from shipboard. This measure again met with the disapproval of the leading officers of the navy, of the department, and failed of passage.

14. In 1895 Capt. Robley D. Evans, being assigned to command the first of the battle ships about to be commissioned, to wit, the Indiana, suggested to the department that, owing to the extremely limited berthing space on board ship and the great demand for men in her powder division, no marines be sent to her. The recommendation of Captain Evans was carefully considered by the Secretary of the Navy who, under date of November 1, 1895, addressed a communication to that officer informing him that his suggestion did not meet with the department's approval, but on the contrary the Indiana would be provided with a marine guard composed of one captain, one subaltern, sixty noncommissioned officers, privates, and musicians, and he further stated that said guard was to be considered in all respects as part of the working force of the ship, and in addition to performing the duties prescribed by regulations and custom, the men thereof were to be detailed for service at the guns in such manner as the commanding officer may deem expedient, and whenever practicable, under their own officers; that they were to assist in scrubbing decks and other police duty, the coaling of ships, and work of like character. This order has been uniformly carried out from said date until the present time, and until reversed by the Secretary of the Navy is the department's ruling in the premises.

15. The unsuccessful agitations of 1894 and 1895 tending to the withdrawal of marines from ships, which culminated in the orders to the commanding officer of the Indiana, assumed greater proportions than any previous ones, and it therefore received the most careful attention not only of the officers of the navy but of the Secretary himself, who deemed it of sufficient importance to embody in his annual report of 1895 to the President the following expression of opinion relative to the Marine Corps:

"MARINES ON BOARD SHIP.

"There has always been more or less objection on the part of some officers of the navy to marines on board ship, but as marines have constituted a part of our naval establishment, both on shore and at sea, from its infancy it may fairly be presumed that experience has, in the opinion of those who control, demonstrated the wisdom of maintaining this branch of the service. The department has recently had occasion to consider carefully whether, under the conditions at present existing in the navy, it was for the interests of the service to depart from the long-established custom and entirely dispense with all marines on battle ships.

"The modern battle ship is largely a floating fort. It remains, as indeed all naval vessels under steam alone must for much the greater portion of the time, in port, where it exercises its crews in landing parties and infantry drills far more than was permissible when ships were for long periods at sea. These drills on shore and afloat, together with the handling and firing of great and rapid-fire guns, constitute also a much larger proportion of the actual experiences of the modern sailor than of the oldtime tar, who was much of his time occupied in performing the duties peculiar to sailing vessels, and it is precisely in infantry and gun drills that the marine is or may be an expert. It would therefore seem that there is far more propriety in having the ship's crew composed in part of marines now than there could have been in the days of the sailing ship.

"No reason appears why marines should not man a portion of the guns on board ship as well as handle small arms, nor is it perceived why their officers can not, subject to the orders of the captain, command gun crews and even gun divisions. The fact that marines are enlisted for five years while sailors are enlisted for three, is clearly an argument in favor of retaining the marines; and the having on board of

two different organizations, if a proper spirit of rivalry between the two is encouraged, ought to be considered another advantage, especially in cases of insubordination. For these and other reasons the department decided to put sixty marines and two marine officers on board the Indiana, and it will put marines on the other battle ships as they are severally commissioned."

16. The above views embodied the opinion and policy of the Navy Department relative to marines serving on board ships and they have been uniformly, consistently, and successfully followed since that date.

17. In 1897 the department convened a board of which the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Hon. Theodore Roosevelt, was president. This board had for its purpose the reorganization of the naval personnel. There was submitted to said board by a member thereof, for consideration, inter alia, the following resolution: "That it is desirable that marines be not embarked as a part of the complement of seagoing ships."

18. This resolution was considered by the board, which, in addition to the Assistant Secretary, was composed of leading officers of the navy, but it failed of adoption. This action of the board in acting adversely on this resolution clearly demonstrated the fact that the Assistant Secretary and said officers of rank and experience believed in the usefulness of the Marine Corps as a part of the naval service, and testified to its efficiency on board ship.

19. From the time of this decisive action of the Roosevelt Board no effort was made tending to the withdrawal of marines from ships until February, 1907, when Commander Fullam, who was the leader of the agitation of 1895, again suggested to the department the advisability of the withdrawal of marines from shipboard and the organization of the Marine Corps into permanent battalions, a certain number of which were to be carried on board transports attached the various fleets and squadrons. This communication of Commander Fullam above referred to was referred, under date of February 2, 1907, to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for comment, and on the 26th idem was returned to the department with the following indorsement: "Respectfully returned to the Secretary of the Navy.

2. In the within communication Commander William F. Fullam, U. S. N., submits certain suggestions regarding the reorganization and employment of the Marine Corps, and the consequent withdrawal of marines from service aboard ship. This is the subject which in the year 1894 and for a short period previous thereto was, in general terms, the subject of more or less serious and extended discussion in the naval service, and resulted in the department's disapproval of the scheme and the increase in the number of marines serving on board ship, which, it is believed, has worked to the betterment of the naval service.

3. No change has occurred since 1894 which, in the opinion of the undersigned, materially alters the conditions then existing, and upon which this question, it was believed, was settled permanently. (Vide paragraph 7, Special Circular No. 16, dated Washington, July 31, 1894, copy inclosed.)

4. In view of the fact that this is simply a suggestion of Commander Fullam, and as it is not believed that the department will consider such suggestion seriously, it is not deemed necessary on the part of the undersigned to enter a lengthy argument to show that neither the navy nor the Marine Corps will be benefited by said suggestion, but that on the contrary the efficiency of both services would be impaired.

"5. The continued desultory agitation of this subject simply tends to injure the efficiency of both the Navy and Marine Corps and causes dissensions amongst its various officers, which can not but be injurious to the service as a whole. Furthermore, that these agitations work to the detriment of the service is illustrated by the recent action of the House of Representatives when an increase of the enlisted personnel of the Marine Corps, which is so badly needed and which was approved by the department and by the Committee on Naval Affairs, was defeated because reference was made to the fact that there was a move on foot to remove the marines from on board ship, and it was, therefore, urged that until that matter was settled, no increase in the Marine Corps should be allowed. (Vide page 3062, Congressional Record, February 14, 1907.)

"6. In view of the foregoing and as it is believed to be the present policy of the department not to disturb the status quo of the Marine Corps, it is respectfully recommended that Commander Fullam be informed that his suggestions do not meet with the department's approval."

20. This recommendation of Commander Fullam was considered by the present head of the department, who did not approve thereof, thus placing himself on record with his predecessors against the removal of marines from vessels of the navy.

21. The foregoing brief review of the attempts made by a certain small number of officers to take marines from the ships of the navy shows clearly that at no time has said proposition received the favorable consideration of a large number of officers, and,

furthermore, that at no time was said move seriously considered favorably by the department, but on the contrary each and every time the department has been called on to decide the matter it has placed itself on record in no equivocal terms as opposed to such a procedure. It is not believed that the conditions to-day are different from what they were in 1836, in 1854, in 1874, in 1895, and the other dates above referred to, but that on the contrary the very same conditions exist, and it is, therefore, asserted that the marine on board ship to-day is just as essential to the efficiency of the naval service, if not more so, as he has been in the past.

22. It having been shown supra that the department has consistently opposed a change of status of the Marine Corps it may be well, in this connection, to discuss the duties which have been and are now being performed on board vessels of the navy by marine detachments. In the days of sailing ships during times of peace marines were used almost exclusively for the military duties of sentries, but in action they were assigned as sharpshooters, thus occupying a very important position at the time when naval battles were fought at close range. With the transition from sail power to steam, and with the ultimate transition into the modern battle ship, the duties of the marines were modified, and this especially after the order of the Secretary of the Navy of November 1, 1895, to the commanding officer of the Indiana. Since that time the marines, in addition to their strictly military duties, have occupied on board ship a status which approximates very closely to that occupied by the enlisted men of the navy proper. În other words in addition to their military duties as sentries and orderlies they have been assigned to a part of the battery under their own officers; they are a part of the complement of the ship so far as pertains to the general duties of the enlisted personnel; they keep their own part of the ship clean, they do their share of coaling ship, and in fact participate generally in all the duties of the enlisted men of the navy. In fine, the marine to-day on board ship, in addition to his military duty, which he and he alone does, is assigned to do exactly the same duty on deck as the seaman, with the possible exception of steering ship and small boats. In this connection it seems pertinent to invite the department's attention to the comment on this subject by Rear-Admiral George A. Converse, U. S. N., retired, who, in his annual report of 1906 as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, stated that:

"The enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps are drawn from much the same class of men, and their duties on board ship do not differ in any essential degree. The marines are detailed as sentries and in connection with honors and ceremonies, and devote more time to infantry and small-arms drills, but their important duties are much the same as those of the blue jackets.”

It will thus be seen from the opinion of this high authority that the marine detachment on board ship is a part and parcel of its complement, performing duties of like importance without any essential difference, and their usefulness is thus testified to by the officer who had special charge of the enlisted personnel of the navy.

23. Ever since the agitation has been started tending toward the removal of marines from ships it has been attended by an argument on the part of the movers to the effect that the military duties now performed by the marines on board ship can not be and are not to be dispensed with, but that said duties are to be performed by the enlisted men of the navy who are to be selected for this specific purpose. No one has vouchsafed the statement that the time has arrived when the performance of military duties, such as sentries, etc., on board ship can be dispensed with, the only argument being that this duty should be performed by enlisted men of the navy rather than by the enlisted men of the Marine Corps. This being true, it may well be asked, Is there any dissatisfaction with the manner of the performance of duty on the part of marines? To this there can be but one answer and that is the negative. There is not on the files of these headquarters or of the department any complaint from the officers of the navy to the effect that the duty assigned to the marines is not well performed, while there is abundant evidence to the contrary. This being conceded it may be asked: Why take from the ships of the navy these 3,000 marines, well drilled, well trained, and efficient, who have performed their duty with thorough satisfaction, when their places must necessarily be filled by others, who from their vocation and surroundings can not be educated up to as high a state of military efficiency, and who if they do replace marines will do so with decreased efficiency and at an increased cost of about $250,000 per annum? That this should not be done is not only the opinion of these headquarters, but also that of a majority of officers of the navy.

24. It is deemed pertinent in this connection to invite attention to an excerpt from a communication of the late Commodore E. Simpson, U. S. N., in his time one of the most prominent officers of the navy, in which, in 1874, he states his opinion of the services of marines on board ship. His views and conclusions are as applicable to-day as they were then. He states:

"I consider that experienced and well-trained marines who have learned their duties as soldiers aid most materially in establishing and maintaining the discipline and efficiency of a man-of-war, and were they not put on board ship the duty of guarding public property, of preserving the police of the ship, of securing and guarding prisoners, etc., would have to be done by men selected from the crew. The best men in the crew would have to be selected for this work, which would not only reduce the available force for ship's use, but would have the effect of depriving the crew of its most valuable leading men, which would be a loss beyond compare, when we consider the general character of the men who ship as sailors in the navy."

25. The proposition briefly is to dispense with marines who by many years of careful training for the performance of the particular duties required of them are especially qualified therefor, and fill their places by those who must be trained to do the same duties and in the course of time would thereby virtually become marines in all respects but name. In other words, we throw aside a well-seasoned, efficient body of men and begin to educate another class of men to do exactly the same duty.

26. The importance of the duties now performed by marines is acknowledged, and it is further admitted that if they were removed from ships their places will have to be taken by an equal number of men who must be trained to perform the same duties, and these men must be carefully picked from those who have had a certain length of service; they must be taken from the seaman class or higher, and we would therefore have the same work performed with no increased efficiency and at a marked increased cost. It is therefore urged that to wipe out of existence this splendid body of 3,000 men, against whom there has not been the slightest ground of complaint, and who have performed their duties in a most satisfactory manner would be a serious mistake and one not in accord with the best interests or the greater efficiency of the navy or tending to economy of administration.

27. The only argument which has been advanced in advocacy of the withdrawal of marines from ships is that the enlisted man of the navy chafes under the restraint of having on board ship to maintain discipline a man of a different service, with a different uniform. This argument is of no force or effect. It requires no military mind to see the fallacy of this argument. Surely no self-respecting and law-abiding citizen objects to the maintenance of a well-organized police force or fire department in the community in which he lives. No self-respecting and law-abiding enlisted man of the navy will require the restraining influence of a marine. The sailor who commits himself and is subject to the restraining influence of the marine is of that type of enlisted man who not only is not entitled to special consideration, but who cares little whether he is to be punished under the supervision of a sailor or marine. The marine aboard ship does not chafe at being under the orders of the enlisted men of the navy, as he is for all purposes of work around the decks, and it may therefore well be asked, Why should the converse of this proposition be true? The officer or man in authority exercises his authority by virtue of his position and military men recognize this without regard to the personality or uniform of him who exercises said authority. A common illustration of this is found in the Navy Regulations, where the coxswain of a boat in which there is no line officer present exercises command over said boat, even though there be in said boat staff officers of the navy..

28. In the past it has always been the custom in considering the needs and questions of organization of the United States Navy to compare them with those of the navy of Great Britain. The records of the department will disclose the fact that in numerous appeals to Congress boards as well as Secretaries have used the British navy as the criterion upon which were based the recommendations for our own. That navy has recognized and still recognizes the necessity for marines on board ship, many of the ships having guards nearly double the size of those on board our largest battle ships. The path of the British marine, however, has not been smoother in their service than has been that of the American marine in the United States Navy. There. again, small coteries of officers have urged against the necessity for the presence of marines on board ship, but, with one exception, to no avail. The mistake then made of withdrawing marines from ships was quickly rectified, and since that time they have uninterruptedly served on board ships. The only question which has recently agitated the British navy was the report of the Douglass Committee, which, while it urged the retention of marines on board ships, recommended against the further appointment of marine officers per se, advising that the duties performed by them should be performed by certain line officers of the navy. This suggestion was adopted, and although it has been in operation but a short time, it is believed by the leading officers of the British navy to be unsuccessful because of the special training necessary to develop the marine officer, which lack of training has had its influence upon the efficiency of the marine detachments. In a recent publication by Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Neville Custance, entitled "Naval Policy," that officer, under the nom

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