:

mitment to an insane asylum of one acquitted of crime on the
ground of insanity if manifestly dangerous, says that "the statute
very sensibly declares that when a jury is called upon to acquit a
prisoner of a crime on the ground that he was insane, they shall
not acquit him of the one without convicting him of the other."
Unfortunately many juries and courts fail to follow Judge Flan-
drau's opinion and to see to it that one so acquitted should be
put in an insane asylum.

In True vs. True, (6 Minn., 315), which was an action for
divorce, we find the importance and sanctity of the marriage re-
lation upheld by Judge Flandrau in the following eloquent and
forceful language:

The contract of marriage differs from all other contracts, in being indissoluble by the action of the parties to it, and of perpetually binding obligation until discharged by a competent court. It is the most important of the social relations. It is sanctioned by Divine authority, and recognized by all Christian nations as the palladium of virtue, morality, social order, and the permanent happiness of the human race. To its auspicious influence may be traced the great advances made in civilization, through the elevation of woman to social equality, the education of children, the refinement of manners, the improved sense of justice, the enlightened cultivation of the arts, and the physical development of man; and, above all, is it valuable as awakening in the human heart those chaste and exalted conceptions of virtue, which, in spiritualizing the mind, and subduing the grosser passions of men, give moral character and grandeur to the state. It is the only lawful relation for the continuance of the species, and the perpetuity of the choicest benefits permitted by Providence to the enjoyment of man, and as such should engage the most profound solicitude of the legislator and the courts, to preserve it unsullied in its purity, and transmit it to posterity with its integrity unimpaired.

It were well if our divorce courts paid more attention to this noble and just statement of the law as to marriage.

It is impossible to quote at length from the many able opinions delivered by Judge Flandrau, but it may be proper to notice a few of interest to the legal profession. In Gates vs. Smith (2 Minn., 21) is an able exposition of the method of pleading as provided by the Code, then quite new, as a substitute for the common-law methods. In Grimes vs. Bryne, (2 Minn., 72) we find an exhaustive investigation into the power of the

legislature under the Constitution of the United States, to exempt a fair and limited amount of property from seizure under execution for debts created prior to the exemption. In McComb vs. Thompson (2 Minn., 114) is laid down the salutary rule which has ever since prevailed in this state, that a party signing a note upon the back at its inception, is to be treated as a maker. In Steele vs. Fish (2 Minn, 129), is found probably the first decision under our statute relating to actions to determine adverse claims, and which did much to simplify and make effective the purpose of this valuable statute in quieting the title to real estate.

In Selby vs. Stanley (4 Minn., 34), limiting vendor's liens, and Gardner vs. McClure (6 Minn., 167), repudiating commonlaw mortgages by deposit of the title deeds, we find exhaustive and able opinions relieving this state of unsound and dangerous principles which had prevailed in many common-law jurisdictions.

That Judge Flandrau never favored harsh or unequal taxation is shown by his opinions in McComb vs. Bell (2 Minn., 256), City of St. Paul vs. Seitz (3 Minn., 205), Foster vs. Commissioners (7 Minn., 84), and Board vs. Parker (7 Minn., 207). His hostility to excessive interest is found in Mason vs. Callender (2 Minn., 302), where the holder of a note was held not entitled to interest after the maturity of the note as stipulated therein at the rate of five per cent per month.

An important opinion is that of Regents vs. Hart (7 Minn., 45), determining the status and rights of the State University and its regents.

Among many other valuable opinions, we may mention State vs. Batchelder (5 Minn., 178), relating to the passing of the title of land from the general government; Heyward vs. Judd (4 Minn., 375), relating to an attempt by the legislature to violate contract rights by enlarging the period of redemption from foreclosure; Filley vs. Register (4 Minn., 296), as to fraudulent conveyances; Butler vs. Paine (8 Minn., 284), as to a note payable in "currency;" and Arnold vs. Wainwright (6 Minn., 241), on the subject of partnership.

In closing this brief review of Judge Flandrau's opinions, we shall quote from Roos vs. State (6 Minn., 291), and Supervisors vs. Heenan (2 Minn., 281), his statement as to methods

which prevailed in our territorial legislature and which cast a side-light on our territorial history. In the latter case was involved the constitutional provision requiring the subject of an act to be stated in the title, and the opinion says:

A knowledge of the character of the legislation which preceded the forming of a state constitution, will show that a very vicious system prevailed of inserting matter in acts, which was entirely foreign to that expressed in the title, and by this means securing the passage of laws which would never have received the sanction of the legislature, had the members known the contents of the act [The constitutional provision] means to secure to the people fair and intelligible legislation, free from all the tricks and finesse which have heretofore disgraced it.

In the former case, relating to change of county lines, Judge Flandrau says:

During the territorial existence of Minnesota, a very great evil had grown up in the legislation of the country, consequent upon the feverish excitement that prevailed for the creation of towns and cities, and the speculation in lots and lands. It was the constant practice of the legislature to change county lines, and the county seats of counties from one town to another, at the solicitation of interested parties, without a full understanding of the wishes and interests of the people of the counties affected. Instances even occurred where such removals were carried through the legislature without the knowledge of that body, by inserting clauses in bills, surreptitiously, the title of which indicated entirely another purpose.

This society has had frequent occasion of late years to bear testimony to the fine character and notable services of many of its deceased members, who have made so creditable the history of this state. It has not been called upon to record its appreciation of a nobler character than that of Judge Flandrau. His integrity and honesty in purpose and act could never be questioned. Indirection or evasion were foreign to his character and his instincts.

He was intensely human, in the sense that he felt the brotherhood of mankind. Kindly in disposition, he ever sympathized with and aided his less fortunate fellow men. Well do I remember his kindly interest and companionship with the poor and rather turbulent population in the vicinity of his home in St. Paul. With these people he was a friend, and where most men

would have found only disturbing and disagreeable neighbors, he found only devoted friends.

He had, as might have been expected in such a gentleman, a natural and inborn courteous manner. His manners were not the mere result of training and polish, and hence he could never be intentionally unkind or discourteous. This trait in Judge Flandrau's character, added to his legal ability, made him a strong advocate. No lawyer at the bar was a more dangerous opponent before a jury.

His hospitality was unlimited, and his friends were without number. With a charming and brilliant wife, surrounded by his children, his home in St. Paul has for many years been a center in social life. He will long be held in remembrance in the community, and he has left to his sorrowing wife and children the inestimable heritage of a good name and an unsullied character.

ADDRESS.

BY HON. JOSEPH A. ECKSTEIN, CITY ATTORNEY OF NEW ULM.

Mr. President: The City of New Ulm desires to join with you in these fitting eulogies on the life and character of Judge Charles E. Flandrau, so ably pronounced by the speakers of the evening. The Mayor of our city received an invitation for himself, city officers, and citizens, from the secretary of your society, to be present at this memorial meeting. The city council appointed a committee of four of its members to represent that body at these exercises, and they are present with me here tonight. The Mayor, the Hon. Dr. C. Weschcke, made all preparations to come, but found that the state of his health would not permit him to do so. He has, however, commissioned me to represent him, and to say a few words for him on behalf of the city, should occasion present itself.

I will ask your indulgence for a few moments, and, as the hour is late, I purpose to be brief in my remarks.

In August, 1862, New Ulm was a mere hamlet on the western frontier of this state; the prairies of southwestern Minnesota were swarming with the bloodthirsty Sioux; and New Ulm was the objective point on which they intended to wreak their vengeance for real or imaginary wrongs suffered at the hands of the whites. At that time most of the young and able-bodied men of New Ulm were at the front in the south fighting for the flag of liberty. Those remaining at home were poorly armed and not fitted to withstand the fierce onslaught of a treacherous and inhuman foe. It was in the nick of time that Judge Flandrau arrived on the scene with his force to relieve the endangered place. I believe that I am correct in making the assertion that, if the Sioux had succeeded in annihilating the little town of New Ulm, our neighbors to the east might have shared the same fate.