must have sufficient certainty to justify a magistrate in committing the accused,20 for a sufficient charge.21 Where there is no indictment, the affidavit must be sworn to upon knowledge. Statements on information" or "on belief," are insufficient to support a requisition.22 So are statements that the deponent "verily believes and has good reason to believe." 23 But it has been said that an affidavit charging a crime directly and positively is not vitiated by the conclusion, "as said deponent verily believes.'' 24 The authentication by the governor is sufficient when they purport to be sworn to by the clerk of any court in the demanding State.25 It has been said that the original affidavit need not be forwarded with the requisition if a copy thereof, duly authenticated, is submitted.26 It has been held that an information unaccompanied by an affidavit is insufficient.27 The warrant of the governor of the State returning the accused is prima facie evidence of compliance with all the necessary requirements.28 The warrant of surrender should show compliance with the requirements of the statute, namely, that the person seized has been charged with crime and is demanded as a fugitive from justice, and that the requisition was accompanied by a copy of an indictment or of an affidavit, made before a magistrate and certified to be authenticated.29 It must specify 20 Ex parte Morgan, 20 Fed. 298. 21 Re Keller, 36 Fed. 681 (of embezzlement); Re Strauss, C. C. A., 126 Fed. 327, 63 C. C. A. 99 (of false pretenses). 22 Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean 121, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12,968; Ex parte Morgan, 20 Fed. 298; Ex parte Spears, 88 Cal. 640, 26 Pac. 608, 22 Am. St. Rep. 341; Ex parte Rowland, 35 Tex. Cr. 108, 31 S. W. 651. 23 Ex parte Baker, 43 Tex. Cr. 281, 65 S. W. 91, 96 Am. St. Rep. 871. 24 Re Keller, 36 Fed. 681. 25 Chung Kin Tow v. Flynn, C. C. A., 218 Fed. 64. 26 Kurtz v. State, 22 Fla. 36, 1 Am. St. Rep. 173; Johnston V. Vanamringe, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 311. 27 Ex parte Hart, C. C. A., 63 Fed. 249, 11 C. C. A., 165, 28 L. R. A. 801; reversing 59 Fed. 894. 28 Chung Kin Tow v. Flynn, C. C. A., 218 Fed. 64. 29 Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 6 S. Ct. 291, 29 L. ed. 544; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 5 S. Ct. 1148, 29 L. ed. 250; Ex parte Dawson, C. C. A., 83 Fed. 306, 28 C. C. A. 354; Re Romaine, 23. Cal. 585; Re Sylvester, 21 Wash. 263, 57 Pac. 829; Re Baker, 21 Wash. 259, 57 Pac. 827; Re Fove, 21 Wash. 250, 57 Pac. 825. the offense charged,30 in substance,31 but it seems that it need. not show that the act charged is a crime by the laws or statutes of the demanding State.32 The copy of an indictment or affidavit that accompanied the requisition need not be annexed to the warrant, nor set forth therein.33 A recital that the governor acted upon the report of his Attorney General, as required by the State statute as well as upon the extradition papers does not effect the validity of the proceedings.34 The Federal Constitution does not effect the power of a State to arrest in advance of extradition proceedings.35 Such arrest may be made when authorized by the common law,36 or the statutes 37 of the State of the asylum. It has been said that he cannot be thus arrested unless it appears that in the State. where the crime is alleged to have been committed he is charged by indictment or affidavit before a magistrate or by some equivalent accusation sanctioned by the laws of such State.38 It has been held that a warrant of arrest by a State magistrate is void when based upon an information alleging "that the offense of fugitive from justice has been committed," and accusing the prisoner thereof, although supported by an affidavit reciting that the prisoner had unlawfully entered the State from Mississippi "where he is charged with the crime of murder.' 39 It has been held, that a person charged with a misdemeanor and not with any felony is entitled to bail as a matter of right, unless his enlargement would be a menace to the community; 40 that repeated denials of an application for his discharge from a criminal insane asylum made upon the returns of writs of habeas corpus were not adjudications which could effect the determination of his subsequent mental capacity.41 A commis 30 Ex parte Cubreth, 49 Cal. 435. 31 State v. Clough, 71 N. H. 594, 53 Atl. 1086, 67 L. R. A. 946. See People v. Stockwell, 135 Mich. 341, 97 N. W. 765. 32 Re Leary, 10 Benedict, 197, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,162; 19 Cyc. 93. 33 Ex parte Dawson, C. C. A., 83 Fed. 306, 28 C. C. A. 354; Re Leary, 10 Benedict, 197, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,162; 19 Cyc. 93. Contra, Re Doo Woon, 18 Fed. 898, 9 Sawyer, 417. 34 Chung Kin Tow v. Flynn, C. C. A., 218 Fed. 64. 35 Burton v. N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. R. Co., 245 U. S. 315. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Reichman v. Harris, C. C. A., 252 Fed. 371. 39 Ibid. 40 Ex parte Shaw, 209 Fed. 954. sion of experts was then appointed to report whether the prisoner's mental condition was then such, that it was reasonably probable that his liberty under bail would be dangerous to the public peace and safety.42 The accused is not entitled to a hearing before the Governor.43 If the proceedings are void for want of jurisdiction or because of due process of law they may be reviewed by the writ of habeas corpus.44 The Governor of a State cannot be compelled, by the writ of mandamus, to surrender a fugitive.45 The only evidence which can be considered is such as tends to prove that the accused was not in the demanding State at the time the crime is alleged to have been committed.46 The defense of the Statutes of Limitations is inadmissible.47 42 Ibid. 43 Ex parte Chung Kin Tow, 218 Fed. 185. 44 Burton v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company, 245 U. S. 315. Ex parte Thaw, 209 Fed. 954. 45 Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 103, 16 L. ed. 717, 727. In Shevlin's Case, (A. D. 1840) Governor Seward, of New York, refused an extradition upon the charge of a resistance to arrest in a civil action by a Pennsylvania writ, while touching in that State upon a voyage from Detroit to Buffalo. In 1842, the same Governor refused to surrender to Virginia three men who were charged with assisting a slave to escape. In Curry's Case, in the following year, the Governor of Virginia, in return, refused to surrender a man demanded by Governor Seward, although the latter Governor had complied with the previous Virginia requisition. He was overruled, however, by the House of Delegates. The surrender was made and the Governor resigned. In Large's Case, (A. D. " 1860) Governor Dennison, of Ohio, refused to honor a requisition from Kentucky charging the enticement of a slave to escape. Moore on Extradition, §§ 522, 523. The last case was the cause of the litigation in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 16 L. ed. 717. In Johnson's Case, A. D. 1917, Governor McCall of Massachusetts refused to honor a requisition from West Virginia, charging a colored man with rape because he believed that exaggerated reports of the crime had been generally circulated in the vicinity of its alleged commission and that on account of the nature of these reports and the race of the defendant there existed a prejudice against the latter which will be difficult if not impossible of control (Official papers of Governor McCall for 1916-1918). There are a number of other precedents of refusals to honor requisitions. 46 Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of City of N. Y., 245 U. S. 128, 135. 47 Ibid. § 492. Summons in criminal cases. Unless some statute otherwise provides, the proper original process against a corporation, and or is against a quasi corporation, or joint stock association, or joint stock company, in a criminal prosecution is a writ of summons. It seems that a summons cannot issue unless supported by an affidavit charging the offense to which it relates. It has been held that, where it is charged that a foreign corporation has committed a crime within the district, service of the summons may be made upon its manager or highest officer within the district. Jurisdiction thus acquired was sustained in a criminal prosecution for a violation of the Interstate Commerce law by accepting unlawful preferential rates," for a violation of the Anti-Trust law by a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and for the sale of malt liquor without a license.9 § 493. Bail. Bail is the taking of security for the appearance of the party accused at the court at the time and place for trial or arraignment. A recognizance is an obligation of record entered into before a court of record.2 It need not be signed by either principal or surety. A bail bond must be signed by those who are bound thereby, the consideration thereof being the release of an accused from custody. Sureties upon the former must personally appear in court.5 Sureties upon the latter may sign before the clerk or his deputy 7 or a United States Commissioner.8 10 Ordinarily, money will not be taken in lieu of bail, but this may be done by a special order of the court.1 The Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution ordains: "Excessive bail shall not be required." 11 9 U. S. v. Faw, 1 Cranch C. C. 486, Fed. Cas. No. 15,078. 10 U. S. v. Neely, 178 Fed. 748. It was said to be against public policy to permit the United States to attach the deposit in a civil suit. Ibid. 11 U. S. v. Lawrence, 4 Cranch C. C. 518, Fed. Cas. No. 15,577. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 377. "When bail is allowed, unreasonable bail is not to be required, but the constitutional principle that demands this is one which, from the very nature of the case, addresses itself exclusively to the judicial discretion and sense of justice of the court or magistrate empowered to fix upon the amount. That bail is reasonable which, in view of the nature of the offence, the penalty which the law attaches to it, and the probabilities that guilt will be established on the trial, seems no more than sufficient to secure the party's attendance. In determining this, some regard should be had to the prisoners' pecuniary circumstances; that which is reasonable bail to a man of wealth being equivalent to a denial of right if exacted of a poor man charged with the like offence. When the court of magistrate requires greater security than in his judgment is needful to secure attendance, and keeps the prisoner in confinement for failure to give it, it is plain that the right to bail which the constitution attempts so carefully to secure has been disregarded; and though the wrong is one for which, in the nature of the case, no remedy exists, the violation of constitutional privilege is aggravated, instead of being diminished, by that circumstance."' Ibid. The magistrate in taking bail exercises an authority essentially judicial. Regina v. Badger, 4 Q. B. 468; Linford v. Fitzroy, 13 Q. B. 240. As to his duty to look into the nature of the charge and the evidence to sustain it, see Barronet's Case, 1 El. & Bl. 1. See Carmody v. State, 105 Ind. 546, as to fixing amount of bail in advance for different clasess of cases."' U. S. v. Lawrence, 4 Cranch 518, Fed. Cas. 15,577: "To require larger bail than the prisoner could give would be to require excessive bail, and to deny bail in a case clearly bailable by law." If this dictum were followed, prisoners who have nothing should in every case be released upon giving no bail or bail of six cents; which would make our system a criminal law not very practicable. In U. S. v. Brawner, 7 Fed. 86, 87, before Hammond, J., there was an application for a warrant for removal from the Western District of Tennessee to the Eastern District of Missouri upon a charge of counterfeit. The prisoner "stated that he could give bond for a smaller sum than $5,000, but could not for that amount. On his oath he stated that he himself had no property except two small town lots, worth about $75, but that his father, upon whom he relied for bail, owned about 240 acres of land and necessary |