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OF THE

TRUE GREATNESS

OF THE

KINGDOM OF BRITAIN.

TO KING JAMES.

-Fortunatos nimium sua si bona norint.

THE greatness of kingdoms and dominions in bulk | estimation: then by propounding and confirming and territory doth fall under measure and demonstration that cannot err: but the just measure and estimate of the forces and power of an estate is a matter, than the which there is nothing among civil affairs more subject to error, nor that error more

subject to perilous consequence. For hence may proceed many inconsiderate attempts and insolent provocations in states that have too high an imagination of their own forces: and hence may proceed, on the other side, a toleration of many fair grievances and indignities, and a loss of many opportunities, in states that are not sensible enough of their own strength. Therefore, that it may the better appear what greatness your Majesty hath obtained of God, and what greatness this island hath obtained by you, and what greatness it is, that by the gracious pleasure of Almighty God you shall leave and transmit to your children and generations as the first founder; I have thought good, as far as I can comprehend, to make a true survey and representation of the greatness of this your kingdom of Britain; being for mine own part persuaded, that the supposed prediction, "Video solem orientem in occidente," may be no less a true vision applied to Britain, than to any other kingdom of Europe; and being out of doubt that none of the great monarchies, which in the memory of times have risen in the habitable world, had so fair seeds and beginnings as hath this your estate and kingdom, whatsoever the event shall be, which must depend upon the dispensation of God's will and providence, and his blessing upon your descendants. And because I have no purpose vainly or assentatorily to represent this greatness, as in water, which shows things bigger than they are, but rather, as by an instrument of art, helping the sense to take a true magnitude and dimension therefore I will use no hidden order, which is fitter for insinuations than sound proofs, but a clear and open order. First by confuting the errors, or rather correcting the excesses of certain immoderate opinions, which ascribe too much to some points of greatness, which are not so essential, and by reducing those points to a true value and

those other points of greatness which are more solid and principal, though in popular discourse less observed and incidently by making a brief application, in both these parts, of the general principles and positions of policy unto the state and condition of these your kingdoms. Of these the former part will branch itself into these articles.

First, That in the measuring or balancing of greatness, there is commonly too much ascribed to largeness of territory.

Secondly, That there is too much ascribed to treasure or riches.

Thirdly, That there is too much ascribed to the fruitfulness of the soil, or affluence of commodities.

And fourthly, That there is too much ascribed to the strength and fortification of towns or holds.

The latter will fall into this distribution: First, That true greatness doth require a fit situation of the place or region.

Secondly, That true greatness consisteth essentially in population and breed of men. Thirdly, That it consisteth also in the value and military disposition of the people it breedeth; and in this that they make profession of arms. Fourthly, That it consisteth in this point, that every common subject by the poll be fit to make a soldier, and not only certain conditions or degrees of men.

Fifthly, That it consisteth in the temper of the government fit to keep the subjects in good heart and courage, and not to keep them in the condition of servile vassals.

And sixthly, That it consisteth in the commandment of the sea.

And let no man so much forget the subject propounded, as to find strange, that here is no mention of religion, laws, or policy. For we speak of that which is proper to the amplitude and growth of states, and not of that which is common to their preservation, happiness, and all other points of wellbeing. First, therefore, touching largeness of terri

tories, the true greatness of kingdoms upon earth is not without some analogy with the kingdom of heaven, as our Saviour describes it: which he doth resemble, not to any great kernel or nut, but to one of the least grains; but yet such a one, as hath a property to grow and spread. For as for large countries and multitude of provinces, they are many times rather matters of burden than of strength, as may manifestly appear both by reason and example. By reason thus. There be two manners of securing of large territories, the one by the natural arms of every province, and the other by the protecting arms of the principal estate, in which case commonly the provincials are held disarmed. So are there two dangers incident unto every estate, foreign invasion, and inward rebellion. Now such is the nature of things, that these two remedies of estate do fall respectively into these two dangers, in case of remote provinces. For if such an estate rest upon the natural arms of the provinces, it is sure to be subject to rebellion or revolt; if upon protecting arms, it is sure to be weak against invasion: neither can this be avoided.

Now for examples, proving the weakness of states possessed of large territories, I will use only two, eminent and selected. The first shall be of the kingdom of Persia, which extended from Egypt, inclusive, unto Bactria, and the borders of the East India; and yet nevertheless was overrun and conquered, in the space of seven years, by a nation not much bigger than this isle of Britain, and newly grown into name, having been utterly obscure till the time of Philip the son of Amyntas. Neither was this effected by any rare or heroical prowess in the conqueror, as is vulgarly conceived, for that Alexander the Great goeth now for one of the wonders of the world; for those that have made a judgment grounded upon reason of estate, do find that conceit to be merely popular, for so Livy pronounceth of him, "Nihil aliud quam bene ausus vana contemnere." Wherein he judgeth of vastness of territory as a vanity that may astonish a weak mind, but no ways trouble a sound resolution. And those that are conversant attentively in the histories of those times, shall find that this purchase which Alexander made and compassed, was offered by fortune twice before to others, though by accident they went not through with it; namely, to Agesilaus, and Jason of Thessaly: for Agesilaus, after he had made himself master of most of the low provinces of Asia, and had both design and commission to invade the higher countries, was diverted and called home upon a war excited against his country by the states of Athens and Thebes, being incensed by their orators and counsellors, which were bribed and corrupted from Persia, as Agesilaus himself avouched pleasantly, when he said, That a hundred thousand archers of the king of Persia had driven him home: understanding it, because an archer was the stamp upon the Persian coin of gold. And Jason of Thessaly, being a man born to no greatness, but one that made a fortune of himself, and had obtained by his own vivacity of spirit, joined with the opportunities of time, a great army compounded of voluntaries and

adventurers, to the terror of all Græcia, that continually expected where that cloud would fall; disclosed himself in the end, that his design was for an expedition into Persia, the same which Alexander not many years after achieved, wherein he was interrupted by a private conspiracy against his life, which took effect. So that it appeareth, as was said, that it was not any miracle of accident that raised the Macedonian monarchy, but only the weak composition of that vast state of Persia, which was prepared for a prey to the first resolute invader.

The second example that I will produce, is of the Roman empire, which had received no diminution in territory, though great in virtue and forces, till the time of Jovianus. For so it was alleged by such as opposed themselves to the rendering Nisibis upon the dishonourable retreat of the Roman army out of Persia. At which time it was avouched, that the Romans, by the space of 800 years, had never, before that day, made any cession or renunciation to any part of their territory, whereof they had once had a constant and quiet possession. And yet, nevertheless, immediately after the short reign of Jovianus, and towards the end of the joint reign of Valentinianus and Valens, which were his immediate successors, and much more in the times succeeding, the Roman empire, notwithstanding the magnitude thereof, became no better than a carcase whereupon all the vultures and birds of prey of the world did seize and ravin for many ages, for a perpetual monument of the essential difference between the scale of miles, and the scale of forces. And therefore, upon these reasons and examples, we may safely conclude, that largeness of territory is so far from being a thing inseparable from greatness of power, as it is many times contrariant and incompatible with the same. But to make a reduction of that error to a truth, it will stand thus, that then greatness of territory addeth strength, when it hath these four conditions:

First, That the territories be compacted, and not dispersed.

Secondly, That the region which is the heart and seat of the state be sufficient to support those parts, which are but provinces and additions. Thirdly, That the arms or martial virtue of the

state be in some degree answerable to the greatness of dominion.

And lastly, That no part or province of the state be utterly unprofitable, but do confer some use or service to the state.

The first of these is manifestly true, and scarcely needeth any explication. For if there be a state that consisteth of scattered points instead of lines, and slender lines instead of latitudes, it can never be solid, and in the solid figure is strength. But what speak we of mathematical principles? The reason of state is evident, that if the parts of an estate be disjoined and remote, and so be interrupted with the provinces of another sovereignty; they cannot possibly have ready succours in case of invasion, nor ready suppression in case of rebellion, nor ready recovery in case of loss or alienation by either of both

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the king of Spain hath had to recover the Low | military forces of a state to the amplitude of empire, Countries, although it were to him patrimony and not purchase; and that chiefly in regard of the great distance. So we see that our nation kept Calais a hundred years' space after it lost the rest of France, in regard of the near situation; and yet in the end they that were nearer carried it by surprise, and overran succour.

Therefore Titus Quintius made a good comparison of the state of the Achaians to a tortoise, which is safe when it is retired within the shell, but if any part be put forth, then the part exposed endangereth all the rest. For so it is with states that have provinces dispersed, the defence whereof doth commonly consume and decay, and sometimes ruin the rest of the estate. And so likewise we may observe, that all the great monarchies, the Persians, the Romans, and the like of the Turks, they had not any provinces to the which they needed to demand access through the country of another: neither had they any long races or narrow angles of territory, which were environed or clasped in with foreign states; but their dominions were continued and entire, and had thickness and squareness in their orb or contents. these things are without contradiction.

But

For the second, concerning the proportion between the principal region, and those which are but secondary, there must evermore distinction be made between the body or stem of the tree, and the boughs and branches. For if the top be over-great, and the stalk too slender, there can be no strength. | Now, the body is to be accounted so much of an estate, as is not separated or distinguished with any mark of foreigners, but is united specially with the bond of naturalization; and therefore we see that when the state of Rome grew great, they were enforced to naturalize the Latins or Italians, because the Roman stem could not bear the provinces and Italy both as branches: and the like they were contented after to do to most of the Gauls. So on the contrary part, we see in the state of Lacedæmon, which was nice in that point, and would not admit their confederates to be incorporate with them, but rested upon their natural-born subjects of Sparta, how that a small time after they had embraced a larger empire, they were presently surcharged, in respect to the slenderness of the stem. For so in the defection of the Thebans and the rest against them, one of the principal revolters spake most aptly, and with great efficacy, in the assembly of the associates, telling them, That the state of Sparta was like a river, which after that it had run a great way, and taken other rivers and streams into it, ran strong and mighty, but about the head and fountain of it was shallow and weak; and therefore advised them to assail and invade the main of Sparta, knowing they should there find weak resistance either of towns or in the field of towns, because upon confidence of their greatness they fortified not upon the main; in the field, because their people was exhaust by garrisons and services far off. Which counsel proved sound, to the astonishment of all Græcia at that time.

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it cannot be better demonstrated than by the two first examples, which we produced, of the weakness of large territory, if they be compared within themselves according to difference of time. For Persia at a time was strengthened with large territory, and at another time weakened; and so was Rome. For while they flourished in arms, the largeness of territory was a strength to them, and added forces, added treasures, added reputation: but when they decayed in arms, then greatness became a burden. For their protecting forces did corrupt, supplant, and enervate the natural and proper forces of all their provinces, which relied and depended upon the succours and directions of the state above. And when that waxed impotent and slothful, then the whole state laboured with her own magnitude, and in the end fell with her own weight. And that, no question, was the reason of the strange inundations of people which both from the east and north-west overwhelmed the Roman empire in one age of the world, which a man upon the sudden would attribute to some constellation or fatal revolution of time, being indeed nothing else but the declination of the Roman empire, which having effeminated and made vile the natural strength of the provinces, and not being able to supply it by the strength imperial and sovereign, did, as a lure cast abroad, invite and entice all the nations adjacent, to make their fortunes upon her decays. And by the same reason, there cannot but ensue a dissolution to the state of the Turk, in regard of the largeness of empire, whensoever their martial virtue and discipline shall be farther relaxed, whereof the time seemeth to approach. For certainly like as great stature in a natural body is some advantage in youth, but is but burden in age; so it is with great territory, which when a state beginneth to decline, doth make it stoop and buckle so much the faster.

For the fourth and last, it is true, that there is to be required and expected as in the parts of a body, so in the members of a state, rather propriety of service, than equality of benefit. Some provinces are more wealthy, some more populous, and some more warlike; some situate aptly for the excluding or expulsing of foreigners, and some for the annoying and bridling of suspected and tumultuous subjects; some are profitable in present, and some may be converted and improved to profit by plantations and good policy. And therefore true consideration of estate can hardly find what to reject, in matter of territory, in any empire, except it be some glorious acquests obtained sometime in the bravery of wars, which cannot be kept without excessive charge and trouble; of which kind were the purchases of king Henry VIII. that of Tournay; and that of Bologne; and of the same kind are infinite other the like examples almost in every war, which for the most part upon treaties of peace are restored.

Thus have we now defined where the largeness of territory addeth true greatness, and where not. The application of these positions unto the particu lar or supposition of this your Majesty's kingdom of For the third, concerning the proportion of the Britain, requireth few words. For, as I professed in

the beginning, I mean not to blazon or amplify, but only to observe and express matter.

First, Your Majesty's dominion and empire comprehendeth all the islands of the north-west ocean, where it is open, until you come to the imbarred and frozen sea, towards Iceland; in all which tract it hath no intermixture or interposition of any foreign land, but only of the sea, whereof you are also absolutely master.

Secondly, The quantity and content of these countries is far greater than have been the principal or fundamental regions of the greatest monarchies, greater than Persia proper, greater than Macedon, greater than Italy. So as here is potentially body and stem enough for Nabuchodonosor's tree, if God should have so ordained.

Thirdly, The prowess and valour of your subjects is able to master and wield far more territory than falleth to their lot. But that followeth to be spoken of in the proper place.

And lastly, It must be confessed, that whatsoever part of your countries and regions shall be counted the meanest, yet is not inferior to those countries and regions, the people whereof some ages since overran the world. We see farther by the uniting of the continent of this island, and the shutting up of the postern, as it was not unfitly termed, all entrance of foreigners is excluded: and we see again, that by the fit situation and configuration of the north of Scotland towards the north of Ireland, and the reputation, commodity, and terror thereof, what good effects have ensued for the better quieting of the troubles of Ireland. And so we conclude this first branch touching largeness of territory.

THE second article was,

That there is too much ascribed to treasure or riches in the balancing of greatness. Wherein no man can be ignorant of the idolatry that is generally committed in these degenerate times to money, as if it could do all things public and private: but leaving popular errors, this is likewise to be examined by reason and examples, and such reason, as is no new conceit or invention, but hath formerly been discerned by the sounder sort of judgments. For we see that Solon, who was no contemplative wise man, but a statesman and a lawgiver, used a memorable censure to Croesus, when he showed him great treasures, and store of gold and silver that he had gathered, telling him, that whensoever another should come that had better iron than he, he would be master of all his gold and silver. Neither is the authority of Machiavel to be despised, specially in a matter whereof he saw the evident experience before his eyes in his own times and country, who derideth the received and current opinion and principle of estate taken first from a speech of Mutianus the lieutenant of Vespasian, That money was the sinews of war; affirming, that it is a mockery, and that there are no other true sinews of war, but the sinews and muscles of men's arms: and that there was never any war, wherein the more valiant people had to deal with the more wealthy, but that the war, if it were well

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And had he

conducted, did nourish and pay itself. not reason so to think, when he saw a needy and ill-provided army of the French, though needy rather by negligence than want of means, as the French manner oftentimes is, make their passage only by the reputation of their swords by their sides undrawn, thorough the whole length of Italy, at that time abounding in wealth after a long peace, and that without resistance, and to seize and leave what countries and places it pleased them? But it was not the experience of that time alone, but the records of all times that do concur to falsify that conceit, that wars are decided not by the sharpest sword, but by the greatest purse. And that very

text or saying of Mutianus which was the original of this opinion, is misvouched, for his speech was, "Pecuniæ sunt nervi belli civilis," which is true, for that civil wars cannot be between people of differing valour; and again, because in them men are as oft bought as vanquished. But in case of foreign wars, you shall scarcely find any of the great monarchies of the world, but have had their foundations in poverty and contemptible beginnings, being in that point also conform to the heavenly kingdom, of which it is pronounced, "Regnum Dei non venit cum observatione." Persia, a mountainous country, and a poor people in comparison of the Medes and other provinces which they subdued. The state of Sparta, a state wherein poverty was enacted by law and ordinance; all use of gold and silver and rich furniture being interdicted. The state of Macedonia, a state mercenary and ignoble until the time of Philip. The state of Rome, a state that had poor and pastoral beginnings. The state of the Turks, which hath been since the terror of the world, founded upon a transmigration of some bands of Sarmatian Scythes, that descended in a vagabond manner upon the province that is now termed Turcomania; out of the remnants whereof, after great variety of fortune, sprang the Ottoman family. But never was any position of estate so visibly and substantially confirmed as this, touching the pre-eminence, yea and predominancy of valour above treasure, as by the two descents and inundations of necessitous and indigent people, the one from the east, and the other from the west, that of the Arabians or Saracens, and that of the Goths, Vandals, and the rest: who, as if they had been the true inheritors of the Roman empire, then dying, or at least grown impotent and aged, entered upon Ægypt, Asia, Græcia, Africk, Spain, France, coming to these nations, not as to a prey, but as to a patrimony; not returning with spoil, but seating and planting themselves in a number of provinces, which continue their progeny, and bear their names till this day. And all these men had no other wealth but their adventures, nor no other title but their swords, nor no other press but their poverty. For it was not with most of these people as it is in countries reduced to a regular civility, that no man almost marrieth except he see he have means to live; but population went on, howsoever sustentation followed, and taught by necessity, as some writers report, when they found themselves surcharged with people,

they divided their inhabitants into three parts, and one third, as the lot fell, was sent abroad and left to their adventures. Neither is the reason much unlike, though the effect hath not followed in regard of a special diversion, in the nation of the Swisses, inhabiting a country, which in regard of the mountainous situation, and the popular estate, doth generate faster than it can sustain. In which people, it well appeared what an authority iron hath over gold at the battle of Granson, at what time one of the principal jewels of Burgundy was sold for twelve pence, by a poor Swiss, that knew no more a precious stone than did Æsop's cock. And although this people have made no plantations with their arms, yet we see the reputation of them such, as not only their forces have been employed and waged, but their alliance sought and purchased, by the greatest kings and states of Europe. So as though fortune, as it fares sometimes with princes to their servants, hath denied them a grant of lands, yet she hath granted them liberal pensions, which are made memorable and renowned to all posterity, by the event which ensued to Louis the twelfth; who, being pressed uncivilly by message from them for the enhancing their pensions, entered into choler and broke out into these words, "What! will these villains of the mountains put a tax upon me ?" which words cost him his duchy of Milan, and utterly ruined his affairs in Italy. Neither were it indeed possible at this day, that that nation should subsist without descents and impressions upon their neighbours, were it not for the great utterance of people which they make into the services of foreign princes and estates, thereby discharging not only number, but in that number such spirits as are most stirring and turbulent.

And therefore we may conclude, that as largeness of territory, severed from military virtue, is but a burden; so, that treasure and riches severed from the same is but a prey. It resteth therefore to make a reduction of this error also unto a truth by distinction and limitation, which will be in this

manner:

Treasure and moneys do then add true greatness and strength to a state, when they are accompanied with these three conditions:

First, the same condition which hath been annexed to largeness of territory, that is, that they be joined with martial prowess and valour.

Secondly, That treasure doth then advance greatness, when it is rather in mediocrity than in great abundance. And again better, when some part of the state is poor, than when all parts of it are rich.

And lastly, That treasure in a state is more or less serviceable, as the hands are in which the wealth chiefly resteth.

For the first of these, it is a thing that cannot be denied, that in equality of valour the better purse is an advantage. For like as in wrestling between man and man, if there be a great overmatch in strength, it is to little purpose though one have the better breath; but, if the strength be near equal,

then he that is short-winded will, if the wager consist of many falls, in the end have the worst; so it is in the wars, if it be a match between a valiant people and a cowardly, the advantage of treasure will not serve; but if they be near in valour, then the better moneyed state will be the better able to continue the war, and so in the end to prevail. But if any man think that money can make those provisions at the first encounters, that no difference of valour can countervail, let him look back but into those examples which have been brought, and he must confess, that all those furnitures whatsoever are but shows and mummeries, and cannot shroud fear against resolution. For there shall he find companies armed with armour of proof taken out of the stately armouries of kings who spared no cost, overthrown by men armed by private bargain and chance as they could get it: there shall he find armies appointed with horses bred of purpose, and in choice races, chariots of war, elephants, and the like terrors, mastered by armies meanly appointed. So of towns strongly fortified, basely yielded, and the like; all being but sheep in a lion's skin, where valour faileth.

For the second point, that competency of treasure is better than surfeit, is a matter of common place or ordinary discourse; in regard that excess of riches, neither in public nor private, ever hath any good effects, but maketh men either sloth ful and effeminate, and so no enterprisers; or insolent and arrogant, and so over-great embracers; but most generally cowardly and fearful to lose, according to the adage, "Timidus Plutus;" so as this needeth no farther speech. But a part of that assertion requireth a more deep consideration, being a matter not so familiar, but yet most assuredly true. For it is necessary in a state that shall grow and enlarge, that there be that composition which the poet speaks of, "Multis utile bellum:" an ill condition of a state, no question, if it be meant of a civil war, as it was spoken; but a condition proper to a state that shall increase, if it be taken of a foreign war. For except there be a spur in the state, that shall excite and prick them on to wars, they will but keep their own, and seek no farther. And in all experience and stories you shall find but three things that prepare and dispose an estate to war the ambition of governors, a state of soldiers professed, and the hard means to live of many subjects. Whereof the last is the most forcible and the most constant. And this is the true reason of that event which we observed and rehearsed before, that most of the great kingdoms of the world have sprung out of hardness and scarceness of means, as the strongest herbs out of the barrenest soils.

For the third point, concerning the placing and distributing of treasure in a state, the position is simple; that then treasure is greatest strength to a state, when it is so disposed, as it is readiest and easiest to come by for public service and use: which one position doth infer three conclusions.

First, That there be quantity sufficient of treasure as well in the treasury of the crown or state, as in the purse of the private subject.

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