A

ACCOMPLICE.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11.

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

1. An answer alleged that the plaintiff,
for a good and valuable considera-
tion, and upon a full settlement con-
cluded between it and S., relinquished
and discharged any and all claims in
regard to certain property, either
against the defendant or any other
person. Held, that the defence thus
set up was by way of accord and sat-
isfaction; and if the agreement was
made as stated, it would be binding
upon the plaintiff as a contract;
whether in writing or otherwise.
Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Irwin,

an actual computation, might be
found due to the creditor.

See BOND, 1.

PROMISSORY NOTES, 8.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

Of a debt.-See LIMITATIONS, Stat-

UTE OF,

ACQUIRING LAND OR WATER.
Proceedings for, by Corporations.

1.

ib

The defendant was, by its charter,
authorized and empowered, "for the
purpose of supplying the city of
Utica with pure and wholesome
water," to purchase, take and hold
any real estate, and to enter upon
any lands necessary for that pur-
pose, and to take the water from
any springs, ponds, streams, &c.,
and divert and convey the same to
that city; and to lay and construct
any pipes, conduits, reservoirs, &c.,
proper for said purpose, upon any
of such lands, after having caused a
survey and map of the lands to be
made and filed. And in case of
failure to agree with the owners of
lands or water, for the purchase
thereof, provision was made for the
appointment of commissioners to as-
certain and determine the compen-
sation. The company made and
filed a map, and, in 1849, took pro-
ceedings for the acquisition of so
much water as would flow through
an aperture twelve inches in diame-
ter, stating that so much water was
necessary; and acquired it, having
paid the damages assessed therefor.
Subsequently it became necessary for
the company to obtain an increased

12. Section twenty-six of the general
railroad act, which provides that if
any title or interest in real estate
required by any company shall be
vested in any trustee not authorized
to sell, release or convey, or in any
infant, idiot or person of unsound
mind, the Supreme Court shall have
power to authorize such trustee, or
the general guardian or committee,
to sell and convey the same, was
designed to enable the trustee, guar-
dian or committee to move in order
to acquire the power to contract or
agree for the sale of the land; and
is not compulsory upon the railroad
company.

ib

13. By statutes passed in 1867 and
1869 the bridge across the East
river, between New York and Brook-
lyn, was required to be completed on
or before the first day of June, 1874.
On the fifth day of June, 1874, four
days after the expiration of the limit,
the legislature passed an act provid- |

ing for the completion of the bridge,
and authorizing the cities of New
York and Brooklyn, by the issue of
bonds, to pay moneys, during the
years 1874 and 1875, towards that
object. Held, that this was not only
a legislative waiver of the limit pre-
viously declared, but an extension of
the time during which the bridge
should be finished.
ib

14. The provisions of the first section
of said act of June, 1874, declaring
that when the cities above named
should accept the provisions of the
third section, and when the owners
of two thirds of the private stock
of the bridge company should ac-
cept the provisions of the second
section, then and thenceforth the
board of directors of the company
should consist of twenty members,
to be appointed, eight by the mayor
and comptroller of each of said cities,
&c., is not a condition precedent
controlling the effect of the act as
a legislative waiver of the limit, or
extension of the time of perform-
ance. Such waiver was absolute
and unconditional.

1.

2.

3.

See ESTOPPEL, 1. 2.
STREETS.

ACTION.

ib

One letting a horse to another, to
be used, for hire, is bound to inform
the hirer of the vicious propensities
of the animal, if any; otherwise he
will be liable for any damages which
may happen to the hirer in conse-
quence of a vicious act of the horse.
Campbell v. Page,
113

Where the agent of the owner
testified that at the time of the hiring
he gave the hirer express notice of
the horse's propensity to kick, and
duly cautioned him on the subject,
which the hirer, in his testimony,
absolutely denied; held that the giv
ing of notice was a question of fact,
to be disposed of by the jury.

ib

Money borrowed upon the credit of
county bonds which the county was
authorized by statute to issue and is
legally liable to pay, becomes the
property of the county the moment
it reaches the hands of the county

11. The common law rule still remains
in force, except as it has been
changed by 114 of the Code and
the act of 1862; and if the wife is
interested in a cause of action not
provided for by those acts, she
must join her husband as a party. ib
Cause of. See COMPLAINT.
What actions are referable.-See REFER-
ENCE, 3, 4, 5.

Motion to revive and continue.—See RE-
VIVOR AND CONTINUANCE, &c.
By United States.-See UNITED STATES.

See CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT.
MARRIED WOMEN.

NEW YORK (CITY OF,) 1.
PROMISSORY NOTES, 10, 11, 12.

2. S. having agreed to furnish B. with
materials and labor for erecting
buildings upon lots owned by B., the
plaintiffs sold to S. sashes, doors
and blinds for such buildings, of the
value of $8,000, for which sum he
filed a lien upon the buildings and
lots. For the purpose of removing
such lien from his property, B. exe-
cuted a bond and mortgage to S., to
secure the payment of $8,000 and
interest; whereupon the plaintiffs
discharged the lien, and the bond and
mortgage were assigned to them.
When the bond and mortgage were
given, there was, by the terms of
the contract, nothing due to S. from
B. In an action to foreclose the
mortgage; held, that want of con-
sideration could not be set up as a
defence. That it was beneficial to
the mortgagor and owner of the
property to have the lien upon it
discharged; and that after receiving
the stipulated benefit, and giving
the bond and mortgage for it, he
could not be exonerated from the
obligation to pay what he expressly
covenanted for as its price.
ib

2. Construction and effect.
4. The plaintiff agreed to deliver to the
defendant, at C., 200,000 hoops, at
$3.50 per M. The hoops were to be
well rived ash hoops, and of speci-
fied dimensions. Payments were to
be made from time to time, as a
certain number should be delivered.
The plaintiff delivered 203,100 hoops
to the defendant, at C., in bundles
claimed to contain 100 hoops, each.
After some 30,000 of the hoops had
been delivered, it was mutually
agreed that the hoops should be in-
spected; but no time or place, or
person, when, where and by whom
such inspection should be made was
agreed upon. The defendant sold
the hoops so bought of the plain-
tiff to a salt company, and shipped
those delivered, by canal, to S.
that place, an agent of the salt
company inspected some fifty bun-
dles and found them short in num-

At

ber, and defective in quality, so that
there were but fifty-eight merchant-
able hoops in a bundle. The defen-
dant then offered to return said
hoops to the plaintiff, at S., provided
he would pay $152, the freight
charges thereon, and the advances
made to the plaintiff. This offer
was refused, the plaintiff saying he
could not take them back, and the
defendant might do as he pleased
with them. The defendant's agent
examined some three hundred bun-
dles of said hoops, at S., including
those examined by the inspector,
and found that they did not contain
over fifty well rived ash hoops to
the bundle, the residue being worth-
less. No inspection was made at C.
In an action to recover the balance
of the purchase price of the hoops,
remaining unpaid: Held, 1. That
the defendant was not entitled to
damages for any deficiency in quan-
tity, or defect in quality, of the
hoops. 2. That the property was,
by the terms of the contract, to be
delivered at C., and when delivered
there, it was the duty of the de-
fendant to examine it, and promptly
to accept or reject it. 3. That the
subsequent agreement, that the
hoops should be inspected, without
designating any time when, place
where, or person by whom, such
inspection should be made, did not
alter the original contract, except
by relieving the defendant from in-
specting at the very time of deliv-
ery. 4. That as the hoops were to
be delivered at C., the inspection
must be held to have been intended
to be made at C. 5. That unless
the plaintiff assented to an inspec-
tion at S., the acceptance at C., and
shipment of the hoops to S. without
the knowledge or assent of the plain-
tiff, was such a retention of the
property as amounted to an admis-
sion that it was accepted in satisfac-
tion of the contract. 6. That if
there was not an acceptance of the
hoops, so as to preclude the defen-
dant from alleging and proving
non-performance on the part of the
plaintiff, there was no offer to return,
within the principle of Read v. Ran-
dall (29 N. Y., 358.) 7. That the
property being deliverable and to be
accepted at C., the offer to return it
at S., on payment of charges, was
not such an offer as the plaintiff was