1805.

To answer this question, it must be maturely considered, under what danger CHAP. XII. of war, the British government would have been placed, without the alliances. It is not the way to arrive at a just conclusion, to set out with allowing that this danger was just any thing which any body pleases. It may be pretty confidently affirmed, that, with good government within their own territories, under the known greatness of their power, the English were almost wholly exempt from the danger of war; because, in this case, war could reach them through but one medium, that of invasion; and from invasion, surely, they had little to dread.

Allowing then, that the subsidiary alliances were a scheme calculated to prevent the danger of war; as far as regards the British government, there was little or nothing of that sort to prevent; the subsidiary alliances were a great and complicated apparatus, for which, when got up, there was nothing to do; a huge cause, prepared when there was no effect to produce.

This is decisive in regard to the practical question. In speculation, another question may still be raised; namely, whether, if the British state had been exposed to the danger of wars, the scheme of the subsidiary alliances was a good instrument for preventing them. In India, as in all countries in corresponding circumstances, one thing saves from aggression, and one thing alone, namely, power; the prospect which the aggressor has before him, of suffering by his aggression, rather than of gaining by it. The question, then, is shortly this; did the subsidiary alliances make the English stronger, in relation to the princes of India, than they would have been without those alliances?

The subsidiary alliances yielded two things: they yielded a portion of territory: and they yielded, a certain position of a certain portion of British troops. In regard to the territory, it may, at any rate, be assumed, as doubtful, whether, in the circumstances of the British state, at the time of the treaty of Bassein, she could be rendered intrinsically stronger by any accession of territory; since, by act of parliament, the question stands decided the opposite way: much more,

* The Governor-General, indeed, takes it as one of his benefits, that the native states would be restrained from war among themselves. But he does not inform us to whom the benefit would accrue. If the English were secure from aggression, the wars of the native princes were of no importance to them. If humanity is pretended, and the deliverance of the people from the horrors of war, it is to be replied, with dreadful certainty, that under the atrocities of a native government, supported by British power, the horrors of peace were no improvement upon the horrors of war. The sufferings of the people under the Nabobs of Carnatic and Oude were described by the English government itself, perhaps with some exaggeration, as unmatched in any portion of India,

1803.

Book VI. then, is it doubtful, whether she could be rendered stronger by an accession of territory, which imported the obligation and expense not merely of defending itself, but of defending the whole kingdom to which it was annexed. It will not, then, be assumed, that the mere territory gotten by the English was the circumstance looked to for preventing the evils of war. If it was that, the ter ritory might have been taken without the alliances.

The only remaining circumstance is, the position of the troops. For as to the other conditions, about not holding intercourse with other states, except in conjunction with the English, these were merely verbal; and would be regarded by the Indian governments, just as long, as they would have been regarded without the alliance; namely, as long as the English could punish them, whenever they should do what the English would dislike.

Now, surely, it is not a proposition which it will be easy to maintain, that a country is stronger with regard to its neighbours, if it has its army dispersed in several countries; a considerable body of it in one country, and a considerable body in another, than if it has the whole concentrated within itself; and skilfully placed in the situation best calculated to overawe any neighbour from whom danger may be apprehended. There are many combinations of circumstances in which this would be a source of weakness, much more than of strength.

If it is said, that the position of the English subsidiary troops, with a native prince, imported the annihilation, or a great reduction, of his own force; this, in the circumstances of India, cannot be regarded as a matter of almost any importance. In a country swarming with military adventurers, and which fights with undisciplined troops, an army can always be got together with great rapidity, as soon as a leader can hold out a reasonable prospect that something will be gained by joining his standards. The whole history of India is a proof, that a man who is without an army to-day, may, if he has the due advantages, tomorrow (if we may use an Eastern hyperbole) be surrounded by a great one. Of this we have had a great and very recent example, in the army with which Holkar, a mere adventurer, was enabled to meet, and to conquer Scindia, the most powerful native prince in India.

It was, in a short time, as we shall see, found by the British government itself, that it could regard the presence of subsidiary troops as a very weak bridle in the mouth of a native prince, when he began to forget his own weakness. The weakness, in fact, was the bridle. If he remained weak, that was enough, without the subsidiary troops. If he grew strong, the subsidiary troops, it was seen, would not long restrain him.

1803.

I cannot aim at the production of all those circumstances, on both sides of this CHAP. XII. question, which would be necessary to be produced, and to be weighed, to demonstrate accurately the probabilities of good or evil, attached to such a scheme of policy, as that of the subsidiary alliances of Governor-General Wellesley. I have endeavoured to conduct the reader into the paths of inquiry; and leave the question undecided.

In summing up the account of the treaty of Bassein, we can only, therefore, approach to a determinate conclusion. On the one side, there is the certain, and the enormous evil, of the expenditure of the Mahratta war. Whether the sub

sidiary alliances, which were looked to for compensation, were calculated to yield any compensation, and did not rather add to the evils, is seen to be, at the least, exceedingly doubtful. The policy of the treaty of Bassein, cannot, therefore, be misunderstood.

CHAP. XIII.

Necessity inferred of curbing Holkar—Intercourse between Holkar and Scindia renewed-Governor-General resolves to take the Holkar Dominions, but to give them away to the Peshwa, Scindia, and the Nizam-Holkar retreats before the Commander-in-Chief, toward the South-The Commanderin-Chief withdraws the Army into Cantonments, leaving Colonel Monson with a Detachment in advance-Holkar turns upon Monson-Monson makes a disastrous Retreat to Agra-The British Army from Guzerat subdues Holkar's Dominions in Malwa-Holkar by a Stratagem attacks DelhiBrave Defence of Delhi-The Holkar Dominions in Deccan subdued-Defeat of Holkar's Infantry at Deeg-Rout of his Cavalry at Furruckabad— The Rajah of Bhurtpore, one of the allied Chieftains, joins with HolkarUnsuccessful Attack upon the Fortress of Bhurtpore-Accommodation with the Rajah of Bhurtpore-Disputes with Scindia-Prospect of a War with Scindia-Holkar joins the Camp of Scindia-The British Resident ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to quit the Camp of Scindia-Scindia endeavours to prevent the Departure of the Resident-Marquis Wellesley succeeded by Marquis Cornwallis-Cornwallis's View of the State of the Government— Of Wellesley's System of subsidiary and defensive Alliance—Cornwallis resolves to avoid a War with Scindia, by yielding every Point in Dispute-To make Peace with Holkar by restoring all the Territories he had lost-To dissolve the Connexion of the British Government with the minor Princes on the Mahratta Frontier-Negotiations between Scindia and the Commander-in-Chief-Death of Lord Cornwallis-Sir G. Barlow adheres to the Plans of Lord Cornwallis-Holkar advances into the Country of the SeiksPursued by Lord Lake-A fresh Treaty concluded with Scindia-Treaty with Holkar-Financial results.

BOOK VI. WHEN the English were freed from the burthen and the dangers of the war with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, they began to think of placing a curb on the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Though Holkar had engaged, and upon very advantageous terms, to join with the other chieftains, he had abstained from co-operation in the war against the English; and though he had committed some

1803. During the war with Scin

dia, the Eng

lish seek for peace with Holkar.

5

1804.

ravages, on a part of the Nizam's territory, toward the beginning of the war; CHAP. XIII. the Governor-General had not held it expedient to treat this offence as a reason for hostilities: Holkar, on the other hand, had been uniformly assured that the English were desirous of preserving with him the relations of peace.

Holkar sus

In the month of December, 1803, Holkar, having marched towards the ter- The designs of ritory of the Rajah of Jyenagur, took up a position which threatened the secu- pected. rity of this ally of the British state. At the same time, he addressed letters to the British Commander-in-Chief, containing assurances of his disposition to cultivate the friendship of the British government. But a letter of his to the Rajah of Macherry, suggesting to him inducements to withdraw from the British alliance, was communicated by that Rajah to the Commander-in-Chief; further correspondence of a hostile nature was discovered; and intelligence was received of his having murdered three British subjects in his service, on a false charge that one of them had corresponded with the Commander-in-Chief. It appeared imprudent to remove the army of the Commander-in-Chief from the field, till security was obtained against the projects of Holkar.

The determination, which hitherto had guided the conduct of the GovernorGeneral, that he would abstain from the dispute in the Holkar family respecting the succession to Tuckojee, still operated in his mind. And he authorized the Commander-in-Chief, to conclude an arrangement with Jeswunt Rao, engaging, on the part of the British government, to leave him in the unmolested exercise of his authority, provided he would engage to abstain from all aggression upon the British or their allies.

The Commander-in-Chief addressed a letter to Holkar, dated the 29th of Negotiations with Holkar. January, 1804, in conformity with the instructions which he had received; inviting him to send vakeels to the British camp for the purpose of effecting the amicable agreement which both parties professed to have in view; but requiring him, as a proof of his friendly intentions, to withdraw his army from its menacing position, and abstain from exactions upon the British allies. At the same time the British army advanced to Hindown, a position which at once commanded the principal roads into the Company's territory, and afforded an easy movement in any direction which the forces of Holkar might be found to pursue. On the 27th of February an answer from that chieftain arrived. It repeated the assurance of his desire to cultivate the friendship of the British government, and expressed his intention to withdraw from his present position, and send a vakeel to the British camp. In the mean time, however, letters were intercepted, addressed by Holkar to subjects and allies of the British go