PROCEEDINGS. the substance of the record which the Court is to examine, and state fairly and clearly and positively the facts which that record contains. There is no reason why the opposing attorney, if he has any fault to find with the statement of the appellant, or plaintiff in error's statement, should not point out exactly what the mistakes are. There is no reason why abstracts should not correctly represent the record as to all the facts. But what is the use of urging facts before a Court which says we will not consider the facts, they are all settled? We accept the verdict of the jury as conclusive. You may urge mistakes as much as you please, the facts are settled. The consequence is in some cases at least, cases are decided in our Supreme Court without reference to the facts in the record. There is no foundation for the law excepting in the facts, it is to facts that the law applies. Settle the facts, determine the facts, the application of the law is easy. There is another fault, I do not say it belongs to our Supreme Court or to the Courts of this State, but I do say it about all Courts of today, and that is, that there is too much anxiety to find a precedent. There is little left, in the way that the business of our Courts is conducted, for the judgment, the efficient, good, sound, common sense of a judge or a Court. The first thing, in my judgment, which a judge ought to do is, upon the record and the facts, to come to a conclusion for himself, that is, as to what the rights of the parties are; consult his own judgment if he has any and if he has not he is not fit to be a judge-form an opinion upon his general understanding of what the law and the rights of the parties are from the record in the case. You may say that this would lead to confusion. Leave it right there and it would. There is such a thing as the overruling of an individual opinion by a concurrence of authority and a judge may be compelled by authority which he respects to reverse his individual opinion. It is PROCEEDINGS. only so, however, in cases where the concurrence of opinion of judges and Courts establishes a rule of property an interference with which would produce confusion in titles. An overruling of an erroneous opinion, which is simply a decision of a Court as between two parties affecting nobody else in the world, is a matter of no consequence. The right between the parties is the thing that Courts are made to establish, and nine-tenths, I might say ninety-nine hundredths of all the litigation that is in the Courts today is simply a controversy between two private citizens. determines their peculiar rights, and the judgment of the highest Court of last resort settles that controversy forever. The fact that it is settled as between those two individuals does not determine the rights of the parties who are not the parties to the record. The doctrine of Stare decisis is one most abused in the administration of the law. There are never two cases exactly alike; it is impossible that there should be. It We have entered upon an era of litigation; one-half at least of the cases that appear upon the dockets of our Courts today never should have been there. The best way to curb this tendency to strife and contention is a serious question, not only for the interests of litigants, but in the interest of others. I have not a particle of doubt that ten judges in Cook county could do all the business of the Courts of Cook county if the system of managing the business was reasonably sensible. I was advised some years ago by a member of the Chicago bar who had been to Europe,had been to England and visited the Courts-as to the methods of the nisi prius Courts in England. We have more judges in the State of Illinois than in the whole kingdom of Great Britain. The substance of their proceeding was this, and there is no reason why our Courts should not adopt it: A case is called; plaintiff's attorney is asked by the Court to state his case, and if he is fit to be an at PROCEEDINGS. torney he can state it. defendant's attorney is When he has stated his case the asked to state his case. Where they agree there is no issue to be tried. The points upon which they disagree are the only ones to be submitted to the jury or to the Court, as might be the case. Such a practice in the Courts of Illinois would save nine-tenths of the time which they expend foolishly, uselessly. There is need of judicial reformation. I am too old to contribute to it, indeed I am nearly out of the profession, but to the young men of this Association this necessity for reformation is committed as a legacy of which they must take the burden. (Applause). PRESIDENT HOLDOM: Are there any further remarks? If not, the report will be accepted and placed on file. The question now recurs upon the resolution offered by Mr. Gregory and accepted by Mr. Moses in substitution for the one offered by him. Are you ready for the question? The question was called for, a vote was taken and the resolution adopted. PRESIDENT HOLDOM: The next on the program is an address by Mr. John H. S. Lee. He has exercised, since accepting the invitation to speak, the ladies' privilege of changing his mind. In place of "The Right of Privacy," his paper will be on this subject, which is a little more up-todate, "Is a parent liable at Common Law on a charge of manslaughter for negligently omitting to furnish medical attendance for his child of tender years, when the failure so to do is caused by religious disbelief of the parent in the efficacy of medicine?" Mr. Lee, will you kindly come this The gentleman principally affected by this is not way? present. (The address will be found in Part II.) PRESIDENT HOLDOM: The next matter to come before PROCEEDINGS. the Association is an address on "Primitive Justice in Illinois," by Mr. J. N. Perrin. (The address will be found in Part II.) GEN. ORENDORFF: I move you, sir, that a vote of thanks. be tendered to Mr. Perrin for his very interesting address, and that a copy be solicited for publication in the proceedings of this meeting. The motion was seconded and carried. MR. GREGORY: I make a motion that the thanks of the Association be tendered to Mr. Tenney and to Mr. Lee, and that copies of their papers be respectfully requested for publication. The motion was seconded and carried. PRESIDENT HOLDOM: The next is the report of Mr. Moses on "John Marshall" Day. Report presented as follows: To the Officers of the Illinois State Bar Association: The undersigned, who has heretofore acted as Chairman of the Associated Committees of Illinois on "John Marshall Day," begs leave to report that the celebration of the day took place in all parts of the United States. The method of the celebration was by the cessasion of general judicial business in all the Courts, both Federal and State. Centennial services were held through the agency of the various Bar Associations, and where there were no Bar Associations, through the agency of the Bar aided by the Courts and the Universities. In three of the States the Day was a legal holiday, by proclamation of the Governors of Kansas, Oregon and Idaho. Imposing ceremonies were held in the City of Washington in the Hall of the House of Representatives, in the presence of the members of the Supreme Court, and of the President of the United States, who had recognized "John Marshall Day" in his December message, 1900. Proceedings in the State of Illinois were of a manifold character. Accompanying this report, your Chairman presents complete proceedings held in the Courts of Cook County, both Federal and State; also the proceedings of the Day at the Auditorium, and of the banquet in the evening of February fourth. The Auditorium held an audience PROCEEDINGS. of over 3,000, and more than four hundred guests graced the tables at the banquet. The entire local celebration was of a high and ennobling character. The various law schools and principal public schools, as well as some of the universities, gave their aid to the celebration. The centennial proceedings at the capital of the State took place before the Supreme Court on February fifth, this being the first day in the February term, and Senator William Lindsay, of Kentucky, delivered the centennial oration in the presence of an audience largely made up of members of the General Assembly and citizens. Although no official advice has reached the Committee of other celebrations in the State, various centennial services were held at Champaign, in the University of Illinois, and at Bloomington, in the Wesleyan University. Commemora tive services were also held at Effingham. It appears from clippings, which have been preserved by your Chairman, that services were held in other places of this State, but the particulars have not been transmitted to him. Considerable of literature bearing on the John Marshall celebration, has already been published, and is being published every day to date. In addition to the pamphlet now presented. containing the centennial oratious of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. and of Senator William Lindsay, and other addresses made in the Courts, and at banquets, the following pamphlet addresses have reached the undersigned: President Andrew S. Draper, University of Illinois, Champaign, Ill., delivered before the University Convocation. Hon. John A. Shauck, of Columbus, O., delivered at Columbus. Hon. Richard Olney, Boston, Mass., delivered before Boston Bar Association. Hon. Wm. Lindsay, U. S. Senator, Washington, D. C., delivered before Supreme Court of Illinois. tion. Hon. Charles H. Simonton, Charleston, S. C., at Columbia, S. C. Hon. J. P. Blair, New Orleans, La., before Louisiana Bar Associa Hon. William Pinkney Whyte, Baltimore, Md. Hon. Charles J. Bonaparte, Baltimore, Md. Prof. James Bradley Thayer, Cambridge, Mass., before Harvard Law School. Hon. Fredk. W. Lehmann, St. Louis, Mo., delivered at Des Moines, Iowa. Hon. John N. Baldwin, Omaha, Neb., delivered before Iowa State University and Iowa State Bar Association, at Iowa City, Iowa. |