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in deciding the case. That is, the rule of practice prescribed by the Supreme Court which requires a clear and concise statement of the facts by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, or the appellant; and so far as my observation is concerned, it seems to me that the weakest part of such arguments as I have read and heard by the bar of Illinois, consists in the statement of the case. Of course we are all familiar with the trite statement that a case well stated is half argued. Now this rule of the Supreme Court requires that the plaintiff make the statement, and if the defendant in error or the appellee does not agree with the statement he shall state the contrary, and the statement made by plaintiff's counsel will be the only one regarded unless it is corrected. Well, of course, in many cases the very fact of the absence of the correction in statement will mislead the Supreme Court in making the decision and deciding the case upon the statement of respective counsel, because it ought to be apparent enough that the parties themselves will properly place themselves upon record.

Now it seems to me the rule might be amended with profit, requiring first that the plaintiff in error state upon the record the uncontroverted facts as he understands them; if that is thoroughly done the Court would then be in possession of a certain portion of the case, of facts undisputed. Then the rule ought to provide that the counsel for plaintiff in error state what he understands to be the contested propositions of fact and then the legal propositions which he believes apply to those propositions in the statement. I believe if that one rule were enforced and observed by the bar there would seldom be necessity for the numerous petitions for rehearing based upon the proposition that there is a glaring misstatement of fact. There are many

cases, very many cases,-several have come under my close observation, where the statement of facts given in the opinion of the Supreme Court is wholly at variance often

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times with facts which are not in controversy between counsel before that time. I do not know, as a practical proposition, how the Bar Association is going to do more than to request the Supreme Court in reference to the manner in which they shall dispose of the business. It is practically impossible, I suppose, that every member shall examine carefully every record, but until such a time as we can reach the Supreme Court, practically speaking, my suggestion is that the bar observe that most important opportunity in aiding the Supreme Court.

MR. MOSES: If the premises are admitted which are recited in this report and in a report which was made some years ago, there is hardly any room for discussion; the bare statement of the grievance is sufficient. I therefore move that the Secretary of the Association be instructed to file with the Supreme Court a copy of that report:

MR. PENCE: I have no desire to criticise the Supreme Court of our State, on the whole I think their decisions are just as good as the decisions of other courts in other states in the Union, and even as the decisions-it may be heresy to say so of the Supreme Court of the United States, for I do think the Supreme Court of the United States can, when they try hard, hand down as bad a decision as any court in the country, and I think they frequently do. The Court undoubtedly does its best.

There is just one fact to which I would like to call attention. I think the bar are unanimous, that the Court ought to sit together during eight or nine months of the year at one place, and that is the reason I think, chiefly, why the Court was consolidated, that they should not call through their docket in three or four weeks and again adjourn, that they should do as is done in most of the Courts of this country, call say twenty cases, hear oral arguments in nearly all the cases, encourage oral arguments, and then

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decide those cases and write the opinions and file them, and again go on with the call of the docket.

There is little use in arguing a case orally which is to be postponed until long afterwards, and moreover, it is impossible for the Judges in their method of doing business to decide justly a case which may be argued orally before them without also reading at the same time the briefs of counsel. They do not tell us that they read the briefs of counsel when a case is argued orally, but that they will determine the case before they separate; but those cases not argued are referred to the various judges and they write their opinions and have them printed and send them around. I think that before a case is finally decided every Judge ought to be expected to read the record and the briefs and then to decide the case, whether it is after the opinion is written or before. At least there ought to be deliberate judgment of every member of the Court upon the case. I think that more could be done if they would call say, but twenty cases at a time at one session, adjourn and write up their opinions and file them in those cases, and then go on again, and stay together practically, for eight or nine months of the year. They would have opportunities for consultation on difficult questions, opportunities of criticising each other when opinions are brought in.

While the Supreme Court of Illinois may not intend to create the impression that oral arguments are not desired, the method of doing business discourages that. The lawyers appreciate that and understand it, and hence I say that many of the Courts, for instance the Court of Appeals of this District, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and of Minnesota, I know, require in every case that the case should be argued orally. With few exceptions indeed the cases are argued orally, and they ask questions, and they have the confidence of the lawyers, as it were, and they arrive at the controverted facts by oral argument.

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To my mind the chief objection which ought to be cured by our Supreme Court is that the judges should reside at the Capital, or wherever the Court is held, for at least eight or nine months in the year, call their cases a few at a time and decide them before they call any other cases, then they can recollect the arguments, the briefs are filed, and there is opportunity for consultation. The Supreme Court of the United States does that way; the Court of Appeals of New York does the same way. I know the Supreme Court of Wisconsin and Minnesota, where I have had some experience, do that way, and the Courts are very satisfactory. ever has been before those Courts knows that their methods are very satisfactory to the bar. This is the only criticism that I desire to make on our Court. I think they ought to remain together and afford opportunity for oral argument.

Who

MR. GREGORY: I do not desire to enter upon any discussion of the question. Of course it is not for this Association to attempt to dictate to the Supreme Court of the State. That body has its responsibilities and its duties and must meet them in accordance with its own appreciation of them and in view of what it may deem the public interest requires. I think, however, it would be proper for the Association to go upon record as expressing the opinion of its members upon this question, and I have no doubt such an expression would receive due consideration by the Court. There are some practical difficulties which I will not stop now to discuss, which present themselves no doubt very strongly to the minds of the members of the Court. I have drawn a resolution which, if it meets with Mr. Moses' approval, I will offer in substitution of his motion; it is as follows:

Resolved, By the members of the Illinois State Bar Association, that it is highly desirable that the Supreme Court of Illinois shall, so soon as practicable, adopt the methods followed by the Supreme Court of the United States as to the call of its docket and the hearing and disposition of cases, and that the Secretary of the Association be in

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structed to transmit to the members of the Court, a printed copy of the report of the Committee on Judicial Administration.

MR. MOSES: That is satisfactory.

PRESIDENT HOLDOM: That is satisfactory, Mr. Moses, to have that substituted for yours?

PRESIDENT HOLDOM: Mr. Jewett, a member of the bar for many years, is with us; I have no doubt he has some ideas that we would like to hear and which will interest us. MR. JEWETT: Mr. President: It is true that I am an old member of the Chicago bar,-getting to be pretty old. I have seen the courts of Cook county raised from two judges to about thirty, the Supreme Court from three judges to seven. I have perhaps had as much personal controversy with the Supreme Court and with other Courts as any member of this body. On some occasions it has been said that I have been impudent to the Courts, at least impertinent. Now the Courts as such, have always had from me the greatest reverence. I have not always been able to agree with the opinions of the Judges, and those opinions, as public property, I have seen fit sometimes to criticise. It is not strange, perhaps, that with my years of experience as a member of the bar I should have found occasion to find fault with the methods which the Courts pursue. I know, I do not need to be told, that the methods in many respects are bad. There is no reason, in my judgment, why a nisi prius Court should sit for two days or three days or a week in trying a little suit for ten dollars. There is no reason

why the Supreme Court of this State should not examine the records that are before it and decide the questions upon the facts as well as on what they may conceive to be the law. Jump the facts and what have you got? There is no reason why a lawyer, if he is deserving of the name, should not state to the Supreme Court in the record, in his brief,