found. It was not contended by Mr. Kelly, in resisting the rule, that the recognizances ought to be discharged. He did not carry his argument to that extent, but he contended that it ought not to be enforced, and should remain in Court to have whatever effect it might by law. Indeed, the case of The King v. Teal is an authority against the argument, that the recognizance ought to be discharged. In that case, the application was, that on payment of the whole amount of the recognizance, (of 40%.), the recognizance should be discharged. Therefore, the bail proposed to pay to the whole amount of the recognizance, and the motion was to discharge it on that payment; but it was refused, as there was an ulterior liability on the recognizance for the costs. For that reason, it is not here contended that this recognizance ought to be discharged. When it is said that it shall remain for such purposes as by law it may be available for, it is difficult to see in what way it can be put in force, except in the way it was in the case of The King v. Teal, and that is to make the parties responsible for the costs. However, the decision of the present case does not rest there; because I have been furnished with another case, which certainly came before some Court, though I cannot learn whether it was this or the full Court. I have got the rule nisi, the affidavits, the names of the counsel in the case, and the form of the rule which was granted. The rule nisi called on the sureties to shew cause why the recognizance should not be estreated. The case came on for argument, and the rule absolute that was granted was in these Thos. Meaning and Thos. How, the bail for the defendants 1839. THE KING v. BEZANT. 1839. THE KING v. BEZANT. in this prosecution do pay to the prosecutors or their attorney, on or before the record day of next Term, the sum of 201. a-piece, being the amount of the recognizance in this prosecution, the rule made this Term that they should show cause why their recognizances should not be estreated into the Exchequer to be discharged. And it is further ordered, that if such several sums of 201. be not paid on or before the 2nd day of next Term, then the said recognizances of the said bail (or of such of them as shall not have so paid the said sum of 201.), shall be estreated into the Exchequer. Mr. Wightman for the plaintiff. By the Court (a)." That appears undoubtedly to have been done, on an affidavit of facts similar to the present. The same objection was raised as in the present case, for I have the affidavit which was used by the sureties. The defendant had taken his trial and had abided by the judgment of the Court, and had suffered the sentence. Therefore, in that case also, as in the present, all that the recognizance in terms required was done, and yet the Court ordered that the recognizances should be estreated, unless the money was paid. The case, therefore, which was that of The King v. Tomkins, is not distinguishable from the present, and is no doubt an authority, as I have all the original documents. I have also been furnished by Mr. Robinson, of the Crown office, with a manuscript of the late Mr. Dealtry (a) Copy of Mr. Robinson's note. "Defendant having removed indictments from sessions, and being convicted, the prosecutor, after final judgment, obtained a side bar rule to get his costs upon it, under the statute, and on affidavit of demand and non-pay ment, an attachment went against the defendant; and on the same day prosecutor obtained a rule nisi to estreat the recognizances of defendant's bail. The rule was made absolute for the bail to pay 201., otherwise their recognizances to be estreated." of that office, of a case of The King v. Chamberlayne (a), which occurred in Hilary Term, in the 26 Geo. 3, where the recognizances were respited on the sureties undertaking to pay the costs. In that case, therefore, there was an express direction that the rccognizances should be estreated, unless the sureties paid the prosecutor's costs. In the case of The King v. Creevey (b) also, which is a material case on another point, it is well known that the sureties did pay the costs of that prosecution. Therefore, as this has been the form of recognizance which has always been used, and this has also been the practice which has been observed in such cases, and as moreover it cannot be contended that this recognizance ought to be discharged, I cannot understand for what purpose it can remain in Court, unless for the purpose that the sureties should be responsible for the costs. This rule must consequently be made absolute. Rule absolute. the recognizance of the defend- Mr. Bearcroft for the defendant. Mr. Dealtry's мs. note. Rule nisi. (b) 1 M. & Selw. 273. 1839. THE KING บ. BEZANT. 1839. sons interested in copyhold property, are entitled to inspect the rolls of the manor, without the others joining in the application. The demand to inspect the rolls cannot be Ex parte HUTT, Any of the per- CARRINGTON moved for a mandamus to be directed to the steward of the manor of Northleigh, Oxfordshire, requiring him to admit the applicant Hutt to inspect the court rolls of the manor. Several persons were interested in the property of which the rolls in question were the title. The applicant Hutt was one of these persons. When he applied to the steward for leave to inspest the rolls, the latter refused to allow the inspection, on the ground that the application was not made, at the instance of all the parties interested jointly. This could, however, be no ground of objection, as the party applying was interested in the property. This inspection of the rolls did not prevent the other persons interested in the property from also inspecting them. Pursuant to 1 Reg. Gen. H. T., 2 Wm. 4, s. 102(a), the tenant was entitled to his rule absolute in the first instance. made by the agent of a person authorized by warrant of attorney to make the demand, on behalf of the tenant, although the agent's authority is in writing, so as to obtain a mandamus in case of refusal. COLERIDGE, J.-You may take your rule absolute. Rule granted. Carrington, on a subsequent day, stated, that a difficulty had arisen, on further examination of the affidavits supporting the rule; for it appeared that the demand to inspect the court rolls had not been made by Hutt himself, but by a person who was acting pursuant to a written authority given by the person, who had a power of attorney from Hutt, to make the demand. The question was, whether this was a sufficient demand to entitle Hutt to his writ of mandamus? COLERIDGE, J.-I think that delegated authority is not sufficient. Rule refused. (a) Ante, Vol 1, p. 197. 1839. LISTER V. VENTOM. It HUMFREY shewed cause against a rule, obtained Issue joined in on the 10th of of January, judg a country cause Bramwell, in support of the rule, submitted that the application was not too soon; as the issue having been joined on the day before Hilary Term, it must be considered as having been joined as of Hilary Term. He cited Apperley v. Morse (a), where it was held, that issue being joined in a country cause in Michalmas Term, and no notice of trial given, it is not too early to move for judgment as in case of a nonsuit in the following Easter Term. COLERIDGE, J.-I think the application was not too early. Rule discharged on a peremptory undertaking. (a) Ante, Vol. 6, p. 505. ROWE V. SAWYER. ment as in case A Wight r: Graham, 5. Exch: 132. BUTT shewed cause against a rule nisi, obtained by James, for an attachment for non-payment of money pursuant to an award. He was aware of the case of Macarthur v. Campbell (a), where it was held that on a motion for an attachment for not performing an award, the Court will not discuss objections to the award, not apparent on the face of it; in the present instance, however, by (a) 2 A. & E. 52; 4 Nev. & M. 208. |