have been held to apply only to penal statutes then in force, and the 4th section is similar in terms. The 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 3, gives the plea of the general issue to the tenant himself, but the following section does not give it to the party assisting in the removal, from which it may be reasonably inferred that it was intended that he should not avail himself of it. Besides, it is questionable, whether not guilty was a good plea even before the New Rules. Coppin v. Carter (a), Faulkner v. Chevell (b). [Lord Abinger, C. B.-It is too late for that objection after verdict.] Cur. adv. vult. Lord ABINGER, C. B., on a subsequent day said, The question in this case was, whether the plea of the general issue was a proper plea to a penal action to recover the double value of goods which had been removed to avoid a distress. We are of opinion that it was, and that the 4th section of the 21 Jac. 1, c. 4, applies to cases arising upon subsequent statutes. The New Rules, therefore, do not affect the plea. PARKE, B.-The case of Earl Spencer v. Swannell was mentioned as in effect deciding the point. We are satisfied that the 4th section of the 21 Jac. 1, c. 4, applies to subsequent statutes. I agree that there should be no rule. 1839. JONES v. WILLIAMS. Rule refused. (a) 1 T. R. 462. (b) 5 A. & E. 213. 1839. for a writ of habeas corpus In re CANADIAN PRISONERS. An application ROEBUCK moved for writs of habeas corpus to be directed to the gaoler of Liverpool gaol, to bring up the bodies of several persons sent from Canada and, as was party himself, alleged, illegally detained in his custody. must be supported by the affidavit of the unless it ap pears frem the circumstances that it cannot be obtained Lord ABINGER, C. B., inquired whether the application was made on the affidavits of the prisoners themselves? Roebuck submitted that it was not requisite, and referred to the case of the Hottentot Venus (a). Lord ABINGER, C. B.-There the party was supposed to be under coercion. You must either obtain an affidavit from the party, or shew circumstances from which the Court may see that it cannot be procured. (a) 13 East, 195. HODSON V. PAMEL. A plea bearing IN this case the defendant had obtained further time to date on a differ- it is delivered, is plead, which expired on the 1st November; on the morning of the 2d, before the opening of the office, the defendant's attorney delivered a plea dated the 1st. Upon this the plaintiff signed judgment. A rule having been obtained, by Chandless, to set aside the judgment, Humfrey shewed cause.-The question depends upon whether or not the delivery of a plea, so dated, was a nullity or merely an irregularity. The first rule of H. T., 4 Wm. 4, (Pleading Rules, s. 1,) requires " that every pleading shall be entitled of the day of the month and year when the same was pleaded, and shall bear no other time or date." This rule was made under the provisions of 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 42, s. 1, and has the force of an act of parliament, it therefore seems, that the plea is not merely irregular but an absolute nullity. Where a plea is required to be signed by counsel, if it is not so signed, it may be treated as a nullity; Samuels v. Dunne (a). So, if the defendant, after craving oyer of a deed, does not set forth the whole deed, the plaintiff may sign judgment as for want of a plea; Wallace v. Duchess of Cumberland (b). If a plea filed before bail is perfected, it is a nullity, and it does not become a good plea by perfecting bail afterwards; Venn v. Calvert (c). In Newnham v. Hanny (d) there was a similar objection to a declaration, but that case was decided on the ground that the defendant himself had treated it as an irregularity only. Chandless contrâ, was stopped by the Court. Lord ABINGER, C. B.-This is merely an irregularity; suppose a plea had been stated the 5th by mistake for the 6th, might not the party shew that it was a mistake? PARKE, B.-There is no express decision on the point, and the most convenient course is certainly to construe this as an irregularity only. ALDERSON, B.-All writs are required to bear date on the day when they issued, but if they are tested on a different day these are treated as irregular only, and not void. Here the plea is right upon the face of it, and the wrong date is in the nature of a mistake. Where a plea, (a) 3 Taunt. 386. (b) 4 T. R. 370. VOL. VII. (c) 4 T. R. 578. D. P. C. 1839. HODSON v. PAMEL. which ought to be signed by Counsel, is not so signed, it the face of it. 1839. is HODSON wrong upon v. Rule absolute. PAMEL. BOYDELL v. JONES. The declaration THE declaration stated, that whereas the plaintiff for a stated that be time of the com attorney of Q. B., and that certain orders had been made by one of the judges for setting aside, with costs, certain proceedings in an action in which the now defend fore, and at the long time before, and at the time of the committing of the mitting of the grievances by the defendant as hereinafter mentioned, grievances, the plaintiff was an resided, and still does reside, in Devonshire Street, Queen Square, London, and had been, and was, and still is, an attorney of the Court of our Lady the Queen before the Queen herself, and had used, exercised, and carried on the profession and business of an attorney at law with great credit and reputation; and whereas before the time of the committing of the grievances by the defendant as hereinafter mentioned, certain orders had been made by one of the Judges of the said Court of our Lady the Queen before the Queen herself, for setting aside, with costs, certain proceedings in a certain action then pending in the said last-mentioned Court, in which action the now defendant; that defendant was the attorney of the then plaintiff, and the now plaintiff was the attorney of the then defendant; and before the time of the committing of the grievances by the now defendant as hereinafter mentioned, the said costs is, disreputable had been, and were ascertained and taxed by one of the practice; yet the Masters of the said Court; and whereas before and at the triving to injure time of the committing of the grievances by the now dethe plaintiff in fendant as hereinafter mentioned, "sharp practice" in the his profession ant was the attorney of the then plaintiff, and the now plaintiff was the attorney of the then the said costs had been taxed by one of the Masters; that "sharp prac tice" was, and defendant con of an attorney, profession of an attorney was and is, and was and is con and to cause it to be believed that the plaintiff had been guilty of" sharp practice,” and had been reprimanded by the Master for such practice, published a certain ironical libel, that is to say, "An honest lawyer, (meaning to represent that he was not an honest lawyer,) a person of the name of C. B., an attorney, (meaning the plaintiff,) was severely reprimanded by one of the Masters for what is called "sharp practice" in his profession. Held, that it was sufficient to allege that the defendant ironically called the plaintiff “ An honest lawyer," and that a prefatory averment was not necessary. It is libellous to impute to an attorney "sharp practice" in his profession. sidered to be and import, disreputable practice, and practice discreditable to the attorney adopting or pursuing the same; whereof the now defendant then had notice: yet the now defendant, well knowing the premises, but continuing and falsely and maliciously intending to injure the now plaintiff in his good name, fame, and credit, and also in his said profession and business of an attorney at law, and to cause it to be suspected and believed that the now plaintiff had been guilty of such "sharp practice" as aforesaid in the said action; and that he, the now plaintiff, had been reprimanded by the said Master for such practice as aforesaid in the said action, &c., heretofore, to wit, on, &c., wrongfully, maliciously, and injuriously composed and published a certain ironical, false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel of and concerning the now plaintiff, and of and concerning him in the way of and in respect to his said profession and business of an attorney at law, and of and concerning the said action, and of and concerning the practice of the now plaintiff as such attorney with respect to the aforesaid orders, then wrongfully supposed by the now defendant to be such "sharp practice" as aforesaid, and of and concerning the said Master, containing therein the ironical, false, &c., matter following of and concerning the now plaintiff, &c. &c., (that is to say), "An honest lawyer, (thereby meaning the now plaintiff and intending to represent that he was not an honest. lawyer), a person of the name of Charles Boydell, (meaning the now plaintiff,) an attorney in Devonshire Street, Queen Square, was severely reprimanded by one of the Masters of the Queen's Bench (meaning the aforesaid Master) the other day, for what is called 'sharp practice' in his profession," meaning and alluding to the now plaintiff's practice with respect to the aforesaid orders in the said action, and that such practice had been and was "sharp practice" as aforesaid). By means of which, &c. The defendant pleaded, first, not guilty; secondly, a justification; thirdly, as to the composing and publishing the 1839. BOYDELL v. JONES. |